Dawn / Tint

Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Memory corruption from web contents, controlled write in the browser, network or GPU process (this project's ceiling; the $250,000 full-chain rungs need a complete Chromium exploit) │ $5,000 │ $6,000 Memory corruption from web contents, ASAN write or use-after-free │ $2,500 │ $3,125 Memory corruption from web contents, controlled read │ $2,500 │ $3,125 Memory corruption from web contents, ASAN read │ $1,000 │ $1,250 Base reward (below-baseline report, mitigated issue, or no harness available) │ $500 │ $625 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 39 Last 12 months 70 Lifetime Memory safety 50 % Parsing/validation 25 % Access control 15 % Info disclosure 5 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Dawn is Chromium's WebGPU implementation and Tint, living in-tree at src/tint, is its WGSL shader compiler. WebGPU is on by default in Chrome, Edge and the Chromium derivatives on desktop, so Dawn is already in front of more than a billion users, and it is additionally used as a standalone native WebGPU implementation by projects that want a portable GPU abstraction. Its strategic significance exceeds its age: it is the successor to WebGL as the primary JavaScript-to-GPU path, and shader compilers are historically one of the richest memory-safety veins in any browser. The numbers bear that out: 39 of its 70 Chrome CVEs landed in a single recent quarter, more than PDFium and Blink combined, which is what a young attack surface under heavy fuzzing looks like. Its own CPE records zero vulnerabilities, so a CPE-driven sweep would conclude this project has never had one. Google pays $500 for a below-baseline report and up to $5,000 on the standard table for a controlled write reached from web contents, with a full chain built on the bug separately eligible for $250,000. sorona.xyz adds 1.25× on top of whatever Google awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. In scope The Chrome VRP takes any High or Critical severity bug in Chrome Browser, and Dawn is Chromium project code, so it is covered directly rather than as a vendored dependency The WebGPU API implementation and its validation layer, the entire security boundary on the newest and least-hardened path from JavaScript to the GPU Tint, the WGSL compiler living in-tree at src/tint: its parser, resolver and transforms, and the SPIR-V, HLSL, MSL and GLSL writers behind them Every backend Dawn ships: Vulkan, Metal, D3D12, D3D11 and OpenGL ES Object lifetime and the command-encoder and queue-submission state machine, covering buffers, textures, bind groups and pipelines The wire protocol between the renderer and the GPU process, an IPC deserialisation surface fed by a sandboxed process Out of scope Anything below the High or Critical bar the scope sentence sets, along with low-quality submissions, which are capped at the $500 base amount Configurations where WebGPU is not enabled by default, which fall under the experimental and unshipped-features exclusion Experimental features, debugging features and unsafe browser flags generally, per the program's standard exclusions Code on trunk less than seven days old, which has not reached any shipping channel Reports filed to the Google OSS VRP rather than the Chrome VRP, where a product vulnerability in Dawn pays nothing Defects that only reproduce in a standalone native embedding of Dawn rather than in Chrome Speculative reports that do not demonstrate the bug actually manifesting in a shipping browser Most-valued findings A controlled write in the GPU process reached from WebGPU on a default desktop Chrome. That is the top of the standard table at $5,000 and the class Dawn's rising CVE rate is concentrated in Tint compiler memory corruption on page-supplied WGSL, where an attacker controls the entire input to a parser, an optimiser and four separate code emitters Validation-layer bypass that lets a page issue commands the WebGPU specification forbids, since the validation layer is the only thing between JavaScript and the driver on this path Buffer and texture lifetime confusion driven through the command encoder, producing use-after-free in the GPU process from ordinary API sequencing Deserialisation flaws in the renderer-to-GPU wire protocol, which is reachable from an already-compromised renderer and is the step a sandbox escape is built out of Uninitialised GPU memory readable back into a page, which is the info-disclosure slice and reaches the user-information-disclosure rung rather than the base amount Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. File to the Chrome VRP, not the Google OSS VRP, where Dawn's absence from the tier file means a product vulnerability pays nothing Reproduce on desktop Chrome, where WebGPU is enabled by default; mobile configurations still sitting behind a flag fall under the unshipped-and-experimental-features exclusion The bug must manifest in an active Stable, Beta or Dev channel on the latest operating system and 64-bit hardware, and code less than seven days old on trunk is excluded Dawn runs in the GPU process, so say so in the report: that is the higher-paying of the two memory-safety tables and the difference is several thousand dollars Name the backend you reproduced on: Vulkan, Metal, D3D12, D3D11 and OpenGL ES are separate code paths and a finding on one does not automatically apply to the others Disclosure Coordinated through the Chromium issue tracker, where reports are made public 14 weeks after being marked as fixed. Hold the detail until the program confirms a fix has shipped and you are clear to publish. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability