- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 16
- Public CVEs
- 28
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 3 days
- As the policy promises.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Response
-
Within 3 days
Harbor's reports go to a private CNCF list answered within three business days, and the project pays nothing at any severity.
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
16 assets you may test, 6 excluded.
Web 1
- https://goharbor.io
Products and areas 15
- Authentication across the local database, LDAP and Active Directory, and OIDC, plus session handling and the CLI secret
- Content trust and signature verification, covering Notary and Cosign, and the deployment security policy that enforces it
- Proxy cache projects, which pull through to an upstream registry on a request from a client
- Replication rules and every registry adapter, including Docker Hub, Quay, ECR, GCR, ACR, Artifactory and Harbor-to-Harbor
- Robot accounts: their creation, the scopes attached to them, token issuance and how those tokens are checked on each request
- SECURITY.md asks for private reports to [email protected] and declares no boundary narrower than Harbor itself. Everything below sits inside that
- Tag retention rules, immutability rules and the garbage collection that acts on them
- The core API in full and the whole registry surface it fronts, including the paths the portal does not use
- The job service and its API, the quota accounting, and the database and Redis interactions behind all of it
- The OCI distribution API paths, manifest and index handling, layer upload and download, and how Harbor proxies these to the storage backend
- The portal UI and every place it renders repository, tag, description or scan content
- The preheat and peer-to-peer distribution integration
- The project and role model end to end, covering limited guest, guest, developer, maintainer, project admin and system admin, and every operation each may perform
- The vulnerability scanner integration, the scan job flow and the report storage behind it
- Webhooks and every other outbound request Harbor makes to an operator-supplied URL
Out of scope (6)
- A project an operator deliberately made public, or a robot account they deliberately gave broad scope
- Harbor distributions repackaged by vendors, which have their own advisory streams
- The container runtimes and Kubernetes clusters that pull from Harbor
- The images stored in Harbor, whose contents are the publisher's responsibility
- The object storage backend Harbor is configured against, which belongs to that provider
- Trivy, Notary and Cosign as upstream projects, unless Harbor's integration is what makes the defect reachable
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
-
Report privately to the address on the policy page , the address SECURITY.md publishes. The maintainers answer within three business days
-
Do not open a public GitHub issue. Fixes are published as GitHub Security Advisories and backported across the three most recent minor branches
-
Give the project roles of every account involved.
-
Say whether the finding runs through the core API, the OCI distribution paths or the portal.
-
Name the authentication mode: local database, LDAP or OIDC.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
Sorona credits this project with 28 CVEs, 2 of them recent. The individual records appear here after the next sync.
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months 28 Lifetime Access control 35 % Auth bypass 25 % SSRF 20 % Supply chain 20 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Harbor is the self-hosted container registry most enterprises put in front of their Kubernetes clusters. It stores the images those clusters run, holds the robot account credentials CI systems push with, and signs and scans what passes through it. A defect in its authentication or its project permission model lets an attacker push an image that every node in the estate will pull and execute, without touching a single one of them. Harbor's reports go to a private CNCF list answered within three business days, and the project pays nothing at any severity. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope SECURITY.md asks for private reports to [email protected] and declares no boundary narrower than Harbor itself. Everything below sits inside that The core API in full and the whole registry surface it fronts, including the paths the portal does not use Authentication across the local database, LDAP and Active Directory, and OIDC, plus session handling and the CLI secret Robot accounts: their creation, the scopes attached to them, token issuance and how those tokens are checked on each request The project and role model end to end, covering limited guest, guest, developer, maintainer, project admin and system admin, and every operation each may perform The OCI distribution API paths, manifest and index handling, layer upload and download, and how Harbor proxies these to the storage backend Replication rules and every registry adapter, including Docker Hub, Quay, ECR, GCR, ACR, Artifactory and Harbor-to-Harbor Proxy cache projects, which pull through to an upstream registry on a request from a client The vulnerability scanner integration, the scan job flow and the report storage behind it Content trust and signature verification, covering Notary and Cosign, and the deployment security policy that enforces it Tag retention rules, immutability rules and the garbage collection that acts on them Webhooks and every other outbound request Harbor makes to an operator-supplied URL The portal UI and every place it renders repository, tag, description or scan content The job service and its API, the quota accounting, and the database and Redis interactions behind all of it The preheat and peer-to-peer distribution integration Out of scope The container runtimes and Kubernetes clusters that pull from Harbor Trivy, Notary and Cosign as upstream projects, unless Harbor's integration is what makes the defect reachable The object storage backend Harbor is configured against, which belongs to that provider A project an operator deliberately made public, or a robot account they deliberately gave broad scope Harbor distributions repackaged by vendors, which have their own advisory streams The images stored in Harbor, whose contents are the publisher's responsibility Most-valued findings Anything that lets an artifact be pushed or a tag be moved without the acting identity permitting it, since every cluster configured against the registry pulls whatever the tag now points at Project permission defects where a member of one project reads, pushes to or deletes another project's repositories, which is the registry's tenancy boundary Robot account tokens honoured beyond their declared scope, given that CI systems hold these and they are minted in bulk Authentication bypass across the local, LDAP and OIDC paths, and session or CLI secret handling that yields another user's identity Signature and content trust verification admitting an unsigned or wrongly-signed artifact, which removes the last control before a cluster runs the image Server-side request forgery out of the replication adapters, proxy cache or webhook paths, all of which fetch from URLs an operator or project admin supplies Manifest, index and layer handling that writes outside the intended storage location or lets one repository's blob be served for another Credential disclosure from replication endpoint configuration, the scanner integration or the job service, since those credentials reach external registries Stored cross-site scripting in the portal escalating to API calls in a project or system administrator's session Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , the address SECURITY.md publishes. The maintainers answer within three business days Do not open a public GitHub issue. Fixes are published as GitHub Security Advisories and backported across the three most recent minor branches Nothing is paid at any severity. The CNCF funds no bounty for Harbor and no platform lists it Give the project roles of every account involved. Harbor's model runs from limited guest through guest, developer, maintainer and project admin to system admin, and a finding is only meaningful against a specific pair Say whether the finding runs through the core API, the OCI distribution paths or the portal. They are separate surfaces with separate authorization code Name the authentication mode: local database, LDAP or OIDC. Robot accounts and their token scopes behave differently under each Disclosure Coordinated privately with the Harbor maintainers through the CNCF security list, which answers within three business days and publishes a GitHub Security Advisory with a CVE. Fixes are backported across the three latest minor release branches, so the embargo runs to that coordinated set of releases rather than to a day count you choose. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability