Skip to content

AppArmor bug bounty programs

apparmor.net Updated

AppArmor runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
1
1 pays cash
Targets in scope
13
2 types
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

The one public program AppArmor runs.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

13 targets. 5 excluded.

  • https://apparmor.net

    Web

  • AppArmor publishes three private intake channels and asks that none of them be public: a GitLab issue marked confidential, which is the preferred route, a Launchpad bug set to Private Security, or the security address that forwards to the team rather than to a public list. No part of the userspace tree is carved out

    Products and areas

  • Mediation rules as the userspace expresses them, covering mount, pivot_root, unix socket, network, ptrace, signal and dbus

    Products and areas

  • Profile abstractions and the include mechanism, along with the abstractions shipped by the project

    Products and areas

  • Profile transitions in full: exec transitions, hats, profile stacking and the fallbacks to unconfined

    Products and areas

  • The compiled policy cache, its invalidation logic and the files written under the cache directory

    Products and areas

  • The D-Bus mediation path and the bus name, path and interface matching behind it

    Products and areas

  • The libapparmor library, including its log parsing and its change_hat and change_profile interfaces

    Products and areas

  • The policy compiler (apparmor_parser) end to end, from profile text through to the policy loaded into the kernel

    Products and areas

  • The profile generation paths that snapd, LXD and container tooling build on top of

    Products and areas

  • The profile language itself: variables, globbing, path rules, aliases, rule precedence and the deny semantics

    Products and areas

  • The profiles shipped by the project for common daemons

    Products and areas

  • The utilities: aa-genprof, aa-logprof, aa-complain, aa-enforce and aa-status, plus the Python and Perl code behind them

    Products and areas

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 5

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • A permissive profile an administrator or a distribution wrote deliberately

  • Applications running unconfined because no profile exists for them, which is a packaging decision rather than an AppArmor defect

  • Confinement policy authored by LXD, Incus or snapd rather than AppArmor's enforcement of it

  • Distribution-specific profile sets rather than the profiles in the upstream tree

  • The in-kernel AppArmor LSM, which belongs to the Linux kernel security process

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every AppArmor program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in AppArmor products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • CVE-2017-6507 Medium

    An issue was discovered in AppArmor before 2.12. Incorrect handling of unknown AppArmor profiles in AppArmor init scripts, upstart jobs, and/or systemd unit files allows an attacker to possibly have increased attack surfaces of processes that were intended to be confined by AppArmor. This is due to the common logic to handle 'restart' operations removing AppArmor profiles that aren't found in the

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under apparmor.net: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.