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OpenSSL

Bug bounty on Sorona openssl.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
9
Public CVEs
294
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Hall of fame
Yes The project batches fixes into scheduled releases and publishes its own advisory with researcher credit

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

9 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://www.openssl.org

Products and areas 8

  • ASN.1 and DER decoding of attacker-supplied certificates, keys, and structures
  • Cryptographic implementation flaws with demonstrated impact, including timing and side-channel leakage in supported operations
  • Parsing of PKCS containers from untrusted data (PKCS#7, PKCS#8, PKCS#12) and PEM handling
  • Reports go privately to the OpenSSL security team at [email protected] and cover OpenSSL's own code; a defect that lives in a bundled dependency goes to that project instead
  • The provider and ENGINE interfaces where untrusted configuration or input crosses into library state
  • The TLS and DTLS handshake and record layers, covering key exchange, session resumption, renegotiation, and fragment reassembly
  • The whole of libcrypto and libssl as reachable from untrusted network peers, including heap and stack overflows, use-after-free, and out-of-bounds reads or writes
  • X.509 certificate parsing and chain building, including path validation, name-constraint enforcement, and CRL and OCSP handling, and anything that lets an attacker bypass verification
Out of scope (6)
  • Application-side API misuse: ignoring return values, calling functions out of the documented order, or passing invalid parameters
  • Attacks that assume the attacker already controls trusted inputs such as private keys or the trusted CA store, which sit inside the trust boundary
  • Defects that actually live in a bundled or linked dependency rather than in OpenSSL itself
  • Deprecated and legacy interfaces the project has already announced as unsupported
  • Issues confined to the command-line utilities rather than the libraries
  • Objections to default cipher, protocol, or algorithm selection, which are configuration and policy matters

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Send a detailed, reproducible report; if we can't reproduce it, it isn't eligible
  • One vulnerability per report unless a chain is needed to show the real impact
  • Give the OpenSSL security team room to ship a fix before any public writeup
  • Findings that live in a bundled dependency belong upstream with that project rather than here

Not accepted

  • Attacks that assume the attacker already controls trusted inputs such as private keys or the trusted CA store
  • Application-side API misuse: ignoring return values, calling functions out of the documented order, or passing invalid parameters
  • Defects that actually live in a bundled or linked dependency rather than in OpenSSL itself
  • Objections to default cipher, protocol, or algorithm selection
  • Issues confined to the command-line utilities rather than the libraries
  • Deprecated and legacy interfaces the project has already announced as unsupported

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-84782 High 8.2 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-84783 High 7.5 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-84784 High 7.5 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-75804 Medium 5.3 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-75805 Medium 5.3 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-75806 Medium 5.3 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-77696 Low 3.7 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-72897 High 7.5 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-54872 Low 3.7 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-54873 High 7.5 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-54875 Low 3.7 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-42772 Medium 5.3 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-35189 Medium 5.3 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-35191 Low 3.7 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-75803 Critical 9.1 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63076 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63072 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63073 Critical 9.8 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63074 Medium 5.9 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63075 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-54874 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-14457 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-18798 High 7.5 25 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-14456 High 7.5 13 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-54876 High 7.5 5 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-9076 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-7383 High 8.1 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-45445 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-45446 Medium 4.8 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-45447 High 8.8 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42770 Low 3.7 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42771 Medium 6.2 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42764 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42765 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42766 Medium 5.9 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42767 Medium 5.9 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42768 Low 3.7 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-42769 Medium 5.3 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-34180 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-34181 High 7.4 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-34182 Critical 9.1 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-34183 High 7.5 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-35188 Medium 5.0 9 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-31789 Critical 9.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-31790 High 7.5 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-28386 High 7.5 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-28387 High 8.1 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-28388 High 7.5 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-28389 High 7.5 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-28390 High 7.5 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-2673 Medium 6.5 13 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-22796 Medium 5.3 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-22795 Medium 5.5 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-69419 High 7.4 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-69420 High 7.5 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-69421 High 7.5 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-69418 Medium 4.0 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-66199 Medium 5.9 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-68160 Medium 4.7 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-15469 Medium 5.5 27 Jan 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Separately, for a merged upstream patch : up to $15,000 Google Patch Rewards pays for a patch you get accepted upstream and that stays merged, without reverts, for one month. It does not pay for the report. Memory-safety hardening can carry a 2× or 3× multiplier. Sanctions and territory exclusions apply, and it is rate-limited to three submissions a month. CVE history 38 Last 12 months 294 Lifetime Memory safety 43 % Auth bypass 19 % Parsing/validation 19 % Denial of service 14 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview OpenSSL is the TLS and cryptography library underneath most of the internet: web servers, load balancers, language runtimes, package managers, embedded firmware and the majority of Linux userland all link against it. Everything above it assumes that a handshake is private and that a certificate chain either verifies or does not. Heartbleed is the reference point for what a bug here costs. The project pays nothing for a vulnerability report, and reports go to its security team through a private address, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope Reports go privately to the OpenSSL security team at [email protected] and cover OpenSSL's own code; a defect that lives in a bundled dependency goes to that project instead The whole of libcrypto and libssl as reachable from untrusted network peers, including heap and stack overflows, use-after-free, and out-of-bounds reads or writes The TLS and DTLS handshake and record layers, covering key exchange, session resumption, renegotiation, and fragment reassembly X.509 certificate parsing and chain building, including path validation, name-constraint enforcement, and CRL and OCSP handling, and anything that lets an attacker bypass verification ASN.1 and DER decoding of attacker-supplied certificates, keys, and structures Parsing of PKCS containers from untrusted data (PKCS#7, PKCS#8, PKCS#12) and PEM handling Cryptographic implementation flaws with demonstrated impact, including timing and side-channel leakage in supported operations The provider and ENGINE interfaces where untrusted configuration or input crosses into library state Out of scope Attacks that assume the attacker already controls trusted inputs such as private keys or the trusted CA store, which sit inside the trust boundary Application-side API misuse: ignoring return values, calling functions out of the documented order, or passing invalid parameters Defects that actually live in a bundled or linked dependency rather than in OpenSSL itself Objections to default cipher, protocol, or algorithm selection, which are configuration and policy matters Issues confined to the command-line utilities rather than the libraries Deprecated and legacy interfaces the project has already announced as unsupported Most-valued findings Remote, unauthenticated memory corruption in libssl reachable during the handshake, before any authentication completes. That is the Heartbleed shape and the highest-value class here Certificate or chain validation bypass that makes a bad certificate verify, since it breaks the guarantee every caller depends on Memory-safety flaws in ASN.1 and X.509 parsing driven purely by attacker-supplied bytes Practical side channels that recover key material from a supported operation, as opposed to a timing difference with no demonstrated recovery Client-side memory corruption triggered by a malicious server, which turns every outbound TLS connection into an attack surface Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Send a detailed, reproducible report; if we can't reproduce it, it isn't eligible One vulnerability per report unless a chain is needed to show the real impact Give the OpenSSL security team room to ship a fix before any public writeup Findings that live in a bundled dependency belong upstream with that project rather than here If you also want the Google patch money, land the fix upstream yourself and keep it merged for a month; that is a separate pathway with its own rules Disclosure Coordinated with the OpenSSL security team through [email protected] . The project batches fixes into scheduled releases and publishes its own advisory with researcher credit; hold the detail until that advisory is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability