- Top reward
- $300,000
- Top severity paid
- Not published
- Assets in scope
- 9
- Public CVEs
- 1,641
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays up to $300,000
- top reward.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
Sorona does not publish a reward table for this program.
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
9 assets you may test, 6 excluded.
Web 1
- https://webkit.org
Products and areas 8
- Apple's declaration is outcome-based: the Security Bounty covers research across all Apple products and public-facing services, and the WebContent process on a shipping Apple device is WebKit. A bug anywhere in the github.com/WebKit/WebKit tree that Safari reaches on a shipped platform is covered. Apple pays for the effect on the platform rather than for the commit
- Graphics and media: WebGL and WebGPU, canvas, the media pipeline, image decoders and font handling, including the copies bundled inside the tree
- JavaScriptCore, in the same repository under Source/JavaScriptCore and covered by the same Apple programme. It is listed separately on this site because its reachable ceiling is different
- The loader and networking layer: URL parsing, resource loading, redirect handling, CORS, Content Security Policy, cookies and the cache, together with the security-origin checks the loader and the DOM both rely on
- The WebKit2 process architecture: the WebContent process sandbox, the multi-process IPC boundary, and the Networking and GPU process boundaries this tree defines
- The WebKit API surface Apple ships to app developers, WKWebView above all, which renders web content inside effectively every iOS app that shows a page
- The web platform features Safari ships: Service Workers, WebAssembly, IndexedDB and the other storage APIs, WebRTC, Web Crypto and Web Push
- WebCore in full: the DOM, CSS and layout, rendering and compositing, SVG, editing and selection, and the HTML and XML parsers
Out of scope (6)
- Apple Pay, non-public-facing Apple systems, and phishing or social engineering, all excluded by terms 5.1 to 5.3
- Bugs only reproducible in WebKitGTK, WPE or another downstream port. Igalia maintains those and nobody pays for them
- Issues in unshipped trunk code, since Apple pays for the effect on a platform it has shipped rather than for the state of the tree
- Reports without a captured Target Flag, which do not reach the stated reward even when the underlying bug is real
- Submissions barred on eligibility rather than on merit: sanctions screening applies, an 18-month bar runs on former Apple employees, and an award lapses if it is not accepted within a year of being offered
- Third-party services: "The Apple Security Bounty program does not extend to third-party services."
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz first.
-
The bug has to affect a shipping Apple platform
-
Capture the Target Flag.
-
Tell nobody but Apple until Apple has shipped the software update and published the advisory
-
Sanctions screening applies, an 18-month bar runs on former Apple employees, and an award has to be accepted within a year of being offered
Not accepted
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Apple Pay, non-public-facing Apple systems, and phishing or social engineering
-
Third-party services
-
Bugs only reproducible in WebKitGTK, WPE or another downstream port
-
Issues in unshipped trunk code
-
Reports without a captured Target Flag
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 50 minutes ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2020-9948 | A type confusion issue was addressed with improved memory handling. This issue is fixed in Safari 14.0. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. | High 8.8 | 16 Oct 2020 |
| CVE-2020-9951 | A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory management. This issue is fixed in Safari 14.0. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to arbitrary code execution. | High 8.8 | 16 Oct 2020 |
| CVE-2020-9952 | An input validation issue was addressed with improved input validation. This issue is fixed in iOS 14.0 and iPadOS 14.0, tvOS 14.0, watchOS 7.0, Safari 14.0, iCloud for Windows 11.4, iCloud for Windows 7.21. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to a cross site scripting attack. | High 7.1 | 16 Oct 2020 |
| CVE-2018-4209 | In iOS before 11.3, Safari before 11.1, iCloud for Windows before 7.4, tvOS before 11.3, watchOS before 4.3, iTunes before 12.7.4 for Windows, unexpected interaction causes an ASSERT failure. This issue was addressed with improved checks. | High 8.8 | 11 Jan 2019 |
| CVE-2018-12294 | WebCore/platform/graphics/texmap/TextureMapperLayer.cpp in WebKit, as used in WebKitGTK+ prior to version 2.20.2, is vulnerable to a use after free for a WebCore::TextureMapperLayer object. | High 8.8 | 19 Jun 2018 |
| CVE-2016-9643 | The regex code in Webkit 2.4.11 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) as demonstrated in a large number of ($ (open parenthesis and dollar) followed by {-2,16} and a large number of +) (plus close parenthesis). | High 7.5 | 7 Mar 2017 |
| CVE-2016-9642 | JavaScriptCore in WebKit allows attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap read) via a crafted Javascript file. | Medium 5.5 | 3 Feb 2017 |
| CVE-2010-1766 | Off-by-one error in the WebSocketHandshake::readServerHandshake function in websockets/WebSocketHandshake.cpp in WebCore in WebKit before r56380, as used in Qt and other products, allows remote websockets servers to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact via an upgrade header that is long and invalid. | High 7.5 | 22 Jul 2010 |
| CVE-2009-3933 | WebKit before r50173, as used in Google Chrome before 3.0.195.32, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a web page that calls the JavaScript setInterval method, which triggers an incompatibility between the WTF::currentTime and base::Time functions. | Medium 5.0 | 12 Nov 2009 |
| CVE-2008-6059 | xml/XMLHttpRequest.cpp in WebCore in WebKit before r38566 does not properly restrict access from web pages to the (1) Set-Cookie and (2) Set-Cookie2 HTTP response headers, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from cookies via XMLHttpRequest calls, related to the HTTPOnly protection mechanism. | Medium 5.0 | 5 Feb 2009 |
| CVE-2008-1590 | JavaScriptCore in WebKit on Apple iPhone before 2.0 and iPod touch before 2.0 does not properly perform runtime garbage collection, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (application crash) via unspecified vectors that trigger memory corruption, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-2317. | Medium 6.8 | 14 Jul 2008 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Browser attack, WebContent sandbox escape (highest row reachable from the WebKit tree; the $1,000,000 Kernel row needs a bug outside it) │ $300,000 │ $301,000 Browser attack, Web Content code execution (what most WebKit reports are) │ $10,000 │ $11,000 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 111 Last 12 months 1,641 Lifetime Memory safety 58 % Code execution 16 % Info disclosure 12 % XSS 7 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview WebKit is Safari, and Safari is the WebContent process on roughly two billion active Apple devices. It is also WKWebView, which renders in-app web content inside effectively every iOS app that shows a page, and until the EU DMA engine-choice carve-out it was the only engine permitted on iOS at all, which is why Chrome, Firefox and Edge on an iPhone were, and mostly still are, WebKit shells. Outside Apple, WebKitGTK is the engine of GNOME Web and WPE WebKit dominates set-top boxes, smart TVs and digital signage, and the PlayStation and Switch browsers are WebKit derivatives. A parsing bug in this tree is a phone bug, a television bug and a console bug at once. Apple pays for it through its own Security Bounty rather than through a platform, and the scope is outcome-based: Apple pays for the bug's effect on a shipping Apple platform, not for the commit. The highest row a WebKit finding can reach on its own is a WebContent sandbox escape at $300,000; plain code execution inside WebContent, which is what most reports here are, pays $10,000, and the $1,000,000 kernel row requires a bug outside this tree entirely. sorona.xyz adds 1.25× on top of whatever Apple awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. In scope Apple's declaration is outcome-based: the Security Bounty covers research across all Apple products and public-facing services, and the WebContent process on a shipping Apple device is WebKit. A bug anywhere in the github.com/WebKit/WebKit tree that Safari reaches on a shipped platform is covered. Apple pays for the effect on the platform rather than for the commit WebCore in full: the DOM, CSS and layout, rendering and compositing, SVG, editing and selection, and the HTML and XML parsers The loader and networking layer: URL parsing, resource loading, redirect handling, CORS, Content Security Policy, cookies and the cache, together with the security-origin checks the loader and the DOM both rely on The WebKit2 process architecture: the WebContent process sandbox, the multi-process IPC boundary, and the Networking and GPU process boundaries this tree defines Graphics and media: WebGL and WebGPU, canvas, the media pipeline, image decoders and font handling, including the copies bundled inside the tree The web platform features Safari ships: Service Workers, WebAssembly, IndexedDB and the other storage APIs, WebRTC, Web Crypto and Web Push The WebKit API surface Apple ships to app developers, WKWebView above all, which renders web content inside effectively every iOS app that shows a page JavaScriptCore, in the same repository under Source/JavaScriptCore and covered by the same Apple programme. It is listed separately on this site because its reachable ceiling is different Out of scope Apple Pay, non-public-facing Apple systems, and phishing or social engineering, all excluded by terms 5.1 to 5.3 Third-party services: "The Apple Security Bounty program does not extend to third-party services." Bugs only reproducible in WebKitGTK, WPE or another downstream port. Igalia maintains those and nobody pays for them Issues in unshipped trunk code, since Apple pays for the effect on a platform it has shipped rather than for the state of the tree Reports without a captured Target Flag, which do not reach the stated reward even when the underlying bug is real Submissions barred on eligibility rather than on merit: sanctions screening applies, an 18-month bar runs on former Apple employees, and an award lapses if it is not accepted within a year of being offered Most-valued findings A WebContent sandbox escape: renderer code execution turned into privileged user-space control through WebKit's own IPC layer or its bundled sandbox profiles. This is the $300,000 row and the only one the WebKit tree can reach on its own. Memory corruption in WebCore driven purely by parsing attacker-controlled HTML, CSS or XML, the single largest slice of the engine's CVE history at 58% memory safety Image decoder, font and media-pipeline memory safety, because those parse untrusted bytes on any page load and are reachable without user interaction beyond navigation GPU-process compromise reached through WebGL or WebGPU, which crosses a boundary WebKit defines and is the natural neighbour of the sandbox-escape class Universal cross-site scripting and same-origin bypass in the DOM and the loader. It is a smaller slice of the history at 7%, and it breaks the web's own trust boundary rather than a process one Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. The bug has to affect a shipping Apple platform: a finding that only reproduces in WebKitGTK, WPE or another downstream port, or only in unshipped trunk code, earns nothing here Capture the Target Flag. Apple describes it as an objective confirmation of exploitability and it gates the stated reward, so a report without one does not reach the published figure Tell nobody but Apple until Apple has shipped the software update and published the advisory: that is an eligibility condition, not a courtesy Bonuses stack on the base award: 50% for an issue that only affects a beta, 100% for a Lockdown Mode bypass, 150% for both, and the whole award doubles again if you donate it to a qualifying cause Sanctions screening applies, an 18-month bar runs on former Apple employees, and an award has to be accepted within a year of being offered Disclosure Apple runs it end to end. The security advisory goes out with the OS release that carries the fix, with researcher credit, and nothing about the timetable is yours to set. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability