- Top reward
- $6,000
- Top severity paid
- High
- Assets in scope
- 11
- Public CVEs
- 2
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays up to $6,000
- for high bugs, from $625.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 1 day
- As the policy promises.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| High |
|
$6,000 |
| Medium |
|
$1,250 |
| Low |
|
$625 |
- Response
-
Within 1 days
1 business day First response
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
11 assets you may test, 7 excluded.
Web 1
- https://nitro.build
Products and areas 10
- Caching: cached event handlers and cached functions, the keys they derive and the entries they write
- Public and server asset serving out of the compiled bundle
- Route rules in full, covering basicAuth, proxy, redirect, cache and header rules, and the order in which several of them compose on one request
- Server middleware and the global middleware chain, including how it applies to WebSocket upgrades and to request paths that do not look like ordinary routes
- The build and prerender pipeline that writes the compiled server bundle and rendered output into the workspace
- The h3 request pipeline Nitro is built on: routing, event handling, body parsing, header handling and response writing
- The hosting presets that compile that bundle for Node, Deno, Bun, Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, Netlify and AWS Lambda, where a preset's own request adaptation can diverge from the reference server
- The nitrojs/nitro repository itself, added to the program on 2026-01-28 and listed under Tier 1 (High Priority) as a source-code asset that is bounty-eligible up to critical severity. The asset is the repo, so Nitro's own server code is the target
- The proxy layer, proxyRequest and sendProxy included, along with the header, cookie and redirect handling they perform in both directions
- The storage layer and its drivers, where server state, cache entries and secrets are read and written
Out of scope (7)
- Cloud-provider and deployment-specific issues, which belong to Vercel's main platform program rather than the open-source one
- Denial of service that only reproduces at development time and has no production path
- Examples, templates and documentation snippets rather than Nitro's own code
- Overbroad route regex matching in the Vercel CDN preset reported without demonstrated impact
- Reports without the mandatory working proof-of-concept zip, which are not eligible regardless of severity
- Third-party dependency CVEs without a demonstrated end-to-end chain through Nitro itself
- Weaknesses in an allowlist the developer configured themselves: the bypass has to be framework-owned
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz first.
-
Include a zip file with working proof-of-concept code, without one the report is not bounty-eligible
-
SSRF through proxyRequest is accepted only where a framework-owned path bypasses the developer's allowlist entirely, not where the allowlist itself was written badly
-
Demonstrate the bug against a built production server bundle: denial of service that only exists at dev time is not eligible
-
Vercel's confidentiality obligations run for two years and survive the end of the program
Not accepted
-
Overbroad route regex matching in the Vercel CDN preset reported without demonstrated impact
-
Weaknesses in an allowlist the developer configured themselves: the bypass has to be framework-owned
-
Denial of service that only reproduces at development time and has no production path
-
Cloud-provider and deployment-specific issues, which belong to Vercel's main platform program rather than the open-source one
-
Third-party dependency CVEs without a demonstrated end-to-end chain through Nitro itself
-
Examples, templates and documentation snippets rather than Nitro's own code
-
Reports without the mandatory working proof-of-concept zip, which are not eligible regardless of severity
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-44372 | Nitro is a next generation server toolkit. Prior to 3.0.260429-beta, an attacker could turn a redirect route rule using wildcards rewrite into a cross-host redirect by sliding an extra slash in after the rule prefix. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.260429-beta. | Medium 5.3 | 13 May 2026 |
| CVE-2026-44373 | Nitro is a next generation server toolkit. Prior to 3.0.260429-beta, an attacker could bypass a proxy route rule by sending percent-encoded path traversal (..%2f) in the URL, causing Nitro to forward a request that the upstream resolved outside the configured scope. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.0.260429-beta. | Medium 5.3 | 13 May 2026 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Critical (Tier 1 asset) │ $10,000 │ $11,000 High │ $5,000 │ $6,000 Medium │ $1,000 │ $1,250 Low │ $500 │ $625 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months 2 Lifetime Auth bypass 40 % Access control 25 % Parsing/validation 20 % Info disclosure 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Nitro is the server engine underneath Nuxt 3 and Nuxt 4, and it is also used standalone and by other frameworks in the UnJS ecosystem, so its blast radius is a superset of Nuxt's server-side footprint. It compiles a portable server bundle targeting Node, Deno, Bun, Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, Netlify, and AWS Lambda, which means one Nitro auth-bypass defect reproduces across every one of those hosting targets at once. Only two advisories exist against it, and both landed in the last twelve months, a count that reflects the project's youth rather than its hardness. Vercel added it to the open-source program as a Tier 1 asset on 2026-01-28 and pays from $500 for a low finding up to $10,000 for a critical. sorona.xyz adds 1.25× on top of whatever Vercel awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. Response times 1 business day First response 7 business days Triage 10 business days after triage Bounty In scope The nitrojs/nitro repository itself, added to the program on 2026-01-28 and listed under Tier 1 (High Priority) as a source-code asset that is bounty-eligible up to critical severity. The asset is the repo, so Nitro's own server code is the target The h3 request pipeline Nitro is built on: routing, event handling, body parsing, header handling and response writing Route rules in full, covering basicAuth , proxy, redirect, cache and header rules, and the order in which several of them compose on one request Server middleware and the global middleware chain, including how it applies to WebSocket upgrades and to request paths that do not look like ordinary routes The proxy layer, proxyRequest and sendProxy included, along with the header, cookie and redirect handling they perform in both directions Caching: cached event handlers and cached functions, the keys they derive and the entries they write The storage layer and its drivers, where server state, cache entries and secrets are read and written The build and prerender pipeline that writes the compiled server bundle and rendered output into the workspace The hosting presets that compile that bundle for Node, Deno, Bun, Cloudflare Workers, Vercel, Netlify and AWS Lambda, where a preset's own request adaptation can diverge from the reference server Public and server asset serving out of the compiled bundle Out of scope Overbroad route regex matching in the Vercel CDN preset reported without demonstrated impact Weaknesses in an allowlist the developer configured themselves: the bypass has to be framework-owned Denial of service that only reproduces at development time and has no production path Cloud-provider and deployment-specific issues, which belong to Vercel's main platform program rather than the open-source one Third-party dependency CVEs without a demonstrated end-to-end chain through Nitro itself Examples, templates and documentation snippets rather than Nitro's own code Reports without the mandatory working proof-of-concept zip, which are not eligible regardless of severity Most-valued findings A basicAuth route-rule bypass that gets an unauthenticated request onto a protected route, the top class here at 40% of Nitro's known bug history and the shape that reaches the Tier 1 critical band Route-rule ordering flaws where a terminating rule executes ahead of the authentication rule, since these reproduce identically on every one of Nitro's nine hosting presets Path traversal in proxy rules or the prerender pipeline that turns into arbitrary file read or write in the build workspace SSRF through proxyRequest demonstrated as a framework-owned bypass reaching an internal address Any of the above shown on the compiled production server bundle rather than on a hand-weakened dev configuration Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. Include a zip file with working proof-of-concept code, without one the report is not bounty-eligible SSRF through proxyRequest is accepted only where a framework-owned path bypasses the developer's allowlist entirely, not where the allowlist itself was written badly Demonstrate the bug against a built production server bundle: denial of service that only exists at dev time is not eligible Vercel's confidentiality obligations run for two years and survive the end of the program Program stats 100 Reports resolved $241k Bounties paid 89% Response efficiency Disclosure Coordinated through Vercel. The program treats report contents as confidential and wants written consent before publication, so the timing is Vercel's rather than a fixed clock. sorona.xyz holds your finding until Vercel has resolved it. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability