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Arm Ltd bug bounty programs

trustedfirmware.org Updated

Arm Ltd runs three public programs: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $20,000, a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $20,000 and a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $20,000.

Top reward
$20,000
Sorona
Programs
3
3 pay cash
Targets in scope
26
2 types, deduplicated
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

3 programs, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.

Start here

TF-PSA-Crypto

Sorona · Pays the most of the 3 programs: up to $20,000.
  • TF-PSA-Crypto

    Sorona · Bug bounty

    Open

    Top reward

    $20k
    Critical
    $20k (highest)
    High
    $10k (highest)
    Medium
    $3,000 (highest)
    Low
    $1,000 (highest)
    Safe harbor
    Partial
    KYC
    Required
  • Trusted Firmware-M

    Sorona · Bug bounty

    Open

    Top reward

    $20k
    Critical
    $20k
    High
    $10k
    Medium
    $3,000
    Low
    $1,000
    Safe harbor
    Partial
    KYC
    Required
  • Trusted Firmware-A

    Sorona · Bug bounty

    Open

    Top reward

    $20k
    Critical
    $20k
    High
    $10k
    Medium
    $3,000
    Low
    $1,000
    Safe harbor
    Partial
    KYC
    Required

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

26 targets across all 3 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 19 excluded.

  • https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/mbed-tls

    Web

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-a

    Web

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • https://www.trustedfirmware.org/projects/tf-m

    Web

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • Arm's program names four Trusted Firmware projects and takes reports on all of them: TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE and TF-PSA-Crypto. The asset here is TF-PSA-Crypto, which the brief describes as a submodule of Mbed TLS, and the vulnerability has to be exploitable through the PSA Cryptography API. Reports run against the main branch or a currently supported LTS branch

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Arm's program names four Trusted Firmware projects and takes reports on all of them: TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE and TF-PSA-Crypto. The asset record describes TF-M as the Secure Processing Environment for Armv8-M and Armv8.1-M parts and for dual-core platforms, and reports run against the main branch or a currently supported LTS branch

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • Arm's program names four Trusted Firmware projects and takes reports on all of them: TF-A, TF-M, OP-TEE and TF-PSA-Crypto. The live asset record describes TF-A as the reference implementation of secure world software for Armv8-A and Armv9-A class processors, and lists source-code review among the skills it wants. Reports run against the main branch or a currently supported LTS branch

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • Arm-owned platform code under /platform/ext/target/arm/* and the common platform layer above it

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • Asymmetric operations: key generation, signature and verification, key agreement and asymmetric encryption across RSA and the supported elliptic curves

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • EL3 Runtime Firmware as a whole: the SMC dispatcher, standard and SiP service dispatch, PSCI, SDEI, exception handling, and world context save and restore

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • Key import, export and format parsing, plus key derivation and the policy checks that decide what a key may be used for

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Mailbox and inter-processor message handling on dual-core platforms

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • PSA Secure Storage in both forms, Internal Trusted Storage and Protected Storage, along with the crypto binding and the filesystem layer beneath them

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • Secure and non-secure isolation across the Armv8-A and Armv9-A TrustZone boundary, including the dispatcher code that hands control to a secure payload or partition

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • Speculative-execution and side-channel mitigations implemented at EL3

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • Symmetric operations end to end, cipher, AEAD, hash and MAC, including the multi-part operation state machines

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • The Arm-owned platform surface, plat/arm/* and plat/common/*, together with the drivers TF-A carries for Arm reference platforms

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

  • The Initial Attestation service and token generation

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • The PSA Crypto service, its key store, and key-identifier ownership across partitions

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • The PSA Cryptography API surface in full: the core dispatch layer, key management and the key store, key policies, and the driver interface beneath them

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • The PSA Firmware Update partition, its image validation and its manifest parsing

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • The random generator and the entropy plumbing the library depends on

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • The Secure Processing Environment as a whole: the Secure Partition Manager, partition scheduling, the isolation levels TF-M implements, and its own secure boot stage and image validation

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • The software implementations sitting under the PSA layer, including the bignum, elliptic-curve and RSA code a call actually lands in

    Products and areas

    Covered by TF-PSA-Crypto

  • The SPE and NSPE interface: secure function veneer entry points, the non-secure callable region, the PSA client API and the IPC model behind it

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-M

  • The trusted board boot chain of trust: X.509 and certificate parsing, the crypto and image-parser module framework, and the non-volatile counters behind rollback protection

    Products and areas

    Covered by Trusted Firmware-A

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 19

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • "Attacks that are outside the scope of the project's threat model", which for a crypto library rules out a good deal of theoretical side-channel work

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • "Compliance, hardening, missing zeroization issues, etc. are not in scope", so a missing wipe with no demonstrated exploit path will not be paid

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • "Vulnerabilities identified in code marked as experimental, test code or other non-production code e.g. support tooling"

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • "Vulnerabilities in modifications or customisations of Trusted Firmware that do not exist in official Trusted Firmware repos", including the vendored copies inside RTOS distributions

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Attacks outside the project's threat model, and physical or glitching attacks against the part itself

    Trusted Firmware-M

  • Attacks outside the project's threat model, and theoretical issues with no realistic exploit scenario

    Trusted Firmware-A

  • Compliance-only, hardening-only and missing-zeroization findings, which Arm states plainly are not in scope

    Trusted Firmware-M

  • Experimental, test and example code, along with support tooling, none of which counts as intended for production deployment

    Trusted Firmware-M

  • Findings Arm already knew about from its own testing, closed as duplicates, and zero-days reported within 14 days of a public patch, which are usually not paid

    TF-PSA-Crypto Trusted Firmware-M Trusted Firmware-A

  • Mbed TLS bugs with no path through the PSA Cryptography API. "Attacks against Mbed TLS that don't impact TF-PSA-Crypto" are excluded by name, and the live brief no longer lists Mbed TLS as an in-scope project at all

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Non-Arm silicon ports: code in the /platform/ext/target/* directory other than /platform/ext/target/arm/* is out, which removes the vendor board support most real TF-M deployments actually ship

    Trusted Firmware-M

  • Physical access, glitching, DDoS and brute force, and devices that no longer receive security updates

    Trusted Firmware-A

  • Platform-specific code for non-Arm products: everything in the /plat directory except /platform/common/* and plat/arm/*. This is the exclusion that matters most here, because it removes every silicon-vendor port

    Trusted Firmware-A

  • Self-attacks from an already-compromised caller, and findings whose whole impact is loss of availability

    TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Test code, support tooling and anything the tree marks experimental, none of which counts as code intended for production deployment

    Trusted Firmware-A

  • Trusted Firmware projects the program does not list, which go to the Trusted Firmware incident handling process, and Trusted Firmware's web estate, which Linaro handles under its own disclosure process

    Trusted Firmware-A Trusted Firmware-M TF-PSA-Crypto

  • Unvalidated LLM output, which the program closes on sight, and reports asserting that software is out of date without a proof-of-concept

    Trusted Firmware-M

  • Vulnerabilities in modifications or customisations of Trusted Firmware that do not exist in the official Trusted Firmware repositories, which rules out vendor forks

    Trusted Firmware-A

  • Vulnerabilities in modifications or customisations that do not exist in the official Trusted Firmware repositories, including the vendor forks bundled into silicon SDKs

    Trusted Firmware-M

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every Arm Ltd program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in Arm Ltd products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • CVE-2026-53763 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.0.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, 32-bit integer overflows in OP-TEE core's AES-GCM implementation cause the authentication tag to be computed with incorrect bit-length values after processing more than 512 megabytes

  • CVE-2026-53763 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.0.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, 32-bit integer overflows in OP-TEE core's AES-GCM implementation cause the authentication tag to be computed with incorrect bit-length values after processing more than 512 megabytes

  • CVE-2026-44362 Medium

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.20.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, a vulnerability in OP-TEE’s subkey rollback protection allows the use of revoked or older subkey versions because the system fails to propagate versioning data during the Trusted App

  • CVE-2026-44362 Medium

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.20.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, a vulnerability in OP-TEE’s subkey rollback protection allows the use of revoked or older subkey versions because the system fails to propagate versioning data during the Trusted App

  • CVE-2026-42546 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.3.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, a resource leak exists in OP-TEE’s shared memory cleanup logic because the function `cleanup_shm_refs()` in `core/tee/entry_std.c` fails to apply a required bitmask (`OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_T

  • CVE-2026-42546 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.3.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, a resource leak exists in OP-TEE’s shared memory cleanup logic because the function `cleanup_shm_refs()` in `core/tee/entry_std.c` fails to apply a required bitmask (`OPTEE_MSG_ATTR_T

  • CVE-2026-41515 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 3.9.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, the RSA-OAEP decryption implementation in the NXP CAAM crypto driver uses non-constant-time `memcmp()` for label hash verification and has multiple distinguishable error paths. This c

  • CVE-2026-41514 Low

    OP-TEE is a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) designed as companion to a non-secure Linux kernel running on Arm; Cortex-A cores using the TrustZone technology. Starting in version 4.5.0 and prior to version 4.11.0, the RSA-OAEP decryption implementation in the Hisilicon HPRE crypto driver uses non-constant-time `memcmp()` for label hash verification and has multiple distinguishable error paths.

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under trustedfirmware.org: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.