Anthropic Cyber Jailbreak
By Anthropic Vulnerability disclosure program on HackerOne anthropic.com
- Top reward
- No cash rewards
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 5
- Public CVEs
- 34
- Last change
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- No cash rewards
- A disclosure program: you report for credit, not money.
- Report on HackerOne
- Submit through the program page.
- Full safe harbor
- Good-faith research is authorised; no legal action.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What HackerOne lists as the payout for each severity.
This program does not pay cash rewards.
- Safe harbor
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Full
we will not pursue legal action against you because of your research or responsible disclosure, subject to Anthropic's compliance with applicable laws and legal obligations.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on HackerOne, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
5 assets you may test.
Products and areas 5
- Fable 5.1 Critical No bounty
- Haiku Class Models Critical No bounty
- Opus 5.5 Critical No bounty
- Other Opus Class Models Critical No bounty
- Sonnet Class Models Critical No bounty
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Anthropic Cyber Jailbreak (via HackerOne)'s policy. "We" in these lines means the program, not this site.
While testing
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Limit exploitation research to what is minimally required to demonstrate that the jailbreak exists.
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Do not use access to generate harmful outputs beyond a proof-of-concept sufficient to document the finding.
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Not exfiltrate, download, or retain any sensitive data you inadvertently access.
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Avoid disclosing the existence of or details relating to any finding to a third party or the public until you have received prior written notice from us.
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Not perform any actions that would degrade the availability or integrity of Anthropic's systems or services.
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Test only against the in-scope model and surface, using your own accounts or designated test access.
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Do not attempt to access, modify, or destroy data that is not yours.
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Do not perform traditional infrastructure attacks (DoS/DDoS, brute force, spam) against Anthropic systems --- this program covers model-safety jailbreaks only.
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Do not use real, sensitive, or third-party harmful material in your testing where avoidable
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Limit the volume of harmful content you generate to the minimum necessary to demonstrate the finding.
Not accepted
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Single-instance or highly brittle techniques that are not reliably reproducible
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Findings where the capability unlocked does not require Claude's assistance to a meaningful degree
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Red-teaming or adversarial testing coordinated directly by Anthropic
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Denial of service or availability attacks against Anthropic infrastructure
Summarised with AI from the program policy on HackerOne, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 57 minutes ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Before we tracked it
Scope and reward changes recorded before this page started tracking it.
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Scope added
Other Opus Class Models
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Scope added
Haiku Class Models
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Scope added
Opus 5.5
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Scope added
Sonnet Class Models
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Rules updated
Added: “…sh with existing publicly available tools on Claude Fable 5.1”
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Scope removed
Fable 5
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Scope added
Fable 5.1
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-111497 | A buffer overflow vulnerability in the Brotli decoder (c/dec/decode.c) in Google Brotli versions 1.0.3 through 1.2.0 on all platforms allows a remote unauthenticated attacker to corrupt adjacent decoder state memory, disclose sensitive memory contents, cause a denial of service, or potentially execute arbitrary code using a crafted Brotli-compressed stream. Users need to update any Brotli librarie | Critical 9.2 | 22 Oct 2026 |
| CVE-2026-55607 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such | High 7.7 | 29 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-46406 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.59 until 2.1.128, the Claude Code /copy command wrote responses to a hardcoded, predictable path (/tmp/claude/response.md) without UID isolation, randomness, or symlink protection. The file was created world-readable (0644) in a world-traversable directory (0755), allowing any local user to read a privileged user's Claude response, which could contai | Medium 4.4 | 29 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-54316 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 0.2.54 until 2.1.163, because the hostname huggingface.co was pre-approved as a bare hostname for the WebFetch tool, any path on that domain—including attacker-controlled model repositories—was auto-approved without a permission prompt or being subject to --allowedTools restrictions. An attacker able to inject untrusted content into a Claude Code context | Medium 6.0 | 23 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-44467 | The Claude Desktop app gives you Claude Code with a graphical interface built for running multiple sessions side by side. From 1.2581.0 to before 1.4304.0, Claude Desktop's SSH remote development feature verified only whether a hostname existed in ~/.ssh/known_hosts without comparing the server's presented host key against the stored key. This allowed a network-positioned attacker to present an ar | High 7.4 | 13 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-44470 | The Claude Desktop app gives you Claude Code with a graphical interface built for running multiple sessions side by side. Prior to 1.3834.0, the CoworkVMService component in Claude Desktop for Windows ran as SYSTEM and did not validate whether the VM bundle directory was a real directory or an NTFS directory junction before creating files within it. A local non-elevated user could replace the user | High 8.5 | 13 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-40068 | In versions 2.1.63 through 2.1.83 of Claude Code, the folder trust determination logic used the git worktree commondir file without validating its contents. An attacker could craft a malicious repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, causing Claude Code to bypass its trust confirmation dialog and immediately execute hooks defined in `.claude/settings.j | High 7.7 | 5 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-41686 | Claude SDK for TypeScript provides access to the Claude API from server-side TypeScript or JavaScript applications. From version 0.79.0 to before version 0.91.1, the BetaLocalFilesystemMemoryTool in the Anthropic TypeScript SDK created memory files and directories using the Node.js default modes (0o666 for files, 0o777 for directories), leaving them world-readable on systems with a standard umask | Medium 4.8 | 4 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-39861 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.1.64, Claude Code's sandbox did not prevent sandboxed processes from creating symlinks pointing to locations outside the workspace. When Claude Code subsequently wrote to a path within such a symlink, its unsandboxed process followed the symlink and wrote to the target location outside the workspace without prompting the user for confirmati | High 7.7 | 21 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-35603 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. In versions prior to 2.1.75 on Windows, Claude Code loaded the system-wide default configuration from C:\ProgramData\ClaudeCode\managed-settings.json without validating directory ownership or access permissions. Because the ProgramData directory is writable by non-administrative users by default and the ClaudeCode subdirectory was not pre-created or access-re | Medium 5.4 | 17 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-34450 | The Claude SDK for Python provides access to the Claude API from Python applications. From version 0.86.0 to before version 0.87.0, the local filesystem memory tool in the Anthropic Python SDK created memory files with mode 0o666, leaving them world-readable on systems with a standard umask and world-writable in environments with a permissive umask such as many Docker base images. A local attacker | Medium 4.8 | 31 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-34451 | Claude SDK for TypeScript provides access to the Claude API from server-side TypeScript or JavaScript applications. From version 0.79.0 to before version 0.81.0, the local filesystem memory tool in the Anthropic TypeScript SDK validated model-supplied paths using a string prefix check that did not append a trailing path separator. A model steered by prompt injection could supply a crafted path tha | Medium 6.3 | 31 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-34452 | The Claude SDK for Python provides access to the Claude API from Python applications. From version 0.86.0 to before version 0.87.0, the async local filesystem memory tool in the Anthropic Python SDK validated that model-supplied paths resolved inside the sandboxed memory directory, but then returned the unresolved path for subsequent file operations. A local attacker able to write to the memory di | Medium 5.8 | 31 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-22561 | Uncontrolled search path elements in Anthropic Claude for Windows installer (Claude Setup.exe) versions prior to 1.1.3363 allow local privilege escalation via DLL search-order hijacking. The installer loads DLLs (e.g., profapi.dll) from its own directory after UAC elevation, enabling arbitrary code execution if a malicious DLL is planted alongside the installer. | Medium 4.7 | 31 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-33068 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions prior to 2.1.53 resolved the permission mode from settings files, including the repo-controlled .claude/settings.json, before determining whether to display the workspace trust confirmation dialog. A malicious repository could set permissions.defaultMode to bypassPermissions in its committed .claude/settings.json, causing the trust dialog to be silen | High 7.7 | 20 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-25724 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.1.7, Claude Code failed to strictly enforce deny rules configured in settings.json when accessing files through symbolic links. If a user explicitly denied Claude Code access to a file (such as /etc/passwd) and Claude Code had access to a symbolic link pointing to that file, it was possible for Claude Code to read the restricted file throug | Low 2.3 | 6 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-25725 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.1.2, Claude Code's bubblewrap sandboxing mechanism failed to properly protect the .claude/settings.json configuration file when it did not exist at startup. While the parent directory was mounted as writable and .claude/settings.local.json was explicitly protected with read-only constraints, settings.json was not protected if it was missing | High 7.7 | 6 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-25722 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.57, Claude Code failed to properly validate directory changes when combined with write operations to protected folders. By using the cd command to navigate into sensitive directories like .claude, it was possible to bypass write protection and create or modify files without user confirmation. Reliably exploiting this required the ability | High 7.7 | 6 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-25723 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.55, Claude Code failed to properly validate commands using piped sed operations with the echo command, allowing attackers to bypass file write restrictions. This vulnerability enabled writing to sensitive directories like the .claude folder and paths outside the project scope. Exploiting this required the ability to execute commands throu | High 7.7 | 6 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-24052 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 1.0.111, Claude Code contained insufficient URL validation in its trusted domain verification mechanism for WebFetch requests. The application used a startsWith() function to validate trusted domains (e.g., docs.python.org, modelcontextprotocol.io), this could have enabled attackers to register domains like modelcontextprotocol.io.example.com | High 7.1 | 3 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-24053 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.74, due to a Bash command validation flaw in parsing ZSH clobber syntax, it was possible to bypass directory restrictions and write files outside the current working directory without user permission prompts. Exploiting this required the user to use ZSH and the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. This issue | High 7.7 | 3 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-24887 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.72, due to an error in command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of untrusted commands through the find command. Reliably exploiting this required the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.72. | High 7.7 | 3 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-21852 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.65, vulnerability in Claude Code's project-load flow allowed malicious repositories to exfiltrate data including Anthropic API keys before users confirmed trust. An attacker-controlled repository could include a settings file that sets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL to an attacker-controlled endpoint and when the repository was opened, Claude Code wo | Medium 5.3 | 21 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-66032 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to 1.0.93, Due to errors in parsing shell commands related to $IFS and short CLI flags, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and trigger arbitrary code execution. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.93. | High 8.7 | 3 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2025-64755 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 2.0.31, due to an error in sed command parsing, it was possible to bypass the Claude Code read-only validation and write to arbitrary files on the host system. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.31. | High 8.7 | 21 Nov 2025 |
| CVE-2025-65099 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 1.0.39, when running on a machine with Yarn 3.0 or above, Claude Code could have been tricked to execute code contained in a project via yarn plugins before the user accepted the startup trust dialog. Exploiting this would have required a user to start Claude Code in an untrusted directory and to be using Yarn 3.0 or above. This issue has bee | High 7.7 | 19 Nov 2025 |
| CVE-2025-59829 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions below 1.0.120 failed to account for symlinks when checking permission deny rules. If a user explicitly denied Claude Code access to a file and Claude Code had access to a symlink pointing to that file, it was possible for Claude Code to access the file. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users perform | Low 2.3 | 3 Oct 2025 |
| CVE-2025-59536 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Versions before 1.0.111 were vulnerable to Code Injection due to a bug in the startup trust dialog implementation. Claude Code could be tricked to execute code contained in a project before the user accepted the startup trust dialog. Exploiting this requires a user to start Claude Code in an untrusted directory. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will | High 8.7 | 3 Oct 2025 |
| CVE-2025-59828 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to Claude Code version 1.0.39, when using Claude Code with Yarn versions 2.0+, Yarn plugins are auto-executed when running yarn --version. This could lead to a bypass of the directory trust dialog in Claude Code, as plugins would be executed prior to the user accepting the risks of working in an untrusted directory. Users running Yarn Classic were unaff | High 7.7 | 24 Sep 2025 |
| CVE-2025-59041 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. At startup, Claude Code executed a command templated in with `git config user.email`. Prior to version 1.0.105, a maliciously configured user email in git could be used to trigger arbitrary code execution before a user accepted the workspace trust dialog. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing man | High 8.7 | 10 Sep 2025 |
| CVE-2025-58764 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Due to an error in command parsing, versions prior to 1.0.105 were vulnerable to a bypass of the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatica | High 8.7 | 10 Sep 2025 |
| CVE-2025-55284 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to version 1.0.4, it's possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompts to read a file and then send file contents over the network without user confirmation due to an overly broad allowlist of safe commands. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. Users on standard Claude Code aut | High 7.1 | 16 Aug 2025 |
| CVE-2025-54794 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. In versions below 0.2.111, a path validation flaw using prefix matching instead of canonical path comparison, makes it possible to bypass directory restrictions and access files outside the CWD. Successful exploitation depends on the presence of (or ability to create) a directory with the same prefix as the CWD and the ability to add untrusted content into a | High 7.7 | 5 Aug 2025 |
| CVE-2025-54795 | Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. In versions below 1.0.20, an error in command parsing makes it possible to bypass the Claude Code confirmation prompt to trigger execution of an untrusted command. Reliably exploiting this requires the ability to add untrusted content into a Claude Code context window. This is fixed in version 1.0.20. | High 8.7 | 5 Aug 2025 |
Original policy
Copied from hackerone.com on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Anthropic Cyber Jailbreak Program on H1
The security of our AI systems and the integrity of our model safeguards are core to Anthropic's mission. We appreciate the work of researchers acting in good faith to identify and report potential jailbreaks of our cyber-relevant safety controls.
Scope
This program is specifically focused on findings where Claude's responses could meaningfully assist an attacker in performing cyber operations beyond what they could accomplish with existing publicly available tools on Claude Fable 5.1
This program does not cover:
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Cyber jailbreaks on any Claude models other than Fable 5.1
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General content safety or jailbreaks not tied to meaningful cyber capability uplift
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Third-party systems or infrastructure not owned or operated by Anthropic
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Anthropic's general web and application infrastructure (covered under the Anthropic Security VDP)
Scope of Findings
This program covers technical findings where a jailbreak of Claude's cyber safeguards could produce meaningful real-world capability uplift for an attacker---for example:
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Techniques that cause Claude to produce functional exploit code, working malware, or detailed attack infrastructure it would otherwise refuse
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Prompting approaches that extract domain-expert-level guidance on offensive cyber techniques that the model is designed to decline
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Jailbreaks that work at scale or across multiple offensive task categories
This program excludes, subject to Anthropic's discretion:
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Findings where the output Claude produces is already equivalent to what an attacker could obtain from publicly available tools, search engines, or open-source resources without meaningful additional uplift
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Single-instance or highly brittle techniques that are not reliably reproducible
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Findings where the capability unlocked does not require Claude's assistance to a meaningful degree (e.g., Claude produces partial output a domain expert would still need to complete independently)
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Red-teaming or adversarial testing coordinated directly by Anthropic
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Denial of service or availability attacks against Anthropic infrastructure
How We Assess Severity
We are focused on jailbreaks we consider high and critical. Please note, how we assess severity is subject to change.
We score a given jailbreak on the four different criteria below.
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Capability gain. How far beyond existing tools does the jailbreak take the user? If existing widely-available tools (including other, weaker AI models) can reach the same capability as the jailbroken model, the score here will be low; if the jailbreak unblocks model capabilities that can significantly accelerate even domain experts, the score will be high.
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Breadth of capability gain. For how many distinct offensive tasks does the same jailbreak technique work? Cases where the jailbreak only allows the model to pursue narrow targets will score low; cases where the same jailbreak technique works for multiple different targets or techniques will score high.
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Ease of weaponization. How much human effort does it take to turn the jailbreak into an attack? Where the jailbreak involves a great deal of skilled prompting and many retries, the score will be low; where the jailbreak works on a single prompt or on the first or second try, the score will be high.
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Discoverability. How easy is it for someone to obtain the technique? If it requires specialist knowledge it will score low; if it is already widely known and available online it will score high.
The severity rating displayed on a HackerOne report is set by the submitting researcher. It does not represent Anthropic's assessment of the finding. We work with HackerOne to independently assess each submission using the criteria above to determine how to handle the report.
Research Guidelines
When conducting research under this program, you agree to:
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Limit exploitation research to what is minimally required to demonstrate that the jailbreak exists. Do not use access to generate harmful outputs beyond a proof-of-concept sufficient to document the finding.
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Avoid accessing, acquiring, or using the content of any communications, data, or information beyond what is necessary to document your finding.
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Not exfiltrate, download, or retain any sensitive data you inadvertently access. If you inadvertently access such data, report it as part of your submission.
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Avoid disclosing the existence of or details relating to any finding to a third party or the public until you have received prior written notice from us. We fully support researchers' right to publicly disclose findings they discover. We ask only to coordinate on the timing of such disclosures to prevent potential harm. Researchers are free to report similar findings in other non-Anthropic AI systems---we will never attempt to restrict such disclosures.
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Not perform any actions that would degrade the availability or integrity of Anthropic's systems or services.
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Comply with all applicable laws in your jurisdiction when conducting research.
How to structure your report
To triage a report quickly, we need to be able to reproduce the behavior. Reports that cannot be reproduced cannot be validated. Please include all of the following:
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Affected model: Confirm the report is against Claude Fable 5.1 (and the surface/interface used).
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Message IDs / conversation reference: Include the relevant message ID(s) for every message in the exchange that demonstrates the jailbreak.
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Full transcript(s): The complete, verbatim input(s) used to elicit the behavior, including any system prompt, prior turns, or setup required.
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For Claude Code attach your transcript from ~/.claude/projects//.jsonl
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Observed output: A description of the harmful output produced and why it constitutes meaningful cyber uplift.
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Reproduction steps: A clear, ordered, step-by-step path another person can follow to reproduce the result.
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Reproducibility / reliability: How consistently the technique works (e.g., "succeeds ~8/10 attempts"), and any conditions required.
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Reporter's severity assessment: Your view of the impact and why.
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Supporting material: Screenshots, transcripts, or recordings as needed.
Reports missing message IDs or reproduction steps may be closed as not reproducible without further review.
Rules of engagement
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Test only against the in-scope model and surface, using your own accounts or designated test access.
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Do not attempt to access, modify, or destroy data that is not yours.
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Do not perform traditional infrastructure attacks (DoS/DDoS, brute force, spam) against Anthropic systems --- this program covers model-safety jailbreaks only.
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Do not use real, sensitive, or third-party harmful material in your testing where avoidable; the goal is to demonstrate the technique, not to generate live operational harm.
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Limit the volume of harmful content you generate to the minimum necessary to demonstrate the finding.
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Do not publicly disclose or distribute any harmful output produced during testing. See Disclosure Policy below.
Your Expectations of Us
All good-faith reports will be taken seriously. Upon responsibly disclosing a potential finding, you can expect us to:
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Promptly evaluate your submission and assess it against our severity framework.
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Take appropriate steps to address or mitigate the jailbreak to the extent appropriate and feasible.
Disclosure Policy
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Please follow HackerOne's disclosure guidelines. We fully support researchers' right to publicly disclose vulnerabilities they discover. We ask only that you coordinate the timing of disclosure with us to prevent potential harm to our services, customers, and other parties. Please do not disclose the existence of or any details relating to a discovered vulnerability to a third party or to the public until you have received written confirmation from us.
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Researchers are free to report similar vulnerabilities in other organizations' services --- we will never attempt to restrict such disclosures.
Safe Harbor
If you, in Anthropic's sole determination, make a good-faith effort to research and disclose a finding in accordance with this Policy and the Research Guidelines above, we will not pursue legal action against you because of your research or responsible disclosure, subject to Anthropic's compliance with applicable laws and legal obligations. To qualify for safe harbor, disclosures must be unconditional and may not involve extortion or threats.
Changes to This Policy
We reserve the right to make changes to this Policy at any time by publishing a new version and amending the date of last update. Findings disclosed prior to any update of this Policy will remain subject to the then-current policy in effect.