Ghostscript

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Separately, for a merged upstream patch : up to $5,000 Google Patch Rewards pays for a patch you get accepted upstream and that stays merged, without reverts, for one month, not for the report. Ghostscript qualifies at Tier 2 through its OSS-Fuzz integration, where a complicated, high-impact improvement tops out at $5,000 against a $100 floor, and memory-safety hardening can carry a 2× or 3× multiplier. Patches must be one to twelve months old at submission, are capped at three per person per month, and sanctions and territory exclusions apply. CVE history 3 Last 12 months 129 Lifetime Code execution 35 % Memory safety 30 % Access control 20 % Parsing/validation 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Ghostscript is the PostScript and PDF rasterisation engine underneath essentially all of Unix printing. It sits below CUPS and lpr , inside most print servers, and inside commercial print-workflow appliances that are updated rarely if ever. The dangerous path is the indirect one: ImageMagick invokes Ghostscript as a delegate whenever a PDF or EPS is converted, so a PDF uploaded to a web application is routinely handed, unattended, to an interpreter that executes attacker-written PostScript behind the -dSAFER sandbox. When that sandbox has failed, the result has repeatedly been a mass-exploited server bug rather than a desktop nuisance. Artifex runs no bounty, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope Reports go through the contact in the project's SECURITY.md, and what is covered is the Ghostscript tree itself, reachable however a downstream caller feeds it. Nothing narrower is carved out The PostScript interpreter in full: the language implementation, the operator table, and the place where attacker-written program text is executed directly The -dSAFER sandbox and every restriction it is supposed to impose, since SAFER is the guarantee every downstream integrator relies on when it feeds Ghostscript an untrusted file The PDF interpreter under pdf/ , rewritten in C for the Ghostscript 10.x series and therefore comparatively fresh, less-exercised code The graphics library and the whole of devices/ , covering the raster, printer and display back ends that turn interpreted content into output The gs_* font and CMap machinery, where malformed embedded fonts and character mappings are parsed The glue around the bundled jbig2dec , JPEG and lcms decoders, where Ghostscript hands attacker-controlled data across a library boundary The command-line front end and the options, resource paths and initialisation files it accepts, which is what downstream delegate invocations such as ImageMagick's are built on Out of scope One-line patches for non-exploitable crashes and resource-exhaustion denial of service, which the Patch Rewards rules say will not generally be rewarded MuPDF, which is a separate Artifex product with its own OSS-Fuzz entry and therefore its own separate Tier 2 line Patches the Artifex maintainers decline, because the money attaches to a patch that is merged and stays merged rather than to one that is proposed Patches outside the one-to-twelve-month age window the programme applies at submission time Submissions beyond the cap of three per person per month Most-valued findings A -dSAFER sandbox escape that reaches file write or command execution from a crafted PostScript or PDF file. Repeated CVEs here have been pure SAFER bypasses, and this is the shape that has turned into mass server exploitation through ImageMagick delegation Memory corruption in the PostScript interpreter or operator table driven purely by attacker-supplied program text. That is historically the richest source of sandbox escapes in this codebase, and code execution and memory safety together account for roughly two-thirds of the CVE history Defects in the freshly rewritten C PDF interpreter under pdf/ , which is the least-exercised large surface in the tree Anything reachable through the ImageMagick delegate path, because that is the route by which an uploaded document reaches Ghostscript unattended on a server Font and CMap parsing bugs reachable from an embedded font, which arrive inside otherwise ordinary-looking documents Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Send a detailed, reproducible report through the contact in the project's SECURITY.md, with the PostScript or PDF file that triggers it; if it cannot be reproduced it is not eligible Show the bug against the -dSAFER sandbox that downstream integrators actually rely on. A finding that only reproduces with SAFER explicitly disabled is not a boundary crossing MuPDF is a separate Artifex product with its own OSS-Fuzz entry and its own Tier 2 line, so aim the report at the right codebase If you also want the Google patch money, land the fix upstream yourself and keep it merged without reverts for one month. That is a separate pathway with its own rules On that pathway Ghostscript is Tier 2 via OSS-Fuzz, patches must be one to twelve months old, submissions are capped at three per person per month, and one-liners for non-exploitable crashes or resource exhaustion are not rewarded Google cannot pay anyone on a sanctions list, in a sanctioned territory, or located in Russia or Belarus Disclosure Coordinated with Artifex through the address in the project's SECURITY.md. Artifex maintains a public security page and ships fixes on a regular cadence, and Patch Rewards imposes no confidentiality or embargo term of its own, so timing is upstream's call. Hold the detail until a release is out: the fix has to reach CUPS, the distributions and a long tail of print appliances before it means anything. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability