- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 16
- Public CVEs
- 41
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
16 assets you may test, 6 excluded.
Web 1
- https://cilium.io
Products and areas 15
- CiliumNetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy evaluation in full, along with Kubernetes NetworkPolicy as Cilium implements it
- Cluster Mesh, the cross-cluster identity and service model, and the trust between clusters it establishes
- DNS-based and FQDN policy: the DNS proxy, the responses it observes and the IP set a name resolves into
- Hubble, the relay, the UI and the flow data each exposes
- kube-proxy replacement, service load balancing, the egress gateway, the bandwidth manager and the NAT and masquerading paths
- Layer 7 policy enforcement, including HTTP, gRPC, Kafka and DNS rules and the proxy that applies them
- Security identity allocation, the mapping from pod labels to numeric identities, and identity garbage collection and reuse
- The BGP control plane and any route Cilium advertises or accepts
- The cilium-agent, its API socket, and the privileged operations a caller on that socket can request on the node
- The cilium CLI and the debug endpoints the agent exposes
- The Cilium operator and every CRD it reconciles, including the identity and endpoint resources
- The eBPF datapath programs and the loader that compiles and installs them, plus the maps they share with userspace
- The Envoy integration Cilium configures for layer 7 policy, Ingress and Gateway API
- The policy asks for private reports at [email protected] with GitHub Security Advisories used for publication, and declares no boundary narrower than the Cilium project's own code
- Transparent encryption with IPsec and WireGuard, key generation, key rotation and what happens to traffic during a rotation
Out of scope (6)
- A network policy an operator wrote that is simply more permissive than intended
- Envoy upstream, unless Cilium's configuration or integration of it is what makes the defect reachable
- Managed Kubernetes providers' own forks and distribution-specific patches
- Reports filed as public GitHub issues rather than through the security list
- Tetragon and other sibling projects in their own repositories
- The Linux kernel and its eBPF verifier, which is upstream and has its own process
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Report privately to the security mailing list at the address on the policy page . GitHub Security Advisories are used for publication and disclosure follows a patched release
-
Do not file this at the Kubernetes HackerOne programme. That paid scope covers the Kubernetes org repositories and does not reach separate CNCF projects
-
Give the full policy set that reproduces it, in YAML, along with the identities of both endpoints.
-
Say which datapath mode was in use: kube-proxy replacement or not, tunnelled or native routing, and whether the encryption layer was on.
-
State the Cilium and kernel versions.
Not accepted
-
A network policy an operator wrote that is simply more permissive than intended
-
Reports filed as public GitHub issues rather than through the security list
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-56742 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution. Prior to 1.17.17, 1.18.11, and 1.19.5, Cilium clusters using Gateway API allow users with permissions to create or update namespaced HTTPRoutes to mirror HTTP traffic to any Service in any namespace, bypassing the ReferenceGrant authorization mechanism. Gateway API functionality is disabled by default. This issue is fixed in versions 1. | Medium 5.9 | 15 Jul 2026 |
| CVE-2026-56743 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution. From 1.19.0 to 1.19.4, standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy specifications using CIDR-based ipBlock rules without pod or namespace selectors erroneously generate a wildcard namespace allow rule when Cilium is configured with a custom clusterName rather than the default any value. The parser incorrectly instantiates a pod selector on select | Medium 5.4 | 15 Jul 2026 |
| CVE-2026-49445 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution. Prior to 1.17.14, 1.18.8, and 1.19.2, when Cilium L7 functionality is enabled, the embedded or standalone Envoy instance creates a world-accessible admin.sock on cluster nodes, allowing a local attacker to access Envoy admin endpoints, expose TLS secrets, disrupt cluster traffic, or terminate Envoy. This issue is fixed in versions 1.17. | Critical 9.2 | 15 Jul 2026 |
| CVE-2026-10722 | A vulnerability has been found in cilium ebpf up to 0.21.0. This affects the function loadRawSpec of the file btf/btf.go of the component LoadCollectionSpec/LoadCollectionSpecFromReader. Such manipulation of the argument offset leads to integer overflow. The attack can only be performed from a local environment. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The name of the patch is | Low 1.9 | 3 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-41520 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.17.15, 1.18.9, and 1.19.3, the output of cilium-bugtool can contain sensitive data when the tool is run against Cilium deployments with WireGuard encryption enabled. This issue has been patched in versions 1.17.15, 1.18.9, and 1.19.3. | High 7.9 | 8 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-33726 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.17.14, 1.18.8, and 1.19.2, Ingress Network Policies are not enforced for traffic from pods to L7 Services (Envoy, GAMMA) with a local backend on the same node, when Per-Endpoint Routing is enabled and BPF Host Routing is disabled. Per-Endpoint Routing is disabled by default, but is automa | Medium 5.4 | 27 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-26963 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Versions 1.18.0 through 1.18.5 will incorrectly permit traffic from Pods on other nodes when Native Routing, WireGuard and Node Encryption are enabled. This issue has been fixed in version 1.18.6. | Medium 6.1 | 20 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2025-64715 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.16.17, 1.17.10, and 1.18.4, CiliumNetworkPolicys which use egress.toGroups.aws.securityGroupsIds to reference AWS security group IDs that do not exist or are not attached to any network interface may unintentionally allow broader outbound access than intended by the policy authors. In suc | Medium 4.0 | 29 Nov 2025 |
| CVE-2025-32793 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Versions 1.15.0 to 1.15.15, 1.16.0 to 1.16.8, and 1.17.0 to 1.17.2, are vulnerable when using Wireguard transparent encryption in a Cilium cluster, packets that originate from a terminating endpoint can leave the source node without encryption due to a race condition in how traffic is processed by Cilium. Th | Medium 4.0 | 21 Apr 2025 |
| CVE-2025-30162 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. For Cilium users who use Gateway API for Ingress for some services and use LB-IPAM or BGP for LB Service implementation and use network policies to block egress traffic from workloads in a namespace to workloads in other namespaces, egress traffic from workloads covered by such network policies to LoadBalanc | Low 3.2 | 24 Mar 2025 |
| CVE-2025-30163 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Node based network policies (`fromNodes` and `toNodes`) will incorrectly permit traffic to/from non-node endpoints that share the labels specified in `fromNodes` and `toNodes` sections of network policies. Node based network policy is disabled by default in Cilium. This issue affects: Cilium v1.16 between v1 | Low 3.4 | 24 Mar 2025 |
| CVE-2025-23047 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. An insecure default `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header value could lead to sensitive data exposure for users of Cilium versions 1.14.0 through 1.14.7, 1.15.0 through 1.15.11, and 1.16.0 through 1.16.4 who deploy Hubble UI using either Cilium CLI or via the Cilium Helm chart. A user with access to a Hubble | Medium 6.5 | 22 Jan 2025 |
| CVE-2025-23028 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. A denial of service vulnerability affects versions 1.14.0 through 1.14.7, 1.15.0 through 1.15.11, and 1.16.0 through 1.16.4. In a Kubernetes cluster where Cilium is configured to proxy DNS traffic, an attacker can crash Cilium agents by sending a crafted DNS response to workloads from outside the cluster. Fo | Medium 5.3 | 22 Jan 2025 |
| CVE-2024-52529 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. For users with the following configuration: 1. An allow policy that selects a Layer 3 destination and a port range `AND` 2. A Layer 7 allow policy that selects a specific port within the first policy's range the Layer 7 enforcement would not occur for the traffic selected by the Layer 7 policy. This issue on | Medium 5.8 | 25 Nov 2024 |
| CVE-2024-47825 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Starting in version 1.14.0 and prior to versions 1.14.16 and 1.15.10, a policy rule denying a prefix that is broader than `/32` may be ignored if there is a policy rule referencing a more narrow prefix (`CIDRSet` or `toFQDN`) and this narrower policy rule specifies either `enableDefaultDeny: false` or `- toE | Medium 4.0 | 21 Oct 2024 |
| CVE-2024-42486 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. In versions on the 1.15.x branch prior to 1.15.8 and the 1.16.x branch prior to 1.16.1, ReferenceGrant changes are not correctly propagated in Cilium's GatewayAPI controller, which could lead to Gateway resources being able to access secrets for longer than intended, or to Routes having the ability to forwar | Medium 5.4 | 16 Aug 2024 |
| CVE-2024-42487 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. In the 1.15 branch prior to 1.15.8 and the 1.16 branch prior to 1.16.1, Gateway API HTTPRoutes and GRPCRoutes do not follow the match precedence specified in the Gateway API specification. In particular, request headers are matched before request methods, when the specification describes that the request met | Medium 4.0 | 15 Aug 2024 |
| CVE-2024-42488 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.14.14 and 1.15.8, a race condition in the Cilium agent can cause the agent to ignore labels that should be applied to a node. This could in turn cause CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicies intended for nodes with the ignored label to not apply, leading to policy bypass. This issue has been pat | Medium 6.8 | 15 Aug 2024 |
| CVE-2024-37307 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Starting in version 1.13.0 and prior to versions 1.13.7, 1.14.12, and 1.15.6, the output of `cilium-bugtool` can contain sensitive data when the tool is run (with the `--envoy-dump` flag set) against Cilium deployments with the Envoy proxy enabled. Users of the TLS inspection, Ingress with TLS termination, G | High 7.9 | 13 Jun 2024 |
| CVE-2024-28860 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Users of IPsec transparent encryption in Cilium may be vulnerable to cryptographic attacks that render the transparent encryption ineffective. In particular, Cilium is vulnerable to chosen plaintext, key recovery, replay attacks by a man-in-the-middle attacker. These attacks are possible due to an ESP sequen | High 8.0 | 27 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-28249 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.13.13, 1.14.8, and 1.15.2, in Cilium clusters with IPsec enabled and traffic matching Layer 7 policies, IPsec-eligible traffic between a node's Envoy proxy and pods on other nodes is sent unencrypted and IPsec-eligible traffic between a node's DNS proxy and pods on other nodes is sent une | Medium 6.1 | 18 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-28250 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Starting in version 1.14.0 and prior to versions 1.14.8 and 1.15.2, In Cilium clusters with WireGuard enabled and traffic matching Layer 7 policies Wireguard-eligible traffic that is sent between a node's Envoy proxy and pods on other nodes is sent unencrypted and Wireguard-eligible traffic that is sent betw | Medium 6.1 | 18 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-28248 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Starting in version 1.13.9 and prior to versions 1.13.13, 1.14.8, and 1.15.2, Cilium's HTTP policies are not consistently applied to all traffic in the scope of the policies, leading to HTTP traffic being incorrectly and intermittently forwarded when it should be dropped. This issue has been patched in Ciliu | High 7.2 | 18 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-25630 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. For Cilium users who are using CRDs to store Cilium state (the default configuration) and Wireguard transparent encryption, traffic to/from the Ingress and health endpoints is not encrypted. This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7 and has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. There is no workaround to this | Medium 6.1 | 20 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2024-25631 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. For Cilium users who have enabled an external kvstore and Wireguard transparent encryption, traffic between pods in the affected cluster is not encrypted. This issue affects Cilium v1.14 before v1.14.7 and has been patched in Cilium v1.14.7. There is no workaround to this issue. | Medium 6.1 | 20 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2023-41332 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. In Cilium clusters where Cilium's Layer 7 proxy has been disabled, creating workloads with `policy.cilium.io/proxy-visibility` annotations (in Cilium >= v1.13) or `io.cilium.proxy-visibility` annotations (in Cilium <= v1.12) causes the Cilium agent to segfault on the node to which the workload is assigned. E | Low 3.5 | 27 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41333 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. An attacker with the ability to create or modify CiliumNetworkPolicy objects in a particular namespace is able to affect traffic on an entire Cilium cluster, potentially bypassing policy enforcement in other namespaces. By using a crafted `endpointSelector` that uses the `DoesNotExist` operator on the `reser | Medium 6.9 | 27 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-39347 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. An attacker with the ability to update pod labels can cause Cilium to apply incorrect network policies. This issue arises due to the fact that on pod update, Cilium incorrectly uses user-provided pod labels to select the policies which apply to the workload in question. This can affect Cilium network policie | High 7.6 | 27 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-34242 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to version 1.13.4, when Gateway API is enabled in Cilium, the absence of a check on the namespace in which a ReferenceGrant is created could result in Cilium unintentionally gaining visibility of secrets (including certificates) and services across namespaces. An attacker on an affected cluster can lev | Low 3.4 | 15 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-30851 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. This issue only impacts users who have a HTTP policy that applies to multiple `toEndpoints` AND have an allow-all rule in place that affects only one of those endpoints. In such cases, a wildcard rule will be appended to the set of HTTP rules, which could cause bypass of HTTP policies. This issue has been pa | Low 2.6 | 25 May 2023 |
| CVE-2023-29002 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. When run in debug mode, Cilium will log the contents of the `cilium-secrets` namespace. This could include data such as TLS private keys for Ingress and GatewayAPI resources. An attacker with access to debug output from the Cilium containers could use the resulting output to intercept and modify traffic to a | High 7.2 | 18 Apr 2023 |
| CVE-2023-28114 | `cilium-cli` is the command line interface to install, manage, and troubleshoot Kubernetes clusters running Cilium. Prior to version 0.13.2,`cilium-cli`, when used to configure cluster mesh functionality, can remove the enforcement of user permissions on the `etcd` store used to mirror local cluster information to remote clusters. Users who have set up cluster meshes using the Cilium Helm chart ar | Medium 4.8 | 22 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2023-27595 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. In version 1.13.0, when Cilium is started, there is a short period when Cilium eBPF programs are not attached to the host. During this period, the host does not implement any of Cilium's featureset. This can cause disruption to newly established connections during this period due to the lack of Load Balancin | Medium 6.5 | 17 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2023-27594 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.11.15, 1.12.8, and 1.13.1, under specific conditions, Cilium may misattribute the source IP address of traffic to a cluster, identifying external traffic as coming from the host on which Cilium is running. As a consequence, network policies for that cluster might be bypassed, depending on | Medium 4.2 | 17 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2023-27593 | Cilium is a networking, observability, and security solution with an eBPF-based dataplane. Prior to versions 1.11.15, 1.12.8, and 1.13.1, an attacker with access to a Cilium agent pod can write to `/opt/cni/bin` due to a `hostPath` mount of that directory in the agent pod. By replacing the CNI binary with their own malicious binary and waiting for the creation of a new pod on the node, the attacke | Medium 4.4 | 17 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2022-29178 | Cilium is open source software for providing and securing network connectivity and loadbalancing between application workloads. Cilium prior to versions 1.9.16, 1.10.11, and 1.11.15 contains an incorrect default permissions vulnerability. Operating Systems with users belonging to the group ID 1000 can access the API of Cilium via Unix domain socket available on the host where Cilium is running. Th | High 8.8 | 20 May 2022 |
| CVE-2022-29179 | Cilium is open source software for providing and securing network connectivity and loadbalancing between application workloads. Prior to versions 1.9.16, 1.10.11, and 1.11.15, if an attacker is able to perform a container escape of a container running as root on a host where Cilium is installed, the attacker can escalate privileges to cluster admin by using Cilium's Kubernetes service account. The | High 7.5 | 20 May 2022 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 8 Last 12 months 41 Lifetime Policy bypass 40 % Identity confusion 25 % Privilege escalation 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Cilium is the eBPF networking and network-policy layer for Kubernetes, embedded as the default dataplane in GKE Dataplane V2, AKS and EKS Anywhere. It writes the datapath every packet between pods traverses and it enforces the policies separating one workload from another. A policy-evaluation defect silently removes a boundary an operator believes is in place, and nothing in the cluster reports that it has gone. Its agent runs privileged on every node with the ability to load eBPF programs into the kernel. Cilium's security policy offers advisory credit and states there is no monetary incentive. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The policy asks for private reports at [email protected] with GitHub Security Advisories used for publication, and declares no boundary narrower than the Cilium project's own code The eBPF datapath programs and the loader that compiles and installs them, plus the maps they share with userspace CiliumNetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy evaluation in full, along with Kubernetes NetworkPolicy as Cilium implements it Layer 7 policy enforcement, including HTTP, gRPC, Kafka and DNS rules and the proxy that applies them DNS-based and FQDN policy: the DNS proxy, the responses it observes and the IP set a name resolves into Security identity allocation, the mapping from pod labels to numeric identities, and identity garbage collection and reuse The cilium-agent, its API socket, and the privileged operations a caller on that socket can request on the node The Cilium operator and every CRD it reconciles, including the identity and endpoint resources Cluster Mesh, the cross-cluster identity and service model, and the trust between clusters it establishes The Envoy integration Cilium configures for layer 7 policy, Ingress and Gateway API Transparent encryption with IPsec and WireGuard, key generation, key rotation and what happens to traffic during a rotation kube-proxy replacement, service load balancing, the egress gateway, the bandwidth manager and the NAT and masquerading paths Hubble, the relay, the UI and the flow data each exposes The BGP control plane and any route Cilium advertises or accepts The cilium CLI and the debug endpoints the agent exposes Out of scope The Linux kernel and its eBPF verifier, which is upstream and has its own process Tetragon and other sibling projects in their own repositories Envoy upstream, unless Cilium's configuration or integration of it is what makes the defect reachable A network policy an operator wrote that is simply more permissive than intended Managed Kubernetes providers' own forks and distribution-specific patches Reports filed as public GitHub issues rather than through the security list Most-valued findings Network policy bypass, any path where traffic a CiliumNetworkPolicy denies is delivered anyway. This is the class the whole product exists to prevent and it fails silently Identity confusion, where a pod is assigned or inherits the security identity of a different workload. Every policy decision downstream then applies to the wrong thing DNS and FQDN policy defects, where a response an attacker influences widens the IP set a policy allows, since the proxy is trusting resolution it did not control Escape from the agent API socket into privileged operations on the node, given that a workload with access to it is talking to a root process holding eBPF load capability eBPF map access or program loading reachable by an unprivileged workload, which reaches kernel state well beyond the container Cluster Mesh trust defects that let one cluster's identities be honoured in another, collapsing the boundary between separate clusters Layer 7 enforcement in the Envoy path where the policy layer and the backend parse a request differently, the classic normalisation gap IPsec and WireGuard handling that leaves traffic unencrypted, reuses key material or fails open during rotation Hubble exposing flow data across a tenancy boundary, since flow records describe every connection in the cluster Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to the security mailing list at [email protected] . GitHub Security Advisories are used for publication and disclosure follows a patched release The policy offers credit only, a Reported-by: trailer and an advisory acknowledgement, and states there is no monetary incentive Do not file this at the Kubernetes HackerOne programme. That paid scope covers the Kubernetes org repositories and does not reach separate CNCF projects Give the full policy set that reproduces it, in YAML, along with the identities of both endpoints. Policy findings depend entirely on how labels resolved to security identities at the time Say which datapath mode was in use: kube-proxy replacement or not, tunnelled or native routing, and whether the encryption layer was on. The eBPF programs differ substantially between them State the Cilium and kernel versions. The datapath is compiled against kernel capabilities and a behaviour on one kernel may be absent on another Disclosure Coordinated privately through the Cilium security list, with disclosure at or after a patched release and a GitHub Security Advisory carrying the CVE and the reporter's credit. Because Cilium is embedded in managed Kubernetes offerings, coordination reaches those distributors before publication, so the embargo runs to the patched release rather than to a day count you set. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability