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rsyslog

By sorona.xyz Bug bounty on Sorona rsyslog.com

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
20
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://www.rsyslog.com

Products and areas 11

  • Framing and connection handling on those inputs, including the optional regex-based framing and the octet-counted and newline-delimited paths
  • RainerScript and the template engine, including property replacers, the string handling that builds output records, and the configuration parser itself
  • SECURITY.md asks for security vulnerabilities through GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting, with direct email to the maintainer as the alternative. It names no excluded component, so the whole upstream rsyslog tree is in bounds
  • The daemon's own privilege handling: it starts as root, and how and when it drops or confines that privilege is part of the surface
  • The local input modules, including imuxsock, imjournal, imklog and imfile, which pull records from other processes and from files on disk
  • The message parsers: the RFC5424 and RFC3164 syslog parsers, plus the message-modification modules such as mmpstrucdata, mmjsonparse and mmnormalize applied to untrusted records
  • The network input modules, including imtcp, imudp, imptcp, imhttp and imrelp, which accept data pre-authentication from any host that can reach the port
  • The output modules that hand data to another system, including omfwd, omfile, the database outputs, omelasticsearch and omprog, where an injected field crosses into someone else's parser or process
  • The project's build and release machinery, including its GitHub Actions workflows, which are what an attacker would target to reach the artefact rather than the code
  • The queue and disk-assisted queue subsystem, where a spool file is written and read by a privileged daemon
  • TLS handling on the network inputs and outputs, including certificate and peer-name verification
Out of scope (5)
  • Adiscon's commercial products and services, which are separate from the open-source rsyslog repository
  • Configuration mistakes such as exposing imtcp to the internet without TLS or access control, which the operator chose
  • Distribution packaging and default configuration files rather than defects in upstream rsyslog
  • Log injection that amounts to writing misleading text into a log file, absent a parser or downstream consumer that can be made to do something with it
  • Resource exhaustion from simply sending a very high volume of legitimate log traffic at a collector configured with no rate limit

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report through GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting at github.com/rsyslog/rsyslog/security/advisories/new, which the project's SECURITY.md names as the primary channel and which is enabled on the repository
  • Direct email to the address on the policy page is the documented alternative if the GitHub flow is not workable for you
  • Include the rsyslog.conf or RainerScript configuration that loads the affected module. Every recent finding is module-specific and unreachable without the right input or parser module loaded
  • Say whether the module is enabled by default on Debian, Ubuntu or RHEL, or whether it requires the operator to opt in, because that is the difference between a fleet-wide remote bug and a niche one
  • For anything on the network inputs, provide the raw bytes or a sending script rather than a description of the malformed message

Not accepted

  • Log injection that amounts to writing misleading text into a log file, absent a parser or downstream consumer that can be made to do something with it
  • Resource exhaustion from simply sending a very high volume of legitimate log traffic at a collector configured with no rate limit
  • Configuration mistakes such as exposing imtcp to the internet without TLS or access control, which the operator chose
  • Adiscon's commercial products and services, which are separate from the open-source rsyslog repository
  • Distribution packaging and default configuration files rather than defects in upstream rsyslog

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-19654 High 7.5 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2022-24903 High 8.1 6 May 2022
CVE-2011-1488 Medium 5.5 14 Nov 2019
CVE-2011-1489 Medium 5.5 14 Nov 2019
CVE-2011-1490 Medium 5.5 14 Nov 2019
CVE-2019-17041 Critical 9.8 7 Oct 2019
CVE-2019-17042 Critical 9.8 7 Oct 2019
CVE-2019-17040 Critical 9.8 30 Sep 2019
CVE-2018-16881 High 7.5 25 Jan 2019
CVE-2018-1000140 Critical 9.8 23 Mar 2018
CVE-2017-12588 Critical 9.8 6 Aug 2017
CVE-2015-3243 Medium 5.5 25 Jul 2017
CVE-2014-3634 High 7.5 2 Nov 2014
CVE-2014-3683 Medium 5.0 2 Nov 2014
CVE-2013-4758 Medium 6.8 4 Oct 2013
CVE-2011-4623 Low 2.1 25 Sep 2012
CVE-2011-3200 Medium 5.0 6 Sep 2011
CVE-2008-5617 High 8.5 17 Dec 2008
CVE-2008-5618 Medium 5.0 17 Dec 2008
CVE-2005-3074 High 7.5 27 Sep 2005

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months Memory safety 45 % Denial of service 25 % Parsing/validation 20 % Supply chain / CI 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview rsyslog is the default system log daemon on the Debian, Ubuntu and RHEL/CentOS families, and it does far more than write /var/log/messages . It is a log ingestion and ETL engine whose input modules bind sockets and accept data from anywhere on the network. That makes it the outlier in this category: almost everything else here is a local-privilege target, while rsyslog carries genuine remote pre-authentication surface on an enormous installed base, because a log collector's job is to accept input from hosts it does not trust. The last twelve months carried two CVEs across four published advisories, most of them on that network surface. Adiscon maintains it commercially and runs no bounty. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope SECURITY.md asks for security vulnerabilities through GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting, with direct email to the maintainer as the alternative. It names no excluded component, so the whole upstream rsyslog tree is in bounds The network input modules, including imtcp , imudp , imptcp , imhttp and imrelp , which accept data pre-authentication from any host that can reach the port Framing and connection handling on those inputs, including the optional regex-based framing and the octet-counted and newline-delimited paths The local input modules, including imuxsock , imjournal , imklog and imfile , which pull records from other processes and from files on disk The message parsers: the RFC5424 and RFC3164 syslog parsers, plus the message-modification modules such as mmpstrucdata , mmjsonparse and mmnormalize applied to untrusted records RainerScript and the template engine, including property replacers, the string handling that builds output records, and the configuration parser itself The output modules that hand data to another system, including omfwd , omfile , the database outputs, omelasticsearch and omprog , where an injected field crosses into someone else's parser or process TLS handling on the network inputs and outputs, including certificate and peer-name verification The queue and disk-assisted queue subsystem, where a spool file is written and read by a privileged daemon The daemon's own privilege handling: it starts as root, and how and when it drops or confines that privilege is part of the surface The project's build and release machinery, including its GitHub Actions workflows, which are what an attacker would target to reach the artefact rather than the code Out of scope Log injection that amounts to writing misleading text into a log file, absent a parser or downstream consumer that can be made to do something with it Resource exhaustion from simply sending a very high volume of legitimate log traffic at a collector configured with no rate limit Configuration mistakes such as exposing imtcp to the internet without TLS or access control, which the operator chose Adiscon's commercial products and services, which are separate from the open-source rsyslog repository Distribution packaging and default configuration files rather than defects in upstream rsyslog Most-valued findings Memory corruption reachable from a single log message on a network input, which is pre-auth remote code execution surface on the default log daemon of most of the Linux server estate. CVE-2026-55556 in imhttp Basic Auth handling and CVE-2026-61548 in mmpstrucdata are the templates Anything that crashes or hangs the daemon from unauthenticated network input, because losing the log collector is both an availability failure and a way to blind incident response. GHSA-cj5r-wh2m-7w29 did it through optional imptcp regex framing Parser defects in the RFC5424 or RFC3164 paths that let a crafted message desynchronise framing or forge fields other rules act on Injection through the template and property-replacer path into a downstream consumer, particularly a database or search output where the log record becomes a query Privilege handling in the daemon itself, since it starts as root and any failure to drop or confine that turns a parser bug into a root bug Compromise of the build and release path, the class GHSA-8q7v-vw7j-33r8 belongs to as a script injection in the project's GitHub Actions Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting at github.com/rsyslog/rsyslog/security/advisories/new, which the project's SECURITY.md names as the primary channel and which is enabled on the repository Direct email to [email protected] is the documented alternative if the GitHub flow is not workable for you Include the rsyslog.conf or RainerScript configuration that loads the affected module. Every recent finding is module-specific and unreachable without the right input or parser module loaded Say whether the module is enabled by default on Debian, Ubuntu or RHEL, or whether it requires the operator to opt in, because that is the difference between a fleet-wide remote bug and a niche one For anything on the network inputs, provide the raw bytes or a sending script rather than a description of the malformed message The SECURITY.md covers handling, timeline and credit attribution. Credit is what the project offers, and there is no payment term in it to negotiate Disclosure Coordinated through GitHub private vulnerability reporting and published as a GitHub Security Advisory with a patched release; the SECURITY.md sets out the handling process, the timeline and how reporters are credited. The cadence through mid-2026 shows a maintainer who triages quickly and ships advisories within weeks. Because this is the default log daemon across the Debian and Red Hat families, expect distribution security teams to be coordinating backports in parallel, and hold the detail until those land. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability