- Top reward
- $1,500
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 13
- Public CVEs
- 21
- Last change
- No changes yet
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays from $1,500
- for critical bugs.
- Report on Sorona
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | $1,500+ | |
| High | $700+ | |
| Medium | $300+ | |
| Low |
|
$100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max |
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.
Web 1
- https://www.home-assistant.io
Products and areas 12
- Authentication end to end: the login flow, multi-factor providers, the trusted-networks provider, the long-lived access tokens that never expire and the refresh token machinery
- Device discovery over mDNS, SSDP, DHCP and Bluetooth, all of which act on unauthenticated broadcast data from the local network
- Home Assistant Cloud and the Nabu Casa remote access path, plus the webhook endpoints reachable without a session
- Template rendering, scripts and automations, and any other path where configuration turns into execution on the host
- The companion mobile apps, their deep-link handlers and the webview bridges where a page can reach the native layer
- The custom-component loading path and the update and backup mechanisms that write to the host filesystem
- The frontend, including cross-site scripting in dashboards, Lovelace cards and anything that renders a device-supplied string
- The integration framework and every integration shipped in the tree, covering both credential storage and whatever each one parses from a device or a cloud service
- The published policy accepts security vulnerabilities across Home Assistant and states its CVE criteria rather than a narrow asset list, so the whole platform is the declared target: Core, Supervisor, the Operating System, the frontend, the add-on system and the companion apps
- The Supervisor and the add-on system: add-on installation, the store, the host network mode that exposes add-on ports to the LAN, and the API a container uses to call back into the Supervisor
- The user and permission model, including what separates an administrator from an ordinary user and what a non-admin account can reach
- The websocket and REST APIs, covering every command an authenticated session can issue and the authorisation checks in front of them
Out of scope (6)
- Deliberate exposure decisions by an operator, such as putting the instance on the public internet without a reverse proxy or handing out administrator accounts freely
- ESPHome device firmware, which carries its own policy and its own advisory stream
- Low-severity findings expecting a CVE identifier, which the policy reserves for medium severity and above
- Template and script execution by a user who already holds the administrator rights the platform grants for exactly that purpose
- Third-party custom components and community repositories that are not shipped in the Home Assistant tree
- Vendor cloud services and device firmware that an integration talks to, unless Home Assistant's own handling is what makes the defect reachable
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.
While testing
-
Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on home-assistant/core, which the project enables, or through the process published at home-assistant.io/security
-
Name the piece you hit. Core, Supervisor, the Operating System, the frontend and the companion apps are separate repositories on separate release trains
-
Integration bugs are worth filing, but say whether the defect is in Core's own code or in a specific integration, and include the integration domain
-
State whether the finding needs an authenticated session, a non-admin account or nothing at all, since the platform's severity model turns on that distinction
-
hold detail until the advisory is out
Not accepted
-
Low-severity findings expecting a CVE identifier, which the policy reserves for medium severity and above
-
Template and script execution by a user who already holds the administrator rights the platform grants for exactly that purpose
Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-54317 | Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.6.0, the Konnected integration registers an HTTP endpoint, KonnectedView (homeassistant/components/konnected/__init__.py), that is marked as not requiring authentication (requires_auth = False). A comment next to that line says auth is instead handled "via the access token from configura | High 7.6 | 23 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-54318 | Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Prior to 2026.5.3, the LocationSensorManager BroadcastReceiver is exported with no permission. Any installed app, with zero runtime permissions, can broadcast a forged Google Play Services LocationResult directly to it; the receiver trusts the extra and forwards it to the user's Home Assistant server | High 7.1 | 23 Jun 2026 |
| CVE-2026-33044 | Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2020.02 and prior to version 2026.01, an authenticated party can add a malicious name to their device entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see a dashboard with a Map-card which includes that entity. It requires that the victim hovers over an info | High 7.3 | 27 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-33045 | Home Assistant is open source home automation software that puts local control and privacy first. Starting in version 2025.02 and prior to version 2026.01 the "remaining charge time"-sensor for mobile phones (imported/included from Android Auto it appears) is vulnerable cross-site scripting, similar to CVE-2025-62172. Version 2026.01 fixes the issue. | High 7.3 | 27 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2025-65713 | Home Assistant Core before v2025.8.0 is vulnerable to Directory Traversal. The Downloader integration does not fully validate file paths during concatenation, leaving a path traversal vulnerability. | Medium 4.0 | 23 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2023-50715 | Home Assistant is open source home automation software. Prior to version 2023.12.3, the login page discloses all active user accounts to any unauthenticated browsing request originating on the Local Area Network. Version 2023.12.3 contains a patch for this issue. When starting the Home Assistant 2023.12 release, the login page returns all currently active user accounts to browsing requests from th | Medium 4.3 | 15 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41893 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. The audit team’s analyses confirmed that the `redirect_uri` and `client_id` are alterable when logging in. Consequently, the code parameter utilized to fetch the `access_token` post-authentication will be sent to the URL specified in the aforementioned parameters. Since an arbitrary URL is permitted and `homeassistant.local` represents the preferre | Medium 4.3 | 20 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41894 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. The assessment verified that webhooks available in the webhook component are triggerable via the `*.ui.nabu.casa` URL without authentication, even when the webhook is marked as Only accessible from the local network. This issue is facilitated by the SniTun proxy, which sets the source address to 127.0.0.1 on all requests sent to the public URL and | Medium 5.3 | 20 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41896 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. Whilst auditing the frontend code to identify hidden parameters, Cure53 detected `auth_callback=1`, which is leveraged by the WebSocket authentication logic in tandem with the `state` parameter. The state parameter contains the `hassUrl`, which is subsequently utilized to establish a WebSocket connection. This behavior permits an attacker to create | High 7.1 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41897 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. Home Assistant server does not set any HTTP security headers, including the X-Frame-Options header, which specifies whether the web page is allowed to be framed. The omission of this and correlating headers facilitates covert clickjacking attacks and alternative exploit opportunities, such as the vector described in this security advisory. This fau | High 8.8 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41898 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. The Home Assistant Companion for Android app up to version 2023.8.2 is vulnerable to arbitrary URL loading in a WebView. This enables all sorts of attacks, including arbitrary JavaScript execution, limited native code execution, and credential theft. This issue has been patched in version 2023.9.2 and all users are advised to upgrade. There are no | High 8.6 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41899 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. In affected versions the `hassio.addon_stdin` is vulnerable to a partial Server-Side Request Forgery where an attacker capable of calling this service (e.g.: through GHSA-h2jp-7grc-9xpp) may be able to invoke any Supervisor REST API endpoints with a POST request. An attacker able to exploit will be able to control the data dictionary, including its | Medium 6.6 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-44385 | The Home Assistant Companion for iOS and macOS app up to version 2023.4 are vulnerable to Client-Side Request Forgery. Attackers may send malicious links/QRs to victims that, when visited, will make the victim to call arbitrary services in their Home Assistant installation. Combined with this security advisory, may result in full compromise and remote code execution (RCE). Version 2023.7 addresses | High 8.6 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-41895 | Home assistant is an open source home automation. The Home Assistant login page allows users to use their local Home Assistant credentials and log in to another website that specifies the `redirect_uri` and `client_id` parameters. Although the `redirect_uri` validation typically ensures that it matches the `client_id` and the scheme represents either `http` or `https`, Home Assistant will fetch th | High 8.8 | 19 Oct 2023 |
| CVE-2023-27482 | homeassistant is an open source home automation tool. A remotely exploitable vulnerability bypassing authentication for accessing the Supervisor API through Home Assistant has been discovered. This impacts all Home Assistant installation types that use the Supervisor 2023.01.1 or older. Installation types, like Home Assistant Container (for example Docker), or Home Assistant Core manually in a Pyt | Critical 10.0 | 8 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2020-36517 | An information leak in Nabu Casa Home Assistant Operating System and Home Assistant Supervised 2022.03 allows a DNS operator to gain knowledge about internal network resources via the hardcoded DNS resolver configuration. | High 7.5 | 10 Mar 2022 |
| CVE-2021-3152 | Home Assistant before 2021.1.3 does not have a protection layer that can help to prevent directory-traversal attacks against custom integrations. NOTE: the vendor's perspective is that the vulnerability itself is in custom integrations written by third parties, not in Home Assistant; however, Home Assistant does have a security update that is worthwhile in addressing this situation | Medium 5.3 | 26 Jan 2021 |
| CVE-2018-21019 | Home Assistant before 0.67.0 was vulnerable to an information disclosure that allowed an unauthenticated attacker to read the application's error log via components/api.py. | High 7.5 | 23 Sep 2019 |
| CVE-2017-16782 | In Home Assistant before 0.57, it is possible to inject JavaScript code into a persistent notification via crafted Markdown text, aka XSS. | Medium 6.1 | 10 Nov 2017 |
Original policy
Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 9 Last 12 months 21 Lifetime Access control 35 % Info disclosure 30 % Auth bypass 20 % Injection 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Home Assistant is the dominant self-hosted home automation platform, and a single instance holds long-lived cloud tokens plus LAN credentials for every device in the house. The add-on system runs containers on the host network, so the blast radius of a defect is the whole home network rather than one application. CVE-2026-34205 is the reference point: add-on endpoints exposed unauthenticated to the local network through host network mode, rated critical. The project states in its published policy that an open source project cannot offer bounties and will credit the discoverer instead, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published policy accepts security vulnerabilities across Home Assistant and states its CVE criteria rather than a narrow asset list, so the whole platform is the declared target: Core, Supervisor, the Operating System, the frontend, the add-on system and the companion apps Authentication end to end: the login flow, multi-factor providers, the trusted-networks provider, the long-lived access tokens that never expire and the refresh token machinery The websocket and REST APIs, covering every command an authenticated session can issue and the authorisation checks in front of them The user and permission model, including what separates an administrator from an ordinary user and what a non-admin account can reach The Supervisor and the add-on system: add-on installation, the store, the host network mode that exposes add-on ports to the LAN, and the API a container uses to call back into the Supervisor Home Assistant Cloud and the Nabu Casa remote access path, plus the webhook endpoints reachable without a session The integration framework and every integration shipped in the tree, covering both credential storage and whatever each one parses from a device or a cloud service Device discovery over mDNS, SSDP, DHCP and Bluetooth, all of which act on unauthenticated broadcast data from the local network The frontend, including cross-site scripting in dashboards, Lovelace cards and anything that renders a device-supplied string The companion mobile apps, their deep-link handlers and the webview bridges where a page can reach the native layer Template rendering, scripts and automations, and any other path where configuration turns into execution on the host The custom-component loading path and the update and backup mechanisms that write to the host filesystem Out of scope ESPHome device firmware, which carries its own policy and its own advisory stream Third-party custom components and community repositories that are not shipped in the Home Assistant tree Deliberate exposure decisions by an operator, such as putting the instance on the public internet without a reverse proxy or handing out administrator accounts freely Vendor cloud services and device firmware that an integration talks to, unless Home Assistant's own handling is what makes the defect reachable Template and script execution by a user who already holds the administrator rights the platform grants for exactly that purpose Low-severity findings expecting a CVE identifier, which the policy reserves for medium severity and above Most-valued findings Anything reachable without authentication from the local network, the class CVE-2026-34205 landed in when add-on endpoints ended up exposed through host network mode at critical severity Token theft and session compromise, especially the long-lived access tokens, including paths that exfiltrate one across an origin boundary as CVE-2026-44698 did through the companion app's webview bridge Authorisation gaps where a non-admin user reaches an administrator capability, or one user reaches another user's data Credential and topology disclosure from integrations. The platform stores working credentials for cloud accounts, cameras, locks and alarm panels, and CVE-2026-54317 showed that even leaking an alarm panel's layout to an unauthenticated actor counts Deep-link and URL-handler abuse in the companion apps, the shape CVE-2026-59717 took when a homeassistant:// invite link was turned into credential phishing Escapes from the template and script sandbox that reach the host without administrator rights Add-on and Supervisor defects that give a container more of the host than it should have, since add-ons run alongside every credential the instance holds Anything that turns a device on the local network into code execution on the hub, since integrations parse data from hardware nobody has audited Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on home-assistant/core, which the project enables, or through the process published at home-assistant.io/security The org-level .github/SECURITY.md is only a redirect. The real policy, with the CVE criteria and the advisory archive, lives on the website The policy states that a CVE is requested only for vulnerabilities of medium severity or higher, so a low-severity finding earns a fix and a credit line without an identifier Name the piece you hit. Core, Supervisor, the Operating System, the frontend and the companion apps are separate repositories on separate release trains Integration bugs are worth filing, but say whether the defect is in Core's own code or in a specific integration, and include the integration domain State whether the finding needs an authenticated session, a non-admin account or nothing at all, since the platform's severity model turns on that distinction The policy states plainly that an open source project cannot offer bounties and will credit the discoverer instead, so there is no payment to negotiate upstream Disclosure Coordinated privately through GitHub and published as a GitHub Security Advisory alongside a release, with a public advisory archive maintained on the project's own site. Nine advisories inside the last twelve months against twenty-one ever published shows a pipeline that has become far busier recently. Releases ship monthly, so plan for an embargo running to the next one, and hold detail until the advisory is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability