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Kata Containers bug bounty programs

katacontainers.io Updated

Kata Containers runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
1
1 pays cash
Targets in scope
13
2 types
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

The one public program Kata Containers runs.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

13 targets. 5 excluded.

  • https://katacontainers.io

    Web

  • Attestation and confidential-containers paths where Kata implements them

    Products and areas

  • Both runtime implementations: the Go runtime and runtime-rs, including everything they build before a VM starts

    Products and areas

  • Integration with QEMU, Cloud Hypervisor and Firecracker as configured backends, covering the command lines and configuration Kata generates

    Products and areas

  • Pod and container annotations, which turn user-supplied Kubernetes metadata into runtime configuration on the host

    Products and areas

  • The agent policy engine and the checks it applies to requests arriving from the host side

    Products and areas

  • The CRI shim (containerd-shim-kata-v2) and the container lifecycle it manages

    Products and areas

  • The current SECURITY.md asks for private GitHub advisory reports against the Kata repository and routes them to a named Vulnerability Management Team. It sets no component boundary, so the runtime, the agent, the guest image and the hypervisor integrations are all inside it

    Products and areas

  • The Dragonball VMM in full, including its own virtio device implementations

    Products and areas

  • The guest image and initrd, the guest kernel configuration and the rootfs build pipeline

    Products and areas

  • The kata-agent inside the guest and the ttRPC channel the runtime drives it over

    Products and areas

  • The virtiofs data path, including how virtiofsd is invoked and every argument the runtime constructs for it

    Products and areas

  • Volume, device and block storage handling between host and guest, including direct-assigned block devices

    Products and areas

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 5

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • Cluster configuration that grants a workload privileges the runtime was never intended to contain

  • Defects inside QEMU, Cloud Hypervisor or Firecracker themselves, which run their own processes, unless Kata's configuration of them is what exposes the flaw

  • Guest kernel defects rather than Kata's guest kernel configuration

  • Issues already published as advisories on the repository

  • Kubernetes and containerd defects above the runtime boundary

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every Kata Containers program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in Kata Containers products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. Versions prior to 3.31.0 ship with a default configuration that allows pod creators to inject arbitrary command-line arguments into the virtiofsd process through the `io.katacontainers.config.hypervisor.virtio_fs_extra_args` pod annotation. By injectin

  • Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. From v3.4.0 to v3.28.0, an oversight in the CopyFile policy (and perhaps the CopyFile handler) allows untrusted hosts to write to arbitrary locations inside the guest workload image. This can be used to overwrite binaries inside the guest and exfiltrat

  • CVE-2026-24834 Critical

    Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. In versions prior to 3.27.0, an issue in Kata with Cloud Hypervisor allows a user of the container to modify the file system used by the Guest micro VM ultimately achieving arbitrary code execution as root in said VM. The current understanding is this

  • Kata Containers is an open source project focusing on a standard implementation of lightweight Virtual Machines (VMs) that perform like containers. In versions prior to 3.26.0, when a container image is malformed or contains no layers, containerd falls back to bind-mounting an empty snapshotter directory for the container rootfs. When the Kata runtime attempts to mount the container rootfs, the bi

  • An issue was discovered in Kata Containers through 1.11.3 and 2.x through 2.0-rc1. The runtime will execute binaries given using annotations without any kind of validation. Someone who is granted access rights to a cluster will be able to have kata-runtime execute arbitrary binaries as root on the worker nodes.

  • An improper file permissions vulnerability affects Kata Containers prior to 1.11.5. When using a Kubernetes hostPath volume and mounting either a file or directory into a container as readonly, the file/directory is mounted as readOnly inside the container, but is still writable inside the guest. For a container breakout situation, a malicious guest can potentially modify or delete files/directori

  • Kata Containers doesn't restrict containers from accessing the guest's root filesystem device. Malicious containers can exploit this to gain code execution on the guest and masquerade as the kata-agent. This issue affects Kata Containers 1.11 versions earlier than 1.11.1; Kata Containers 1.10 versions earlier than 1.10.5; and Kata Containers 1.9 and earlier versions.

  • A malicious guest compromised before a container creation (e.g. a malicious guest image or a guest running multiple containers) can trick the kata runtime into mounting the untrusted container filesystem on any host path, potentially allowing for code execution on the host. This issue affects: Kata Containers 1.11 versions earlier than 1.11.1; Kata Containers 1.10 versions earlier than 1.10.5; Kat

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under katacontainers.io: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.