Tor Project bug bounty programs
torproject.org Updated
Tor Project runs three public programs: a HackerOne bug bounty paying up to $4,000, a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $2,500 and a Sorona bug bounty paying up to $2,500.
- Top reward
- $4,000
- HackerOne
- Programs
- 3
- 3 pay cash
- Targets in scope
- 18
- 2 types, deduplicated
- Last change
- None yet
- Tracked since Nov 2026
Where to report
3 programs, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.
Start here
Tor
HackerOne · Pays the most of the 3 programs: up to $4,000.
| Program | Critical | High | Medium | Low | Top reward | Safe harbor | KYC | First response | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tor
HackerOne · Bug bounty |
$4,000 (highest) | $2,000 | $1,000 | $100 | $4,000 | Full | – | 11 days average | Open |
|
Tor Browser
Sorona · Bug bounty |
– | $2,500 (highest) | $1,250 (highest) | $125 (highest) | $2,500 | Partial | – | 3 days promised | Open |
|
Tor
Sorona · Bug bounty |
– | $2,500 | $625 | $125 | $2,500 | Partial | – | – | Open |
-
- Critical
- $4,000 (highest)
- High
- $2,000
- Medium
- $1,000
- Low
- $100
- Safe harbor
- Full
- First response
- 11 days average
-
- Critical
- –
- High
- $2,500 (highest)
- Medium
- $1,250 (highest)
- Low
- $125 (highest)
- Safe harbor
- Partial
- First response
- 3 days promised
-
- Critical
- –
- High
- $2,500
- Medium
- $625
- Low
- $125
- Safe harbor
- Partial
Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.
What is in scope
18 targets across all 3 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 11 excluded.
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Bootstrapping and connection assist: the Tor Launcher path, bridge configuration and the pluggable transports the bundle integrates, obfs4 and Snowflake among them
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
-
Guard selection, path selection and the rest of the code that decides which relays a circuit gets built from
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
Onion services v3 across the whole flow, from descriptor publication and encryption through introduction and rendezvous to the client lookup, plus the ed25519 identity and blinded-key handling behind it
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
Pluggable-transport management and the bridge and proxy paths the daemon drives when a direct connection to the network is blocked
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The browser as shipped, meaning the whole Gecko engine as Tor patches it: the content process and its sandbox, SpiderMonkey, the networking stack, the extension surface and the add-ons the bundle ships
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
-
The daemon in every role the single binary takes: client, relay, bridge, directory authority and onion service. The same code ships for all of them, so a defect reachable in any one of them counts
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The directory subsystem end to end: descriptor and consensus document parsing, authority voting and signature checking, and the client side that fetches, validates and caches all of it
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The internal library tree under src/lib: buffers, encoding and string handling, compression, the crypto wrappers over OpenSSL or NSS, and the event loop and networking core every subsystem sits on
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The link and circuit layer in full: TLS link handshakes, the ntor and ntor-v3 circuit handshakes, relay-cell cryptography, flow control and the padding machinery on top
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The local interfaces the daemon exposes: the SOCKS port, the control port and its authentication, the torrc parser and the command line
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The program pays for supported versions of two products only, the Tor daemon and Tor Browser. This page is the Tor asset row: the onion-routing daemon at gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor, graded up to critical, in the releases the download page lists as current
Products and areas
Covered by Tor
-
The program pays for supported versions of two products only, the Tor daemon and Tor Browser. This page is the Tor Browser asset row: the Gecko fork at gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/applications/tor-browser, graded up to critical, on the latest stable, alpha and nightly builds
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
-
The Tor Browser patch set itself: first-party isolation, the fingerprinting-resistance work, the security-level slider and the invariant that no traffic reaches the network outside the SOCKS proxy
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
-
The updater and the signature checking behind it, which is the path an attacker would take to ship a build a user already trusts
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
-
Tor Browser on desktop across Windows, macOS and Linux, and Tor Browser for Android, all carried by that one asset row
Products and areas
Covered by Tor Browser
No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.
Out of scope 11
Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.
-
Defects that reproduce unchanged in stock Firefox, which are Mozilla's code and get filed against Mozilla; the Tor Browser CVE record is small for that reason
Tor Browser
-
Model-generated findings submitted without manual verification and a working proof of concept, and the program also wants you to name the model you used
Tor Browser
-
Model-generated findings submitted without manual verification and a working proof of concept, which are closed as informational
Tor
-
Orbot, OONI and Tor Messenger, the other Tor Project products the scope list marks ineligible
Tor Browser Tor
-
Reports sent by email rather than through HackerOne, which the policy treats as forfeiting the bounty
Tor Tor Browser
-
The tor daemon itself, which the same program pays on its own asset row at up to $4,000 critical and which this row does not cover
Tor Browser
-
The Tor Project's hosted services, meaning the website, the bug tracker and the server infrastructure, all carried in the structured scope as not bounty-eligible
Tor
-
The Tor Project's hosted services, meaning torproject.org, the bug tracker and the server infrastructure, which the policy rules out by name
Tor Browser
-
Tor Browser, which the same program pays on its own asset row at up to $3,000 critical and which this row does not cover
Tor
-
Unsupported and end-of-life builds. Supported means the latest stable, alpha and nightly, so a bug that only reproduces on an older release earns nothing
Tor Browser
-
Versions of the daemon outside the supported set the download page lists as current
Tor
Recent changes
Reward and scope changes across every Tor Project program, newest first.
No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.
Recent CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in Tor Project products, from the NVD.
-
CVE-2026-77642 High
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to an out-of-bounds write when parsing a consensus or detached signature with unexpected signature digest type. Impact is minor for most Tor roles, but potentially major for directory authorities. This is TROVE-2026-019.
-
CVE-2026-77642 High
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to an out-of-bounds write when parsing a consensus or detached signature with unexpected signature digest type. Impact is minor for most Tor roles, but potentially major for directory authorities. This is TROVE-2026-019.
-
CVE-2026-77642 High
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to an out-of-bounds write when parsing a consensus or detached signature with unexpected signature digest type. Impact is minor for most Tor roles, but potentially major for directory authorities. This is TROVE-2026-019.
-
CVE-2026-77641 Medium
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to a NULL write after free when sending a CONFLUX_SWITCH cell fails. The return value of relay_send_command_from_edge() was ignored, so a send failure (which calls circuit_mark_for_close() and removes the leg via cfx_del_leg()) would go undetected, causing the caller to write to the now-freed current leg and resulting in a crash. This is TROVE-2026-017.
-
CVE-2026-77641 Medium
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to a NULL write after free when sending a CONFLUX_SWITCH cell fails. The return value of relay_send_command_from_edge() was ignored, so a send failure (which calls circuit_mark_for_close() and removes the leg via cfx_del_leg()) would go undetected, causing the caller to write to the now-freed current leg and resulting in a crash. This is TROVE-2026-017.
-
CVE-2026-77641 Medium
tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to a NULL write after free when sending a CONFLUX_SWITCH cell fails. The return value of relay_send_command_from_edge() was ignored, so a send failure (which calls circuit_mark_for_close() and removes the leg via cfx_del_leg()) would go undetected, causing the caller to write to the now-freed current leg and resulting in a crash. This is TROVE-2026-017.
-
CVE-2026-77639 Medium
Tor before 0.4.9.9 was prone to a compression bomb bypass where an attacker could concatenate many gzip or zlib sub-streams, each just under the per-stream detection threshold, to avoid the compression bomb check entirely. This is TROVE-2026-022.
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CVE-2026-77584 High
Tor before 0.4.9.10 did not reject a CONFLUX_LINK cell that arrives on a circuit which already has attached streams. A malicious client could send a RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN before the CONFLUX_LINK on the same circuit, attaching an exit stream that would later end up orphan leaving a dangling circuit back-pointer and a use-after-free (UAF) when the circuit is freed. This is TROVE-2026-025.
About this page
This page gathers every public program listed under torproject.org: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.
Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.