Outline bug bounty: rewards, scope, CVEs and changes

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500: for critical bugs.
Report on Sorona: Submit through the program page.
Partial safe harbor: Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix: Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity	Relative size	Reward
Critical		$1,500+
High		$700+
Medium		$300+
Low		$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max

Safe harbor: Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

https://www.getoutline.com

Products and areas 11

Attachments and file upload, covering presigned upload and download URLs and the storage the install is pointed at
Authentication and every SSO provider an install can be wired to, plus session issuance and the invitation flow that creates accounts
Collections, documents and the permission model over them, including nested document permissions, collection memberships and group memberships
Import and export routines, which parse archives and documents an untrusted user supplied and write into the collection tree
Integrations and webhooks, and the credentials they hold for third-party services
Public share links, the tokens behind them, their expiry and the child documents a share does or does not reach
Search and the indexing path, where a result can cross content the searcher has no permission to read
The API in full, along with API keys, OAuth clients and the scopes each one is meant to be confined to
The editor and everything that renders untrusted document content, including embeds and the sanitisation applied before another user's browser sees it
The policy asks for any security vulnerability in Outline through a GitHub advisory and draws no boundary narrower than the repository itself
Workspace and team provisioning, along with the admin settings surface above it

Out of scope (6)

A permission an administrator granted deliberately, including a collection published to the whole workspace on purpose
Deployment configuration: storage bucket policy, reverse-proxy setup and environment variables the operator set
The hosted getoutline.com service where the finding is about the operator's infrastructure rather than the code, since no vendor channel exists to receive it
The policy publishes no exclusions list, so nothing is carved out by name. What follows are genuine out-of-scope classes
Third-party integrations and the services behind them, which belong to their own vendors
Upstream Node and database dependencies, unless Outline's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
File through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on outline/outline . The policy names that form as the channel
Report against a current release. The project ships often and v1.9.2 landed on 21 July 2026
There is no bounty and no vendor program to escalate to, so there is nothing to negotiate

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 9 minutes ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD

CVE	Summary	Severity	Published
CVE-2026-44695	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.7.1, the Slack integration callback for GET /auth/slack.post accepts an unsigned, session-independent OAuth state value. A third party who can obtain a Slack OAuth code for the same Outline Slack client can make a logged-in Outline user complete the callback and link that user's Outline account to the attacker's Slack tea	Medium 5.8	11 May 2026
CVE-2026-41649	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. The `shares.create` API endpoint starting in version 0.86.0 and prior to version 1.7.0 has an insecure direct object reference.. When both `collectionId` and `documentId` are provided in the request, the authorization logic only checks access to the collection, completely ignoring the document. This allows an authenticated attacker	High 7.7	28 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33640	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Outline implements an Email OTP login flow for users not associated with an Identity Provider. Starting in version 0.86.0 and prior to version 1.6.0, Outline does not invalidate OTP codes based on amount or frequency of invalid submissions, rather it relies on the rate limiter to restrict attempts. Consequently, identified bypasses	Critical 9.1	26 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-28506	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.5.0, the events.list API endpoint, used for retrieving activity logs, contains a logic flaw in its filtering mechanism. It allows any authenticated user to retrieve activity events associated with documents that have no collection (e.g., Private Drafts, Deleted Documents), regardless of the user's actual permissions on th	Medium 4.3	17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-24901	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.4.0, an Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the document restoration logic allows any team member to unauthorizedly restore, view, and seize ownership of deleted drafts belonging to other users, including administrators. By bypassing ownership validation during the restore process, an attacker can acc	High 8.1	17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-25062	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.4.0, during the JSON import process, the value of attachments[].key from the imported JSON is passed directly to path.join(rootPath, node.key) and then read using fs.readFile without validation. By embedding path traversal sequences such as ../ or absolute paths, an attacker can read arbitrary files on the server and impo	Medium 5.5	11 Feb 2026
CVE-2025-64487	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.1.0, a privilege escalation vulnerability exists in the Outline document management system due to inconsistent authorization checks between user and group membership management endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.	High 7.6	11 Feb 2026
CVE-2025-68663	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. Prior to 1.1.0, a vulnerability was found in Outline's WebSocket authentication mechanism that allows suspended users to maintain or establish real-time WebSocket connections and continue receiving sensitive operational updates after their account has been suspended. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.1.0.	Medium 6.9	11 Feb 2026
CVE-2023-54331	Outline 1.6.0 contains an unquoted service path vulnerability that allows local attackers to potentially execute arbitrary code with elevated system privileges. Attackers can exploit the unquoted service path in the OutlineService executable to inject malicious code that will be executed with LocalSystem permissions.	High 8.5	13 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-58351	Outline is a service that allows for collaborative documentation. In versions 0.72.0 through 0.83.0, Outline introduced a feature which facilitates local file system storage capabilities as an optional file storage strategy. This feature allowed a CSP bypass as well as a ContentType bypass that might facilitate further attacks. In the case of self-hosting and using Outline FILE_STORAGE=local on th	Medium 6.8	3 Sep 2025
CVE-2024-40626	Outline is an open source, collaborative document editor. A type confusion issue was found in ProseMirror’s rendering process that leads to a Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Outline. An authenticated user can create a document containing a malicious JavaScript payload. When other users view this document, the malicious Javascript can execute in the origin of Outline. Outline inc	High 7.3	16 Jul 2024
CVE-2024-37829	An issue in Outline <= v0.76.1 allows attackers to execute a session hijacking attack via user interaction with a crafted magic sign-in link.	High 8.8	9 Jul 2024
CVE-2024-37830	An issue in Outline <= v0.76.1 allows attackers to redirect a victim user to a malicious site via intercepting and changing the state cookie.	Medium 6.1	9 Jul 2024
CVE-2023-3532	Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository outline/outline prior to 0.70.1.	Medium 5.4	7 Jul 2023
CVE-2022-2342	Cross-site Scripting (XSS) - Stored in GitHub repository outline/outline prior to v0.64.4.	Medium 5.4	7 Jul 2022

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 24 Last 12 months Access control 40 % Auth/SSO 20 % XSS 20 % Info disclosure 20 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Outline is a team knowledge base, the tool a lot of engineering organisations self-host for runbooks and internal handbooks, at 13.5 million Docker pulls. Everything valuable about it is the collection and document permission model, because a self-hosted install is where a company writes down how its own infrastructure works. Twenty-four advisories landed in the last twelve months, one critical and nine high, the densest stream of any wiki in this group. The vendor runs no security program of its own: no security.txt and nothing on HackerOne, and the funded commercial cloud does not backstop the open-source core. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The policy asks for any security vulnerability in Outline through a GitHub advisory and draws no boundary narrower than the repository itself Collections, documents and the permission model over them, including nested document permissions, collection memberships and group memberships Public share links, the tokens behind them, their expiry and the child documents a share does or does not reach The API in full, along with API keys, OAuth clients and the scopes each one is meant to be confined to Authentication and every SSO provider an install can be wired to, plus session issuance and the invitation flow that creates accounts The editor and everything that renders untrusted document content, including embeds and the sanitisation applied before another user's browser sees it Attachments and file upload, covering presigned upload and download URLs and the storage the install is pointed at Import and export routines, which parse archives and documents an untrusted user supplied and write into the collection tree Integrations and webhooks, and the credentials they hold for third-party services Search and the indexing path, where a result can cross content the searcher has no permission to read Workspace and team provisioning, along with the admin settings surface above it Out of scope The policy publishes no exclusions list, so nothing is carved out by name. What follows are genuine out-of-scope classes The hosted getoutline.com service where the finding is about the operator's infrastructure rather than the code, since no vendor channel exists to receive it Upstream Node and database dependencies, unless Outline's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable Third-party integrations and the services behind them, which belong to their own vendors Deployment configuration: storage bucket policy, reverse-proxy setup and environment variables the operator set A permission an administrator granted deliberately, including a collection published to the whole workspace on purpose Most-valued findings Cross-workspace or cross-collection access. Twenty-four advisories landed in the window and this is the class the entire product exists to enforce, on data that is by definition a company's internal documentation Public share links that reach beyond the document they were minted for, survive revocation or expose child documents the sharer never intended API key and OAuth client handling, where a scoped token reads or writes data outside its scope Identity binding in the SSO path, where an attacker-controlled identity attaches to an existing account and inherits its collection memberships Stored cross-site scripting through document content or embeds, since one user writes and an entire organisation reads Attachment handling and presigned URL generation reaching another workspace's files Import and export routines parsing an attacker-supplied archive, which write into the document tree with the importing user's authority Anything unauthenticated at all, on an install base that assumes a corporate network boundary is doing part of the access control Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. File through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on outline/outline . The policy names that form as the channel The policy sits at docs/SECURITY.md , not in .github/ and not at the repository root, so it is easy to miss No security address and no vendor disclosure page exist. GitHub is the entire intake, and the trust subdomain is an empty shell Most published advisories carry no attributed reporter, so ask for credit explicitly in the advisory thread if you want it Report against a current release. The project ships often and v1.9.2 landed on 21 July 2026 There is no bounty and no vendor program to escalate to, so there is nothing to negotiate Disclosure Coordinated through the GitHub advisory flow on outline/outline and published as a GHSA alongside a patched release. The stream is steady rather than batched, at roughly two advisories a month across the last year, and the project releases frequently enough that a fix generally ships quickly. No embargo length is published, so agree a publication date in the advisory thread. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability