- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 15
- Public CVEs
- 0
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Replies within 5 days
- As the policy promises.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Response
-
Within 5 days
Expect acknowledgement within five working days
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
15 assets you may test, 9 excluded.
Web 1
- https://github.com/rancher/rancher
Products and areas 14
- Audit logging, and the backup and restore operator with the cluster state it reads and writes
- Cluster provisioning: RKE2 and k3s provisioning, node drivers and node templates, cloud credentials and the machine lifecycle
- Every authentication provider Rancher supports: local, SAML in all its flavours (Shibboleth, PingID, Okta, Keycloak, ADFS), OIDC, Active Directory, LDAP, GitHub, Google and Azure AD
- Fleet and the GitOps integration, including repository access and the manifests it applies
- The bundled monitoring, logging and CIS scan chart integrations as Rancher deploys and configures them
- The catalog, Helm chart and app deployment path, including chart repositories Rancher fetches and the values it renders
- The multi-cluster management path: the cattle-cluster-agent and cattle-node-agent connections, the remotedialer tunnel and the proxy that carries requests from Rancher into a downstream cluster
- The policy accepts vulnerability reports on Rancher by email, subject to a working proof of concept and disclosure of any AI tooling used. It names cross-site scripting on the Rancher Manager UI and privilege escalation through Rancher Manager RBAC as valid examples, and lists invalid types rather than narrowing the product surface
- The Rancher CLI and its login, token storage and TLS handling
- The Rancher Manager server and its APIs in full, covering the Norman and Steve API layers and every resource they expose
- The Rancher Manager UI, both the current Dashboard and the older Ember UI, and the Extensions loading mechanism
- The rancher/webhook admission controller and the validation it is supposed to enforce
- The RBAC model end to end across global roles, cluster roles and project roles, plus the role templates and bindings that project them into downstream clusters
- The token and API-key model, including token scoping, expiry, refresh and the user impersonation path
Out of scope (9)
- Exploits that require administrator privilege to begin with, which the policy treats as admin-only and invalid
- k3s and RKE2 as products, which have their own scope even though the security address is shared
- Missing HTTP security headers with no demonstrated impact, named as invalid
- Public CVEs surfaced by a scanner with no demonstrated impact on Rancher, named by the policy as an invalid report type
- Public disclosure before the agreed embargo lifts
- Reports without a working proof of concept, which the policy will not process
- Self-inflicted misconfiguration, also named as invalid
- Third-party charts and extensions that Rancher neither maintains nor ships by default
- Upstream Kubernetes defects that Rancher only inherits
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
-
Report privately by email to the address on the policy page , optionally encrypted to the GPG key published inline in the policy
-
GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on rancher/rancher, so email is the channel
-
A working proof of concept is mandatory. SUSE introduced this as proof of work to cut the volume of low-quality automated submissions
-
Disclose any AI tooling used to find the issue, automate the work, write the report or produce the patch. A report missing required fields may be treated as AI-generated spam
-
Expect acknowledgement within five working days, an embargo agreed with the team, and credit in the published advisory
-
State the starting privilege precisely: unauthenticated, standard user, project member, project owner or cluster owner. The policy rejects admin-only exploits, so the boundary you cross is the finding
Not accepted
-
Public CVEs surfaced by a scanner with no demonstrated impact on Rancher
-
Self-inflicted misconfiguration
-
Exploits that require administrator privilege to begin with
-
Missing HTTP security headers with no demonstrated impact
-
Reports without a working proof of concept
-
Third-party charts and extensions that Rancher neither maintains nor ships by default
-
Public disclosure before the agreed embargo lifts
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
No CVEs matched yet. We match NVD records by vendor name, so products sold under another name can be missing.
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 13 Last 12 months Privilege escalation & RBAC 35 % Authentication bypass 30 % Injection 20 % Transport & path handling 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Rancher is SUSE's multi-cluster Kubernetes management platform, and it is one of the most widely deployed enterprise control planes there is. A single Rancher server typically holds administrative access to every cluster it manages, so a compromise is rarely limited to one of them. CVE-2026-44939 is the reference point: command injection through an unsanitised YAML parameter, rated critical. Thirteen advisories came out of this project in the last year, and the team behind them is demonstrably responsive. The governing SUSE policy states in writing that there is no bounty programme and no swag either, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The policy accepts vulnerability reports on Rancher by email, subject to a working proof of concept and disclosure of any AI tooling used. It names cross-site scripting on the Rancher Manager UI and privilege escalation through Rancher Manager RBAC as valid examples, and lists invalid types rather than narrowing the product surface The Rancher Manager server and its APIs in full, covering the Norman and Steve API layers and every resource they expose The multi-cluster management path: the cattle-cluster-agent and cattle-node-agent connections, the remotedialer tunnel and the proxy that carries requests from Rancher into a downstream cluster Every authentication provider Rancher supports: local, SAML in all its flavours (Shibboleth, PingID, Okta, Keycloak, ADFS), OIDC, Active Directory, LDAP, GitHub, Google and Azure AD The token and API-key model, including token scoping, expiry, refresh and the user impersonation path The RBAC model end to end across global roles, cluster roles and project roles, plus the role templates and bindings that project them into downstream clusters The Rancher Manager UI, both the current Dashboard and the older Ember UI, and the Extensions loading mechanism Cluster provisioning: RKE2 and k3s provisioning, node drivers and node templates, cloud credentials and the machine lifecycle The catalog, Helm chart and app deployment path, including chart repositories Rancher fetches and the values it renders The rancher/webhook admission controller and the validation it is supposed to enforce Fleet and the GitOps integration, including repository access and the manifests it applies The Rancher CLI and its login, token storage and TLS handling Audit logging, and the backup and restore operator with the cluster state it reads and writes The bundled monitoring, logging and CIS scan chart integrations as Rancher deploys and configures them Out of scope k3s and RKE2 as products, which have their own scope even though the security address is shared Upstream Kubernetes defects that Rancher only inherits Public CVEs surfaced by a scanner with no demonstrated impact on Rancher, named by the policy as an invalid report type Self-inflicted misconfiguration, also named as invalid Exploits that require administrator privilege to begin with, which the policy treats as admin-only and invalid Missing HTTP security headers with no demonstrated impact, named as invalid Reports without a working proof of concept, which the policy will not process Third-party charts and extensions that Rancher neither maintains nor ships by default Public disclosure before the agreed embargo lifts Most-valued findings Privilege escalation across the RBAC boundary, which the policy names as a valid class and which the record backs up. CVE-2026-41052 went from Project Owner to the host, and any step up through project, cluster and global scope is worth the same attention Anything that reaches from Rancher into a downstream cluster with more authority than the caller holds. A Rancher server usually has administrative credentials for every cluster it manages, so this class is multi-cluster by default Injection into anything Rancher parses or templates. CVE-2026-44939 was command injection through an unsanitised YAML parameter and was rated critical, so YAML, chart values and provisioning parameters all deserve direct attack Authentication provider defects, SAML above all. CVE-2026-44946 replayed a SAML assertion, and CVE-2026-41053 pulled over-inclusive team membership out of GitHub App authentication Identity binding in any external provider, where an attacker-controlled identity is attached to an existing account or a group claim grants more than it should Path traversal in the components that load files or bundles, the class CVE-2026-25705 landed in through Rancher Extensions TLS verification that is skipped or bypassable on any connection Rancher or its CLI makes, as CVE-2025-67601 showed on CLI login Cross-site scripting on the Rancher Manager UI, named as a valid class by the policy, particularly anywhere downstream cluster data is rendered Token and impersonation handling: scope confusion, tokens that outlive a revoked account, or impersonation reaching a subject the caller may not act as The agent tunnel itself, where a compromised or spoofed downstream agent influences the management plane Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately by email to [email protected] , optionally encrypted to the GPG key published inline in the policy GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on rancher/rancher, so email is the channel A working proof of concept is mandatory. SUSE introduced this as proof of work to cut the volume of low-quality automated submissions Disclose any AI tooling used to find the issue, automate the work, write the report or produce the patch. A report missing required fields may be treated as AI-generated spam Expect acknowledgement within five working days, an embargo agreed with the team, and credit in the published advisory The policy names valid report types by example, including cross-site scripting on the Rancher Manager UI and privilege escalation through Rancher Manager RBAC. Framing a finding against those examples helps State the starting privilege precisely: unauthenticated, standard user, project member, project owner or cluster owner. The policy rejects admin-only exploits, so the boundary you cross is the finding There is no cash payment and no swag on this channel. The policy is explicit about both Disclosure Coordinated privately by email with the SUSE Rancher security team, acknowledged within five working days, and published as a GitHub Security Advisory on rancher/rancher with credit to the reporter. This is one of the better-documented processes in the container layer and the throughput shows it, with thirteen advisories in the last year. Fixes land across the supported Rancher minor branches and enterprise operators upgrade a control plane cautiously, so hold detail until the advisory is out and expect the real patch window to run past it. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability