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OpenWrt

Bug bounty on Sorona openwrt.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://openwrt.org

Products and areas 12

  • libubox and its blob and JSON parsing, which almost every OpenWrt component links and feeds untrusted data into
  • LuCI in full: the web interface, its CGI and RPC endpoints, session handling, the ACL system that decides which RPC methods a session may call, and every luci-app and luci-proto module in the tree
  • netifd and the network configuration layer, including the protocol handler scripts that build interfaces out of configuration
  • Package handling through opkg and apk, signature verification, and the update path that installs code onto the device
  • procd, the init and process manager, along with the service definitions and hotplug handling it executes
  • rpcd and its plugins, the RPC daemon that LuCI and remote management tooling call into
  • The image build system and the sysupgrade path, which decide what firmware the device runs after a reboot
  • The network daemons as packaged and configured by OpenWrt, including dnsmasq and odhcpd, plus firewall and nftables rule generation
  • The security guide states that reports cover the OpenWrt distribution with the official package feeds hosted at github.com/openwrt, and also the OpenWrt-specific tools hosted at git.openwrt.org such as procd, ubus and libubox. That is the declared boundary, and everything below sits inside it
  • The UCI configuration system and everything that reads or writes it
  • ubus and ubusd, the message bus every daemon on the system speaks through, together with the ACL files governing who may call what
  • uhttpd, the web server LuCI runs on, and its CGI and Lua handlers
Out of scope (6)
  • Configuration decisions an administrator made, such as exposing LuCI on the WAN interface or leaving a default password in place
  • Denial of service that amounts to saturating the device's links
  • OEM and ODM vendor forks. A defect that exists only in a vendor's derivative belongs to that vendor, and those forks routinely lag upstream by years
  • Physical attacks on a router an attacker already holds, including serial console access and flash readout
  • Third-party packages outside the official feeds the policy names
  • Upstream defects in packaged software that OpenWrt ships unmodified, unless the OpenWrt packaging or default configuration is what makes them reachable

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report in confidence to the address on the policy page , the address the security guide names, or through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on openwrt/openwrt and openwrt/luci
  • The standalone openwrt/ubus repository has no security policy of its own and private reporting is disabled there. The OpenWrt policy covers it, so file through the main channel rather than treating it as unreachable
  • Name the release branch and the target architecture, and say whether the defect sits in core, in LuCI or in a package feed
  • State the privilege you started from. LuCI runs privileged, so the difference between an unauthenticated finding and one needing a session is the whole severity question here

Not accepted

  • OEM and ODM vendor forks
  • Third-party packages outside the official feeds the policy names
  • Configuration decisions an administrator made, such as exposing LuCI on the WAN interface or leaving a default password in place
  • Upstream defects in packaged software that OpenWrt ships unmodified, unless the OpenWrt packaging or default configuration is what makes them reachable
  • Physical attacks on a router an attacker already holds, including serial console access and flash readout
  • Denial of service that amounts to saturating the device's links

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-62947 Medium 4.9 15 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-62948 Critical 9.6 15 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-55490 Medium 6.5 7 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-30874 Low 1.8 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32721 High 8.6 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-30871 Critical 9.5 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-30872 Critical 9.5 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-30873 Low 2.4 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-20435 Medium 4.6 2 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-20430 High 8.8 2 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-20419 Medium 6.5 2 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-20408 High 8.8 2 Feb 2026
CVE-2025-20765 Medium 4.7 2 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-20747 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20748 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20746 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20742 High 8.0 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20741 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20739 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20737 High 7.8 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20738 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20736 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20735 High 7.8 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20733 High 7.8 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20734 Medium 5.3 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20732 Medium 5.3 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20731 Medium 5.3 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20729 Medium 4.2 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-20730 Medium 6.7 4 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-62525 High 7.9 22 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-62526 High 7.9 22 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20718 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20719 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20720 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20722 Medium 5.5 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20724 Medium 5.5 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20711 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20712 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20713 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20714 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20715 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20716 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20717 High 7.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20709 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20710 High 8.8 14 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-20705 High 7.8 1 Sep 2025
CVE-2025-20696 Medium 6.8 4 Aug 2025
CVE-2025-20689 Medium 5.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20690 Medium 5.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20691 Medium 5.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20692 Medium 5.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20693 Medium 6.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20694 Medium 6.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20695 Medium 6.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20683 Critical 9.8 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20685 High 8.8 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20686 High 8.8 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20688 Medium 5.5 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20681 Critical 9.8 8 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-20682 Critical 9.8 8 Jul 2025

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 27 Last 12 months Injection 35 % Memory safety 28 % Access control 22 % Privilege escalation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview OpenWrt is the Linux distribution that consumer and prosumer router firmware is built on, and a long tail of OEM and ODM vendor SDKs are forks of it that never rebase. The device it runs on is the edge of the network by definition, with a WAN interface facing the internet and the LuCI web interface facing every host on the LAN. CVE-2025-62526 is the reference point: a heap buffer overflow in ubusd, the message bus every service on the box talks through. The project asks for security reports in confidence to a project address and pays nothing for them, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The security guide states that reports cover the OpenWrt distribution with the official package feeds hosted at github.com/openwrt, and also the OpenWrt-specific tools hosted at git.openwrt.org such as procd, ubus and libubox. That is the declared boundary, and everything below sits inside it LuCI in full: the web interface, its CGI and RPC endpoints, session handling, the ACL system that decides which RPC methods a session may call, and every luci-app and luci-proto module in the tree uhttpd, the web server LuCI runs on, and its CGI and Lua handlers ubus and ubusd, the message bus every daemon on the system speaks through, together with the ACL files governing who may call what libubox and its blob and JSON parsing, which almost every OpenWrt component links and feeds untrusted data into procd, the init and process manager, along with the service definitions and hotplug handling it executes netifd and the network configuration layer, including the protocol handler scripts that build interfaces out of configuration rpcd and its plugins, the RPC daemon that LuCI and remote management tooling call into The UCI configuration system and everything that reads or writes it Package handling through opkg and apk, signature verification, and the update path that installs code onto the device The network daemons as packaged and configured by OpenWrt, including dnsmasq and odhcpd, plus firewall and nftables rule generation The image build system and the sysupgrade path, which decide what firmware the device runs after a reboot Out of scope OEM and ODM vendor forks. A defect that exists only in a vendor's derivative belongs to that vendor, and those forks routinely lag upstream by years Third-party packages outside the official feeds the policy names Configuration decisions an administrator made, such as exposing LuCI on the WAN interface or leaving a default password in place Upstream defects in packaged software that OpenWrt ships unmodified, unless the OpenWrt packaging or default configuration is what makes them reachable Physical attacks on a router an attacker already holds, including serial console access and flash readout Denial of service that amounts to saturating the device's links Most-valued findings Command injection reachable from LuCI, the densest class in the current record. The luci-proto-openvpn key generation defect ran attacker-supplied input as root, and the web interface is privileged by design ACL flaws in ubus or rpcd where a low-privilege session reaches a method it should not, including the recent case where a stale ACL granted write access to root's crontab Memory corruption in ubusd or libubox, the shape CVE-2025-62526 took. Every service on the box speaks through that bus, so a parsing bug there is reachable from many directions at once Anything reachable from the WAN interface without credentials, since that is the surface the entire internet can touch Authentication bypass on LuCI or rpcd, which amounts to full administrative control of the network's edge device Stored cross-site scripting in luci-app modules, a recurring class in the recent batch, since a LuCI session is a root-equivalent session Local privilege escalation in kernel modules and drivers shipped by the project, the class CVE-2025-62525 landed in with ltq-ptm Defects in package signature verification or the sysupgrade path, which put attacker-chosen firmware onto the device permanently Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report in confidence to [email protected] , the address the security guide names, or through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on openwrt/openwrt and openwrt/luci The project says in its own guide that the contact mailbox is not always monitored and mail there may go unnoticed. Its documented fallback is to ping the public openwrt-adm list with no detail at all and wait to be contacted privately The declared scope covers the OpenWrt distribution with the official package feeds on github.com/openwrt, plus the OpenWrt-specific tools on git.openwrt.org including procd, ubus and libubox The standalone openwrt/ubus repository has no security policy of its own and private reporting is disabled there. The OpenWrt policy covers it, so file through the main channel rather than treating it as unreachable Name the release branch and the target architecture, and say whether the defect sits in core, in LuCI or in a package feed State the privilege you started from. LuCI runs privileged, so the difference between an unauthenticated finding and one needing a session is the whole severity question here No money language appears on the security guide or the advisory index and the project is on no bounty platform, so there is no payment to negotiate upstream Disclosure Coordinated privately with the OpenWrt developers, published as a GitHub Security Advisory on the affected repository and carried in the project's advisory index. Volume is high and recent: nine core advisories and eighteen LuCI advisories inside the last twelve months. A fix landing upstream is only the beginning, since vendor forks routinely take years to converge or never do at all, so expect the field exposure to outlive the embargo by a long way. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability