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vLLM

By sorona.xyz Bug bounty on Sorona vllm.ai

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
14
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

14 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://docs.vllm.ai

Products and areas 13

  • LoRA adapter loading and the multi-adapter serving path, including where an adapter is fetched from
  • Model loading across safetensors, GGUF and PyTorch checkpoint formats, along with the remote code execution flag on models fetched from a hub
  • Multimodal input handling for image, video and audio models, which decodes attacker-supplied media in process
  • SECURITY.md routes reports to the vulnerability management team through GitHub private advisory reporting, and the published process declares no boundary narrower than the project. Everything below sits inside that
  • Speculative decoding, prefix-cache-aware routing and the disaggregated prefill paths
  • The CLI, the entrypoints and the configuration parsing in front of the engine
  • The distributed execution layer: the worker-to-worker transport, the collective communication backend and every control channel between engine processes
  • The KV cache, prefix caching and any cross-request state that persists between one caller's request and another's
  • The metrics, health and server info endpoints and what each exposes about loaded models and adapters
  • The OpenAI-compatible API server: the chat, completions, embeddings, tokenisation and pooling endpoints, and the request parsing and validation behind each
  • The Ray and Kubernetes integrations the project ships, and the plugin and custom executor interfaces
  • The tokenizer and chat template rendering, which evaluates a Jinja template that arrives with the model
  • Tool calling, structured output and guided decoding, covering the grammar and schema parsing each performs on request input
Out of scope (6)
  • A deployment deliberately run with remote code execution enabled against an untrusted model
  • Model weights and their provenance, which the operator chooses to trust or not
  • Prompt injection, jailbreaks and output content, which are model behaviour rather than engine defects
  • PyTorch, transformers, CUDA and other upstream dependencies, unless vLLM's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable
  • Ray as a project, which has its own security process and its own paid huntr history
  • Resource consumption within limits the operator configured

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on vllm-project/vllm , which reaches the Vulnerability Management Team.
  • Give the serving command, the model and the engine arguments.
  • Say whether the deployment ran single-node or multi-node.
  • Prompt-level model behaviour is not a vulnerability here. Show a defect in the engine's code rather than in what a model was persuaded to say

Not accepted

  • Prompt injection, jailbreaks and output content, which are model behaviour rather than engine defects
  • Resource consumption within limits the operator configured
  • Model weights and their provenance, which the operator chooses to trust or not

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-115914 Medium 6.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115915 High 8.1 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115916 Medium 6.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115917 Low 3.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115918 Medium 6.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115911 Medium 6.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115912 High 7.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-115913 Medium 6.5 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116179 High 8.7 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116180 High 8.3 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116181 High 7.1 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116172 High 8.2 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116173 High 8.2 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116174 High 8.2 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116175 High 7.1 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116176 High 8.8 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116177 High 8.7 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-116178 High 8.2 25 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114049 Medium 6.3 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114050 High 7.1 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114051 High 7.1 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114052 High 8.7 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114053 Critical 9.2 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114054 High 7.1 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-114055 High 8.7 21 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105922 Low 2.1 6 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105758 Medium 5.3 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105759 Medium 5.9 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105760 Medium 5.3 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105752 Low 3.1 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105753 Medium 6.5 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105754 Medium 6.5 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105755 Medium 4.2 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105756 Medium 6.5 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-105757 Medium 6.5 5 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-103241 Medium 5.5 30 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100650 High 7.1 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100651 High 7.1 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100652 High 8.2 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100653 High 8.3 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100654 High 7.1 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100647 Medium 6.9 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100648 Medium 6.9 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-100649 Medium 6.3 26 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94626 High 8.7 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94627 High 8.7 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94622 High 8.7 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94623 High 8.7 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94624 High 8.7 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-94625 Medium 6.9 21 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-93989 Low 2.3 19 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-93840 Medium 6.3 18 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-93841 Medium 6.3 18 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-93592 High 8.7 18 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-93436 High 8.7 17 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-69147 Medium 6.5 16 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-57173 Medium 6.5 16 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-90553 High 8.5 12 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-90554 Medium 6.9 12 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-90555 High 7.1 12 Sep 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 41 Last 12 months 59 Lifetime Deserialization RCE 40 % Access control 25 % Template injection 20 % Parsing/validation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview vLLM is the inference engine most production LLM serving runs on, from single-node deployments through to multi-node clusters on GPU hardware. It loads model artifacts, exposes an OpenAI-compatible API, and in distributed mode passes tensors and control messages between worker processes. CVE-2024-9053 is the reference point: unsafe pickle deserialization reaching remote code execution, the class that recurs wherever machine learning infrastructure moves Python objects across a network. vLLM's policy routes reports to its vulnerability management team through GitHub and offers no reward, and huntr currently lists the repository at zero. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope SECURITY.md routes reports to the vulnerability management team through GitHub private advisory reporting, and the published process declares no boundary narrower than the project. Everything below sits inside that The OpenAI-compatible API server: the chat, completions, embeddings, tokenisation and pooling endpoints, and the request parsing and validation behind each Model loading across safetensors, GGUF and PyTorch checkpoint formats, along with the remote code execution flag on models fetched from a hub The distributed execution layer: the worker-to-worker transport, the collective communication backend and every control channel between engine processes The KV cache, prefix caching and any cross-request state that persists between one caller's request and another's LoRA adapter loading and the multi-adapter serving path, including where an adapter is fetched from Tool calling, structured output and guided decoding, covering the grammar and schema parsing each performs on request input Multimodal input handling for image, video and audio models, which decodes attacker-supplied media in process The tokenizer and chat template rendering, which evaluates a Jinja template that arrives with the model The metrics, health and server info endpoints and what each exposes about loaded models and adapters Speculative decoding, prefix-cache-aware routing and the disaggregated prefill paths The Ray and Kubernetes integrations the project ships, and the plugin and custom executor interfaces The CLI, the entrypoints and the configuration parsing in front of the engine Out of scope Model weights and their provenance, which the operator chooses to trust or not PyTorch, transformers, CUDA and other upstream dependencies, unless vLLM's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable Ray as a project, which has its own security process and its own paid huntr history A deployment deliberately run with remote code execution enabled against an untrusted model Prompt injection, jailbreaks and output content, which are model behaviour rather than engine defects Resource consumption within limits the operator configured Most-valued findings Deserialization reaching code execution, the CVE-2024-9053 shape, anywhere the engine unpickles or otherwise materialises objects that crossed a process or network boundary The distributed execution transport, where a worker accepting control messages or tensors from an unauthenticated peer becomes code execution across the whole serving cluster Chat template rendering, since a Jinja template arriving with a model repository and evaluated at load time is code execution before a single request is served KV cache and prefix caching paths where one request's state influences or leaks into another's response, the multi-tenant failure mode for a shared serving endpoint LoRA adapter loading from a path or URL a request can influence, which turns an inference call into arbitrary artifact loading Guided decoding and structured output grammar handling, a newer surface with untrusted request input driving a parser Multimodal input decoding, which parses attacker-supplied images, video and audio inside the serving process Unauthenticated API endpoints exposing loaded model names, adapters, configuration or metrics that describe a proprietary deployment CVE-2026-41523 and CVE-2026-22778 are the further entries the study records without describing them, which shows the advisory stream is live rather than dormant Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on vllm-project/vllm , which reaches the Vulnerability Management Team. The process is documented in SECURITY.md and in the vLLM docs Nothing is paid upstream. huntr lists the repository with every severity tier at zero and the project's own policy mentions no reward Re-verify the huntr state before you start. huntr paid roughly $1,500 for a vLLM RCE in 2024 and the repository is still listed, so the tiers could be re-funded Give the serving command, the model and the engine arguments. A finding usually depends on whether tensor or pipeline parallelism was on and which backend executed Say whether the deployment ran single-node or multi-node. The worker transport between processes is a completely different trust boundary from the API server Prompt-level model behaviour is not a vulnerability here. Show a defect in the engine's code rather than in what a model was persuaded to say Disclosure Coordinated privately with the vLLM vulnerability management team through the GitHub advisory flow, published as a GitHub Security Advisory with a CVE alongside a release. vLLM ships frequently and most deployments track recent versions, so the embargo runs to the advisory and its release rather than to a day count you set. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability