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sorona.xyz bug bounty programs

gnupg.org Updated

Sorona.xyz runs one public program: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500.

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
1
1 pays cash
Targets in scope
12
2 types
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

The one public program sorona.xyz runs.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

12 targets. 5 excluded.

  • https://gnupg.org/software/libgcrypt

    Web

  • Key derivation and password-based key derivation, including the parameter handling that decides the real cost of a crack

    Products and areas

  • The GnuPG security page asks for severe security problems by private mail and publishes an explicit threat model for libgcrypt. Beyond the side channel carve-out in that model, it draws no boundary narrower than the library itself

    Products and areas

  • The hand-written assembly selected per CPU feature, along with the portable C fallback that runs where no accelerated path exists

    Products and areas

  • The hash and MAC families, covering the SHA and BLAKE algorithms and the HMAC and CMAC constructions built on them

    Products and areas

  • The multi-precision integer layer, which is the arithmetic every asymmetric operation runs through and the place a carry or reduction defect becomes a key recovery

    Products and areas

  • The public key implementations: RSA, DSA, the elliptic curve algorithms, and the key generation and parameter checking around each

    Products and areas

  • The random number generator, its entropy gathering, its reseeding and its behaviour in the early boot and container cases where entropy is scarce

    Products and areas

  • The S-expression parser and the public API surface, which handles structured input supplied by the calling application

    Products and areas

  • The secure memory subsystem, covering locked pages, the allocator and the wiping guarantees the library advertises

    Products and areas

  • The self-test and FIPS mode machinery, where a test that passes over a broken implementation is itself the defect

    Products and areas

  • The symmetric ciphers and their modes, including the AEAD constructions and their tag verification paths

    Products and areas

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 5

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • Caller misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken

  • Cross-VM and hardware-level side channels, which the published threat model places outside the library's boundary

  • Defects in GnuPG, GnuTLS or systemd rather than in libgcrypt, even where libgcrypt is on the call path

  • Distribution patches and packaging choices rather than upstream libgcrypt

  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every sorona.xyz program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in sorona.xyz products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • Libgcrypt before 1.12.2 sometimes allows a heap-based buffer overflow and denial of service via crafted ECDH ciphertext to gcry_pk_decrypt.

  • Libgcrypt before 1.12.2 mishandles Dilithium signing. Writes to a static array lack a bounds check but do not use attacker-controlled data.

  • In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a crafted CMS (S/MIME) EnvelopedData message carrying an oversized wrapped session key can cause a stack-based buffer overflow in gpg-agent during PKDECRYPT--kem=CMS handling. This can easily be leveraged for denial of service; however, there is also memory corruption that could lead to remote code execution.

  • In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in tpm2daemon during handling of the PKDECRYPT command for TPM-backed RSA and ECC keys.

  • In GnuPG before 2.5.17, a long signature packet length causes parse_signature to return success with sig->data[] set to a NULL value, leading to a denial of service (application crash).

  • In GnuPG before 2.4.9, armor_filter in g10/armor.c has two increments of an index variable where one is intended, leading to an out-of-bounds write for crafted input. (For ExtendedLTS, 2.2.51 and later are fixed versions.)

  • In GnuPG through 2.4.8, if a signed message has \f at the end of a plaintext line, an adversary can construct a modified message that places additional text after the signed material, such that signature verification of the modified message succeeds (although an "invalid armor" message is printed during verification). This is related to use of \f as a marker to denote truncation of a long plaintex

  • In GnuPG before 2.5.5, if a user chooses to import a certificate with certain crafted subkey data that lacks a valid backsig or that has incorrect usage flags, the user loses the ability to verify signatures made from certain other signing keys, aka a "verification DoS."

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under gnupg.org: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

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