Apptainer bug bounty programs
apptainer.org Updated
Apptainer runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.
- Top reward
- $1,500
- Sorona
- Programs
- 1
- 1 pays cash
- Targets in scope
- 14
- 2 types
- Last change
- None yet
- Tracked since Nov 2026
Where to report
The one public program Apptainer runs.
| Program | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Top reward | Safe harbor | KYC | First response | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Apptainer
Sorona · Bug bounty |
– | – | – | $100 | $1,500 | Partial | – | – | Open |
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- Critical
- –
- High
- –
- Medium
- –
- Low
- $100
- Safe harbor
- Partial
Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.
What is in scope
14 targets. 5 excluded.
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https://apptainer.org
Web
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FUSE-based image mounting as Apptainer invokes it, covering squashfuse, fuse2fs and gocryptfs
Products and areas
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GPU and device passthrough setup for NVIDIA and ROCm, including the host libraries bound into the container
Products and areas
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Image signature verification, key handling and the encrypted-image support
Products and areas
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Instance mode, its lifecycle and the sockets and state files behind it
Products and areas
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Network configuration through CNI plugins where the privileged path sets it up
Products and areas
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OCI and Docker image conversion, layer extraction and the caching of pulled layers
Products and areas
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Overlay and bind mount setup, including the underlay path and every mount performed before privilege is dropped
Products and areas
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SIF image format parsing in full: the header, the descriptor table and every data object inside a container file
Products and areas
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The build path, including builds from definition files, the %post script execution model and builds from Docker or OCI sources
Products and areas
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The published security policy asks for reports to the project security address and declares one boundary: attacker-controlled content inside a container image is not treated as a risk to the user who runs it, while privilege escalation arising from image content is a valid concern
Products and areas
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The setuid starter binary and the entire privileged startup path, including exactly where privilege is dropped
Products and areas
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The site configuration file and the enforcement of an administrator's bind path restrictions, allowed capabilities and limits
Products and areas
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The user namespace startup path and the id mapping it establishes
Products and areas
No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.
Out of scope 5
Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.
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Batch scheduler and cluster manager integration outside the Apptainer codebase
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Defects in a container's payload rather than in the runtime
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Kernel defects reachable from inside a container
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Malicious content inside a container image affecting the user who chose to run it, which the policy states is not treated as a vulnerability
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Site configuration that deliberately grants capabilities or wide bind paths
Recent changes
Reward and scope changes across every Apptainer program, newest first.
No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.
About this page
This page gathers every public program listed under apptainer.org: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.
Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.