RIPE NCC bug bounty programs
ripe.net Updated
RIPE NCC runs two public programs: an Intigriti bug bounty paying up to €2,000 and a self-hosted bug bounty.
- Top reward
- €2,000
- Intigriti
- Programs
- 2
- 2 pay cash
- Targets in scope
- 20
- 5 types, deduplicated
- Last change
- None yet
- Tracked since Nov 2026
Where to report
2 programs, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.
Start here
RIPE NCC
Intigriti · Pays the most of the 2 programs: up to €2,000.
| Program | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Top reward | Safe harbor | KYC | First response | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
RIPE NCC
Intigriti · Bug bounty |
€2,000 (highest) | €700 (highest) | €250 (highest) | – | €2,000 | Full | – | – | Open |
|
Ripe NCC
Self-hosted · Bug bounty |
– | – | – | – | Not published | Partial | – | 3 days promised | Open |
-
- Critical
- €2,000 (highest)
- High
- €700 (highest)
- Medium
- €250 (highest)
- Low
- –
- Safe harbor
- Full
-
- Safe harbor
- Partial
- First response
- 3 days promised
Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.
What is in scope
20 targets across all 2 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 15 excluded.
No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.
Out of scope 15
Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.
-
*.anchors.atlas.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
any *.ripe.net host that is located outside of the in-scope ip ranges
Intigriti
-
*aso.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
*nro.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
*.probes.atlas.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
193.0.0.160/27
Intigriti
-
2001:67c:2e8:3::/64
Intigriti
-
https://exams.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
https://labs.ripe.net
Intigriti
-
RIPE Meeting network (2001:67c:64::/48 and 193.0.24.0/21)
Self-hosted Intigriti
-
Any *.ripe.net host located outside of the in-scope IP ranges
Self-hosted
-
https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rpki-publication-server
Intigriti
-
https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/rsyncit
Intigriti
-
Public directories (many of them are supposed to be public)
Self-hosted
-
ripe[1-100].ripe.net
Intigriti
Recent changes
Reward and scope changes across every RIPE NCC program, newest first.
No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.
Recent CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in RIPE NCC products, from the NVD.
-
CVE-2020-16162 High
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x through 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. Missing validation checks on CRL presence or CRL staleness in the X509-based RPKI certificate-tree validation procedure allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions by using revoked certificates. NOTE: there may be counterarguments related to backwards compatibility
-
CVE-2020-16163 Critical
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x before 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. RRDP fetches proceed even with a lack of validation of a TLS HTTPS endpoint. This allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions, or to trigger denial of service to traffic directed to co-dependent routing systems. NOTE: third parties assert that the behavior is intentionally permitted by RFC 8182
-
CVE-2020-16164 High
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x through 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. It allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions or to cause a denial of service on dependent routing systems by strategically withholding RPKI Route Origin Authorisation ".roa" files or X509 Certificate Revocation List files from the RPKI relying party's view. NOTE: some third parties may regard
-
CVE-2020-16162 High
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x through 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. Missing validation checks on CRL presence or CRL staleness in the X509-based RPKI certificate-tree validation procedure allow remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions by using revoked certificates. NOTE: there may be counterarguments related to backwards compatibility
-
CVE-2020-16163 Critical
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x before 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. RRDP fetches proceed even with a lack of validation of a TLS HTTPS endpoint. This allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions, or to trigger denial of service to traffic directed to co-dependent routing systems. NOTE: third parties assert that the behavior is intentionally permitted by RFC 8182
-
CVE-2020-16164 High
An issue was discovered in RIPE NCC RPKI Validator 3.x through 3.1-2020.07.06.14.28. It allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions or to cause a denial of service on dependent routing systems by strategically withholding RPKI Route Origin Authorisation ".roa" files or X509 Certificate Revocation List files from the RPKI relying party's view. NOTE: some third parties may regard
About this page
This page gathers every public program listed under ripe.net: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.
Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.