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Pi-hole / FTL

By Pi-hole Bug bounty on Sorona pi-hole.net

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
11
Public CVEs
43
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

11 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://pi-hole.net

Products and areas 10

  • Blocklist and gravity handling: fetching remote lists, parsing them and building the blocking database from data whoever publishes the list controls
  • Conditional forwarding and the upstream resolver paths, including DoH or DoT where an installation adds it
  • Docker packaging and the container's default configuration, the way a large share of installations actually run
  • FTL, the C daemon: the forked dnsmasq core, DNS query handling, DHCP handling and the blocking logic layered on top
  • The admin web interface and its templates, where query data collected from the network is rendered back to an operator
  • The DHCP server function, which Pi-hole commonly runs in place of the router's own
  • The installer and update scripts, which run as root and fetch code over the network
  • The organisation's policy welcomes all responsible disclosures and names one email address for them. It draws no boundary beyond ruling out public issues, so the whole product is in
  • The query database and statistics engine, including everything written to and read back from long-term storage
  • The web API in full, covering authentication, session handling, every endpoint and every setting a caller can change
Out of scope (5)
  • A user deliberately exposing the admin interface to the internet, absent a defect in the interface itself
  • Blocklist content, including a list that blocks or fails to block a given domain
  • Public GitHub issues filed as security reports, which the policy rules out by name
  • Third-party plugins and community scripts that are not part of the Pi-hole repositories
  • Unmodified upstream dnsmasq code, which belongs to that project's own maintainer and reporting channel

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Email the address on the policy page , the address the organisation's policy names, or use GitHub private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on both pi-hole/pi-hole and pi-hole/FTL
  • Do not open a public issue. The policy rules that out directly, and a working sinkhole exploit posted publicly reaches a very large installed base within hours
  • Look for the policy at the organisation level. Neither main repository carries a SECURITY.md; the real one is in pi-hole/.github
  • Say which component you hit: the FTL daemon in C, the web interface, the API, or the installer scripts.
  • Separate Pi-hole's dnsmasq fork from upstream dnsmasq.
  • State whether the finding needs an authenticated admin session.
  • Hold detail until the advisory is public and leave home installations time to pick up the update.

Not accepted

  • Unmodified upstream dnsmasq code
  • A user deliberately exposing the admin interface to the internet, absent a defect in the interface itself
  • Blocklist content, including a list that blocks or fails to block a given domain
  • Public GitHub issues filed as security reports
  • Third-party plugins and community scripts that are not part of the Pi-hole repositories

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-50130 High 8.8 14 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-39849 High 8.7 5 May 2026
CVE-2026-35520 High 8.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35521 High 8.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35517 High 8.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35518 High 8.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35519 High 8.8 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35491 Medium 6.1 7 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33405 Low 3.1 6 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33727 Medium 6.4 6 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33406 Medium 5.4 6 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33403 Medium 6.1 6 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33404 Low 3.4 6 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33765 High 8.9 27 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-26952 Medium 5.4 19 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-26953 Medium 5.4 19 Feb 2026
CVE-2025-59151 High 8.2 27 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-53533 Medium 5.1 27 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-32785 Low 2.0 27 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-34087 Critical 9.0 3 Jul 2025
CVE-2024-44069 High 7.5 19 Aug 2024
CVE-2024-34361 High 8.5 5 Jul 2024
CVE-2024-28247 High 7.6 27 Mar 2024
CVE-2023-23614 High 8.8 26 Jan 2023
CVE-2022-23513 Medium 5.3 23 Dec 2022
CVE-2022-31029 Medium 5.9 7 Jul 2022
CVE-2021-41175 High 7.3 26 Oct 2021
CVE-2021-3811 Medium 6.1 17 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-3812 Medium 6.1 17 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-3706 High 7.5 15 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-32793 Medium 5.7 4 Aug 2021
CVE-2021-32706 High 7.6 4 Aug 2021
CVE-2021-29448 High 7.6 15 Apr 2021
CVE-2021-29449 Medium 6.3 14 Apr 2021
CVE-2020-35591 Medium 5.4 18 Feb 2021
CVE-2020-35592 Medium 5.4 18 Feb 2021
CVE-2020-35659 Medium 6.1 24 Dec 2020
CVE-2020-12620 High 7.8 30 Jul 2020
CVE-2020-14162 High 7.8 30 Jul 2020
CVE-2020-14971 High 7.8 23 Jun 2020
CVE-2020-8816 High 7.2 29 May 2020
CVE-2020-11108 High 8.8 11 May 2020
CVE-2019-13051 High 8.8 9 Oct 2019

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 13 Last 12 months Remote code execution 40 % Access control 25 % DNS/packet parsing 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Pi-hole is the DNS sinkhole people put on their home network to block ads and tracking, and FTL is the daemon underneath it: a fork of dnsmasq with a query database and an authenticated web API added. It sits in the resolution path for every device in the house, which makes it a position rather than an application. Thirteen advisories landed in the last twelve months and many are remote code execution, including the CVE-2026-35517 series. The forked dnsmasq core brings its own long parsing history along with it, and the web layer is additional. Nobody pays for findings here. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The organisation's policy welcomes all responsible disclosures and names one email address for them. It draws no boundary beyond ruling out public issues, so the whole product is in FTL, the C daemon: the forked dnsmasq core, DNS query handling, DHCP handling and the blocking logic layered on top The query database and statistics engine, including everything written to and read back from long-term storage The web API in full, covering authentication, session handling, every endpoint and every setting a caller can change The admin web interface and its templates, where query data collected from the network is rendered back to an operator Blocklist and gravity handling: fetching remote lists, parsing them and building the blocking database from data whoever publishes the list controls The installer and update scripts, which run as root and fetch code over the network The DHCP server function, which Pi-hole commonly runs in place of the router's own Conditional forwarding and the upstream resolver paths, including DoH or DoT where an installation adds it Docker packaging and the container's default configuration, the way a large share of installations actually run Out of scope Unmodified upstream dnsmasq code, which belongs to that project's own maintainer and reporting channel A user deliberately exposing the admin interface to the internet, absent a defect in the interface itself Blocklist content, including a list that blocks or fails to block a given domain Public GitHub issues filed as security reports, which the policy rules out by name Third-party plugins and community scripts that are not part of the Pi-hole repositories Most-valued findings Unauthenticated remote code execution on the FTL daemon or through the web API. Several of the thirteen recent advisories are RCE, including CVE-2026-65963 and the CVE-2026-35517 through -35521 cluster, with CVE-2026-39849 and CVE-2026-44693 in the same twelve months Anything reachable from a DNS query alone. Every device on the network can send one, including the ones nobody trusts, and the sinkhole answers before anything else does Authentication and session handling on the web API, where a bypass converts a foothold on the guest network into administrative control of the household's DNS Injection into the query log or statistics path, where an attacker-chosen hostname is stored and later rendered back in the admin interface Blocklist and gravity processing, since that path fetches and parses remote data on a schedule with root behind it Defects in the forked dnsmasq core that upstream does not have, introduced by Pi-hole's own changes to that code Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Email [email protected] , the address the organisation's policy names, or use GitHub private vulnerability reporting, which is enabled on both pi-hole/pi-hole and pi-hole/FTL Do not open a public issue. The policy rules that out directly, and a working sinkhole exploit posted publicly reaches a very large installed base within hours Look for the policy at the organisation level. Neither main repository carries a SECURITY.md; the real one is in pi-hole/.github Say which component you hit: the FTL daemon in C, the web interface, the API, or the installer scripts. They are separate repositories in different languages with different reviewers Separate Pi-hole's dnsmasq fork from upstream dnsmasq. A defect in unmodified upstream code belongs to that project's maintainer, and a defect in the fork or in how FTL drives it belongs here State whether the finding needs an authenticated admin session. Much of the recent record is post-authentication, and an unauthenticated equivalent is worth far more Disclosure Coordinated by email or GitHub private vulnerability reporting with the Pi-hole team, then published as a GitHub Security Advisory alongside a fixed release. The cadence is high, with thirteen advisories in the last twelve months and several arriving in clusters, so a report tends to land in a batch rather than alone. Hold detail until the advisory is public and leave home installations time to pick up the update. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability