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Microsoft bug bounty programs

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Microsoft runs 5 public programs on Sorona and its own site; 5 pay cash, the most up to $250,000 (Microsoft Bounty Program). 3 companies it owns, including GitHub and LinkedIn, run 76 more programs.

Top reward
$250,000
Self-hosted
Programs
81
76 pay cash
Targets in scope
827
9 types, deduplicated
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

5 programs Microsoft runs itself, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.

Start here

Microsoft Bounty Program

Self-hosted · The company-wide program. Pays up to $250,000.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

Companies Microsoft owns

3 companies with 76 programs of their own. Each has its own scope and rules: report to the one that owns the asset.

What is in scope

827 targets across all 81 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 426 excluded.

  • *.github.net

    Wildcards Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • *.githubapp.com

    Wildcards Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • *.githubusercontent.com

    Wildcards Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • live.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • live.net

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • lync.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • microsoft.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • office.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • office365.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • onedrive.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • sharepoint.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • skype.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • sway.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • yammer.com

    Domains

    Covered by Microsoft Bounty Program

  • api.github.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • api.linkedin.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by LinkedIn

  • business.linkedin.com

    Web High

    Covered by LinkedIn

  • classroom.github.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • education.github.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • gist.github.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • github.com

    Web Critical

    Covered by GitHub

  • https://developer.microsoft.com/fluentui

    Web

    Covered by Fluent UI

  • https://dotnet.microsoft.com

    Web

    Covered by .NET

  • https://github.com/AcademySoftwareFoundation/openexr

    Web

    Covered by OpenEXR

  • https://github.com/Aiven-Open/tiered-storage-for-apache-kafka

    Web

    Covered by Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 426

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • *.github.io

    GitHub

  • *.gocd.org

    GoCD

  • blog.github.com

    GitHub

  • community.github.com

    GitHub

  • enterprise.github.com

    GitHub

  • git.io

    GitHub

  • github.blog

    GitHub

  • http://education.github.com/forum

    GitHub

  • shop.github.com

    GitHub

  • spectrum.chat

    GitHub

  • Atom

    GitHub

  • Electron

    GitHub

  • GitHub Classroom Assistant

    GitHub

  • "Use of unsupported platforms, unreleased versions, or non-standard build processes", quoted from the policy's out-of-scope list: build it the way the project builds it

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • @Beta-annotated APIs, where the project states the contract is explicitly unstable

    Guava

  • A cluster deliberately deployed without ACLs enabled and with admin endpoints on a public interface, where the finding is the deployment decision

    Dgraph

  • A consuming application's own misuse of the component APIs

    Fluent UI

  • A crash on malformed input with no demonstrated gain in privilege, which the program treats as an unfinished report rather than a finding

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • A defect already covered by another vendor's bounty program, which MSRC declines to pay for a second time

    PowerShell

  • A distribution's choice of default PAM stack, which is configuration by the distributor rather than a defect in the code

    Linux-PAM

  • A DNS provider's own API behaviour rather than lego's integration with it

    go-acme/lego

  • A Dockerfile that does something dangerous the author asked for, such as running an untrusted script during a build the author controls

    BuildKit

  • A finding already covered by an open or published advisory, which the first-come-first-served duplicate policy will close

    xrdp

  • A patch the maintainers decline, since the reward panel states it will not second-guess a maintainer's decision

    Deno Wasmtime

  • A patch the maintainers decline: the reward panel states it will not second-guess a maintainer's decision, so an unmerged patch is worth nothing however good it is

    Ruby (CRuby)

  • A patch the maintainers or the Strike Team decline, since the reward panel states it will not second-guess a maintainer's decision

    Joomla

  • A project author writing a macro or a model that executes SQL with the credentials they configured, which is what dbt does

    dbt-core

  • A user who explicitly enabled allow_remote_control and is then remote-controlled as documented, unless the finding shows that boundary failing

    kitty

  • A vulnerability report on its own where the patch money is concerned: that rail pays only on a change merged upstream that then survives a month without reverts

    PrestaShop

  • A warehouse role granted more privilege than it needed, which is a configuration decision by the operator

    dbt-core

  • A weak policy a caller wrote deliberately, such as a runtime that allowlists a dangerous syscall on purpose

    libseccomp

  • Accessibility, layout and visual defects with no security impact

    Fluent UI

  • ActiveJob, Sidekiq, Resque and the other queue backends, which are other projects' code even where job-iteration drives them

    Shopify job-iteration

  • ActiveRecord and Rails behaviour that identity_cache only inherits, which belongs upstream

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Adobe's other products, which sit on other asset rows of the same HackerOne program rather than on this one

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative) Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • Amazon retail properties, devices and consumer applications, which the AWS VDP policy explicitly sends to Amazon's separate public bug bounty programme

    AWS-LC

  • Amazon retail, device and consumer application reports, which the AWS VDP policy sends to a separate programme

    s2n-tls

  • An application's decision to accept a signature xmlsec correctly reported as covering only part of the document

    xmlsec

  • An operator deliberately exposing an internal service through a tunnel, which is what the product does rather than a defect

    frp

  • An operator's deliberate configuration choice, such as pointing the webroot provider at a directory the web server executes from

    go-acme/lego

  • Anything already covered by a published advisory, given how much of this surface was rewritten during 2026

    Dgraph

  • Anything already covered by one of the seven published advisories

    kitty

  • Anything already publicly disclosed before the submission, and dependency-confusion reports

    TypeScript

  • Anything already reported, ruled out by name in the policy's exclusions list

    Vaultwarden

  • Anything filed as a public issue, which the policy asks reporters to avoid

    Jackson

  • Anything in kubernetes/autoscaler beyond the core autoscaling loop, the Vertical Pod Autoscaler and addon-resizer, since those are the components the program pays on

    Cluster Autoscaler

  • Anything in the archived or example crates carried in the repository

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Anything other than the most recent release, which is the only version the program will grade

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Anything outside the repositories the archived scope named: ntpd-rs, clock-steering and timestamped-socket

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • Anything outside the repository the OSS-Fuzz integration names as main_repo, since the Tier 2 scope line attaches to that repository and nothing else

    Wasmtime

  • Anything outside the repository the OSS-Fuzz integration names as main_repo: the Tier 2 scope line attaches to that repository and nothing else

    Deno

  • Anything outside the swiyu public beta trust infrastructure and the components the programme names. The exact asset list sits behind the app.bugbounty.ch login, so treat anything you have not seen on it as out until you have

    swiyu (Swiss e-ID and Trust Infrastructure)

  • Anything reachable only with a self-hosted or modified build of dependabot-core

    Dependabot Core

  • Anything reproducible only on main or on a pre-release build, which the policy classifies as a regular issue

    Exiv2

  • Anything requiring administrative or root OS privileges to exploit in the first place

    Kibana

  • Anything that only reproduces on a version other than the current one, since the program covers the latest release

    XNNPACK

  • Anything that only reproduces under a non-default configuration, since the in-scope wording is anchored to default configurations

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • Anything that requires contacting Shopify Support to demonstrate, which is itself a disqualifier

    Shopify job-iteration

  • Application code that misuses a ThreadX API in a way the documentation warns against

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Application-layer findings shown only on a deployment below the 1 CPU and 2 GB RAM floor the program requires

    Kibana

  • Application-level bugs in code written in Ruby, as opposed to defects in the interpreter that runs it

    Ruby (CRuby)

  • Application-level denial of service, excluded by the program's baseline for all targets

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Application-side API misuse: an embedding application that skips the host-key check or ignores a return value and reports the consequence

    libssh2

  • Application-side misuse of intentionally dangerous functions: passing request data to eval, include, system or unserialize and reporting the consequence

    PHP

  • Applications that choose to call fromJson on untrusted data into unsafe target types

    Gson

  • Applications that choose to compile attacker-supplied patterns without setting a max_mem limit

    RE2

  • Applications that deliberately raise or disable MAX_IMAGE_PIXELS and then run out of memory, which is the operator's decision

    Pillow

  • Applications that enable default typing over untrusted input and then bind to a permissive base type, where Jackson behaved exactly as configured and documented

    Jackson

  • Applications that use Guava insecurely, as opposed to defects in Guava's own behaviour

    Guava

  • Aqua Security's commercial platform, a separate product with a separate report surface

    Trivy

  • Assets from Elastic acquisitions closed within the last six months

    Kibana

  • Attacks relying on insecure configurations, subject to the Security Response Committee's opinion

    Cluster Autoscaler

  • Attacks requiring invasive physical access to a card, such as fault injection or decapping

    OpenSC

  • Attacks requiring physical access to the host

    Vaultwarden

  • Attacks that assume a compromised host or an attacker who already holds the private key

    s2n-tls

  • Attacks that need physical access to the victim's machine, a man in the middle, or an already-compromised account

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Awards are gated on sanctions screening, so a reporter who cannot clear it will not be paid however good the finding

    Dependabot Core

  • Awards to researchers on a sanctions list, in a territory subject to sanctions, or located in Russia or Belarus, which Google states it cannot pay

    XNNPACK

  • Awards to researchers on sanctions lists, in territories subject to sanctions, or located in Russia or Belarus, which Google states it will not issue

    Brotli Gson Distroless

  • AWS service configuration and the operational estate rather than a defect in this library's source

    AWS-LC

  • AWS services and their configuration rather than a defect in this library

    s2n-tls

  • Azure RTOS releases predating the Eclipse donation, along with Microsoft's own downstream products built on them

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Badger and other upstream dependency defects, unless Dgraph's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable

    Dgraph

  • Behaviour an application deliberately opted into by enabling a documented lenient flag, unless the flag is more permissive than it is documented to be

    llhttp

  • Behaviour differences from Jackson that carry no independent security impact

    Gson

  • Behaviour the shared-responsibility threat model assigns to the calling application, unless the documentation leads a careful caller into it

    s2n-tls

  • Best-practice and non-security findings, and duplicates that share a root cause with an existing submission

    Shopify job-iteration

  • Best-practice observations, and duplicates sharing a root cause with a report already filed

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Bugs in HarfBuzz, FreeType or fontconfig, which libass calls but does not own

    libass

  • Bugs in libFLAC, libvorbis, libogg or libmpg123 rather than in libsndfile's use of them

    libsndfile

  • Bugs in TensorFlow Lite, PyTorch or another framework that merely calls XNNPACK, which belong to the calling project's own program

    XNNPACK

  • Bugs in the player embedding libass rather than in the library

    libass

  • Bugs in the Python wrappers, soundfile and librosa, which are separate projects on top of this library

    libsndfile

  • Bugs inherited from a forked upstream project rather than introduced by this plugin

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Bugs that first require a GitHub organisation owner to be compromised

    Dependabot Core

  • Bugs that require a build configuration nobody ships, without a route to the same defect in a default build

    libheif

  • Build system and packaging issues rather than upstream library code

    libsndfile

  • Building from an index the user asked uv to use, likewise ruled out by name

    uv

  • BuildKit, which ships as a separate project with its own policy and its own entry here

    Docker Engine

  • Bundling several unrelated issues into one report, which the policy's one-advisory-per-issue rule rules out

    OpenSC

  • Callers that extract into a directory they do not control, or that disable the library's own path protections and then get what they asked for

    node-tar

  • Catastrophic-backtracking reports, since RE2's entire design guarantee is linear-time matching and the absence of backtracking

    RE2

  • Client libraries maintained in separate repositories, where the defect is in the binding rather than the server

    Dgraph

  • Client-side tooling such as Docker Engine, Podman or Skopeo, which have their own entries here

    Distribution

  • Cloud-provider infrastructure issues in S3, GCS or Azure Blob rather than in this plugin's use of them

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Community adapters and community packages published on the hub that dbt Labs does not maintain

    dbt-core

  • Compiler Object Tools, which NVIDIA places outside the compiler threat model because they are standalone development and diagnostic tools

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Compression side channels of the CRIME and BREACH family, which are a protocol-level property rather than a defect in this codec

    Brotli

  • Compression-ratio and performance issues without security impact

    Brotli

  • Compression-ratio denial of service inherent to gzip or tar rather than to this implementation

    node-tar

  • Configuration mistakes in /etc/fstab or in a distribution's sudoers rules that grant mounting rights the operator chose to grant

    util-linux

  • Configuration mistakes in somebody else's PrestaShop deployment rather than a defect in the shipped code

    PrestaShop

  • Configurations the operator deliberately weakened: a policy that grants a capability, mounts a writable host path or permits a syscall is doing exactly what it was told

    nsjail

  • Container parsing, which belongs to libheif or to whichever demuxer produced the bitstream

    libde265

  • Container runtime and host kernel escapes, which these images neither implement nor mediate

    Distroless

  • containerd and runc, which are separate upstream projects with their own security channels

    Docker Engine

  • containerd, runc and the kernel primitives BuildKit configures

    BuildKit

  • crabbyavif, the separate Rust implementation Chromium now uses, which shares no code with this tree

    libavif

  • Crash-only one-liners that silence a non-exploitable abort without closing a class of defect

    bmcweb

  • Crashes in a tool the reporter already had the privilege to run, where no user, mount or ownership boundary is actually crossed

    util-linux

  • Cross-site scripting without a CSP bypass, which Elastic assesses case by case and may pay only at low severity, a caveat that bites harder here than anywhere else in the program given how much of Kibana's history is XSS

    Kibana

  • curl's use of libssh2: a defect in how curl drives the library belongs with curl, which has its own entry

    libssh2

  • dbt Cloud, the hosted product, along with Snowflake, Databricks and Fivetran integrations that embed dbt. Those belong to their vendors

    dbt-core

  • Defects in a card's own firmware or applet rather than in OpenSC's handling of it

    OpenSC

  • Defects in a consumer's use of the API rather than in the library's behaviour

    libseccomp

  • Defects in a consuming SAML or document signing implementation rather than in xmlsec itself

    xmlsec

  • Defects in an embedding application rather than in GoBGP's own code

    GoBGP

  • Defects in libxml2 or libxslt rather than in xmlsec, which belong upstream with those projects

    xmlsec

  • Defects in PC/SC-lite, in a reader driver, or in a consuming application rather than in OpenSC

    OpenSC

  • Defects in Traefik or in another consumer rather than in lego itself

    go-acme/lego

  • Defects inside a dependency itself, such as Imath or the underlying compression library. The policy covers coordination for inherited flaws, and the fix belongs upstream

    OpenEXR

  • Defects inside a third-party library Exiv2 links, unless Exiv2's own use of it is what makes them reachable

    Exiv2

  • Defects inside an upstream library such as libjpeg-turbo, zlib or libtiff that Pillow merely calls, unless Pillow's use of it is what makes the defect reachable

    Pillow

  • Defects inside CPython or inside the standalone interpreter builds uv downloads, as opposed to how uv fetches and verifies them

    uv

  • Defects inside the AV1 codecs themselves. libaom, dav1d, libgav1, rav1e and SVT-AV1 are separate projects with their own processes

    libavif

  • Defects inside the codec libraries themselves. A crash in libde265, dav1d, aom or x265 belongs to that project, and libde265 in particular runs its own disclosure process

    libheif

  • Defects that actually live in a linked crypto backend such as OpenSSL, mbedTLS, libgcrypt or WinCNG rather than in libssh2

    libssh2

  • Defects that actually live in Cargo, rustc or crates.io rather than in the plugin, which belong upstream with those projects

    CycloneDX Rust Cargo

  • Defects that actually live in the Linux kernel's namespace, seccomp or cgroup implementation: a kernel privilege escalation reached from inside a jail is a kernel bug rather than an nsjail bug

    nsjail

  • Defects that actually live in the Rust standard library or in a third-party crate rather than in the in-scope repositories

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • Defects that only reproduce on a release the project no longer ships, since the program covers the latest versions

    RE2 Guava

  • Deliberate cluster configuration, such as admitting privileged pods, granting hostPath mounts or disabling seccomp by policy

    CRI-O

  • Deliberate operator choices, such as exposing the daemon socket to a container, running containers privileged or publishing the API on a network without TLS

    Docker Engine

  • Deliberate operator configuration, such as running with delete.enabled on for anonymous users, serving without TLS or leaving the catalog endpoint public on purpose

    Distribution

  • Denial of service against the hosted Dependabot service by volume rather than by defect

    Dependabot Core

  • Denial of service aimed at Cloudflare's production edge, which the program excludes outright

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Denial of service and distributed denial of service, brute force, spam, social engineering and physical intrusion

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Denial of service and memory exhaustion driven by large inputs, which the policy places out of scope outright

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • Denial of service whose cost is merely linear in the size of the input

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Denial of service, spamming and social engineering, ruled out by the policy's research conduct rules

    Vaultwarden

  • Dependency CVEs in third-party crates without a demonstrated reachable path through Pingora itself

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Dependency-confusion reports

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Dependency-only CVE reports without a demonstrated chain through this code

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Deployments exposing 3389 to the internet with no TLS and no network controls, which is an operator decision

    xrdp

  • Deployments running with no token or OIDC configured at all, where the server was told to accept anyone

    frp

  • Deprecated components, which are not supported targets

    kube-state-metrics Cluster Autoscaler

  • Deserialisation gadget chains that live in the application's own classpath rather than in Gson

    Gson

  • DevUI and other prototype, experimental or local-testing-only components

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Differences between the guava and guava-android artifacts that carry no independent security impact

    Guava

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches

    libde265

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than the upstream tree

    OpenEXR

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than upstream libavif

    libavif

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than upstream libheif

    libheif

  • Distribution packaging and downstream patches

    libseccomp

  • Distribution packaging and downstream patches rather than upstream CRI-O

    CRI-O

  • Distribution packaging and vendor patches rather than the upstream repository

    xrdp

  • Distribution packaging and vendored copies that have drifted from upstream

    libass

  • Distribution patches and packaging rather than upstream Exiv2

    Exiv2

  • Distribution-specific patches and packaging rather than defects in the upstream tree

    util-linux

  • Distribution-specific patches and packaging rather than upstream libpng

    libpng

  • Docker Desktop's proprietary components and the Docker Hub service, which sit outside the moby/moby tree

    Docker Engine

  • Docker Engine itself, which ships as a separate project with its own policy and its own entry here

    BuildKit

  • Documentation-only issues

    TypeScript PowerShell

  • Downstream applications that call Exiv2, including KDE components, digiKam and darktable, which have their own trackers

    Exiv2

  • Downstream consumers that link libmount or libblkid, such as systemd and udisks, which are maintained elsewhere

    util-linux

  • Downstream consumers that link libpng, such as ImageMagick, Qt and GTK, which are maintained elsewhere

    libpng

  • Downstream consumers that link OpenEXR, including OpenCV, Blender and Nuke, and other Academy Software Foundation projects with their own repositories

    OpenEXR

  • Downstream integrations such as GIMP, ImageMagick and libvips

    libavif

  • Downstream integrations such as GIMP, ImageMagick and libvips, which are maintained elsewhere

    libheif

  • Downstream players and integrations rather than the decoder itself

    libde265

  • Downstream servers misconfiguring Brotli content encoding

    Brotli

  • Downstream wrappers and frameworks that call Pillow, including Django's image handling

    Pillow

  • Draft-protocol reference implementations and IETF interop endpoints, which the program calls out as Informational only

    CIRCL

  • Earlier web stacks on .NET Framework, namely ASP.NET Web Forms and ASP.NET MVC

    .NET

  • Embedder mistakes: a host that deliberately handed the guest a capability, or wired a host function that does no validation of its own

    Wasmtime

  • Enforcement of the CAWG X.509 trust model, also recorded as not currently accepted

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • Executing a PEP 517 build for a source distribution, ruled out by name; running build code is what installing an sdist means

    uv

  • Exploits that require administrator privilege to begin with, which the policy treats as admin-only and invalid

    Rancher

  • Findings against a third-party network stack or filesystem an integrator substituted for the ones in the tree

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Findings against an outdated release: the in-scope statement covers the current latest release plus main and testing only

    Vaultwarden

  • Findings against releases and backends outside the published five-year support matrix

    xmlsec

  • Findings against versions where the fix has already shipped, given how frequently this project releases

    node-tar

  • Findings filed as a public GitHub issue, which the policy explicitly redirects away from

    Dgraph

  • Findings in BoringSSL or OpenSSL that AWS-LC has not inherited, which belong with the upstream project

    AWS-LC

  • Findings only reachable in a bespoke proxy an outside developer wrote on top of the framework, with no Cloudflare-reachable path

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Findings only reproducible on end-of-life or legacy versions of the distribution

    Kibana

  • Findings outside the published security boundary in PROJECT.md

    BuildKit

  • Findings submitted without a working proof of concept

    CIRCL

  • Findings that assume the operator already granted the permission being abused, which is a configuration choice rather than a bypass

    Deno

  • Findings that belong to a separate upstream project nsjail depends on rather than to its own tree, since the Patch Rewards scope row covers this project by repository URL

    nsjail

  • Findings that cannot be argued to CVSS impact on Shopify or its merchants

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Findings that cannot be tied to CVSS impact on Shopify, its merchants, or its partners

    Shopify job-iteration

  • Findings that only reproduce on an unmaintained stock Magento CE build with none of the fork's fixes applied

    OpenMage LTS

  • Findings that presuppose the attacker already controls the machine running the scan

    Trivy

  • Findings whose impact stays on the local machine, since Fluent UI sits outside the carve-out Microsoft grants to VS Code, Agent Framework, TypeScript, Monaco Editor and PowerShell

    Fluent UI

  • Findings with no working proof of concept

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Findings you cannot tie back to the Apache-2.0 cyclonedx-rust-cargo code this program is scoped to

    CycloneDX Rust Cargo

  • Forks and downstream repackagings of the interpreter rather than the upstream repository the OSS-Fuzz integration names

    Ruby (CRuby)

  • Format-support gaps and files libsndfile declines to open

    libsndfile

  • FreeRDP, Remmina or the Microsoft RDP client's own defects, as opposed to xrdp's handling of what they send

    xrdp

  • Gadget classes in third-party libraries. The gadget belongs to that library; the report here is that Jackson's validation failed to stop it

    Jackson

  • Google repositories the tier file does not name, which sit at OT2 or OT3 and pay nothing for a product vulnerability

    XNNPACK

  • Gradle and Maven consumer configuration problems on the integrator's side

    Guava

  • Harbor, the GitLab Container Registry and other products that embed or fork this code, where the defect is in their own additions

    Distribution

  • Hardening or standards-deviation findings with no demonstrated impact

    CIRCL

  • Hosting and server configuration, including a deployment that serves the var or media directory as executable

    OpenMage LTS

  • Image size, layer count and build-time complaints, which carry no security consequence

    Distroless

  • Independent Brotli reimplementations such as brotli-rs or dropbox/rust-brotli, which are not in the tier file

    Brotli

  • Insecure configurations, notably an operator who deliberately allow-listed sensitive labels

    kube-state-metrics

  • Integrator configuration choices, such as building without the module manager's memory protection enabled

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Intentionally disclosed information, which for this project is most of what it emits

    kube-state-metrics

  • Invoking a system Python interpreter, which the policy states is not a vulnerability in uv

    uv

  • Issues already published as advisories on the repository

    libseccomp

  • Issues in the upstream Apache Kafka broker itself, which belong to the ASF, and the ASF pays nothing for them

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • k3s and RKE2 as products, which have their own scope even though the security address is shared

    Rancher

  • Kernel-side seccomp defects, which belong to the Linux kernel security process

    libseccomp

  • Kubernetes on Windows or other non-Linux platforms

    Cluster Autoscaler kube-state-metrics

  • libass publishes no exclusion list. The items below are genuinely another project's code rather than policy text

    libass

  • libssh, which is a different project with a different codebase despite the similar name, and has its own upstream and its own scope row

    libssh2

  • libyuv and other third-party libraries libavif links, unless libavif's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable

    libavif

  • Load or availability testing against a production ACME endpoint

    go-acme/lego

  • Local users with a valid account doing what their account already permits inside their own session

    xrdp

  • Long-superseded releases where the fix has been available for years and the finding is simply that an old version is old

    Jackson

  • Low business criticality prices a finding down by the programme's own stated rule, alongside technical impact and the quality of the documentation you supply, and there is no published ladder to appeal to

    swiyu (Swiss e-ID and Trust Infrastructure)

  • Low-impact CSRF, low-impact server-side information disclosure, and bugs needing extensive or unlikely user interaction

    .NET

  • Magento 1: the legacy asset is marked neither eligible for bounty nor eligible for submission, so a finding there cannot be filed here even for triage

    Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • Magento 2 and Adobe Commerce, which are a different codebase covered by Adobe's own paid programme

    OpenMage LTS

  • Malicious packages published to PyPI, which is registry abuse rather than a uv defect

    uv

  • Malicious-package findings on npm or RubyGems, which are abuse reports to those registries rather than bounty submissions here

    Dependabot Core

  • Memory exhaustion from a large but entirely well-formed file, where the caller ran with limits deliberately disabled

    OpenEXR

  • Memory-corruption reports filed without exact OSS-Fuzz reproduction steps against an existing fuzz target, or an already merged patch

    XNNPACK

  • Memory-corruption reports submitted without exact OSS-Fuzz reproduction steps against an existing fuzz target, or a merged upstream patch

    RE2

  • Memory-corruption reports without exact OSS-Fuzz reproduction steps against an existing fuzz target, or an already merged patch, which the program requires on every OT0 and OT1 repository

    Brotli

  • Merchant configuration and store-level settings chosen deliberately

    OpenMage LTS

  • Microsoft repositories outside the program's fifteen-entry SCOPE list: the standard SECURITY.md pointing at MSRC is a reporting path and funds nothing

    TypeScript Fluent UI Microsoft Agent Framework PowerShell

  • microsoft/semantic-kernel and microsoft/autogen, which the program's own scope text names as separate projects it does not include

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Missing HTTP security headers with no demonstrated impact, named as invalid

    Rancher

  • Model output quality, hallucination, and prompt injection treated as jailbreak where no security boundary is actually crossed

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Moderate and Low severity, which pay $0 at every report quality

    TypeScript Microsoft Agent Framework Fluent UI PowerShell

  • Network access triggered by C2PA manifest input, which the policy records as not currently accepted while mitigations are in progress

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • Node.js core code outside the parser, including undici and the http module, unless the parser is what makes the issue reachable

    llhttp

  • Node.js runtime defects and npm dependency CVEs, unless Haraka's own use of them is what makes the defect reachable

    Haraka

  • Non-default build configurations the policy describes as unsafe, unless the same defect reaches a default build

    libde265

  • Non-Shopify GitHub repositories and forks, which fall outside the org-wide wildcard

    Shopify job-iteration

  • npm's own install logic and the npm registry, which belong to GitHub's paid programme rather than to this library

    node-tar

  • Null-pointer issues, listed as asset-specific out of scope

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Object storage services themselves rather than the registry's use of them

    Distribution

  • Object-typed deserialisation, which the project documents as unsafe by design

    Gson

  • One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules exclude by name along with resource-exhaustion denial of service

    Ruby (CRuby) Deno Wasmtime Joomla

  • One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules will not reward, and resource-exhaustion denial of service, which is excluded by name

    nsjail

  • One-line fixes for non-exploitable crashes, which the Patch Rewards rules will not reward, including crashes that come from resource exhaustion

    libssh2 PHP

  • One-liner patches that fix non-exploitable crashes, and denial of service by resource exhaustion, which the rules exclude by name

    PrestaShop

  • OpenShift's own components layered above the runtime

    CRI-O

  • Operating-system clipboard and window-manager behaviour outside kitty's control

    kitty

  • Operator configuration: an open relay someone configured deliberately is a decision rather than a defect

    Haraka

  • Operator decisions such as running a builder privileged, sharing one builder between untrusted tenants without isolation, or mounting the host Docker socket into a build

    BuildKit

  • Operator policy configuration that accepts a prefix it should have filtered

    GoBGP

  • Other HTTP parsers, including the archived nodejs/http-parser that llhttp replaced

    llhttp

  • Other tar implementations. GNU tar, libarchive and the rest are separate targets with separate reporting

    node-tar

  • Other terminals, including VTE-based ones. kitty implements its own core and shares no parser with them

    kitty

  • Out-of-support or end-of-life versions of .NET or ASP.NET Core, plus daily and pre-RTM builds

    .NET

  • Password-guessing and brute-force observations against a correctly functioning pam_unix

    Linux-PAM

  • Patches older than twelve months or newer than one month at the moment of submission, and anything past three submissions per person per month

    PrestaShop

  • Patches over twelve months old, which fall outside the program's age window

    bmcweb

  • Patches the bmcweb maintainers decline, since the reward is contingent on the merge rather than on the idea

    bmcweb

  • Patches the maintainers decline, patches under one month or over twelve months old, and anything past three submissions a person a month

    PHP libssh2 nsjail

  • Patches the PrestaShop maintainers decline, since Google explicitly declines to second-guess a maintainer's decision

    PrestaShop

  • Payment gates that apply across the Adobe program: identity verification before a payout is released, and the stated requirement to "provide your Testing IP address" in order to receive a monetary payout

    Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • Payment gates that apply across the Adobe program: identity verification before a payout is released, and the stated requirement to "provide your Testing IP address" in order to receive a monetary payout where that applies

    Adobe C2PA Tool (c2patool / c2pa-rs, Content Authenticity Initiative)

  • PCRE, RE2J and other regex engines, including ones that advertise RE2-compatible syntax

    RE2

  • Performance regressions and non-security behaviour changes

    Guava

  • Performance regressions and numerical accuracy differences, which are not security issues

    XNNPACK

  • PHP itself and bundled upstream libraries, which have their own separate pathways rather than being defects in Joomla core

    Joomla

  • Physical attacks on a device an attacker already holds, including debug-port readout of flash

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Pickle deserialization that presupposes the attacker already has write access to the checkpoint storage backend, which Microsoft treats as a trusted channel in the deployment architecture

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Platform components not unique to .NET (for example IIS, OpenSSL, and similar dependencies), and third-party dependencies the .NET team does not maintain

    .NET

  • Prometheus, Grafana and the rest of the downstream stack, which are separate projects with no bounty at all

    kube-state-metrics

  • Public CVEs surfaced by a scanner with no demonstrated impact on Rancher, named by the policy as an invalid report type

    Rancher

  • Public disclosure ahead of coordination

    BuildKit

  • Public disclosure ahead of the coordinated release

    Distribution

  • Public disclosure before the agreed embargo lifts

    Rancher

  • Public disclosure before the embargo lifts, which the policy sets automatically

    CRI-O

  • Public GitHub issues for security matters, since the policy asks for the confidential channel instead

    Haraka

  • Public GitHub issues used for an unfixed security defect, when the policy provides a private draft advisory instead

    Exiv2

  • Public GitHub issues used to report an unfixed memory-safety defect, when private reporting is enabled on the repository

    libheif

  • Public GitHub issues used to report an unfixed security defect, which the policy asks you not to do

    Pillow

  • Public GitHub issues used to report an unfixed vulnerability, when the private advisory route is documented at length

    OpenEXR

  • Public issue reports and third-party CNA submissions, both ruled out by the policy

    GoBGP

  • Public issue reports for an unfixed vulnerability, which the policy asks you not to file

    libavif

  • Publicly disclosed issues and anything already reported to Microsoft

    .NET

  • Publicly disclosed issues and dependency-confusion reports

    Fluent UI PowerShell

  • Python interpreter and standard library bugs

    Pillow

  • React and the other third-party packages the library consumes rather than owns

    Fluent UI

  • Read the scope tab yourself once you have an account

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • Releases outside the three most recent, which the Kubernetes program does not treat as supported

    Cluster Autoscaler kube-state-metrics

  • Rendering and appearance defects with no memory-safety or disclosure consequence

    libass

  • Reports against code paths Cloudflare does not run in production and that have no documented production usage

    CIRCL

  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues on aws/aws-lc, since the private advisory channel is disabled and AWS asks for reports through its own intake

    AWS-LC

  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues or posted to the png-mng-implement list, which puts the finding in the open before a fix exists

    libpng

  • Reports filed by anyone other than the finder: Google wants the submission through bughunters.google.com under the researcher's own identity, and it does not pay Google or Google Partner employees

    RE2 Guava

  • Reports filed by anyone other than the researcher: Google requires the submission under your own identity through bughunters.google.com, and treats routing around the designated channel as grounds to reject

    Gson Brotli Distroless

  • Reports filed publicly on GitHub before coordination, which the policy rules out

    Docker Engine

  • Reports from a maintainer, or from the author or reviewer of the vulnerable code, which the program cannot award

    Cluster Autoscaler

  • Reports from anyone unable to complete the platform's identity verification, which YesWeHack records as required on this program, or unwilling to hold an account at all, since the program cannot be seen without one

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • Reports Microsoft cannot pay out on: residency in a sanctioned country, or no IRS tax form returned within 30 days of validation, voids the award

    PowerShell Fluent UI Microsoft Agent Framework TypeScript

  • Reports that merely state software is out of date or vulnerable without a proof of concept

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Reports that only demonstrate impact with a Super User account already in hand, since that role is inside the trust boundary by design

    Joomla

  • Reports with no functional proof of concept, which the program closes rather than triages

    Shopify job-iteration

  • Reports without a working proof of concept, which the policy will not process

    Rancher

  • Repositories in Google's GitHub orgs that the tier file does not list, which pay nothing for a product vulnerability after the April 2026 rules update

    RE2 Guava

  • Repositories outside the Shopify organisation, plus forks and archived repositories, none of which the wildcard covers

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Repositories the tier file does not name, and images that are not current: the program covers the latest versions of the listed repositories, and any other repository in the same organisation counts only where the file names it. What the file omits sits at OT2 or OT3, where product vulnerabilities earn no monetary reward

    Distroless

  • Repositories the tier file does not name, and releases that are not current: the program covers the latest versions of the listed repositories, and any other repository in the same organisation counts only where the file names it. What the file omits sits at OT2 or OT3, where product vulnerabilities earn no monetary reward

    Gson Brotli

  • Resource exhaustion from an expensive traversal or a large mutation, which is a capacity question

    Dgraph

  • Resource exhaustion from raw connection volume against a server with no limits configured

    frp

  • Reverse proxies and front ends as products; the disagreement between them and llhttp is in scope on the parser's side

    llhttp

  • Rewards to researchers on a sanctions list, in a sanctioned territory, or located in Russia or Belarus, which Google states it cannot issue

    RE2 Guava

  • Route hijacking by a peer sending what it is configured and authorised to send, which is BGP behaving as specified

    GoBGP

  • RubyGems, Rack and the wider gem ecosystem, which this study records as separate projects with no paid pathway of their own

    Ruby (CRuby)

  • Ruff and Astral's other projects, which share the same security address but are separate codebases

    uv

  • runc and crun themselves, where the defect is in the runtime rather than in the spec CRI-O generates or the way it invokes them

    CRI-O

  • Samples, tutorials and quickstart code

    Fluent UI PowerShell

  • Samples, tutorials, quickstart code and anything under samples/

    TypeScript

  • Samples, tutorials, quickstart code and samples/ directories

    Microsoft Agent Framework

  • Scanner false positives about packages present in the image, without a demonstrated impact

    Distroless

  • Self-inflicted misconfiguration, also named as invalid

    Rancher

  • Severity cap to plan around: the org-wide open-source row tops out at $3,500 for a Critical, since Cloudflare's $10,000 row is bound to production infrastructure rather than the GitHub org

    CIRCL

  • Severity cap to plan around: the Tier 2 open-source row tops out at $3,500 for a Critical, since Cloudflare's $10,000 row is bound to production infrastructure rather than the GitHub org

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Silicon vendor SDK forks. ST, Renesas, NXP and Microchip ship their own integrations, and a defect that exists only there belongs to that vendor

    Eclipse ThreadX

  • Site-specific misconfiguration: a permission an administrator granted, or an ACL set up more broadly than intended

    Joomla

  • Software that no longer receives security updates, and issues NVIDIA already knew about from its own testing, which are flagged as duplicates

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Static-analysis-only reports pointing at unsafe blocks with no runnable reproduction

    Cloudflare Pingora

  • Submissions from outside the Bug Bounty Switzerland platform, which is the only channel the programme runs on, and KYC is required before a payout is released

    swiyu (Swiss e-ID and Trust Infrastructure)

  • Supply-chain findings against Elastic's build and release tooling, which are paid on the separate Software Supply Chain row rather than as a Kibana finding

    Kibana

  • Syntax incompatibilities with PCRE that carry no security impact

    RE2

  • Testing carried out against live merchant storefronts or Adobe-operated environments, when the test plan permits testing only against your own local installations

    Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • The absence of authentication on /metrics as a finding in itself, since that is the documented deployment model. A report has to show something reaching the endpoint that was never meant to be there

    kube-state-metrics

  • The ACME server side and CA policy, which belong with the CA operating it

    go-acme/lego

  • The C reference implementation and chrony, which are separate projects with separate maintainers and, in the reference implementation's case, a separate program entirely

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • The CycloneDX specification itself, and the sibling CycloneDX implementations for other ecosystems, which are separate projects with their own repositories

    CycloneDX Rust Cargo

  • The documentation site and Storybook demos

    Fluent UI

  • The experimental encoder, ruled out by name in the policy

    libde265

  • The external token auth service in a token-auth deployment, where that service is a separate implementation

    Distribution

  • The full/classic .NET Framework, which is explicitly out of scope

    .NET

  • The Go runtime and standard library, unless GoBGP's use of them is what makes the issue reachable

    GoBGP

  • The Kubernetes control plane and kubelet, which belong to the Kubernetes program and carry their own scope

    CRI-O

  • The Linux kernel primitives CRI-O configures

    CRI-O

  • The Linux kernel primitives the daemon configures, where the defect is in the kernel rather than in what Docker asked for

    Docker Engine

  • The medium-severity cap on this asset: the $50,000 and $200,000 cells cannot be reached from a source-code finding however it scores

    Shopify job-iteration Shopify identity_cache

  • The original PIL, which is unmaintained and is a different codebase

    Pillow

  • The policy publishes no exclusions list, so what follows is ordinary out-of-scope territory rather than a stated policy position

    Haraka

  • The project publishes no exclusion list, so the items above are genuine boundaries rather than policy text

    libsndfile

  • The registries, container runtimes and cloud APIs Trivy talks to

    Trivy

  • The rest of the OpenBMC distribution, meaning the Yocto layers and the phosphor-* daemons, unless separately integrated into OSS-Fuzz, since projects/openbmc does not exist

    bmcweb

  • The roughly 30 per-cloud provider implementations in the same repository, which the program treats as vendor-specific plugins and does not pay for

    Cluster Autoscaler

  • The Rust png crate Chrome now uses. Different codebase, different project, no relationship to this tree

    libpng

  • The sample and demo applications shipped with the source, also ruled out by name

    libde265

  • The security of the service on the far end of the tunnel, as opposed to frp's handling of the traffic

    frp

  • The shell or the program that emitted the sequence; kitty displaying hostile output is a bug only where kitty mishandles it

    kitty

  • The web-vault and Bitwarden's mobile and desktop clients: the policy sends these to github.com/bitwarden, which Vaultwarden is explicitly not associated with

    Vaultwarden

  • The X server and desktop environment behind the session rather than xrdp and xorgxrdp

    xrdp

  • Theoretical findings with no proof of concept

    Tiered Storage for Apache Kafka

  • Theoretical issues with no realistic exploit scenario, and anything requiring complex end-user interaction to reach

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • Theoretical weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than a defect in this implementation of it

    AWS-LC

  • Third-party charts and extensions that Rancher neither maintains nor ships by default

    Rancher

  • Third-party components and services, which fall outside the policy even where Kibana bundles them

    Kibana

  • Third-party extensions and marketplace modules, which are not part of the shipped Commerce editions the asset row names

    Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • Third-party extensions, templates and plugins from the Joomla Extensions Directory, which are separate projects and are not the repository Google's Tier 1 row names

    Joomla

  • Third-party forks and the many rebranded frp derivatives rather than the upstream repository

    frp

  • Third-party frontends and downstream builders, where the defect is theirs rather than in the interface BuildKit exposes

    BuildKit

  • Third-party JSON libraries, including other parsers an application happens to use alongside Gson

    Gson

  • Third-party Magento 1 extensions and themes maintained outside the OpenMage tree

    OpenMage LTS

  • Third-party modules and themes, which are not the repository named in the Tier 1 scope row and are maintained by their own authors

    PrestaShop

  • Third-party modules from the PowerShell Gallery that Microsoft does not own

    PowerShell

  • Third-party npm modules, which belong to the separate ecosystem programme

    llhttp

  • Third-party PAM modules that are not in this repository, including vendor SSO modules, pam_mount, and the long tail of out-of-tree modules

    Linux-PAM

  • Third-party PECL extensions that are not carried in the php-src tree

    PHP

  • Third-party plugins that are not part of the engine

    Docker Engine

  • Third-party plugins written outside the Haraka organisation

    Haraka

  • Third-party Trivy plugins that are not maintained in the project

    Trivy

  • Third-party TypeScript-adjacent packages that Microsoft does not own, including language-service plugins and community @types definitions

    TypeScript

  • Time-source trust decisions the operator made deliberately, such as running unauthenticated NTP where NTS was available. That is configuration rather than a defect

    ntpd-rs (Project Pendulum)

  • Timing observations presented on their own, without a demonstrated recovery of key material or other security consequence

    CIRCL

  • Training material, community forums, and non-product sample or community sites (outside the in-scope docs/samples category)

    .NET

  • Type-system unsoundness with no security impact, which the project treats as designed behaviour rather than a defect

    TypeScript

  • Unpayable without KYC: the platform verifies identity before releasing money, so the account you file under has to be verifiable in your own name

    CycloneDX Rust Cargo

  • Upstream Debian package CVEs that distroless merely repackages, which belong with the upstream package maintainers

    Distroless

  • Upstream dependencies and distribution packaging rather than the upstream kitty tree

    kitty

  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Jackson's own use of the dependency is what makes them reachable

    Jackson

  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Vaultwarden's own use of the dependency is what makes it reachable

    Vaultwarden

  • Upstream Go library defects, unless frp's own use of the library is what makes them reachable

    frp

  • Upstream Jinja2, agate or Python dependency bugs, unless dbt's own use of the dependency is what makes them reachable

    dbt-core

  • Upstream Kubernetes defects that Rancher only inherits

    Rancher

  • Upstream libraries and third-party services the federal repositories depend on, which belong to their own projects rather than to this programme

    swiyu (Swiss e-ID and Trust Infrastructure)

  • Upstream PHP library issues, unless OpenMage's own use of the library is what makes the defect reachable

    OpenMage LTS

  • V8 itself, which is a separate project already carrying its own funded programme

    Deno

  • Vendor BMC forks, which is the practical limitation here: most shipped BMCs are AMI MegaRAC or a vendor derivative rather than upstream bmcweb

    bmcweb

  • Volumetric denial of service, described by the policy as 'network flooding, request flooding, port flooding, required traffic volume scaling with deployment size', which is never eligible

    Kibana

  • Volumetric denial of service. A single crafted session that pins a worker is the interesting case; sending a million messages is not

    Haraka

  • Vulnerabilities in applications and frameworks written in PHP such as WordPress, Drupal and Laravel, rather than in php-src; those have their own programmes

    PHP

  • Vulnerabilities in Memcached itself, which is a separate project running no bounty at all

    Shopify identity_cache

  • Vulnerabilities in the application a user layers on top of a distroless base image

    Distroless

  • Vulnerabilities in the upstream package managers themselves rather than in dependabot-core, a boundary the scope line draws firmly

    Dependabot Core

  • Vulnerabilities in Trivy's own dependencies, which the policy routes to GitHub Discussions rather than to the private channel

    Trivy

  • Vulnerability reports with no merged patch behind them, which earn nothing on Google's rail

    bmcweb

  • Wasmer, WasmEdge and other WebAssembly runtimes, which are separate projects with their own repositories and their own pathways

    Wasmtime

  • Weak local policy an administrator configured deliberately, such as a permissive pam_access rule or a disabled password quality check

    Linux-PAM

  • Weaknesses in a standardised algorithm rather than in this implementation of it

    OpenSC

  • Weaknesses in the underlying libcrypto rather than in s2n-tls's use of it; those belong with AWS-LC, OpenSSL or whichever backend is linked

    s2n-tls

  • Weaknesses in the XML Signature specification itself rather than in this implementation of it, unless xmlsec has a safer option it fails to apply

    xmlsec

  • Web server or FPM pool misconfiguration rather than a defect in the interpreter

    PHP

  • Whatever Adobe's own written exclusions cover: read the program's policy and scope page in full before assuming a bug class qualifies

    Adobe Commerce Open Source (Magento Open Source)

  • Windows PowerShell 5.1 and the inbox Windows component, which belong to Windows servicing

    PowerShell

  • Wrong or missing data in the upstream advisory feeds Trivy consumes; a bad record in an upstream source is not a Trivy defect

    Trivy

  • Zero-days in in-scope assets reported within 14 days of a patch or mitigation going public, which may be filed but are usually not bounty-eligible

    NVIDIA Container Toolkit

  • zlib defects, unless libpng's own use of zlib is what makes them reachable

    libpng

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every Microsoft program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in Microsoft products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

  • Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

  • Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

  • Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

  • Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

  • UI misrepresentation in Notifications in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

  • UI misrepresentation in Notifications in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

  • UI misrepresentation in Notifications in Google Chrome on on Windows prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to spoof UI elements via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low)

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under microsoft.com and the companies Microsoft owns: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test. Ownership comes from settled, public acquisitions, or from a program's own text naming Microsoft.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.