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Gradle

By Gradle Inc. Bug bounty on Sorona gradle.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
50
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://gradle.org

Products and areas 11

  • Build script compilation and evaluation for both the Groovy and Kotlin DSLs, plus init scripts, included builds and buildSrc
  • Credential handling for repository authentication, together with anything that lands a secret in build output, a log or a build scan
  • Dependency resolution and artefact download from Maven and Ivy repositories, including repository metadata handling, redirects and mirror behaviour
  • Java toolchain provisioning, where Gradle downloads and installs a JDK on demand
  • Plugin resolution from the Gradle Plugin Portal and the plugin marker mechanism behind it
  • The build cache, local and remote, covering cache key derivation, entry packing and unpacking, and anything that lets one build's output be served to another build
  • The configuration cache and the serialised state it stores and later replays
  • The dependency verification subsystem in full: checksum and signature checking, the verification metadata file, key server lookups and trusted-key handling
  • The Gradle daemon and everything reachable across its client connection, including the Tooling API that IDEs drive it through
  • The Gradle wrapper: the checked-in wrapper JAR, the distribution download and the checksum verification meant to make that download safe
  • The policy declares a wide scope in writing: the Gradle Build Tool, Develocity, the Build Cache node Docker image, the official plugins, and any non-example, non-archived repository in the Gradle GitHub org, along with the gradle.org, gradle.com and grdev.net domains. Third-party dependencies count too where you can show the impact on Gradle's own use of them. Reports go to [email protected]
Out of scope (6)
  • A build executing code the build script legitimately asked it to execute, which is the entire job of a build tool
  • Maven Central, the Plugin Portal and other registries as services, as opposed to Gradle's handling of what they return
  • Reports filed on the HackerOne directory listing, which is an external entry with no live program behind it
  • The Android Gradle Plugin, which is Google's code and goes through Google's process
  • The JVM and the JDK themselves, which have their own vendors and their own reporting paths
  • Third-party plugins published to the Plugin Portal, which belong to their authors; a plugin behaving badly is an ecosystem problem rather than a Gradle defect

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Email the address on the policy page . The policy asks for all security bug reports to go there
  • GitHub private vulnerability reporting is off on gradle/gradle , so the advisory button is not an option here even though it is the norm elsewhere in this category
  • Say which Gradle version and which JVM, and whether the build had the configuration cache, the build cache or dependency verification switched on.
  • Include the build script and the dependency declarations.
  • Android Gradle Plugin defects belong to Google and third-party plugins belong to their authors, both of which are different reporting paths

Not accepted

  • The Android Gradle Plugin, which is Google's code and goes through Google's process
  • Third-party plugins published to the Plugin Portal, which belong to their authors; a plugin behaving badly is an ecosystem problem rather than a Gradle defect
  • Maven Central, the Plugin Portal and other registries as services, as opposed to Gradle's handling of what they return
  • A build executing code the build script legitimately asked it to execute, which is the entire job of a build tool
  • The JVM and the JDK themselves, which have their own vendors and their own reporting paths
  • Reports filed on the HackerOne directory listing, which is an external entry with no live program behind it

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 9 minutes ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-25063 High 8.3 29 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-22816 High 8.6 16 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-22865 High 8.6 16 Jan 2026
CVE-2023-49238 Critical 9.8 9 Jan 2024
CVE-2023-42445 Medium 6.8 6 Oct 2023
CVE-2023-44387 Low 3.2 5 Oct 2023
CVE-2023-35946 Medium 6.9 30 Jun 2023
CVE-2023-35947 Medium 6.9 30 Jun 2023
CVE-2023-30853 High 7.6 28 Apr 2023
CVE-2023-26053 Medium 6.6 2 Mar 2023
CVE-2022-41575 High 7.5 21 Oct 2022
CVE-2022-41574 High 7.5 7 Oct 2022
CVE-2022-31156 Medium 6.6 14 Jul 2022
CVE-2022-30587 High 7.5 6 Jun 2022
CVE-2022-30586 High 7.2 6 Jun 2022
CVE-2022-27919 Critical 9.8 25 Mar 2022
CVE-2022-25364 High 8.1 17 Mar 2022
CVE-2022-27225 Medium 6.5 16 Mar 2022
CVE-2022-23630 High 7.5 10 Feb 2022
CVE-2021-41589 Critical 9.8 27 Oct 2021
CVE-2021-41590 Medium 5.3 27 Oct 2021
CVE-2021-41619 High 7.2 27 Oct 2021
CVE-2021-41586 High 7.5 24 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-41587 High 7.5 24 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-41588 High 8.1 24 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-41584 High 7.5 24 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-32751 High 7.5 20 Jul 2021
CVE-2021-29427 High 8.0 13 Apr 2021
CVE-2021-29428 High 8.8 13 Apr 2021
CVE-2021-29429 Medium 4.0 12 Apr 2021
CVE-2021-26719 Medium 6.5 9 Feb 2021
CVE-2020-11979 High 7.5 1 Oct 2020
CVE-2020-15773 Medium 6.5 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15776 High 8.8 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15767 Medium 5.3 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15768 High 7.5 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15769 Medium 6.1 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15770 Medium 5.5 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15771 High 7.5 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15772 Medium 4.9 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15774 Medium 6.8 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15775 High 7.5 18 Sep 2020
CVE-2020-15777 High 7.8 25 Aug 2020
CVE-2020-7599 Medium 6.5 30 Mar 2020
CVE-2019-16370 Medium 5.9 16 Sep 2019
CVE-2019-15052 Critical 9.8 14 Aug 2019
CVE-2019-11403 Critical 9.8 22 Apr 2019
CVE-2019-11402 Critical 9.8 22 Apr 2019
CVE-2019-11065 Medium 5.9 10 Apr 2019
CVE-2016-6199 Critical 9.8 7 Feb 2017

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 5 Last 12 months Integrity bypass 35 % Cache poisoning 30 % Transport security 20 % Code execution 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Gradle builds Android. Close to every app in the store is assembled by it, along with a large share of JVM server code, and it evaluates build scripts and resolves dependencies with the full privileges of the developer or the CI runner. The subsystem that decides whether this target matters is dependency verification: Gradle can be told to check checksums and signatures on everything it downloads, and a bypass of that check puts attacker-chosen bytes into every artefact built downstream. Gradle Inc. is a funded company and states in its policy that it offers no financial bug bounties, only swag, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The policy declares a wide scope in writing: the Gradle Build Tool, Develocity, the Build Cache node Docker image, the official plugins, and any non-example, non-archived repository in the Gradle GitHub org, along with the gradle.org , gradle.com and grdev.net domains. Third-party dependencies count too where you can show the impact on Gradle's own use of them. Reports go to [email protected] Dependency resolution and artefact download from Maven and Ivy repositories, including repository metadata handling, redirects and mirror behaviour The dependency verification subsystem in full: checksum and signature checking, the verification metadata file, key server lookups and trusted-key handling The build cache, local and remote, covering cache key derivation, entry packing and unpacking, and anything that lets one build's output be served to another build The configuration cache and the serialised state it stores and later replays The Gradle wrapper: the checked-in wrapper JAR, the distribution download and the checksum verification meant to make that download safe The Gradle daemon and everything reachable across its client connection, including the Tooling API that IDEs drive it through Build script compilation and evaluation for both the Groovy and Kotlin DSLs, plus init scripts, included builds and buildSrc Plugin resolution from the Gradle Plugin Portal and the plugin marker mechanism behind it Java toolchain provisioning, where Gradle downloads and installs a JDK on demand Credential handling for repository authentication, together with anything that lands a secret in build output, a log or a build scan Out of scope The Android Gradle Plugin, which is Google's code and goes through Google's process Third-party plugins published to the Plugin Portal, which belong to their authors; a plugin behaving badly is an ecosystem problem rather than a Gradle defect Maven Central, the Plugin Portal and other registries as services, as opposed to Gradle's handling of what they return A build executing code the build script legitimately asked it to execute, which is the entire job of a build tool The JVM and the JDK themselves, which have their own vendors and their own reporting paths Reports filed on the HackerOne directory listing, which is an external entry with no live program behind it Most-valued findings Dependency verification bypass: any path where an artefact that fails its checksum or signature is used anyway, or where verification silently does not apply to something a user believed it covered. This is the control the whole supply-chain story rests on Build cache poisoning, particularly against a remote cache shared across an organisation, where one write serves compiled output to every build that asks for the same key Cleartext or downgraded artefact resolution, and any place a checksum is trusted from the same source that served the artefact it is meant to validate Wrapper handling: swapping the distribution a gradlew invocation fetches, or getting past the verification on it, executes on every developer machine that clones the repository Plugin resolution confusion where a plugin id resolves to a coordinate the build did not intend Configuration cache or serialised state that carries an attacker-controlled value into a later build, and credential exposure through logs, build scans or cached entries Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Email [email protected] . The policy asks for all security bug reports to go there GitHub private vulnerability reporting is off on gradle/gradle , so the advisory button is not an option here even though it is the norm elsewhere in this category The stated thanks is swag for a previously unreported report that triggers a code or configuration change. There is no money to negotiate Say which Gradle version and which JVM, and whether the build had the configuration cache, the build cache or dependency verification switched on. Those subsystems carry the severe classes Include the build script and the dependency declarations. Findings here usually turn on what a build was told to resolve rather than on an exotic binary Android Gradle Plugin defects belong to Google and third-party plugins belong to their authors, both of which are different reporting paths Disclosure Coordinated by email with Gradle Inc., which fixes privately and ships the patch in a release. The policy publishes no response target and no fixed embargo length, so agree the timeline in the thread. Build tooling upgrades slowly inside enterprises and Android projects pin their Gradle version in the wrapper, so downstream needs real time before any writeup. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability