- Top reward
- $4,000
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 8
- Public CVEs
- 49
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays up to $4,000
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 4 days
- As the policy promises.
- Paid by wire, Goody
- No identity requirement stated.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical |
|
$4,000 from $2,000 |
| High |
|
$2,000 from $500 |
- Response
-
Within 4 days
Coordinated directly with LangChain, which states an initial response within four business days and initial triage within fifteen.
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
8 assets you may test, 7 excluded.
Web 1
- https://www.langchain.com
Products and areas 7
- Document loaders, retrievers, vector-store integrations and output parsers, where the framework handles attacker-supplied content most directly
- langchain and langchain-core in full: the runnable execution layer, chains and agents, prompt templating, callbacks and tracing, and the serialisation helpers that load and dump objects
- langgraph, the stateful agent-graph runtime, with its checkpointers and persistence layer, where graph state crosses a serialisation boundary
- LangSmith and langchain.com are in the same program on their own higher tables, as closed-source assets rather than as part of this entry
- The declared scope is high-usage LangChain-maintained open-source repositories, roughly 50,000 downloads a day or more, with non-production repositories like langchain-experimental excluded and langchain-community accepted for submission without a bounty
- The first-party integration packages that clear the download threshold on their own
- Tool-calling and agent-executor paths, meaning anywhere model output reaches something that executes: a shell, an interpreter, a database client or an HTTP caller
Out of scope (7)
- Automated scanner output, rate limiting, missing headers, self-XSS and open redirects without demonstrated impact
- Issues that only affect LangChain users without a LangChain-controlled vulnerability, so insecure application code written on top of the framework is not a framework bug
- Known vulnerable libraries reported without a working proof of concept, and third-party vulnerabilities that need no LangChain-specific mitigation
- langchain-community for reward purposes: submissions are welcome there but the policy states no bounty is offered
- langchain-experimental and any repository under roughly 50,000 downloads a day, which are excluded from the paid scope outright
- Low and Medium severity on the open-source table, which the policy prices at zero, so a finding has to reach High before there is any money in it
- Prompt injection without demonstrated exploitability, the standalone carve-out that runs through every framework program in this space
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz first.
-
The repository has to be a high-usage LangChain-maintained one, roughly 50,000 downloads a day or more
-
Prompt injection with no demonstrated exploitability is out of scope: show the injected output actually reaching an executor, a secret or a filesystem
-
A known-vulnerable dependency without a working proof of concept does not count
-
Low and Medium severity pay nothing on the open-source table, so a finding has to reach High before there is any money in it at all
Not accepted
-
Prompt injection without demonstrated exploitability
-
Known vulnerable libraries reported without a working proof of concept
-
third-party vulnerabilities that need no LangChain-specific mitigation
-
Issues that only affect LangChain users without a LangChain-controlled vulnerability
-
Low and Medium severity on the open-source table
-
Automated scanner output, rate limiting, missing headers, self-XSS and open redirects without demonstrated impact
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-55443 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.3.9, several LangChain components that resolve filesystem paths or expand search patterns do not consistently confine the resolved path to the intended root directory. Affected behaviors include: a file-search agent middleware that validates a starting directory but not the search pattern or the resolved target o | Medium 5.1 | 22 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-48776 | LangGraph Python SDK is used to connect to running LangGraph API servers, manage assistants, threads and stream runs from Python applications. Versions 0.3.14 and prior have unsafe URL path construction through unsanitized caller-supplied identifier values used in HTTP request paths for resource operations. Without sanitization of those values, identifiers that contain characters with special mean | Medium 4.2 | 17 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-48775 | LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint is an implementation of LangGraph CheckpointSaver that uses SQLite DB (both sync and async, via aiosqlite). In versions 4.1.0 and prior, the JsonPlusSerializer can reconstruct Python objects from JSON checkpoint payloads. Under conditions where someone could modify checkpoint bytes at rest in the backing store, the deserialization path could reconstruct objects beyond w | Medium 6.8 | 16 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-44843 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 0.3.85 and 1.3.3, LangChain contains older runtime code paths that deserialize run inputs, run outputs, or other application-controlled payloads using overly broad object allowlists. These paths may call load() with allowed_objects="all". This does not enable arbitrary Python object deserialization, but it does all | High 8.2 | 26 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-41488 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, langchain-openai's _url_to_size() helper (used by get_num_tokens_from_messages for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could | Low 3.1 | 24 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-41481 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to langchain-text-splitters 1.1.2, HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url() validated the initial URL using validate_safe_url() but then performed the fetch with requests.get() with redirects enabled (the default). Because redirect targets were not revalidated, a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server could | Medium 6.5 | 24 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-40190 | LangSmith Client SDKs provide SDK's for interacting with the LangSmith platform. Prior to 0.5.18, the LangSmith JavaScript/TypeScript SDK (langsmith) contains an incomplete prototype pollution fix in its internally vendored lodash set() utility. The baseAssignValue() function only guards against the __proto__ key, but fails to prevent traversal via constructor.prototype. This allows an attacker wh | Medium 5.6 | 10 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-40087 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 0.3.84 and 1.2.28, LangChain's f-string prompt-template validation was incomplete in two respects. First, some prompt template classes accepted f-string templates and formatted them without enforcing the same attribute-access validation as PromptTemplate. In particular, DictPromptTemplate and ImagePromptTemplate co | Medium 5.3 | 9 Apr 2026 |
| CVE-2026-34070 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to version 1.2.22, multiple functions in langchain_core.prompts.loading read files from paths embedded in deserialized config dicts without validating against directory traversal or absolute path injection. When an application passes user-influenced prompt configurations to load_prompt() or load_prompt_from_config(), | High 7.5 | 31 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-28277 | LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint is an implementation of LangGraph CheckpointSaver that uses SQLite DB (both sync and async, via aiosqlite). In version 1.0.9 and prior, LangGraph checkpointers can load msgpack-encoded checkpoints that reconstruct Python objects during deserialization. If an attacker can modify checkpoint data in the backing store (for example, after a database compromise or other privi | Medium 6.8 | 5 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-25750 | Langchain Helm Charts are Helm charts for deploying Langchain applications on Kubernetes. Prior to langchain-ai/helm version 0.12.71, a URL parameter injection vulnerability existed in LangSmith Studio that could allow unauthorized access to user accounts through stolen authentication tokens. The vulnerability affected both LangSmith Cloud and self-hosted deployments. Authenticated LangSmith users | High 8.5 | 4 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-27795 | LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying fetch to follow redirects automatically, which permits a transition from a safe public URL to an internal or metadata endpoint witho | Medium 4.1 | 25 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-26019 | LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.1.14, the RecursiveUrlLoader class in @langchain/community is a web crawler that recursively follows links from a starting URL. Its preventOutside option (enabled by default) is intended to restrict crawling to the same site as the base URL. The implementation used String.startsWith() to compare URLs, which does not perform | Medium 4.1 | 11 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-26013 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to 1.2.11, the ChatOpenAI.get_num_tokens_from_messages() method fetches arbitrary image_url values without validation when computing token counts for vision-enabled models. This allows attackers to trigger Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by providing malicious image URLs in user input. This vulnerability is | Low 3.7 | 10 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2024-58340 | LangChain versions up to and including 0.3.1 contain a regular expression denial-of-service (ReDoS) vulnerability in the MRKLOutputParser.parse() method (libs/langchain/langchain/agents/mrkl/output_parser.py). The parser applies a backtracking-prone regular expression when extracting tool actions from model output. An attacker who can supply or influence the parsed text (for example via prompt inj | High 8.7 | 12 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-68664 | LangChain is a framework for building agents and LLM-powered applications. Prior to versions 0.3.81 and 1.2.5, a serialization injection vulnerability exists in LangChain's dumps() and dumpd() functions. The functions do not escape dictionaries with 'lc' keys when serializing free-form dictionaries. The 'lc' key is used internally by LangChain to mark serialized objects. When user-controlled data | Critical 9.3 | 23 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2025-68665 | LangChain is a framework for building LLM-powered applications. Prior to @langchain/core versions 0.3.80 and 1.1.8, and prior to langchain versions 0.3.37 and 1.2.3, a serialization injection vulnerability exists in LangChain JS's toJSON() method (and subsequently when string-ifying objects using JSON.stringify(). The method did not escape objects with 'lc' keys when serializing free-form data in | High 8.6 | 23 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2025-67644 | LangGraph SQLite Checkpoint is an implementation of LangGraph CheckpointSaver that uses SQLite DB (both sync and async, via aiosqlite). Versions 3.0.0 and below are vulnerable to SQL injection through the checkpoint implementation. Checkpoint allows attackers to manipulate SQL queries through metadata filter keys, affecting applications that accept untrusted metadata filter keys (not just filter v | High 7.3 | 11 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2025-2828 | A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the RequestsToolkit component of the langchain-community package (specifically, langchain_community.agent_toolkits.openapi.toolkit.RequestsToolkit) in langchain-ai/langchain version 0.0.27. This vulnerability occurs because the toolkit does not enforce restrictions on requests to remote internet addresses, allowing it to also access loca | Critical 10.0 | 23 Jun 2025 |
| CVE-2024-8309 | A vulnerability in the GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchain version 0.2.5 allows for SQL injection through prompt injection. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service (DoS) by deleting all data, breaches in multi-tenant security environments, and data integrity issues. Attackers can create, update, or delete nodes and relation | Critical 9.8 | 29 Oct 2024 |
| CVE-2024-7774 | A path traversal vulnerability exists in the `getFullPath` method of langchain-ai/langchainjs version 0.2.5. This vulnerability allows attackers to save files anywhere in the filesystem, overwrite existing text files, read `.txt` files, and delete files. The vulnerability is exploited through the `setFileContent`, `getParsedFile`, and `mdelete` methods, which do not properly sanitize user input. | Critical 9.1 | 29 Oct 2024 |
| CVE-2024-7042 | A vulnerability in the GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchainjs versions 0.2.5 and all versions with this class allows for prompt injection, leading to SQL injection. This vulnerability permits unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service (DoS) by deleting all data, breaches in multi-tenant security environments, and data integrity issues. Attackers can create, | Critical 9.8 | 29 Oct 2024 |
| CVE-2024-46946 | langchain_experimental (aka LangChain Experimental) 0.1.17 through 0.3.0 for LangChain allows attackers to execute arbitrary code through sympy.sympify (which uses eval) in LLMSymbolicMathChain. LLMSymbolicMathChain was introduced in fcccde406dd9e9b05fc9babcbeb9ff527b0ec0c6 (2023-10-05). | Critical 9.8 | 19 Sep 2024 |
| CVE-2024-5998 | A vulnerability in the FAISS.deserialize_from_bytes function of langchain-ai/langchain allows for pickle deserialization of untrusted data. This can lead to the execution of arbitrary commands via the os.system function. The issue affects the latest version of the product. | High 7.8 | 17 Sep 2024 |
| CVE-2024-21513 | Versions of the package langchain-experimental from 0.0.15 and before 0.0.21 are vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution when retrieving values from the database, the code will attempt to call 'eval' on all values. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability and execute arbitrary python code if they can control the input prompt and the server is configured with VectorSQLDatabaseChain. **Notes:** Imp | High 8.5 | 15 Jul 2024 |
| CVE-2024-38459 | langchain_experimental (aka LangChain Experimental) before 0.0.61 for LangChain provides Python REPL access without an opt-in step. NOTE; this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-27444. | High 7.8 | 16 Jun 2024 |
| CVE-2024-3095 | A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the Web Research Retriever component of langchain-ai/langchain version 0.1.5. The vulnerability arises because the Web Research Retriever does not restrict requests to remote internet addresses, allowing it to reach local addresses. This flaw enables attackers to execute port scans, access local services, and in some scenarios, read inst | High 7.7 | 6 Jun 2024 |
| CVE-2024-2965 | A Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the `SitemapLoader` class of the `langchain-ai/langchain` repository, affecting all versions. The `parse_sitemap` method, responsible for parsing sitemaps and extracting URLs, lacks a mechanism to prevent infinite recursion when a sitemap URL refers to the current sitemap itself. This oversight allows for the possibility of an infinite loop, leadin | Medium 4.7 | 6 Jun 2024 |
| CVE-2024-3571 | langchain-ai/langchain is vulnerable to path traversal due to improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') in its LocalFileStore functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to read or write files anywhere on the filesystem, potentially leading to information disclosure or remote code execution. The issue lies in the handling of file paths in the mse | High 8.8 | 16 Apr 2024 |
| CVE-2024-1455 | A vulnerability in the langchain-ai/langchain repository allows for a Billion Laughs Attack, a type of XML External Entity (XXE) exploitation. By nesting multiple layers of entities within an XML document, an attacker can cause the XML parser to consume excessive CPU and memory resources, leading to a denial of service (DoS). | Medium 5.9 | 26 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-28088 | LangChain through 0.1.10 allows ../ directory traversal by an actor who is able to control the final part of the path parameter in a load_chain call. This bypasses the intended behavior of loading configurations only from the hwchase17/langchain-hub GitHub repository. The outcome can be disclosure of an API key for a large language model online service, or remote code execution. (A patch is availa | High 8.1 | 4 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-2057 | A vulnerability was found in LangChain langchain_community 0.0.26. It has been classified as critical. Affected is the function load_local in the library libs/community/langchain_community/retrievers/tfidf.py of the component TFIDFRetriever. The manipulation leads to server-side request forgery. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be u | Medium 6.3 | 1 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-27444 | langchain_experimental (aka LangChain Experimental) in LangChain before 0.1.8 allows an attacker to bypass the CVE-2023-44467 fix and execute arbitrary code via the __import__, __subclasses__, __builtins__, __globals__, __getattribute__, __bases__, __mro__, or __base__ attribute in Python code. These are not prohibited by pal_chain/base.py. | Critical 9.8 | 26 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2024-0243 | With the following crawler configuration: ```python from bs4 import BeautifulSoup as Soup url = "https://example.com" loader = RecursiveUrlLoader( url=url, max_depth=2, extractor=lambda x: Soup(x, "html.parser").text ) docs = loader.load() ``` An attacker in control of the contents of `https://example.com` could place a malicious HTML file in there with links like "https://example.completely.diffe | High 8.1 | 26 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2023-32786 | In Langchain through 0.0.155, prompt injection allows an attacker to force the service to retrieve data from an arbitrary URL, essentially providing SSRF and potentially injecting content into downstream tasks. | High 7.5 | 20 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-46229 | LangChain before 0.0.317 allows SSRF via document_loaders/recursive_url_loader.py because crawling can proceed from an external server to an internal server. | High 8.8 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-44467 | langchain_experimental (aka LangChain Experimental) in LangChain before 0.0.306 allows an attacker to bypass the CVE-2023-36258 fix and execute arbitrary code via __import__ in Python code, which is not prohibited by pal_chain/base.py. | Critical 9.8 | 9 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-39631 | An issue in LanChain-ai Langchain v.0.0.245 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the evaluate function in the numexpr library. | Critical 9.8 | 1 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-36281 | An issue in langchain v.0.0.171 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a JSON file to load_prompt. This is related to __subclasses__ or a template. | Critical 9.8 | 22 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-39659 | An issue in langchain langchain-ai v.0.0.232 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted script to the PythonAstREPLTool._run component. | Critical 9.8 | 15 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38860 | An issue in LangChain v.0.0.231 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the prompt parameter. | Critical 9.8 | 15 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-38896 | An issue in Harrison Chase langchain v.0.0.194 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the from_math_prompt and from_colored_object_prompt functions. | Critical 9.8 | 15 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-36095 | An issue in Harrison Chase langchain v.0.0.194 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code via the python exec calls in the PALChain, affected functions include from_math_prompt and from_colored_object_prompt. | Critical 9.8 | 5 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-36188 | An issue in langchain v.0.0.64 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the PALChain parameter in the Python exec method. | Critical 9.8 | 6 Jul 2023 |
| CVE-2023-36189 | SQL injection vulnerability in langchain before v0.0.247 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the SQLDatabaseChain component. | High 7.5 | 6 Jul 2023 |
| CVE-2023-36258 | An issue in LangChain before 0.0.236 allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code because Python code with os.system, exec, or eval can be used. | Critical 9.8 | 3 Jul 2023 |
| CVE-2023-34541 | Langchain 0.0.171 is vulnerable to Arbitrary code execution in load_prompt. | Critical 9.8 | 20 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-34540 | Langchain before v0.0.225 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the component JiraAPIWrapper (aka the JIRA API wrapper). This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via crafted input. As noted in the "releases/tag" reference, a fix is available. | Critical 9.8 | 14 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-29374 | In LangChain through 0.0.131, the LLMMathChain chain allows prompt injection attacks that can execute arbitrary code via the Python exec method. | Critical 9.8 | 5 Apr 2023 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Severe / Critical, open-source tier (the $5,000-$10,000+ band is the separate LangSmith commercial table) │ $2,000 - $4,000 │ $2,500 - $5,000 High, open-source tier │ $500 - $2,000 │ $625 - $2,500 Low / Medium, open-source tier: the policy states no bounty │ $0 │ $0 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 9 Last 12 months 45 Lifetime Code execution 35 % Injection 25 % Info disclosure 20 % Parsing/validation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview LangChain is the default orchestration layer for a very large share of production LLM applications, and its footprint is much larger than its star count suggests because most consumption is transitive: langchain and langchain-core together run to tens of millions of PyPI downloads a month, and langchain-core sits underneath most of the Python agent ecosystem, including LangGraph, the LangSmith SDKs and a long tail of vendor integration packages. Deployment is overwhelmingly server-side, inside enterprise application backends, which is exactly where a deserialisation bug or a tool-execution path that model output can steer converts into remote code execution on infrastructure holding customer data: code execution is 35 percent of this project's advisory history, and langchain-core is the hot surface right now with fourteen advisories in the last twelve months. LangChain, Inc. runs the bounty itself out of the repository's security policy rather than through a platform, and the open-source table pays $2,000 to $4,000 for a Severe or Critical finding, $500 to $2,000 for a High, and nothing at all for Low or Medium. Read the tables carefully before you size the work: the $5,000 to $10,000+ band that appears on the same page is the LangSmith commercial-platform scale, and LangSmith is not open source. sorona.xyz adds 1.25× on top of whatever LangChain awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. In scope The declared scope is high-usage LangChain-maintained open-source repositories, roughly 50,000 downloads a day or more, with non-production repositories like langchain-experimental excluded and langchain-community accepted for submission without a bounty langchain and langchain-core in full: the runnable execution layer, chains and agents, prompt templating, callbacks and tracing, and the serialisation helpers that load and dump objects langgraph , the stateful agent-graph runtime, with its checkpointers and persistence layer, where graph state crosses a serialisation boundary Tool-calling and agent-executor paths, meaning anywhere model output reaches something that executes: a shell, an interpreter, a database client or an HTTP caller Document loaders, retrievers, vector-store integrations and output parsers, where the framework handles attacker-supplied content most directly The first-party integration packages that clear the download threshold on their own LangSmith and langchain.com are in the same program on their own higher tables, as closed-source assets rather than as part of this entry Out of scope Prompt injection without demonstrated exploitability, the standalone carve-out that runs through every framework program in this space Known vulnerable libraries reported without a working proof of concept, and third-party vulnerabilities that need no LangChain-specific mitigation Issues that only affect LangChain users without a LangChain-controlled vulnerability, so insecure application code written on top of the framework is not a framework bug langchain-experimental and any repository under roughly 50,000 downloads a day, which are excluded from the paid scope outright langchain-community for reward purposes: submissions are welcome there but the policy states no bounty is offered Low and Medium severity on the open-source table, which the policy prices at zero, so a finding has to reach High before there is any money in it Automated scanner output, rate limiting, missing headers, self-XSS and open redirects without demonstrated impact Most-valued findings A reliable path to remote code execution reachable from untrusted input across many deployments: a deserialisation defect in a loader or a checkpointer, or an executor that model output can steer into a shell. This is the Severe/Critical band, the only one that reaches $4,000, and the policy names RCE as its own example. Exposure of environment secrets or provider API keys out of a running chain, which the policy places in the same top band and which turns one framework bug into credential theft across every tenant Injection that survives to a sink with real consequences, whether SQL, command, template or SSRF through a retriever or a tool, as distinct from prompt injection that only changes model output and is explicitly out of scope Defects in langchain-core specifically, which carries fourteen advisories in the last twelve months and sits transitively under most of the Python agent ecosystem, so one bug there reaches far beyond direct users Cross-session or cross-tenant data exposure through LangGraph's persistence layer, where one user's checkpointed graph state becomes readable to another Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. The repository has to be a high-usage LangChain-maintained one, roughly 50,000 downloads a day or more; langchain , langchain-core and langgraph all clear that comfortably and smaller packages do not langchain-community submissions are accepted but explicitly earn no bounty, because the project treats it as community-maintained Prompt injection with no demonstrated exploitability is out of scope: show the injected output actually reaching an executor, a secret or a filesystem, not just that it changes the model's behaviour A known-vulnerable dependency without a working proof of concept does not count, and a third-party vulnerability is out of scope unless LangChain-specific mitigations are required Low and Medium severity pay nothing on the open-source table, so a finding has to reach High before there is any money in it at all Payment is by wire or Goody and availability varies by country, which is worth checking before you commit time Disclosure Coordinated directly with LangChain, which states an initial response within four business days and initial triage within fifteen. The policy tells you not to disclose publicly without their explicit written permission, so the timing is theirs; sorona.xyz holds the finding until LangChain has shipped a fix. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability