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Home Assistant bug bounty programs

home-assistant.io Updated

Home Assistant runs two public programs: a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $1,500 and a self-hosted disclosure program with no cash rewards.

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
2
1 pays cash
Targets in scope
18
4 types, deduplicated
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

2 programs, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.

Start here

Home Assistant

Sorona · Pays the most of the 2 programs: up to $1,500.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

18 targets across all 2 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 12 excluded.

  • https://www.home-assistant.io

    Web

    Covered by Sorona

  • Home Assistant for Android

    Android

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • Home Assistant for iOS

    iOS

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • Authentication end to end: the login flow, multi-factor providers, the trusted-networks provider, the long-lived access tokens that never expire and the refresh token machinery

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • Device discovery over mDNS, SSDP, DHCP and Bluetooth, all of which act on unauthenticated broadcast data from the local network

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • Home Assistant

    Products and areas

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • Home Assistant Cloud and the Nabu Casa remote access path, plus the webhook endpoints reachable without a session

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • Home Assistant Core

    Products and areas

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • Home Assistant Supervisor

    Products and areas

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • Template rendering, scripts and automations, and any other path where configuration turns into execution on the host

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The companion mobile apps, their deep-link handlers and the webview bridges where a page can reach the native layer

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The custom-component loading path and the update and backup mechanisms that write to the host filesystem

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The frontend, including cross-site scripting in dashboards, Lovelace cards and anything that renders a device-supplied string

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The integration framework and every integration shipped in the tree, covering both credential storage and whatever each one parses from a device or a cloud service

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The published policy accepts security vulnerabilities across Home Assistant and states its CVE criteria rather than a narrow asset list, so the whole platform is the declared target: Core, Supervisor, the Operating System, the frontend, the add-on system and the companion apps

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The Supervisor and the add-on system: add-on installation, the store, the host network mode that exposes add-on ports to the LAN, and the API a container uses to call back into the Supervisor

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The user and permission model, including what separates an administrator from an ordinary user and what a non-admin account can reach

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

  • The websocket and REST APIs, covering every command an authenticated session can issue and the authorisation checks in front of them

    Products and areas

    Covered by Sorona

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 12

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • a device or network that’s already seriously compromised

    Self-hosted

  • a user’s device

    Self-hosted

  • Deliberate exposure decisions by an operator, such as putting the instance on the public internet without a reverse proxy or handing out administrator accounts freely

    Sorona

  • ESPHome device firmware, which carries its own policy and its own advisory stream

    Sorona

  • forks of Home Assistant

    Self-hosted

  • Low-severity findings expecting a CVE identifier, which the policy reserves for medium severity and above

    Sorona

  • Template and script execution by a user who already holds the administrator rights the platform grants for exactly that purpose

    Sorona

  • the Home Assistant host system

    Self-hosted

  • their own setup

    Self-hosted

  • third-party application or library

    Self-hosted

  • Third-party custom components and community repositories that are not shipped in the Home Assistant tree

    Sorona

  • Vendor cloud services and device firmware that an integration talks to, unless Home Assistant's own handling is what makes the defect reachable

    Sorona

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every Home Assistant program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in Home Assistant products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.6.0, the Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, KonnectedView (homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py), that is marked as not requiring authentication (requires_auth = False). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configura

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.6.0, the Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, KonnectedView (homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py), that is marked as not requiring authentication (requires_auth = False). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configura

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2020.02 and prior to version 2026.01, an authenticated party can add a malicious name to their device entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see a dashboard with a Map-card which includes that entity. It requires that the victim hovers over an info

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2025.02 and prior to version 2026.01 the "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable cross-site scripting, similar to CVE-2025-62172. Version 2026.01 fixes the issue.

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2025.02 and prior to version 2026.01 the "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable cross-site scripting, similar to CVE-2025-62172. Version 2026.01 fixes the issue.

  • Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2020.02 and prior to version 2026.01, an authenticated party can add a malicious name to their device entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see a dashboard with a Map-card which includes that entity. It requires that the victim hovers over an info

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under home-assistant.io: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

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