Skip to content

libgcrypt

By sorona.xyz Bug bounty on Sorona gnupg.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
55
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://gnupg.org/software/libgcrypt

Products and areas 11

  • Key derivation and password-based key derivation, including the parameter handling that decides the real cost of a crack
  • The GnuPG security page asks for severe security problems by private mail and publishes an explicit threat model for libgcrypt. Beyond the side channel carve-out in that model, it draws no boundary narrower than the library itself
  • The hand-written assembly selected per CPU feature, along with the portable C fallback that runs where no accelerated path exists
  • The hash and MAC families, covering the SHA and BLAKE algorithms and the HMAC and CMAC constructions built on them
  • The multi-precision integer layer, which is the arithmetic every asymmetric operation runs through and the place a carry or reduction defect becomes a key recovery
  • The public key implementations: RSA, DSA, the elliptic curve algorithms, and the key generation and parameter checking around each
  • The random number generator, its entropy gathering, its reseeding and its behaviour in the early boot and container cases where entropy is scarce
  • The secure memory subsystem, covering locked pages, the allocator and the wiping guarantees the library advertises
  • The self-test and FIPS mode machinery, where a test that passes over a broken implementation is itself the defect
  • The S-expression parser and the public API surface, which handles structured input supplied by the calling application
  • The symmetric ciphers and their modes, including the AEAD constructions and their tag verification paths
Out of scope (5)
  • Caller misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken
  • Cross-VM and hardware-level side channels, which the published threat model places outside the library's boundary
  • Defects in GnuPG, GnuTLS or systemd rather than in libgcrypt, even where libgcrypt is on the call path
  • Distribution patches and packaging choices rather than upstream libgcrypt
  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Report by email to the security address published on the GnuPG security page
  • Send plain text.
  • Name the version and the build.
  • Say which consumer reaches the defect.
  • Hold the detail until the announcement and the distribution updates are out.

Not accepted

  • Cross-VM and hardware-level side channels
  • Defects in GnuPG, GnuTLS or systemd rather than in libgcrypt
  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it
  • Caller misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken
  • Distribution patches and packaging choices rather than upstream libgcrypt

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-41989 Medium 6.7 23 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-41990 Medium 4.0 23 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-24881 High 8.1 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-24882 High 8.4 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-24883 Low 3.7 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-68973 High 7.8 28 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-68972 Medium 5.9 27 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-30258 Low 2.7 19 Mar 2025
CVE-2022-3219 Low 3.3 23 Feb 2023
CVE-2022-3515 Critical 9.8 12 Jan 2023
CVE-2022-47629 Critical 9.8 20 Dec 2022
CVE-2022-34903 Medium 6.5 1 Jul 2022
CVE-2021-40528 Medium 5.9 6 Sep 2021
CVE-2021-33560 High 7.5 8 Jun 2021
CVE-2021-3345 High 7.8 29 Jan 2021
CVE-2020-25125 High 7.8 3 Sep 2020
CVE-2019-14855 High 7.5 20 Mar 2020
CVE-2014-3591 Medium 4.2 29 Nov 2019
CVE-2015-0837 Medium 5.9 29 Nov 2019
CVE-2011-2207 Medium 5.3 27 Nov 2019
CVE-2015-1606 Medium 5.5 20 Nov 2019
CVE-2015-1607 Medium 5.5 20 Nov 2019
CVE-2019-13050 High 7.5 29 Jun 2019
CVE-2019-12904 Medium 5.9 20 Jun 2019
CVE-2018-1000858 High 8.8 20 Dec 2018
CVE-2017-7526 Medium 6.1 26 Jul 2018
CVE-2018-0495 Medium 4.7 13 Jun 2018
CVE-2018-12020 High 7.5 8 Jun 2018
CVE-2018-9234 High 7.5 4 Apr 2018
CVE-2018-6829 High 7.5 7 Feb 2018
CVE-2017-0379 High 7.5 29 Aug 2017
CVE-2017-9526 Medium 5.9 11 Jun 2017
CVE-2016-6313 Medium 5.3 13 Dec 2016
CVE-2016-4579 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2016-4574 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2016-4356 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2016-4355 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2016-4354 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2016-4353 High 7.5 13 Jun 2016
CVE-2015-7511 Low 2.0 19 Apr 2016
CVE-2014-9087 High 7.5 1 Dec 2014
CVE-2014-5270 Low 2.1 10 Oct 2014
CVE-2014-4617 Medium 5.0 25 Jun 2014
CVE-2013-4576 Low 2.1 20 Dec 2013
CVE-2013-4402 Medium 5.0 28 Oct 2013
CVE-2013-4351 Medium 5.8 10 Oct 2013
CVE-2013-4242 Low 1.9 19 Aug 2013
CVE-2012-6085 Medium 5.8 24 Jan 2013
CVE-2010-2547 High 8.1 5 Aug 2010
CVE-2008-1530 High 9.3 27 Mar 2008
CVE-2007-1263 Medium 5.0 6 Mar 2007
CVE-2006-6169 Medium 6.8 29 Nov 2006
CVE-2006-3746 Medium 5.0 28 Jul 2006
CVE-2006-3082 Medium 5.0 19 Jun 2006
CVE-2005-0366 Medium 5.0 2 May 2005

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months 17 Lifetime Side channel / timing 35 % Memory safety 30 % Cryptographic correctness 25 % Denial of service 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview libgcrypt is the low-level cryptography library of the GnuPG project and a dependency of systemd, GnuTLS and a long list of distribution packages, so it is installed on effectively every Linux system. It performs the arithmetic behind key generation, signing and bulk encryption for callers that never see it directly, and a flaw in one primitive reaches all of them at once. GnuPG has never run a bounty; the funding is donations, grants and paid support contracts, and reports go to a plain-text security address. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The GnuPG security page asks for severe security problems by private mail and publishes an explicit threat model for libgcrypt. Beyond the side channel carve-out in that model, it draws no boundary narrower than the library itself The symmetric ciphers and their modes, including the AEAD constructions and their tag verification paths The hash and MAC families, covering the SHA and BLAKE algorithms and the HMAC and CMAC constructions built on them The public key implementations: RSA, DSA, the elliptic curve algorithms, and the key generation and parameter checking around each The multi-precision integer layer, which is the arithmetic every asymmetric operation runs through and the place a carry or reduction defect becomes a key recovery The hand-written assembly selected per CPU feature, along with the portable C fallback that runs where no accelerated path exists The random number generator, its entropy gathering, its reseeding and its behaviour in the early boot and container cases where entropy is scarce The S-expression parser and the public API surface, which handles structured input supplied by the calling application The secure memory subsystem, covering locked pages, the allocator and the wiping guarantees the library advertises Key derivation and password-based key derivation, including the parameter handling that decides the real cost of a crack The self-test and FIPS mode machinery, where a test that passes over a broken implementation is itself the defect Out of scope Cross-VM and hardware-level side channels, which the published threat model places outside the library's boundary Defects in GnuPG, GnuTLS or systemd rather than in libgcrypt, even where libgcrypt is on the call path Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it Caller misuse of the API where the documented contract was broken Distribution patches and packaging choices rather than upstream libgcrypt Most-valued findings Side channel signals inside the process boundary: timing, cache and branch behaviour in the public key or multi-precision integer code, which the published threat model keeps in scope while ruling out the cross-VM variants Anything in the multi-precision integer layer that produces a wrong result on specific inputs, since a faulty reduction in a signing operation is a private key recovery rather than a crash Memory corruption reachable through the S-expression parser or through any API path where a caller passes structured data it did not author Random number generator weaknesses, particularly in early boot and container environments where entropy is thin and every key on the host derives from the same pool AEAD tag verification or signature verification that accepts what it should reject, because the callers above treat that answer as final Self-test and FIPS mode defects where the library reports a healthy state over an implementation that is not producing correct output Key generation defects that reduce the entropy or the parameter quality of a generated key, since those keys outlive the fix by years Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report by email to the security address published on the GnuPG security page, which is the documented channel for libgcrypt as well as for GnuPG itself Send plain text. The page asks for it explicitly and states that the team does not use a shared OpenPGP key, so do not plan on encrypting to one The published threat model puts cross-VM and hardware-level side channels out of scope. A finding in that class will be declined on policy rather than on merit, so read the model before spending time there Name the version and the build. libgcrypt selects hand-written assembly per CPU feature, and a defect may exist only on one architecture or only in the portable fallback Say which consumer reaches the defect. The same function is called by systemd, GnuTLS and GnuPG itself, and the severity depends entirely on which of those can drive the input The project pays nothing for a report; the funding is donations, grants and support contracts, so there is no reward to negotiate Disclosure Coordinated by email with the GnuPG security team, who publish through project announcements and hand the advisory to distribution security teams rather than filing GitHub advisories. That routing matters for timing: the practical embargo is set by how quickly the distributions can rebuild a package that sits underneath systemd and GnuTLS on every install. Hold the detail until the announcement and the distribution updates are out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability