- Top reward
- $971
- Top severity paid
- Medium
- Assets in scope
- 10
- Public CVEs
- 25
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays up to $971
- for medium bugs, from $416.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 1 day
- As the policy promises.
- Paid by PayPal, HackerOne
- No identity requirement stated.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Medium |
|
$971 |
| Low |
|
$416 |
- Response
-
Within 1 days
~13 hours First response
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
10 assets you may test, 7 excluded.
Web 1
- https://matomo.org
Products and areas 9
- Authentication and session handling as shipped, including the login, password reset and two-factor flows
- Everything else under the matomo-org and innocraft GitHub organisations, bounty-eligible but capped at High
- Matomo Cloud on the per-account *.matomo.cloud subdomains, tested on an instance you set up yourself, without automated tooling and without disturbing a live one
- That release in full, meaning the whole application: the tracking endpoint every measured site posts to, the reporting API, the web UI and the administration area
- The archiving and cron pipeline, the import and export paths, and the installer and updater that run against a live database
- The multi-site and user-permission model: sites, users, roles, auth tokens, and every check meant to keep one site's analytics away from another's
- The official Docker project at github.com/matomo-org/docker, a Critical-severity asset in its own right
- The plugin machinery itself, together with the official first-party plugins by Matomo and InnoCraft, premium ones included, which the program prices at Critical through the plugins.matomo.org/developer asset rows
- The program's own definition of the target: an issue in the latest official release at builds.matomo.org/latest.zip as installed on a typical server, possibly using any official plugin by Matomo or InnoCraft from the Marketplace. The matomo-org/matomo source-code asset carries that at Critical severity
Out of scope (7)
- Anything already fixed in the code, even where the fix has not yet shipped in a release
- Critical-band claims anywhere outside matomo-org/matomo, the official Docker project and the two official plugin developer accounts, since the rest of both organisations caps at High
- Findings derived only from code reading, scanners, or AI output with no reproduction on a running instance
- forum.matomo.org, which runs Discourse and belongs on Discourse's own bug bounty rather than this one
- The Matomo Mobile 2 Android and iOS apps, which are not bounty-eligible at all and take only critical issues compromising the token
- The project's own web properties: matomo.org, api.matomo.org, shop.matomo.org, and plugins.matomo.org as a platform, as opposed to the first-party plugins it distributes
- Third-party Marketplace plugins written by anyone other than Matomo or InnoCraft, which pay nothing regardless of severity. This is the exclusion that most changes a researcher's expected value
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz first.
-
Findings must be validated in a real, running Matomo instance; reports based solely on reading the code are closed
-
Reports based on automated tools or AI-generated output without demonstrated exploitability are not accepted
-
Vulnerabilities already fixed in code do not qualify even if the fix has not yet landed in a release
-
Super-user-only RCE is downgraded from Critical to High by explicit rule
-
On matomo.cloud, keep tests to ones that do not affect the live instance and do not point automated tools at it: set up your own instance instead
Not accepted
-
Third-party Marketplace plugins written by anyone other than Matomo or InnoCraft
-
Anything already fixed in the code, even where the fix has not yet shipped in a release
-
Findings derived only from code reading, scanners, or AI output with no reproduction on a running instance
-
Critical-band claims anywhere outside matomo-org/matomo, the official Docker project and the two official plugin developer accounts
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2025-4415 | Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Drupal Piwik PRO allows Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).This issue affects Piwik PRO: from 0.0.0 before 1.3.2. | Medium 4.8 | 21 May 2025 |
| CVE-2023-6923 | The Matomo Analytics – Ethical Stats. Powerful Insights. plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Reflected Cross-Site Scripting via the idsite parameter in all versions up to, and including, 4.15.3 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that execute if they can successfully trick a user | Medium 6.1 | 29 Feb 2024 |
| CVE-2022-33156 | The matomo_integration (aka Matomo Integration) extension before 1.3.2 for TYPO3 allows XSS. | Medium 6.1 | 12 Jul 2022 |
| CVE-2020-29578 | The official piwik Docker images before fpm-alpine (Alpine specific) contain a blank password for a root user. Systems using the Piwik Docker container deployed by affected versions of the Docker image may allow an remote attacker to achieve root access. | Critical 9.8 | 8 Dec 2020 |
| CVE-2013-0193 | Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in Piwik before 1.10.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. NOTE: This is a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-0194 and CVE-2013-0195. | Medium 6.1 | 20 Nov 2019 |
| CVE-2013-0194 | Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in Piwik before 1.10.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. NOTE: This is a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-0193 and CVE-2013-0195. | Medium 6.1 | 20 Nov 2019 |
| CVE-2013-0195 | Cross-site Scripting (XSS) in Piwik before 1.10.1 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. NOTE: This is a different vulnerability than CVE-2013-0193 and CVE-2013-0194. | Medium 6.1 | 20 Nov 2019 |
| CVE-2019-12215 | A full path disclosure vulnerability was discovered in Matomo v3.9.1 where a user can trigger a particular error to discover the full path of Matomo on the disk, because lastError.file is used in plugins/CorePluginsAdmin/templates/safemode.twig. NOTE: the vendor disputes the significance of this issue, stating "avoid reporting path disclosures, as we don't consider them as security vulnerabilities | Medium 4.3 | 20 May 2019 |
| CVE-2015-7816 | The DisplayTopKeywords function in plugins/Referrers/Controller.php in Piwik before 2.15.0 allows remote attackers to conduct PHP object injection attacks, conduct Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks, and execute arbitrary PHP code via a crafted HTTP header. | High 7.5 | 16 Nov 2015 |
| CVE-2015-7815 | Directory traversal vulnerability in core/ViewDataTable/Factory.php in Piwik before 2.15.0 allows remote attackers to include and execute arbitrary local files via the viewDataTable parameter. | High 7.5 | 16 Nov 2015 |
| CVE-2013-1844 | Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Piwik before 1.11 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. | Medium 4.3 | 21 Mar 2013 |
| CVE-2013-2633 | Piwik before 1.11 accepts input from a POST request instead of a GET request in unspecified circumstances, which might allow attackers to obtain sensitive information by leveraging the logging of parameters. | Medium 5.0 | 21 Mar 2013 |
| CVE-2012-4541 | Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Piwik before 1.9 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. | Medium 4.3 | 19 Nov 2012 |
| CVE-2011-4941 | Unspecified vulnerability in Piwik 1.2 through 1.4 allows remote attackers with the view permission to execute arbitrary code via unknown attack vectors. | Medium 6.8 | 18 Sep 2012 |
| CVE-2011-3791 | Piwik 1.1 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via a direct request to a .php file, which reveals the installation path in an error message, as demonstrated by plugins/Widgetize/Widgetize.php and certain other files. | Medium 5.0 | 24 Sep 2011 |
| CVE-2011-0004 | Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Piwik before 1.1 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors. | Medium 4.3 | 10 Jan 2011 |
| CVE-2011-0398 | The Piwik_Common::getIP function in Piwik before 1.1 does not properly determine the client IP address, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended geolocation and logging functionality via (1) use of a private (aka RFC 1918) address behind a proxy server or (2) spoofing of the X-Forwarded-For HTTP header. | Medium 6.4 | 10 Jan 2011 |
| CVE-2011-0399 | Piwik before 1.1 does not prevent the rendering of the login form inside a frame in a third-party HTML document, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct clickjacking attacks via a crafted web site. | Medium 4.3 | 10 Jan 2011 |
| CVE-2011-0400 | Cookie.php in Piwik before 1.1 does not set the secure flag for the session cookie in an https session, which makes it easier for remote attackers to capture this cookie by intercepting its transmission within an http session. | Medium 5.0 | 10 Jan 2011 |
| CVE-2011-0401 | Piwik before 1.1 does not properly limit the number of files stored under tmp/sessions/, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (inode consumption) by establishing many sessions. | Medium 5.0 | 10 Jan 2011 |
| CVE-2010-2786 | Directory traversal vulnerability in Piwik 0.6 through 0.6.3 allows remote attackers to include arbitrary local files and possibly have unspecified other impact via directory traversal sequences in a crafted data-renderer request. | Medium 6.8 | 2 Aug 2010 |
| CVE-2010-1453 | Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Login form in Piwik 0.1.6 through 0.5.5 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the form_url parameter. | Medium 4.3 | 7 May 2010 |
| CVE-2009-4137 | The loadContentFromCookie function in core/Cookie.php in Piwik before 0.5 does not validate strings obtained from cookies before calling the unserialize function, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or upload arbitrary files via vectors related to the __destruct function in the Piwik_Config class; php://filter URIs; the __destruct functions in Zend Framework, as demonstrated by | High 7.5 | 24 Dec 2009 |
| CVE-2009-4140 | Unrestricted file upload vulnerability in ofc_upload_image.php in Open Flash Chart v2 Beta 1 through v2 Lug Wyrm Charmer, as used in Piwik 0.2.35 through 0.4.3, Woopra Analytics Plugin before 1.4.3.2, and possibly other products, when register_globals is enabled, allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary code by uploading a file with an executable extension through the name parameter | High 7.5 | 22 Dec 2009 |
| CVE-2009-1085 | Piwik 0.2.32 and earlier stores sensitive information under the web root with insufficient access control, which allows remote attackers to obtain the API key and other sensitive information via a direct request for misc/cron/archive.sh. | Medium 5.0 | 25 Mar 2009 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Critical (official latest.zip release on a typical server) │ $13,000 │ $14,000 High (including super-user-only RCE, demoted from Critical by rule) │ $1,777 │ $2,221 Medium │ $777 │ $971 Low │ $333 │ $416 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 0 Last 12 months 23 Lifetime Code execution 30 % XSS 25 % Injection 20 % Access control 20 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Matomo is the self-hosted analytics platform organisations run when they want the open alternative to Google Analytics and want the visitor data to stay on their own servers. The program's scope statement is the cleanest self-hosted one anywhere: the target is the official release build at builds.matomo.org/latest.zip as installed on a typical server, plus the first-party plugins by Matomo and InnoCraft, the official Docker image, the rest of the matomo-org and innocraft GitHub organisations, and Matomo Cloud: the hosted product is one asset among seven rather than the headline. That means a bug in the downloadable code is the main event here, not an afterthought. InnoCraft pays a valid Critical at $13,000, with High at $1,777 (and super-user-only RCE explicitly demoted to that rung), and the program is a fast one in practice, 320 reports resolved at 99% response efficiency. sorona.xyz adds 1.25× on top of whatever InnoCraft awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. Response times ~13 hours First response ~13 hours Triage ~4 days Bounty In scope The program's own definition of the target: an issue in the latest official release at builds.matomo.org/latest.zip as installed on a typical server, possibly using any official plugin by Matomo or InnoCraft from the Marketplace. The matomo-org/matomo source-code asset carries that at Critical severity That release in full, meaning the whole application: the tracking endpoint every measured site posts to, the reporting API, the web UI and the administration area The multi-site and user-permission model: sites, users, roles, auth tokens, and every check meant to keep one site's analytics away from another's Authentication and session handling as shipped, including the login, password reset and two-factor flows The plugin machinery itself, together with the official first-party plugins by Matomo and InnoCraft, premium ones included, which the program prices at Critical through the plugins.matomo.org/developer asset rows The archiving and cron pipeline, the import and export paths, and the installer and updater that run against a live database The official Docker project at github.com/matomo-org/docker, a Critical-severity asset in its own right Everything else under the matomo-org and innocraft GitHub organisations, bounty-eligible but capped at High Matomo Cloud on the per-account *.matomo.cloud subdomains, tested on an instance you set up yourself, without automated tooling and without disturbing a live one Out of scope Third-party Marketplace plugins written by anyone other than Matomo or InnoCraft, which pay nothing regardless of severity. This is the exclusion that most changes a researcher's expected value The project's own web properties: matomo.org, api.matomo.org, shop.matomo.org, and plugins.matomo.org as a platform, as opposed to the first-party plugins it distributes forum.matomo.org, which runs Discourse and belongs on Discourse's own bug bounty rather than this one The Matomo Mobile 2 Android and iOS apps, which are not bounty-eligible at all and take only critical issues compromising the token Anything already fixed in the code, even where the fix has not yet shipped in a release Findings derived only from code reading, scanners, or AI output with no reproduction on a running instance Critical-band claims anywhere outside matomo-org/matomo, the official Docker project and the two official plugin developer accounts, since the rest of both organisations caps at High Most-valued findings Remote code execution on a default install reachable without super-user rights, the only shape that holds the full $13,000, since super-user-only RCE drops by rule to the $1,777 rung, and code execution is the largest expected class at 30% SQL injection through the tracking or reporting API, the surface where Matomo takes input from every website it measures Stored XSS in a report, segment, annotation or site setting that fires in a higher-privileged user's session and escalates to admin Access-control failure that lets one user read or write another site's analytics data across the multi-site boundary The same classes inside a first-party Matomo or InnoCraft plugin, which pay at the full rate while third-party plugins pay nothing at all Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. Findings must be validated in a real, running Matomo instance; reports based solely on reading the code are closed Reports based on automated tools or AI-generated output without demonstrated exploitability are not accepted Vulnerabilities already fixed in code do not qualify even if the fix has not yet landed in a release, so racing a maintainer's commit loses the bounty Super-user-only RCE is downgraded from Critical to High by explicit rule, which is the whole $13,000 versus $1,777 boundary On matomo.cloud, keep tests to ones that do not affect the live instance and do not point automated tools at it: set up your own instance instead Payment is made by PayPal or through HackerOne Program stats 320 Reports resolved $155k Bounties paid 99% Response efficiency Disclosure Coordinated through Matomo. The policy asks for a reasonable amount of time to resolve the issue before any disclosure to the public or a third party, and does not bound that with a number of days, so publication waits on the fix reaching a release. It is a softer clause than most on this list, there is no perpetual gag and no IP assignment, but sorona.xyz still holds your finding until Matomo has resolved it. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability