Skip to content

HashiCorp Vault

By HashiCorp Bug bounty on Sorona vaultproject.io

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
16
Public CVEs
0
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Hall of fame
Yes Reporters may be acknowledged in the bulletin.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

16 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://www.vaultproject.io

Products and areas 15

  • Audit devices, their HMAC treatment of sensitive fields and any path that avoids being audited
  • Every auth method the tree ships: AppRole, Kubernetes, JWT and OIDC, AWS, Azure, GCP, LDAP, userpass, TLS certificates, Okta, Radius and GitHub
  • HashiCorp asks for coordinated disclosure at [email protected] and states there is no bug bounty and no monetary reward. The trust page declares no scope narrower than the product itself
  • Identity: entities, aliases, groups, group membership resolution and the identity tokens Vault issues
  • Namespaces and the isolation between them on a multi-tenant server
  • Policy evaluation end to end, covering path matching, wildcards and globs, capability sets, denied paths and the templated policy machinery
  • Response wrapping, the cubbyhole and the unwrap flow, which is how secrets reach workloads
  • The HTTP API in full, including every sys/ endpoint and the operations only a root token should reach
  • The PKI engine specifically: issuance, role constraints, allowed domains and SANs, intermediate signing, and CRL and OCSP handling
  • The plugin system and the loading and verification of external plugins
  • The seal and unseal path, Shamir key shares, auto-unseal through a cloud KMS or HSM, recovery keys and the rekey and rotate operations
  • The secrets engines shipped in the tree, including KV version 1 and 2, database, PKI, transit, SSH, AWS, Azure, GCP, Consul, Nomad, TOTP and Kubernetes
  • The storage backends and exactly what is written to them, plus the barrier encryption in front of that
  • The token store: creation, child and orphan tokens, renewal, revocation, use limits, periodic tokens and the entity binding on each
  • Vault Agent, the Kubernetes sidecar injector, the CSI provider and Vault Secrets Operator where the tree ships them
Out of scope (6)
  • A policy an operator wrote that grants more than they intended
  • A Vault deliberately run in dev mode, which is unsealed and in-memory by design
  • External plugins not shipped in the Vault tree
  • HCP Vault, the hosted service, whose infrastructure is a separate asset from the product
  • Terraform, Consul, Nomad and other HashiCorp products, each with its own advisory stream
  • The cloud KMS or HSM used for auto-unseal, which belongs to that vendor

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report to the address on the policy page , the address both the repository SECURITY.md and the trust page publish. A PGP key is provided
  • Give the auth method, the policies attached to the token and the exact API paths involved.
  • State whether the finding exists in the open-source binary or only with enterprise features enabled, since namespaces and some replication paths are licensed
  • Do not test against a production Vault. Reproduce on your own instance and include the configuration that sets it up

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD

No CVEs matched yet. We match NVD records by vendor name, so products sold under another name can be missing.

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Vault is the secrets manager most large cloud and enterprise environments standardised on. It holds database credentials, cloud API keys, PKI roots and encryption keys for everything around it, and it issues short-lived credentials to Kubernetes workloads and CI/CD pipelines through its agent and CSI driver. That concentration is the whole point of the product and also its risk: a defect here yields every secret in the organisation at once rather than one system's worth. HashiCorp's vulnerability management page states that it does not operate a public bug bounty programme or offer monetary rewards. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope HashiCorp asks for coordinated disclosure at [email protected] and states there is no bug bounty and no monetary reward. The trust page declares no scope narrower than the product itself Every auth method the tree ships: AppRole, Kubernetes, JWT and OIDC, AWS, Azure, GCP, LDAP, userpass, TLS certificates, Okta, Radius and GitHub Policy evaluation end to end, covering path matching, wildcards and globs, capability sets, denied paths and the templated policy machinery The token store: creation, child and orphan tokens, renewal, revocation, use limits, periodic tokens and the entity binding on each Identity: entities, aliases, groups, group membership resolution and the identity tokens Vault issues The secrets engines shipped in the tree, including KV version 1 and 2, database, PKI, transit, SSH, AWS, Azure, GCP, Consul, Nomad, TOTP and Kubernetes The PKI engine specifically: issuance, role constraints, allowed domains and SANs, intermediate signing, and CRL and OCSP handling The seal and unseal path, Shamir key shares, auto-unseal through a cloud KMS or HSM, recovery keys and the rekey and rotate operations The storage backends and exactly what is written to them, plus the barrier encryption in front of that The HTTP API in full, including every sys/ endpoint and the operations only a root token should reach Audit devices, their HMAC treatment of sensitive fields and any path that avoids being audited Namespaces and the isolation between them on a multi-tenant server Response wrapping, the cubbyhole and the unwrap flow, which is how secrets reach workloads Vault Agent, the Kubernetes sidecar injector, the CSI provider and Vault Secrets Operator where the tree ships them The plugin system and the loading and verification of external plugins Out of scope HCP Vault, the hosted service, whose infrastructure is a separate asset from the product Terraform, Consul, Nomad and other HashiCorp products, each with its own advisory stream A policy an operator wrote that grants more than they intended External plugins not shipped in the Vault tree The cloud KMS or HSM used for auto-unseal, which belongs to that vendor A Vault deliberately run in dev mode, which is unsealed and in-memory by design Most-valued findings Authentication bypass in any auth method, above all the Kubernetes and JWT or OIDC paths, where a service account token or an identity token from elsewhere decides who the caller is Policy path matching defects where a path an ACL denies becomes reachable through normalisation, a wildcard, a glob or a policy template. The policy engine is the entire access control model Entity and alias merging that grants one identity another's group memberships, which is privilege escalation without touching a policy Token creation or renewal producing a token with more capability, longer life or a different entity than the parent held PKI engine defects issuing a certificate outside a role's constraints, since Vault is frequently the internal trust root and a certificate it signs is accepted everywhere Unseal and recovery key handling that reduces the number of shares actually required, or that exposes the master key during rekey Namespace isolation failures on a multi-tenant server, where one namespace reads or writes another's secrets Audit device omissions letting a privileged action go unrecorded, which removes the only detection control operators have Response wrapping and cubbyhole paths where a wrapped token or secret is readable by a party other than the intended recipient The agent, injector and CSI paths that place secrets into pods, since those run with the credentials that fetch them Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report to [email protected] , the address both the repository SECURITY.md and the trust page publish. A PGP key is provided HashiCorp states it does not operate a public bug bounty programme or offer monetary rewards. Recognition is an acknowledgement in a product security bulletin The hackerone.com/hashicorp URL does not resolve to a public paid programme, and IBM's HackerOne scope does not list HashiCorp products. Filing there creates no reward path Give the auth method, the policies attached to the token and the exact API paths involved. Almost every severe finding here is an identity or a policy-path question rather than a memory one State whether the finding exists in the open-source binary or only with enterprise features enabled, since namespaces and some replication paths are licensed Do not test against a production Vault. Reproduce on your own instance and include the configuration that sets it up Disclosure Coordinated with HashiCorp's product security team through the security address, published as a security bulletin with a CVE alongside patched releases across the supported version lines. Vault sits under a great deal of production infrastructure, so the coordination runs to those releases rather than to a day count you pick. Reporters may be acknowledged in the bulletin. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability