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Bouncy Castle

Bug bounty on Sorona bouncycastle.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Hall of fame
Yes The project offers to open a security advisory crediting you, and optionally to list you in Contributors.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://www.bouncycastle.org

Products and areas 12

  • CMS, S/MIME, PKCS#7, PKCS#12 and the certificate management protocols the project implements, including CMP and EST
  • The ASN.1 layer underneath all of the above, which decodes attacker-supplied structure before any signature has been checked
  • The FIPS distributions and their self-test and boundary machinery
  • The JCE and JCA provider surface: every algorithm registered through it, and the parameter handling on the way in
  • The lightweight API, which callers use directly to reach primitives without going through the provider framework
  • The OpenPGP implementation and everything it parses, which handles data supplied entirely by a third party
  • The PKIX stack: certificate parsing, path building and validation, name constraints, CRL and OCSP handling
  • The public key implementations across RSA, DSA, the elliptic curve families, the national algorithm suites such as GOST and SM2, and the post-quantum algorithms the project has added
  • The published policy asks for security reports at the dedicated mailbox and commits to opening an advisory. It sets out a workflow rather than a component boundary, so treat the whole provider as in scope across both the Java and C# distributions
  • The symmetric ciphers and their modes, including the AEAD constructions, tag verification and the counter and IV handling that recent findings landed in
  • The TLS and DTLS implementation and the JSSE provider built on it, covering handshake state, the record layer and the trust decisions in between
  • The utility and encoding surface, including the base64, hex and PEM handling that parses input a caller did not produce
Out of scope (5)
  • Application misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken, such as supplying a repeated IV to a mode that requires a unique one
  • Forks and repackaged copies of Bouncy Castle maintained by someone else, including a platform vendor's derived version
  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues, since the project asks for security reports at the dedicated mailbox
  • The JDK's own bundled providers or the .NET platform's cryptography APIs rather than Bouncy Castle's implementations
  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Report by email to the address on the policy page , the dedicated security mailbox the project publishes
  • Say which distribution the finding is in, bc-java or bc-csharp, and check the other one before reporting.
  • Name the JDK or .NET target and the provider registration.
  • State whether the FIPS distribution is affected.

Not accepted

  • Application misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken
  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it
  • Forks and repackaged copies of Bouncy Castle maintained by someone else
  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 22 minutes ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-63575 High 7.1 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63576 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63577 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63578 High 7.1 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63570 High 7.1 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63571 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63572 High 7.1 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63573 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63574 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103601 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103602 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103603 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103604 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-17507 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103600 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-16001 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63566 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63567 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63568 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-63569 Critical 9.1 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-15999 High 8.2 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-16000 High 8.7 2 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-14682 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13586 Medium 5.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12852 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12860 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13506 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12803 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12816 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12817 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12802 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-58061 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-58062 Critical 9.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-58063 Medium 5.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-58059 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-58060 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59652 Medium 6.9 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-8763 Critical 9.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59645 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59646 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59647 Medium 6.9 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59648 Medium 6.9 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59649 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59650 Critical 9.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59651 High 7.1 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59638 Critical 9.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59639 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59640 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59641 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59642 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59643 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-59644 High 8.7 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-12185 High 7.1 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-15055 Medium 5.3 3 Aug 2026
CVE-2024-14041 High 8.2 28 Jul 2026
CVE-2023-33202 Medium 5.5 23 Nov 2023
CVE-2023-33201 Medium 5.3 5 Jul 2023
CVE-2022-45146 Medium 5.5 21 Nov 2022
CVE-2020-15522 Medium 5.9 20 May 2021
CVE-2020-28052 High 8.1 18 Dec 2020

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 4 Last 12 months Cryptographic weakness 40 % Side channel / timing 25 % Injection 20 % Resource exhaustion 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Bouncy Castle is the cryptography provider Java and .NET software reaches for when the platform's own APIs fall short. It is the default provider across a large amount of JVM enterprise software, parts of it were carried into Android, and its FIPS builds run in regulated deployments where the alternative is a hardware module. GHSA-574f-3g2m-x479 is the reference point: a keystream reuse defect in GOST CTR mode, meaning a cipher that quietly stopped encrypting. The Legion of the Bouncy Castle is a real corporate entity and it offers advisory credit rather than money. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published policy asks for security reports at the dedicated mailbox and commits to opening an advisory. It sets out a workflow rather than a component boundary, so treat the whole provider as in scope across both the Java and C# distributions The JCE and JCA provider surface: every algorithm registered through it, and the parameter handling on the way in The lightweight API, which callers use directly to reach primitives without going through the provider framework The symmetric ciphers and their modes, including the AEAD constructions, tag verification and the counter and IV handling that recent findings landed in The public key implementations across RSA, DSA, the elliptic curve families, the national algorithm suites such as GOST and SM2, and the post-quantum algorithms the project has added The PKIX stack: certificate parsing, path building and validation, name constraints, CRL and OCSP handling CMS, S/MIME, PKCS#7, PKCS#12 and the certificate management protocols the project implements, including CMP and EST The OpenPGP implementation and everything it parses, which handles data supplied entirely by a third party The TLS and DTLS implementation and the JSSE provider built on it, covering handshake state, the record layer and the trust decisions in between The ASN.1 layer underneath all of the above, which decodes attacker-supplied structure before any signature has been checked The FIPS distributions and their self-test and boundary machinery The utility and encoding surface, including the base64, hex and PEM handling that parses input a caller did not produce Out of scope The JDK's own bundled providers or the .NET platform's cryptography APIs rather than Bouncy Castle's implementations Application misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken, such as supplying a repeated IV to a mode that requires a unique one Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it Forks and repackaged copies of Bouncy Castle maintained by someone else, including a platform vendor's derived version Reports filed as public GitHub issues, since the project asks for security reports at the dedicated mailbox Most-valued findings Anything that makes a cipher stop encrypting. GHSA-574f-3g2m-x479 reused the keystream in GOST CTR mode, which produces ciphertext that looks correct and protects nothing Signature or certificate verification that accepts what it should reject, anywhere in PKIX, CMS or OpenPGP, since this library is the verification path for a great deal of enterprise document and code signing Timing and other side channel signals in the primitive implementations, the class GHSA-p93r-85wp-75v3 landed in, which matter on shared JVM hosting where an attacker runs beside the victim Injection through a component that builds a query or a name from parsed material. GHSA-c3fc-8qff-9hwx was LDAP injection reached through this library rather than through the application above it Algorithmic complexity and unbounded allocation on parsed input, the shape GHSA-67mf-3cr5-8w23 took, which on a JVM service is a remote denial of service against the whole process ASN.1 decoder defects generally, because everything above it, certificates, CMS structures and OpenPGP packets, is decoded before it is authenticated Anything that breaks a FIPS build's boundary or lets a self-test pass over an implementation that is not producing correct output A defect present in both bc-java and bc-csharp, which doubles the blast radius and is common given how much design the two distributions share Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report by email to [email protected] , the dedicated security mailbox the project publishes GitHub private vulnerability reporting is switched off on bcgit/bc-java , so email is the only private intake and the advisory button is not available Say which distribution the finding is in, bc-java or bc-csharp, and check the other one before reporting. The two share design and a great many algorithm implementations, so a defect in one is often present in both Name the JDK or .NET target and the provider registration. Behaviour differs between the JCE provider, the lightweight API and the FIPS builds, and a finding may only exist in one of them State whether the FIPS distribution is affected. Those builds are certified artefacts used in regulated deployments and a defect there carries a certification consequence as well The project offers to open a security advisory crediting you, and optionally to list you in Contributors. There is no payment to negotiate Disclosure Coordinated by email with the maintainers and published as a GitHub Security Advisory that credits the reporter. The April 2026 pattern shows three advisories going out on a single day, so expect fixes to be batched into a release rather than published one at a time. Enterprise JVM consumers upgrade a crypto provider slowly and the FIPS builds slower still, so hold the detail past the release date rather than to it. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability