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Traefik

By Traefik Labs Bug bounty on Sorona traefik.io

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://traefik.io

Products and areas 12

  • Access logs, metrics and tracing exporters, and what each writes about a request
  • Every middleware shipped in core, in particular ForwardAuth, BasicAuth, DigestAuth, IPAllowList, Headers, StripPrefix, RedirectRegex, ReplacePathRegex, RateLimit, InFlightReq, Buffering and Chain
  • HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 handling, connection reuse to backends and the header rewriting that happens on the way through
  • Service load balancing, sticky sessions, health checking, mirroring and the weighted and failover services
  • The ACME client and every certificate resolver, covering HTTP, TLS-ALPN and DNS challenges and the provider credentials each holds
  • The API and the dashboard, plus the entrypoint configuration that decides whether they are reachable
  • The entrypoint layer itself, including proxy protocol handling and the trusted IP configuration that decides which forwarded headers are believed
  • The HTTP, TCP and UDP routers and the rule matcher behind them, covering host, path, header, query and method matching in both the v2 and v3 syntaxes
  • The plugin system, both the Yaegi-interpreted plugins and the WASM path, and the plugin catalogue install flow
  • The provider layer in full: Kubernetes Ingress, IngressRoute and Gateway API, Docker and Swarm label discovery, Consul, Nomad, ECS, the file provider and the key-value stores
  • The published process asks for a private GitHub Security Advisory on traefik/traefik and states there is no paid programme. It draws no boundary narrower than the Traefik binary itself
  • TLS termination, SNI-based routing, certificate resolution, mutual TLS and the client certificate information passed to backends
Out of scope (6)
  • A middleware chain or routing rule an operator wrote that is simply more permissive than they intended
  • The applications behind the proxy: a defect in the backend is the backend's
  • The dashboard or API deliberately exposed on a public entrypoint without authentication, which the documentation warns against
  • The Go standard library and other upstream dependencies, unless Traefik's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable
  • Third-party plugins from the catalogue that Traefik Labs does not maintain
  • Traefik Hub and the commercial proxy products, which are separate offerings

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Report through a private GitHub Security Advisory on traefik/traefik . That is the documented channel and the project publishes fixes as GHSAs with CVEs
  • Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security bug, and do not raise it in the community forum or Discord
  • Give the full dynamic and static configuration that reproduces it, including the provider in use.
  • Name the Traefik major version.
  • Show what sits behind the proxy and what the backend does with the request.
  • Hold detail until the advisory is public.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-119573 Low 2.1 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-119574 High 8.2 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114637 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114638 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114639 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114640 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114641 Medium 6.3 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114642 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114656 Medium 6.9 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114635 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114636 High 7.0 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-112778 Medium 6.4 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88010 Medium 6.3 22 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88009 High 8.8 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88011 Medium 5.3 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88012 Medium 5.3 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88007 Critical 9.1 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88008 High 7.0 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88004 High 7.0 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88877 Critical 9.3 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88878 Medium 6.9 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-88879 Medium 5.3 10 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-85594 High 7.0 4 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-85595 Critical 9.3 4 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-85596 High 8.2 4 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-85597 High 8.2 4 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-71326 Low 2.1 6 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-71327 High 7.6 6 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-71324 High 7.0 6 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-71325 Medium 4.8 6 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-67309 High 7.8 1 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-65602 Medium 5.3 22 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-65600 High 7.8 22 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-65601 Medium 5.3 22 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-54763 High 7.8 6 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-54764 Medium 6.9 6 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-54765 Medium 6.3 6 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-54761 Medium 6.0 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-54762 Medium 5.9 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-53622 High 7.8 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-48020 High 7.8 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-48491 High 7.8 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2023-54365 High 8.7 23 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-44774 Medium 6.4 15 May 2026
CVE-2026-41181 Medium 6.9 15 May 2026
CVE-2026-40912 High 7.8 30 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-41174 Medium 4.8 30 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-41263 Medium 6.3 30 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-35051 High 7.8 30 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-39858 High 7.8 30 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-33433 Medium 5.1 27 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32695 Medium 6.3 27 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32595 Medium 6.3 20 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32305 High 7.8 20 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-29777 Medium 6.1 11 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-29054 High 7.5 5 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-26998 Medium 4.4 5 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-26999 High 7.5 5 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-25949 High 7.5 12 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-22045 Medium 5.9 15 Jan 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 29 Last 12 months 51 Lifetime Auth bypass 35 % Routing/path handling 30 % Request smuggling 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Traefik is the edge router in front of a large share of containerised deployments. It is the default ingress in K3s and the usual reverse proxy in Docker Compose stacks, so it terminates TLS and makes the routing decision for traffic arriving from the internet. A routing or middleware defect there is an authentication bypass for everything behind it, because the proxy is the component enforcing the rule. Traefik Labs states in its own documentation that it does not operate a paid bug bounty program, and its code of conduct rules out demands for compensation. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published process asks for a private GitHub Security Advisory on traefik/traefik and states there is no paid programme. It draws no boundary narrower than the Traefik binary itself The HTTP, TCP and UDP routers and the rule matcher behind them, covering host, path, header, query and method matching in both the v2 and v3 syntaxes Every middleware shipped in core, in particular ForwardAuth, BasicAuth, DigestAuth, IPAllowList, Headers, StripPrefix, RedirectRegex, ReplacePathRegex, RateLimit, InFlightReq, Buffering and Chain The provider layer in full: Kubernetes Ingress, IngressRoute and Gateway API, Docker and Swarm label discovery, Consul, Nomad, ECS, the file provider and the key-value stores TLS termination, SNI-based routing, certificate resolution, mutual TLS and the client certificate information passed to backends The ACME client and every certificate resolver, covering HTTP, TLS-ALPN and DNS challenges and the provider credentials each holds The API and the dashboard, plus the entrypoint configuration that decides whether they are reachable Service load balancing, sticky sessions, health checking, mirroring and the weighted and failover services The plugin system, both the Yaegi-interpreted plugins and the WASM path, and the plugin catalogue install flow HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 handling, connection reuse to backends and the header rewriting that happens on the way through Access logs, metrics and tracing exporters, and what each writes about a request The entrypoint layer itself, including proxy protocol handling and the trusted IP configuration that decides which forwarded headers are believed Out of scope The applications behind the proxy: a defect in the backend is the backend's A middleware chain or routing rule an operator wrote that is simply more permissive than they intended The dashboard or API deliberately exposed on a public entrypoint without authentication, which the documentation warns against Third-party plugins from the catalogue that Traefik Labs does not maintain Traefik Hub and the commercial proxy products, which are separate offerings The Go standard library and other upstream dependencies, unless Traefik's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable Most-valued findings Routing and path normalisation defects where a request reaches a router the rule was never meant to match. On an ingress this is a direct authentication bypass for whatever the intended router was protecting ForwardAuth and the authentication middlewares, particularly any path where a client-supplied header reaches the backend as an authenticated identity, or where the auth call is skipped Request smuggling and desync between Traefik's parser and the backend's, which lets one client's request be attributed to another connection Trusted-header handling, where X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-IP or client certificate headers from the client survive into the backend and forge the caller's identity or address IPAllowList and rate limit evaluation that reads the wrong source address, since both are commonly the only control on an administrative route Kubernetes provider defects where a namespaced IngressRoute, middleware or TLS option reaches a service or secret in another namespace, which crosses the cluster's tenancy boundary ACME and certificate resolver defects that issue, cache or serve a certificate for a host the deployment does not control The API or dashboard becoming reachable through a routing rule rather than through the entrypoint an operator configured The advisory stream is live rather than dormant here, with CVE-2026-54763 the most recent entry the study records Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through a private GitHub Security Advisory on traefik/traefik . That is the documented channel and the project publishes fixes as GHSAs with CVEs Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security bug, and do not raise it in the community forum or Discord The documentation states directly that Traefik does not operate a paid bug bounty program, and the code of conduct prohibits demands for payment or compensation. There is nothing to negotiate Give the full dynamic and static configuration that reproduces it, including the provider in use. A rule that behaves one way under the file provider can behave differently under the Kubernetes CRDs Name the Traefik major version. The v2 and v3 routing rule syntax and matcher semantics differ enough that a finding on one may not exist on the other Show what sits behind the proxy and what the backend does with the request. A middleware bypass matters because of the application it exposes Disclosure Coordinated through the GitHub advisory flow with the Traefik maintainers, published as a GHSA with a CVE alongside a patched release on the affected branches. Traefik backports security fixes across supported minor versions, so the embargo runs to that coordinated release rather than to a day count you choose. Hold detail until the advisory is public. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability