- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 6
- Public CVEs
- 27
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
6 assets you may test, 5 excluded.
Web 1
- https://avahi.org
Products and areas 5
- avahi-dnsconfd and the path on which the daemon writes resolver configuration for the rest of the system
- Record and hostname conflict resolution, and the probe and announce state machine that drives it
- The client library libavahi-client, which browsers, printing stacks and file managers link against and feed with daemon-supplied data
- The D-Bus interface exposed by avahi-daemon, where a local unprivileged caller reaches a daemon that has historically run as root
- The mDNS and DNS-SD packet parser in avahi-core, reachable from any unauthenticated host on the local link, the origin of CVE-2021-3468 and of the 2023 CVE-2023-1981 assert cluster
Out of scope (5)
- AppArmor and SELinux policy gaps introduced by a distribution rather than by Avahi itself
- Apple's Bonjour and mDNSResponder, which are a different implementation of the same protocol
- Local denial of service triggered by a user who already holds a session on the machine
- One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules exclude by name along with resource-exhaustion denial of service
- The fact that mDNS has no authentication, which is a property of the protocol rather than a defect in this implementation
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
-
Report through the project's GitHub private vulnerability reporting; the maintainer triages there and pays nothing for the report itself
-
Send a detailed, reproducible report with the packet or D-Bus message that triggers it. If we can't reproduce it, it isn't eligible
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Give the maintainer room to ship a fix before any public writeup
-
If you also want the Google patch money, land the fix upstream yourself and keep it merged without reverts for a month. That is a separate pathway with its own rules
-
The Patch Rewards side is rate-limited to three submissions per person per month, will not pay for one-liner fixes to non-exploitable crashes, and excludes researchers in sanctioned territories
Not accepted
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The fact that mDNS has no authentication, which is a property of the protocol rather than a defect in this implementation
-
Apple's Bonjour and mDNSResponder, which are a different implementation of the same protocol
-
AppArmor and SELinux policy gaps introduced by a distribution rather than by Avahi itself
-
Local denial of service triggered by a user who already holds a session on the machine
-
One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules exclude by name along with resource-exhaustion denial of service
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-34933 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. Prior to version 0.9-rc4, any unprivileged local user can crash avahi-daemon by sending a single D-Bus method call with conflicting publish flags. This issue has been patched in version 0.9-rc4. | Medium 5.5 | 3 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-24401 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In versions 0.9rc2 and below, avahi-daemon can be crashed via a segmentation fault by sending an unsolicited mDNS response containing a recursive CNAME record, where the alias and canonical name point to the same domain (e.g., "h.local" as a CNAME for "h.local"). This causes unbounded recur | Medium 6.5 | 24 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-68276 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In 0.9-rc2 and earlier, an unprivileged local users can crash avahi-daemon (with wide-area disabled) by creating record browsers with the AVAHI_LOOKUP_USE_WIDE_AREA flag set via D-Bus. This can be done by either calling the RecordBrowserNew method directly or creating hostname/address/servi | Medium 5.5 | 12 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-68468 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In 0.9-rc2 and earlier, avahi-daemon can be crashed by sending unsolicited announcements containing CNAME resource records pointing it to resource records with short TTLs. As soon as they expire avahi-daemon crashes. | Medium 6.5 | 12 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-68471 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In 0.9-rc2 and earlier, avahi-daemon can be crashed by sending 2 unsolicited announcements with CNAME resource records 2 seconds apart. | Medium 6.5 | 12 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-59529 | Avahi is a system which facilitates service discovery on a local network via the mDNS/DNS-SD protocol suite. In versions up to and including 0.9-rc5, the simple protocol server ignores the documented client limit and accepts unlimited connections, allowing for easy local DoS. Although `CLIENTS_MAX` is defined, `server_work()` unconditionally `accept()`s and `client_new()` always appends the new cl | Medium 5.5 | 18 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2023-38473 | A vulnerability was found in Avahi. A reachable assertion exists in the avahi_alternative_host_name() function. | Medium 6.2 | 2 Nov 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38469 | A vulnerability was found in Avahi, where a reachable assertion exists in avahi_dns_packet_append_record. | Medium 6.2 | 2 Nov 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38470 | A vulnerability was found in Avahi. A reachable assertion exists in the avahi_escape_label() function. | Medium 6.2 | 2 Nov 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38471 | A vulnerability was found in Avahi. A reachable assertion exists in the dbus_set_host_name function. | Medium 6.2 | 2 Nov 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38472 | A vulnerability was found in Avahi. A reachable assertion exists in the avahi_rdata_parse() function. | Medium 6.2 | 2 Nov 2023 |
| CVE-2023-1981 | A vulnerability was found in the avahi library. This flaw allows an unprivileged user to make a dbus call, causing the avahi daemon to crash. | Medium 5.5 | 26 May 2023 |
| CVE-2021-3468 | A flaw was found in avahi in versions 0.6 up to 0.8. The event used to signal the termination of the client connection on the avahi Unix socket is not correctly handled in the client_work function, allowing a local attacker to trigger an infinite loop. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to the availability of the avahi service, which becomes unresponsive after this flaw is triggered. | Medium 5.5 | 2 Jun 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3502 | A flaw was found in avahi 0.8-5. A reachable assertion is present in avahi_s_host_name_resolver_start function allowing a local attacker to crash the avahi service by requesting hostname resolutions through the avahi socket or dbus methods for invalid hostnames. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to the service availability. | Medium 5.5 | 7 May 2021 |
| CVE-2021-26720 | avahi-daemon-check-dns.sh in the Debian avahi package through 0.8-4 is executed as root via /etc/network/if-up.d/avahi-daemon, and allows a local attacker to cause a denial of service or create arbitrary empty files via a symlink attack on files under /run/avahi-daemon. NOTE: this only affects the packaging for Debian GNU/Linux (used indirectly by SUSE), not the upstream Avahi product. | High 7.8 | 17 Feb 2021 |
| CVE-2017-6519 | avahi-daemon in Avahi through 0.6.32 and 0.7 inadvertently responds to IPv6 unicast queries with source addresses that are not on-link, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (traffic amplification) and may cause information leakage by obtaining potentially sensitive information from the responding device via port-5353 UDP packets. NOTE: this may overlap CVE-2015-2809. | Critical 9.1 | 1 May 2017 |
| CVE-2011-1002 | avahi-core/socket.c in avahi-daemon in Avahi before 0.6.29 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via an empty mDNS (1) IPv4 or (2) IPv6 UDP packet to port 5353. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2010-2244. | Medium 5.0 | 22 Feb 2011 |
| CVE-2010-2244 | The AvahiDnsPacket function in avahi-core/socket.c in avahi-daemon in Avahi 0.6.16 and 0.6.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (assertion failure and daemon exit) via a DNS packet with an invalid checksum followed by a DNS packet with a valid checksum, a different vulnerability than CVE-2008-5081. | Medium 4.3 | 8 Jul 2010 |
| CVE-2009-0758 | The originates_from_local_legacy_unicast_socket function in avahi-core/server.c in avahi-daemon 0.6.23 does not account for the network byte order of a port number when processing incoming multicast packets, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (network bandwidth and CPU consumption) via a crafted legacy unicast mDNS query packet that triggers a multicast packet storm. | High 7.8 | 3 Mar 2009 |
| CVE-2008-5081 | The originates_from_local_legacy_unicast_socket function (avahi-core/server.c) in avahi-daemon in Avahi before 0.6.24 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) via a crafted mDNS packet with a source port of 0, which triggers an assertion failure. | Medium 5.0 | 17 Dec 2008 |
| CVE-2007-3372 | The Avahi daemon in Avahi before 0.6.20 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (exit) via empty TXT data over D-Bus, which triggers an assert error. | Low 2.1 | 22 Jun 2007 |
| CVE-2006-6870 | The consume_labels function in avahi-core/dns.c in Avahi before 0.6.16 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a crafted compressed DNS response with a label that points to itself. | Medium 5.0 | 31 Dec 2006 |
| CVE-2006-5461 | Avahi before 0.6.15 does not verify the sender identity of netlink messages to ensure that they come from the kernel instead of another process, which allows local users to spoof network changes to Avahi. | Low 2.1 | 14 Nov 2006 |
| CVE-2006-2289 | Buffer overflow in avahi-core in Avahi before 0.6.10 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via unknown vectors. | Low 2.1 | 10 May 2006 |
| CVE-2006-2288 | Avahi before 0.6.10 allows local users to cause a denial of service (mDNS/DNS-SD service disconnect) via unspecified mDNS name conflicts. | Low 3.6 | 10 May 2006 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Separately, for a merged upstream patch : up to $5,000 Google Patch Rewards pays for a patch you get accepted upstream and that stays merged, without reverts, for one month, not for the report. Avahi sits at Tier 2, where the panel grades a merged patch from $100 for a one-liner up to $5,000 for a complicated, high-impact improvement, entirely at its discretion. Patches must be at least one month and no more than twelve months old, maintainers hold a veto, the panel may split the award with them, and sanctions and territory exclusions apply. CVE history 6 Last 12 months 27 Lifetime Denial of service 40 % Memory safety 25 % Parsing/validation 20 % Access control 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Avahi is the mDNS and DNS-SD stack on effectively every Linux desktop and a very large share of Linux servers, NAS boxes and embedded images: CUPS printing, network file-share discovery, Chromecast and AirPlay discovery and most IoT provisioning flows all depend on it. avahi-daemon listens on UDP/5353 on every local interface and processes packets from any host on the same L2 segment with no authentication, having historically run as a privileged system daemon. That is one of the very few pre-auth attack surfaces present by default on a stock Linux install. Twenty-seven CVEs lifetime and six in the last twelve months say it is still producing. The project pays nothing for a vulnerability report, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The mDNS and DNS-SD packet parser in avahi-core , reachable from any unauthenticated host on the local link, the origin of CVE-2021-3468 and of the 2023 CVE-2023-1981 assert cluster The D-Bus interface exposed by avahi-daemon , where a local unprivileged caller reaches a daemon that has historically run as root Record and hostname conflict resolution, and the probe and announce state machine that drives it avahi-dnsconfd and the path on which the daemon writes resolver configuration for the rest of the system The client library libavahi-client , which browsers, printing stacks and file managers link against and feed with daemon-supplied data Out of scope The fact that mDNS has no authentication, which is a property of the protocol rather than a defect in this implementation Apple's Bonjour and mDNSResponder, which are a different implementation of the same protocol AppArmor and SELinux policy gaps introduced by a distribution rather than by Avahi itself Local denial of service triggered by a user who already holds a session on the machine One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules exclude by name along with resource-exhaustion denial of service Most-valued findings Remote, unauthenticated memory corruption in the avahi-core packet parser driven purely by link-local traffic, which is the highest-consequence shape this daemon can produce and the one the reward panel grades at the top of its ladder A structural hardening of the parser that closes a whole class of malformed-record handling rather than one crash, since Patch Rewards pays most for improvements that prevent future vulnerabilities rather than fix a single one Privilege escalation across the D-Bus boundary, where a local unprivileged process reaches something the root daemon should never have exposed Remotely triggerable denial of service, the largest slice of Avahi's CVE history at 40%, where the fix is systematic rather than a single bounds check Any of the above demonstrated on a default distribution install, since Avahi's value as a target is precisely that nobody chose to enable it Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through the project's GitHub private vulnerability reporting; the maintainer triages there and pays nothing for the report itself Send a detailed, reproducible report with the packet or D-Bus message that triggers it. If we can't reproduce it, it isn't eligible Give the maintainer room to ship a fix before any public writeup If you also want the Google patch money, land the fix upstream yourself and keep it merged without reverts for a month. That is a separate pathway with its own rules The Patch Rewards side is rate-limited to three submissions per person per month, will not pay for one-liner fixes to non-exploitable crashes, and excludes researchers in sanctioned territories Disclosure Coordinated with the Avahi maintainer through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, which produces a GitHub Security Advisory and a CVE with researcher credit. Avahi came out of a maintenance gap and is active again, so hold the detail until the advisory publishes rather than working to a fixed clock. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability