Skip to content
bugbounty.fyi
Get paid to secure open source 475 paid open-source programs on Sorona, up to $1M Perk Low bugs: $100 or 1 mo Claude Max

Also on Patchstack. All 476 paid open-source programs

Try

Highest paying Newly launched Paid without KYC Full safe harbor
All results

About this site

Sigstore bug bounty programs

sigstore.dev Updated

Sigstore runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
1
1 pays cash
Targets in scope
8
2 types
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

The one public program Sigstore runs.

  • Sigstore

    Sorona · Bug bounty

    Open

    Top reward

    $1,500
    Critical
    –
    High
    –
    Medium
    –
    Low
    $100
    Safe harbor
    Partial

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

8 targets. 6 excluded.

  • https://sigstore.dev

    Web

  • Bundle and attestation parsing wherever it happens, together with the SLSA provenance and in-toto predicate validation built on top of it

    Products and areas

  • cosign in full, verification logic first: certificate identity and issuer matching, --certificate-identity and --certificate-oidc-issuer enforcement, and the keyless verification paths

    Products and areas

  • OCI registry interaction and attachment resolution through the .sig and .att tags, including confusion between a subject digest and the attachment bound to it

    Products and areas

  • rekor in full, covering transparency-log integrity: inclusion proofs, signed entry timestamps, checkpoint and consistency-proof handling, and the Merkle tree operations underneath them

    Products and areas

  • Reports go to the Sigstore security team at [email protected], and coverage here runs to the six Sigstore repositories in the OSS-Fuzz integration: cosign, rekor, sigstore, sigstore-go, sigstore-java and sigstore-python. Everything below sits inside those trees

    Products and areas

  • The client libraries end to end, sigstore-go, sigstore-python and sigstore-java, including protobuf bundle deserialization from attacker-supplied input

    Products and areas

  • TUF root-of-trust handling and trusted-root refresh, the material every later verification is measured against

    Products and areas

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 6

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • Availability or abuse of the public-good Rekor log and Fulcio CA as running services, as opposed to defects in the code that implements them

  • Key-compromise scenarios where the attacker already controls the signing identity, which sits inside the trust boundary rather than breaking it

  • One-liner fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the reward rules place below the bar regardless of which repository they land in

  • Policy decisions a downstream verifier makes about which identities to trust, as opposed to defects in the Sigstore libraries themselves

  • Reports with no merged upstream patch behind them, which earn nothing on the Google pathway even though sorona.xyz still pays for the finding

  • sigstore/fulcio, which is not an OSS-Fuzz project and carries no Patch Rewards coverage, so no money reaches it on this pathway

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every Sigstore program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in Sigstore products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • CVE-2026-49834 Medium

    sigstore-go is a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification. Prior to 1.2.0, a verifier configured with WithTransparencyLog(N>1) or WithSignedCertificateTimestamps(N>1) counts verified witnesses per entry or per validation path rather than per log authority, allowing a single compromised transparency log or CT log to satisfy multi-log threshold requirements and defeat the multi-log policy. T

  • CVE-2026-39395 Medium

    Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to 3.0.6 and 2.6.3, cosign verify-blob-attestation may erroneously report a "Verified OK" result for attestations with malformed payloads or mismatched predicate types. For old-format bundles and detached signatures, this was due to a logic flaw in the error handling of the predicate type validation. For new-format bu

  • CVE-2026-31830 High

    sigstore-ruby is a pure Ruby implementation of the sigstore verify command from the sigstore/cosign project. Prior to 0.2.3, Sigstore::Verifier#verify does not propagate the VerificationFailure returned by verify_in_toto when the artifact digest does not match the digest in the in-toto attestation subject. As a result, verification of DSSE bundles containing in-toto statements returns Verification

  • CVE-2026-24122 Low

    Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. In versions 3.0.4 and below, an issuing certificate with a validity that expires before the leaf certificate will be considered valid during verification even if the provided timestamp would mean the issuing certificate should be considered expired. When verifying artifact signatures using a certificate, Cosign first verifi

  • CVE-2026-22703 Medium

    Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's p

  • CVE-2024-45395 Low

    sigstore-go, a Go library for Sigstore signing and verification, is susceptible to a denial of service attack in versions prior to 0.6.1 when a verifier is provided a maliciously crafted Sigstore Bundle containing large amounts of verifiable data, in the form of signed transparency log entries, RFC 3161 timestamps, and attestation subjects. The verification of these data structures is computationa

  • CVE-2024-29902 Medium

    Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to version 2.2.4, a remote image with a malicious attachment can cause denial of service of the host machine running Cosign. This can impact other services on the machine that rely on having memory available such as a Redis database which can result in data loss. It can also impact the availability of other services o

  • CVE-2024-29903 Medium

    Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to version 2.2.4, maliciously-crafted software artifacts can cause denial of service of the machine running Cosign thereby impacting all services on the machine. The root cause is that Cosign creates slices based on the number of signatures, manifests or attestations in untrusted artifacts. As such, the untrusted arti

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under sigstore.dev: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.