Netty bug bounty programs
netty.io Updated
Netty runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.
- Top reward
- $1,500
- Sorona
- Programs
- 1
- 1 pays cash
- Targets in scope
- 13
- 2 types
- Last change
- None yet
- Tracked since Nov 2026
Where to report
The one public program Netty runs.
| Program | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Top reward | Safe harbor | KYC | First response | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Netty
Sorona · Bug bounty |
– | – | – | $100 | $1,500 | Partial | – | – | Open |
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- Critical
- –
- High
- –
- Medium
- –
- Low
- $100
- Safe harbor
- Partial
Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.
What is in scope
13 targets. 6 excluded.
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https://netty.io
Web
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Every other protocol codec shipped in the tree, including Redis, MQTT, STOMP, HAProxy protocol, SPDY, memcached, SMTP and the socks and haproxy proxy handlers
Products and areas
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Native transports, epoll, kqueue and io_uring, and their JNI boundaries
Products and areas
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The buffer allocator and the reference-counting model, where a leak or a double release is a memory-safety issue even on the JVM
Products and areas
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The channel pipeline, event loops and handler lifecycle, including exception propagation and what happens to a connection when a handler throws
Products and areas
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The codec-base machinery: cumulation, frame decoders and every place a length prefix from the wire drives an allocation
Products and areas
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The DNS codec and resolver: transaction ID generation, response matching, bailiwick checks and cache behaviour
Products and areas
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The HTTP/1.1 codec: request and response decoding, header validation, chunked handling, and the reconciliation of Content-Length against Transfer-Encoding
Products and areas
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The HTTP/2 codec: frame handling, HPACK, stream state, flow control and the HTTP/1-to-HTTP/2 translation layer downstream frameworks depend on
Products and areas
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The HTTP/3 and QUIC codecs, including QPACK encoding and decoding and the state each connection holds
Products and areas
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The security policy takes reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting under a ninety-day disclosure window and draws no boundary narrower than the Netty tree, so every codec and every transport in the repository is in bounds
Products and areas
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The SSL and TLS layer in full, covering the JDK and OpenSSL-backed engines, certificate and hostname verification, and OCSP stapling validation
Products and areas
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The WebSocket implementation from handshake through frame decoding, extension negotiation and continuation handling
Products and areas
No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.
Out of scope 6
Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.
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Branches the project no longer maintains
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Denial of service proportional to connection count with no amplification factor
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Downstream frameworks including Spark, Elasticsearch and Spring WebFlux as products, unless the defect is in Netty's own code
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Findings already covered by one of the published 2026 advisory batches
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JDK and OpenSSL defects that reach Netty as a dependency
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Pipelines a downstream project assembled unsafely out of components that behave correctly on their own
Recent changes
Reward and scope changes across every Netty program, newest first.
No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.
Recent CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in Netty products, from the NVD.
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CVE-2026-89044 Medium
Netty versions 4.1.133.Final through 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.13.Final through 4.2.17.Final fail to properly validate the final transfer coding in the Transfer-Encoding header, allowing attackers to smuggle requests by using malformed encoding declarations. Attackers can split Transfer-Encoding headers across multiple lines or use values like 'chunked, xchunked' to bypass validation and decode messag
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CVE-2026-62380 Medium
Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-socks) versions 4.2.0.Final through 4.2.16.Final and 4.1.x through 4.1.136.Final contain null byte, CRLF, and credential injection vulnerabilities in the SOCKS4 (Socks4ClientEncoder) and SOCKS5 (Socks5ClientEncoder) client encoders, which fail to validate domain address and authentication (username/password) fields. An attacker able to control these fields can inject nu
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CVE-2026-75595 Critical
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Fina and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode checks the wrong offset before reading the four-byte TLS handshake header, so a ClientHello whose handshake header spans records can cause an IndexOutOfBoundsException and invoke select(ctx, null). This selects the default SslContext instea
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CVE-2026-75596 High
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, the default io.netty.handler.ssl.SniHandler constructors use the pre-handshake ClientHello aggregation path in handler/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/ssl/SslClientHelloHandler.java at io.netty.handler.ssl.SslClientHelloHandler#decode, where handshakeBuffer.clear() and writeBytes() recopy
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CVE-2026-59902 High
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler limits incomplete messages and fragment counts but not maxBufferedBytes, allowing unauthenticated peers to exhaust memory with large SCTP fragments. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final.
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CVE-2026-59903 Medium
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.137.Final and 4.2.17.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.http.cors.CorsHandler setVaryHeader replaces application Vary headers such as Authorization or Cookie with Origin, allowing a caching proxy or CDN to reuse authenticated responses across users and disclose sensitive information. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.1
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CVE-2026-73507 High
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.xml.XmlFrameDecoder.decode() failed to preserve closing-tag parser state across invocations, so an unauthenticated remote attacker could trickle-feed repeated </ sequences that repeatedly rescanned the accumulated buffer and exhausted an EventLoop thread's CPU, caus
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CVE-2026-73508 Medium
Netty is an asynchronous, event-driven network application framework. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.AbstractDnsRecord, io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DefaultDnsRecordDecoder.decodeRecord(), and io.netty.handler.codec.dns.DnsCodecUtil.decompressDomainName() failed to release retained or newly allocated ByteBuf objects when IDN.toASCII() or encodeDomainName() reject
About this page
This page gathers every public program listed under netty.io: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.
Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.