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RabbitMQ

Bug bounty on Sorona rabbitmq.com

Accepting reports open-source
Go to program Website
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
15
Public CVEs
73
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Report on Sorona
Submit through the program page.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

15 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://www.rabbitmq.com

Products and areas 14

  • AMQP 0-9-1 and AMQP 1.0 frame parsing, channel handling and the connection negotiation in front of both
  • Clustering, Erlang distribution between nodes, the shared cluster cookie and the peer discovery backends
  • Plugin loading, the plugin directory and what an enabled plugin can reach inside the node
  • Queue types and their implementations: classic queues, quorum queues and the Raft implementation behind them, and streams
  • rabbitmqctl, rabbitmq-diagnostics and the Erlang remote shell path they use to reach a running node
  • Shovel and federation, the plugins that connect one broker to another, along with the credentials and TLS settings on those links
  • The authentication and authorization backends in full: internal, LDAP, HTTP, OAuth 2 and JWT, and the cache backend in front of them
  • The management plugin, its HTTP API, its web UI and the definitions import and export it performs
  • The MQTT, STOMP, Web-MQTT and Web-STOMP plugins and the protocol handling each adds
  • The permission model across virtual hosts, exchanges, queues and topics, including topic authorization and the regular expressions permissions are written as
  • The project's security page asks for a private GitHub Security Advisory on rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server, with a Broadcom PSIRT address as fallback. It declares no boundary narrower than the broker the project ships
  • The Prometheus and management metrics endpoints and what an unauthenticated caller can read from them
  • The stream protocol and its plugin, which is a separate wire protocol with its own authentication
  • TLS termination on every listener, peer certificate verification and the mapping from a certificate to a RabbitMQ user
Out of scope (6)
  • A broker deliberately exposed to an untrusted network with the default guest account still reachable, which is a configuration decision the documentation warns about
  • Client libraries maintained outside the server repository
  • Erlang/OTP itself, unless RabbitMQ's own use of it is what makes the defect reachable
  • Tanzu RabbitMQ and other Broadcom commercial builds, which have their own support and advisory process
  • The applications publishing and consuming messages
  • The RabbitMQ Cluster Operator and the Kubernetes Messaging Topology Operator, separate repositories with their own advisory streams

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server , the primary documented channel
  • Broadcom PSIRT is the email fallback, at the RabbitMQ core address the project publishes on its security page
  • The HackerOne VMware page is a Response Policy rather than a bug bounty. It pays nothing, and filing there does not create a reward path
  • Name the protocol the finding runs over. RabbitMQ speaks AMQP 0-9-1, AMQP 1.0, MQTT and STOMP, and a defect in one plugin's frame handling usually does not exist in the others
  • Give the authentication backend in use. Internal, LDAP, HTTP and OAuth 2 each decide identity differently and the severe findings cluster there
  • State whether the node was clustered. Erlang distribution between nodes is a different trust boundary from the client-facing listeners
  • Hold detail until the advisory is public.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2020-36282 Critical 9.8 12 Mar 2021

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 66 Last 12 months 73 Lifetime Auth bypass 35 % Access control 25 % Remote code execution 25 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview RabbitMQ is the default message broker for a very large slice of enterprise and microservice architecture. It is what Celery talks to, it carries OpenStack's internal messaging, and the Cluster Operator puts it into Kubernetes. The broker holds queued work in transit along with credentials for everything connected to it, so a defect in its authentication or its management plane lets an attacker read, forge or drop other applications' messages. Broadcom runs an unpaid response policy on HackerOne for VMware-lineage products and no bounty, and RabbitMQ's own security page offers no reward. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The project's security page asks for a private GitHub Security Advisory on rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server , with a Broadcom PSIRT address as fallback. It declares no boundary narrower than the broker the project ships AMQP 0-9-1 and AMQP 1.0 frame parsing, channel handling and the connection negotiation in front of both The MQTT, STOMP, Web-MQTT and Web-STOMP plugins and the protocol handling each adds The authentication and authorization backends in full: internal, LDAP, HTTP, OAuth 2 and JWT, and the cache backend in front of them The permission model across virtual hosts, exchanges, queues and topics, including topic authorization and the regular expressions permissions are written as The management plugin, its HTTP API, its web UI and the definitions import and export it performs Shovel and federation, the plugins that connect one broker to another, along with the credentials and TLS settings on those links Clustering, Erlang distribution between nodes, the shared cluster cookie and the peer discovery backends TLS termination on every listener, peer certificate verification and the mapping from a certificate to a RabbitMQ user Queue types and their implementations: classic queues, quorum queues and the Raft implementation behind them, and streams The stream protocol and its plugin, which is a separate wire protocol with its own authentication rabbitmqctl , rabbitmq-diagnostics and the Erlang remote shell path they use to reach a running node Plugin loading, the plugin directory and what an enabled plugin can reach inside the node The Prometheus and management metrics endpoints and what an unauthenticated caller can read from them Out of scope Tanzu RabbitMQ and other Broadcom commercial builds, which have their own support and advisory process The RabbitMQ Cluster Operator and the Kubernetes Messaging Topology Operator, separate repositories with their own advisory streams Client libraries maintained outside the server repository Erlang/OTP itself, unless RabbitMQ's own use of it is what makes the defect reachable A broker deliberately exposed to an untrusted network with the default guest account still reachable, which is a configuration decision the documentation warns about The applications publishing and consuming messages Most-valued findings Authentication bypass across any of the backends, above all the OAuth 2 and JWT path where token validation decides who the connecting client is Permission evaluation defects where a user publishes to, consumes from or binds a resource in a virtual host its permissions never granted, including topic authorization and the regular expression matching behind it Erlang distribution and cluster cookie handling, where network access to the distribution port becomes remote code execution on the node. This is the highest-severity shape the deployment model allows Management HTTP API paths that let a non-administrator create users, change permissions or import definitions, which is administrative control of the whole broker Definitions import that writes more than the operator asked for, since definitions carry users, permissions and policies together TLS peer verification defects on federation and shovel links, where one broker accepts messages from a peer it should not trust Frame parsing on any of the wire protocols, particularly before authentication completes, since all four listeners accept bytes from anything that can reach the port Certificate-to-user mapping, where the identity extracted from a client certificate differs from the identity the operator configured Stored cross-site scripting in the management UI escalating to API calls in an administrator's session Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on rabbitmq/rabbitmq-server , the primary documented channel Broadcom PSIRT is the email fallback, at the RabbitMQ core address the project publishes on its security page The HackerOne VMware page is a Response Policy rather than a bug bounty. It pays nothing, and filing there does not create a reward path Name the protocol the finding runs over. RabbitMQ speaks AMQP 0-9-1, AMQP 1.0, MQTT and STOMP, and a defect in one plugin's frame handling usually does not exist in the others Give the authentication backend in use. Internal, LDAP, HTTP and OAuth 2 each decide identity differently and the severe findings cluster there State whether the node was clustered. Erlang distribution between nodes is a different trust boundary from the client-facing listeners Disclosure Coordinated through the GitHub advisory flow with the RabbitMQ team at Broadcom, published as a GHSA with a CVE alongside a patched release. The project ships security fixes in patch releases across supported series and credits reporters, so the embargo runs to that release rather than to a fixed day count. Hold detail until the advisory is public. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability