- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 17
- Public CVEs
- 0
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 3 days
- As the policy promises.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Response
-
Within 3 days
Expect three working days for acknowledgement and initial analysis, with updates through triage, fix and release
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
17 assets you may test, 7 excluded.
Web 1
- https://github.com/podman-container-tools/podman
Products and areas 16
- Checkpoint and restore through CRIU, including the checkpoint archive parser
- Configuration handling for containers.conf, storage.conf, registries.conf and policy.json, including the drop-in directories
- Container creation and the isolation it configures: namespaces, cgroups, capabilities, seccomp, SELinux labelling and the conmon boundary
- Image pull and push, registry authentication, credential storage in auth.json, signature verification and policy.json trust evaluation
- Networking through netavark and aardvark-dns, plus the legacy CNI path, port publishing and the firewall rules Podman writes
- podman build, which runs Buildah as a library, and the whole Containerfile and build-context path it drives
- podman kube play and podman kube generate, and the Kubernetes YAML they parse and act on
- podman machine: the VM lifecycle across Hyper-V, WSL and applehv, the connection to the guest and the TLS and SSH setup between host and VM
- Pods, the infra container and the shared namespaces inside a pod
- Rootless operation end to end: user namespace setup, subuid and subgid mapping, the rootlesskit and pasta or slirp4netns paths, and the storage layout under the user's home
- systemd integration: Quadlet unit generation and parsing, podman generate systemd and the auto-update path
- The podman CLI in full, across every subcommand and every flag that changes the privilege or isolation setup
- The REST API in both flavours, the libpod API and the Docker-compatible API, and the socket they are served on including the systemd-activated socket
- The shared container-libs code (containers/image, containers/storage, containers/common) as Podman executes it, which the same address accepts
- The shared Containers-projects policy asks for any vulnerability to be reported privately to the security list and rules out public disclosure. It draws no boundary narrower than the Podman tree itself
- Volume and mount handling, including bind mounts, named volumes, --mount parsing, SELinux relabelling and the resolution of paths supplied by an image
Out of scope (7)
- Buildah-specific and Skopeo-specific code paths, which have their own entries here even though the security address is shared
- Deliberate operator choices, such as running a container privileged, disabling SELinux, mounting the host root or setting a registry insecure
- Distribution packaging and downstream patches rather than upstream Podman
- Docker Engine and Docker Desktop, which are a different vendor's code
- Public disclosure ahead of the coordinated release, which the policy rules out
- Reports against unsupported old releases once a fixed version exists
- runc, crun and the kernel primitives Podman configures, where the defect belongs upstream
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
-
Report privately to the address on the policy page , the shared Containers-projects security list read only by core maintainers
-
GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on podman-container-tools/podman, so a draft advisory is a second working channel
-
The policy states plainly that security problems must not be reported publicly, so no GitHub issue and no mailing-list post
-
Give the affected version range explicitly. Recent findings here have reached back across many releases, and CVE-2026-57231 covered a span of roughly six years
-
Say whether the finding needs rootful or rootless mode. The privilege model differs enough that the two are separate arguments
Not accepted
-
Deliberate operator choices, such as running a container privileged, disabling SELinux, mounting the host root or setting a registry insecure
-
Distribution packaging and downstream patches rather than upstream Podman
-
Reports against unsupported old releases once a fixed version exists
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
No CVEs matched yet. We match NVD records by vendor name, so products sold under another name can be missing.
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 5 Last 12 months Path / symlink traversal 40 % Information disclosure 25 % Command injection 20 % Insecure file handling 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Podman is the daemonless container engine that RHEL, Fedora and CentOS Stream ship as their default, so it is the container runtime across essentially the whole Red Hat estate, and Docker is not packaged for RHEL 8 or later. It also carries most rootless container workflows on desktops and CI. CVE-2026-57231 is the reference point: a malformed image tricked podman run into leaking the host's environment variables, and it reached back through six years of releases. Red Hat runs no public paid bounty and the project's security policy offers no reward of any kind, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The shared Containers-projects policy asks for any vulnerability to be reported privately to the security list and rules out public disclosure. It draws no boundary narrower than the Podman tree itself The podman CLI in full, across every subcommand and every flag that changes the privilege or isolation setup The REST API in both flavours, the libpod API and the Docker-compatible API, and the socket they are served on including the systemd-activated socket Rootless operation end to end: user namespace setup, subuid and subgid mapping, the rootlesskit and pasta or slirp4netns paths, and the storage layout under the user's home Container creation and the isolation it configures: namespaces, cgroups, capabilities, seccomp, SELinux labelling and the conmon boundary Image pull and push, registry authentication, credential storage in auth.json, signature verification and policy.json trust evaluation Volume and mount handling, including bind mounts, named volumes, --mount parsing, SELinux relabelling and the resolution of paths supplied by an image podman build , which runs Buildah as a library, and the whole Containerfile and build-context path it drives podman kube play and podman kube generate , and the Kubernetes YAML they parse and act on podman machine : the VM lifecycle across Hyper-V, WSL and applehv, the connection to the guest and the TLS and SSH setup between host and VM Pods, the infra container and the shared namespaces inside a pod Networking through netavark and aardvark-dns, plus the legacy CNI path, port publishing and the firewall rules Podman writes systemd integration: Quadlet unit generation and parsing, podman generate systemd and the auto-update path Checkpoint and restore through CRIU, including the checkpoint archive parser Configuration handling for containers.conf, storage.conf, registries.conf and policy.json, including the drop-in directories The shared container-libs code (containers/image, containers/storage, containers/common) as Podman executes it, which the same address accepts Out of scope runc, crun and the kernel primitives Podman configures, where the defect belongs upstream Buildah-specific and Skopeo-specific code paths, which have their own entries here even though the security address is shared Docker Engine and Docker Desktop, which are a different vendor's code Deliberate operator choices, such as running a container privileged, disabling SELinux, mounting the host root or setting a registry insecure Distribution packaging and downstream patches rather than upstream Podman Public disclosure ahead of the coordinated release, which the policy rules out Reports against unsupported old releases once a fixed version exists Most-valued findings Symlink and path traversal wherever Podman resolves a path that came from an image, a Kubernetes manifest or a build context. Two of the last five advisories were exactly this: CVE-2026-55686 through WORKDIR and CVE-2025-9566 through podman kube play Host state leaking into a container from a crafted image. CVE-2026-57231 got the host's environment variables out through a malformed image and affected releases from 1.8.1 to 5.8.4 Command injection in the podman machine path, particularly where a value crosses into a shell or a PowerShell invocation. CVE-2026-33414 is that shape, and Red Hat rated it Important at CVSS 8.8 while the repo advisory called it low Anything that breaks the rootless privilege model: a subuid or subgid mapping error, a namespace setup mistake or a path where rootless operation reaches privilege it should not have Temporary file and permission handling during build and run, the class CVE-2025-4953 landed in with an insecure build-context bind mount Missing or bypassable TLS verification on any connection Podman makes, including the machine connection that CVE-2025-6032 left unverified Registry credential exposure: auth.json handling, credential helper invocation and credentials sent to a registry other than the one they belong to Signature and trust policy evaluation, where an image that should fail policy.json runs anyway The API socket as an attack surface, including anything a container that can reach the socket can then do to the host Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , the shared Containers-projects security list read only by core maintainers GitHub private vulnerability reporting is enabled on podman-container-tools/podman, so a draft advisory is a second working channel The policy states plainly that security problems must not be reported publicly, so no GitHub issue and no mailing-list post Expect three working days for acknowledgement and initial analysis, with updates through triage, fix and release The repository moved from containers/podman to podman-container-tools/podman on 2026-04-20 and Go import paths moved to go.podman.io. Old links redirect, but cite the current path Give the affected version range explicitly. Recent findings here have reached back across many releases, and CVE-2026-57231 covered a span of roughly six years Say whether the finding needs rootful or rootless mode. The privilege model differs enough that the two are separate arguments There is no cash payment on this channel. Red Hat runs no public paid bounty and the project's policy names no reward Disclosure Coordinated privately through the shared Containers-projects process, acknowledged and analysed within three working days, with the reporter kept updated through triage, fix and release. Advisories are published on the repository and, for anything Red Hat ingests, tracked separately in Red Hat's security data with its own severity rating. Because the underlying code is shared with Buildah, Skopeo and CRI-O, a fix is often staged across several repositories before publication, so plan for an embargo that runs to the coordinated release. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability