- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 13
- Public CVEs
- 1
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.
Web 1
- https://trino.io
Products and areas 12
- Authentication in every supported form: password files, LDAP, Kerberos, OAuth2 and OIDC, JWT and certificate-based authentication
- Catalog configuration handling, including dynamically created catalogs and anything that lets a session influence how a catalog connects
- Communication between the coordinator and the workers, including the shared secret that is supposed to protect it and what a worker accepts from an unauthenticated peer
- Every connector the project ships, covering the Hive, Iceberg, Delta Lake, JDBC, object store, message queue and search connectors, along with the credentials and the catalog properties each one holds
- Plugin and function loading, including user-defined functions and anything else that puts new code on the classpath
- Spooling, exchange and temporary data handling, including where intermediate results are written and who can read them
- The access control interface and every implementation shipped or commonly plugged into it, including file-based rules and external policy engines, along with the point at which each check is applied
- The CLI, the JDBC driver and the client libraries the project publishes
- The coordinator in full: the client protocol, the statement API, the query lifecycle endpoints and every administrative route it exposes
- The published policy asks for security vulnerabilities by email to the project address and states no scope carve-out, so the whole Trino tree is in
- The SQL layer end to end, covering parsing, analysis, planning, optimisation and every built-in function a query can reach
- The web interface and the query and cluster information it exposes
Out of scope (6)
- A cluster deliberately deployed with authentication disabled or with the coordinator published to an untrusted network, which is a deployment decision
- Presto and its derivatives, which are separate projects with their own reporting paths
- Resource exhaustion from an expensive query on an engine designed to consume the cluster
- Starburst's commercial products and hosted service, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the open source release
- The systems Trino queries, such as an object store, a Hive Metastore or a relational database, where Trino is only the client
- Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Trino's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Submit through sorona.xyz.
-
Report privately to the address on the policy page , the address the repository's security policy names.
-
Do not report Trino findings to the Presto project or the reverse.
-
Name the connector.
-
State the access control implementation in use: the built-in rules, a file-based configuration or an external policy engine.
-
Say whether the coordinator's HTTP surface was authenticated in your setup, and which authentication type was configured
-
Include the SQL, the catalog configuration and the version.
-
Hold the detail until the advisory is out.
Not accepted
-
Resource exhaustion from an expensive query on an engine designed to consume the cluster
-
Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Trino's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 9 minutes ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-34214 | Trino is a distributed SQL query engine for big data analytics. From version 439 to before version 480, Iceberg connector REST catalog static credentials (access key) or vended credentials (temporary access key) are accessible to users that have write privilege on SQL level. This issue has been patched in version 480. | High 7.7 | 31 Mar 2026 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months Access control bypass 40 % Credential disclosure 25 % Auth bypass 20 % SSRF/file read 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Trino is the query engine sitting on top of enterprise data lakes, the actively developed continuation of Presto. It ships in AWS EMR, underpins Starburst's commercial products, and its lineage runs into Athena. A coordinator federates over Iceberg, Delta and Hive tables alongside live JDBC connections, so it holds credentials for most of the data estate at once and enforces the access rules deciding who reads what. CVE-2026-34214, rated high, is the most recent published finding. The Trino Software Foundation is a non-profit and Starburst runs no bounty programme, so nothing here is paid. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published policy asks for security vulnerabilities by email to the project address and states no scope carve-out, so the whole Trino tree is in The coordinator in full: the client protocol, the statement API, the query lifecycle endpoints and every administrative route it exposes The SQL layer end to end, covering parsing, analysis, planning, optimisation and every built-in function a query can reach The access control interface and every implementation shipped or commonly plugged into it, including file-based rules and external policy engines, along with the point at which each check is applied Authentication in every supported form: password files, LDAP, Kerberos, OAuth2 and OIDC, JWT and certificate-based authentication Every connector the project ships, covering the Hive, Iceberg, Delta Lake, JDBC, object store, message queue and search connectors, along with the credentials and the catalog properties each one holds Catalog configuration handling, including dynamically created catalogs and anything that lets a session influence how a catalog connects Communication between the coordinator and the workers, including the shared secret that is supposed to protect it and what a worker accepts from an unauthenticated peer The web interface and the query and cluster information it exposes The CLI, the JDBC driver and the client libraries the project publishes Plugin and function loading, including user-defined functions and anything else that puts new code on the classpath Spooling, exchange and temporary data handling, including where intermediate results are written and who can read them Out of scope Presto and its derivatives, which are separate projects with their own reporting paths Starburst's commercial products and hosted service, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the open source release The systems Trino queries, such as an object store, a Hive Metastore or a relational database, where Trino is only the client A cluster deliberately deployed with authentication disabled or with the coordinator published to an untrusted network, which is a deployment decision Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Trino's own use of the dependency makes them reachable Resource exhaustion from an expensive query on an engine designed to consume the cluster Most-valued findings Access control bypass in any form: a query reading a table, a column or a row that the configured rules refuse, or a path where the check is applied after the data has already been touched. This is the core promise of the product and the highest-value class it has Disclosure of catalog properties or connector credentials. One coordinator commonly holds the keys to the object store, the metastore and several production databases, so a single leak of configuration is a breach of the whole estate Anything reachable on the coordinator's HTTP surface without valid credentials, the band CVE-2026-34214 sits in at high severity Impersonation and identity-propagation defects, where a query runs against a downstream system as an identity the caller should not be able to assume The trust boundary between coordinator and worker, where a worker accepts task instructions from something that never proved it belongs to the cluster Connector paths that read or write arbitrary local files on a worker, or that fetch a URL a session controls Function or plugin loading that lets session-controlled input put new code on the classpath Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , the address the repository's security policy names. It is the whole channel and it carries no reward language There is no money at any severity. The Trino Software Foundation is a non-profit and Starburst publishes no bounty page and appears on no platform Do not report Trino findings to the Presto project or the reverse. prestodb is a separate codebase with separate maintainers, even where the code has common ancestry Name the connector. Most of the interesting surface here is connector-specific, and a finding in the Hive connector means something different from one in a JDBC connector State the access control implementation in use: the built-in rules, a file-based configuration or an external policy engine. An access control finding is only meaningful against a named enforcement path Say whether the coordinator's HTTP surface was authenticated in your setup, and which authentication type was configured Include the SQL, the catalog configuration and the version. Trino releases weekly, so give an exact release number Disclosure Coordinated privately by email with the maintainers and published as an advisory on the repository alongside a patched release, with a CVE assigned. Trino ships releases weekly, so a fix usually lands quickly once triaged, and the practical embargo runs to that release rather than to a published day count. Hold the detail until the advisory is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability