- Top reward
- $10,000
- Top severity paid
- Critical
- Assets in scope
- 51
- Public CVEs
- 60
- Last change
At a glance
What to know before you start testing.
- Pays up to $10,000
- for critical bugs.
- Report on HackerOne
- Submit through the program page.
- Partial safe harbor
- Some legal protection; read the terms.
- Publish after a fix
- Coordinate the timing with the company.
Rewards
What HackerOne lists as the payout for each severity.
| Severity | Relative size | Reward |
|---|---|---|
| Critical |
|
$10,000 from $1,500 |
| High |
|
$3,000 from $750 |
| Medium |
|
$750 from $250 |
| Low |
|
$500 from $100 |
- Safe harbor
-
Partial
We have to mention however, that any actions done in bad faith might result in excluding malicious reporters from the program or, in case of disclosing Cloudflare or Cloudflare customers’ information (like PII, or other sensitive information) might even force us to take legal actions.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on HackerOne, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Scope
51 assets you may test, 33 excluded.
Web 5
- api.cloudflare.com Critical
- cloudflareworkers.com Critical
- dash.cloudflare.com Critical
- http://github.com/cloudflare Critical
- one.dash.cloudflare.com Critical
Wildcard domains 3
- *.cloudflare.com Critical
- *.cloudflarepartners.com Critical
- *.teams.cloudflare.com Critical
Source code 2
- https://github.com/cloudflare/vinext Critical
- https://github.com/cloudflare/workerd Critical
Products and areas 41
- 1.1.1.1 Resolver Critical
- AI Gateway Critical
- AMP Real URL Critical
- API Shield Critical
- Area 1 Critical
- Bot Management Critical
- Browser Isolation Critical
- CDNJS Critical
- China Network Critical
- Cloudflare Access Critical
- Cloudflare Analytics Critical
- Cloudflare Cache Critical
- Cloudflare CASB Critical
- Cloudflare D1 Critical
- Cloudflare DNS Critical
- Cloudflare Durable Objects Critical
- Cloudflare Pages Critical
- Cloudflare R2 Critical
- Cloudflare Tunnel Critical
- Cloudflare Workers CI Critical
- Cloudflare Zaraz Critical
- Cloudflare Zero Trust/Cloudflare One Critical
- Data Loss Prevention (DLP) Critical
- Gateway Critical
- Hyperdrive Critical
- Images Informational
- Load Balancing Critical
- Magic Firewall Critical
- Magic Transit Critical
- Magic WAN Critical
- Open source tools from Cloudflare Critical
- Spectrum Critical
- SSL/TLS Critical
- Stream Critical
- Vectorize Critical
- Waiting Room Critical
- WARP desktop client Critical
- WARP Mobile Apps Critical
- Workers Critical
- Workers AI Critical
- Workers KV Critical
Out of scope (33)
- 172.65.0.0/16
- Turnstile
- https://github.com/cloudflare/agentic-inbox
- https://github.com/cloudflare/boringtun
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cf
- https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflare-os
- https://github.com/cloudflare/computer
- https://github.com/cloudflare/moq-rs
- https://github.com/cloudflare/pp-browser-extension
- https://github.com/cloudflare/privacy-gateway-server-go
- https://github.com/cloudflare/realtimekit-web-examples
- https://github.com/cloudflare/recapn
- https://github.com/cloudflare/saffron.git
- https://github.com/cloudflare/security-audit-skill
- https://github.com/cloudflare/templates
- https://github.com/cloudflare/vibesdk
- https://github.com/cloudflare/vinext-private
- api.staging.realtime.cloudflare.com
- app.dyte.io
- community.cloudflare.com
- demo.realtime.cloudflare.com
- events.www.cloudflare.com
- examples.realtime.cloudflare.com
- files.plugins.realtime.cloudflare.com
- https://php-rce.cloudflare.app
- https://playground.ai.cloudflare.com
- https://vibecoder.cloudflare.dev
- react-examples.realtime.cloudflare.com
- support.cloudflare.com
- support.cloudflarewarp.com
- test.realtime.cloudflare.com
- waf.cumulusfire.net
- *.plugins.realtime.cloudflare.com
Rules
What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Cloudflare Public Bug Bounty (via HackerOne)'s policy. "We" in these lines means the program, not this site.
While testing
-
You must make a good faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data and interruption or degradation of Cloudflare’s services and products during your research.
-
All attacks must be executed against your own Cloudflare Account. You can sign up for a free Cloudflare account and use it for testing.
-
Do not perform tests against customers of Cloudflare.
-
Once you find a vulnerability, report it and reach out to us before you use the vulnerability to pivot across multiple in-scope assets.
-
Do not send unsolicited bulk messages (spam) or unauthorized messages.
-
Do not knowingly post, transmit, upload, link to, or send any program or script that might be considered malicious.
-
If your report is the product of collaboration, please add your collaborators _before the bounty_ is awarded.
-
Do not attempt to authenticate with leaked credentials.
-
Do not access non-public systems or data.
Not accepted
-
Reports that rely on validating leaked employee, customer, partner, or third-party credentials by attempting to log in.
-
Reposts, recycled dumps, credential stuffing datasets, or previously public leaked credentials.
-
Reports where the only impact is modification of the researcher's own fork, branch, pull request, or artifacts.
-
Reports that rely on malicious changes being merged after normal manual or automated review.
-
Reports where the claimed exploit requires social engineering maintainers, reviewers, employees, or contributors.
-
Reports where the only impact is that malicious project files execute code when a developer runs install, build, test, or init commands in the project.
-
Reports requiring a developer to clone and run commands in an untrusted repository without demonstrating impact beyond ordinary malicious-repository execution.
-
VS Code workspace trust bypass claims where the developer has explicitly trusted the workspace.
-
Attacks requiring physical access to a user's device.
-
Local denial-of-service against the attacker's own device or account.
-
Reports where the only affected asset is an example application intended to demonstrate functionality, not to provide production security guarantees.
Summarised with AI from the program policy on HackerOne, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original
Changes
Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.
-
Scope +
Added to scope: https://github.com/cloudflare/boringtun
Before we tracked it
Scope and reward changes recorded before this page started tracking it.
-
Scope added
https://vibecoder.cloudflare.dev/ (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/vibesdk (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://playground.ai.cloudflare.com/ (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/security-audit-skill (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/cf (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/agentic-inbox (out of scope)
-
Scope added
*.plugins.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/pp-browser-extension (out of scope)
-
Scope removed
https://github.com/cloudflare/wirefilter/ (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/templates (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflare-os (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/computer (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/recapn (out of scope)
-
Scope added
app.dyte.io (out of scope)
-
Scope added
files.plugins.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/realtimekit-web-examples (out of scope)
-
Scope added
test.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
examples.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
react-examples.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
api.staging.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
demo.realtime.cloudflare.com (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/saffron.git (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/moq-rs (out of scope)
-
Scope added
https://github.com/cloudflare/privacy-gateway-server-go (out of scope)
Public CVEs
Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.
| CVE | Summary | Severity | Published |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-12523 | Summary Cloudflare quiche's HTTP/3 layer was discovered to be vulnerable to resource exhaustion (i.e., memory) by means of specially crafted HTTP/3 frames. Impact HTTP/3 defines multiple frame types to support HTTP message exchanges and connection management. Each frame has a length and a payload whose length depends on the frame type. quiche was found to be vulnerable when parsing some frame type | High 7.5 | 14 Jul 2026 |
| CVE-2026-2836 | A cache poisoning vulnerability has been found in the Pingora HTTP proxy framework’s default cache key construction. The issue occurs because the default HTTP cache key implementation generates cache keys using only the URI path, excluding critical factors such as the host header (authority). Operators relying on the default are vulnerable to cache poisoning, and cross-origin responses may be impr | High 8.4 | 5 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-2835 | An HTTP Request Smuggling vulnerability (CWE-444) has been found in Pingora's parsing of HTTP/1.0 and Transfer-Encoding requests. The issue occurs due to improperly allowing HTTP/1.0 request bodies to be close-delimited and incorrect handling of multiple Transfer-Encoding values, allowing attackers to send HTTP/1.0 requests in a way that would desync Pingora’s request framing from backend servers’ | Critical 9.3 | 5 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-2833 | An HTTP request smuggling vulnerability (CWE-444) was found in Pingora's handling of HTTP/1.1 connection upgrades. The issue occurs when a Pingora proxy reads a request containing an Upgrade header, causing the proxy to pass through the rest of the bytes on the connection to a backend before the backend has accepted the upgrade. An attacker can thus directly forward a malicious payload after a req | Critical 9.3 | 5 Mar 2026 |
| CVE-2026-1229 | The CombinedMult function in the CIRCL ecc/p384 package (secp384r1 curve) produces an incorrect value for specific inputs. The issue is fixed by using complete addition formulas. ECDH and ECDSA signing relying on this curve are not affected. The bug was fixed in v1.6.3 https://github.com/cloudflare/circl/releases/tag/v1.6.3 . | Low 2.9 | 24 Feb 2026 |
| CVE-2026-0933 | SummaryA command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) has been found to exist in the `wrangler pages deploy` command. The issue occurs because the `--commit-hash` parameter is passed directly to a shell command without proper validation or sanitization, allowing an attacker with control of `--commit-hash` to execute arbitrary commands on the system running Wrangler. Root causeThe commitHash variable, | High 7.7 | 20 Jan 2026 |
| CVE-2025-13353 | In gokey versions <0.2.0, a flaw in the seed decryption logic resulted in passwords incorrectly being derived solely from the initial vector and the AES-GCM authentication tag of the key seed. This issue has been fixed in gokey version 0.2.0. This is a breaking change. The fix has invalidated any passwords/secrets that were derived from the seed file (using the -s option). Even if the input seed f | High 7.1 | 2 Dec 2025 |
| CVE-2025-7054 | Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to an infinite loop when sending packets containing RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames. QUIC connections possess a set of connection identifiers (IDs); see Section 5.1 of RFC 9000 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Once the QUIC handshake completes, a local endpoint is responsible for issuing and retiring Connection IDs that are u | High 8.7 | 7 Aug 2025 |
| CVE-2025-4821 | Impact Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to incorrect congestion window growth, which could cause it to send data at a rate faster than the path might actually support. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by first completing a handshake and initiating a congestion-controlled data transfer towards itself. Then, it could manipulate the victim's congestion | High 7.5 | 18 Jun 2025 |
| CVE-2025-4820 | Impact Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to incorrect congestion window growth, which could cause it to send data at a rate faster than the path might actually support. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by first completing a handshake and initiating a congestion-controlled data transfer towards itself. Then, it could manipulate the victim's congestion | Medium 5.3 | 18 Jun 2025 |
| CVE-2025-6087 | A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the @opennextjs/cloudflare package. The vulnerability stems from an unimplemented feature in the Cloudflare adapter for Open Next, which allowed unauthenticated users to proxy arbitrary remote content via the /_next/image endpoint. This issue allowed attackers to load remote resources from arbitrary hosts under the victim site’s | High 7.8 | 16 Jun 2025 |
| CVE-2025-4366 | A request smuggling vulnerability identified within Pingora’s proxying framework, pingora-proxy, allows malicious HTTP requests to be injected via manipulated request bodies on cache HITs, leading to unauthorized request execution and potential cache poisoning. Fixed in: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/fda3317ec822678564d641e7cf1c9b77ee3759ff https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/comm | High 7.4 | 22 May 2025 |
| CVE-2025-4144 | PKCE was implemented in the OAuth implementation in workers-oauth-provider that is part of MCP framework https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-mcp . However, it was found that an attacker could cause the check to be skipped. Fixed in: https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider/pull/27 https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider/pull/27 Impact: PKCE is a defense-in-depth mechanis | Medium 5.3 | 1 May 2025 |
| CVE-2025-4143 | The OAuth implementation in workers-oauth-provider that is part of MCP framework https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-mcp , did not correctly validate that redirect_uri was on the allowed list of redirect URIs for the given client registration. Fixed in: https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider/pull/26 https://github.com/cloudflare/workers-oauth-provider/pull/26 Impact: Under certain | Medium 6.0 | 1 May 2025 |
| CVE-2021-3978 | When copying files with rsync, octorpki uses the "-a" flag 0, which forces rsync to copy binaries with the suid bit set as root. Since the provided service definition defaults to root ( https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki/blob/master/package/octorpki.service ) this could allow for a vector, when combined with another vulnerability that causes octorpki to process a malicious TAL file, for a local | High 7.5 | 29 Jan 2025 |
| CVE-2025-0651 | Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in Cloudflare WARP on Windows allows File Manipulation. User with a low system privileges can create a set of symlinks inside the C:\ProgramData\Cloudflare\warp-diag-partials folder. After triggering the 'Reset all settings" option the WARP service will delete the files that the symlink was pointing to. Given the WARP service operates with System privile | Medium 6.1 | 22 Jan 2025 |
| CVE-2024-1765 | Cloudflare Quiche (through version 0.19.1/0.20.0) was affected by an unlimited resource allocation vulnerability causing rapid increase of memory usage of the system running quiche server or client. A remote attacker could take advantage of this vulnerability by repeatedly sending an unlimited number of 1-RTT CRYPTO frames after previously completing the QUIC handshake. Exploitation was possible f | Medium 5.9 | 12 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-1410 | Cloudflare quiche was discovered to be vulnerable to unbounded storage of information related to connection ID retirement, which could lead to excessive resource consumption. Each QUIC connection possesses a set of connection Identifiers (IDs); see RFC 9000 Section 5.1 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#section-5.1 . Endpoints declare the number of active connection IDs they are willing | Low 3.7 | 12 Mar 2024 |
| CVE-2024-0212 | The Cloudflare Wordpress plugin was found to be vulnerable to improper authentication. The vulnerability enables attackers with a lower privileged account to access data from the Cloudflare API. | High 8.1 | 29 Jan 2024 |
| CVE-2023-6992 | Cloudflare version of zlib library was found to be vulnerable to memory corruption issues affecting the deflation algorithm implementation (deflate.c). The issues resulted from improper input validation and heap-based buffer overflow. A local attacker could exploit the problem during compression using a crafted malicious file potentially leading to denial of service of the software. Patches: The i | Medium 4.0 | 4 Jan 2024 |
| CVE-2023-7079 | Sending specially crafted HTTP requests and inspector messages to Wrangler's dev server could result in any file on the user's computer being accessible over the local network. An attacker that could trick any user on the local network into opening a malicious website could also read any file. | Medium 6.4 | 29 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-7080 | The V8 inspector intentionally allows arbitrary code execution within the Workers sandbox for debugging. wrangler dev would previously start an inspector server listening on all network interfaces. This would allow an attacker on the local network to connect to the inspector and run arbitrary code. Additionally, the inspector server did not validate Origin/Host headers, granting an attacker that c | High 8.5 | 29 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-7078 | Sending specially crafted HTTP requests to Miniflare's server could result in arbitrary HTTP and WebSocket requests being sent from the server. If Miniflare was configured to listen on external network interfaces (as was the default in wrangler until 3.19.0), an attacker on the local network could access other local servers. | High 7.5 | 29 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-6193 | quiche v. 0.15.0 through 0.19.0 was discovered to be vulnerable to unbounded queuing of path validation messages, which could lead to excessive resource consumption. QUIC path validation (RFC 9000 Section 8.2) requires that the recipient of a PATH_CHALLENGE frame responds by sending a PATH_RESPONSE. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit the vulnerability by sending PATH_CHALLENGE frames a | Medium 5.3 | 12 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-6180 | The tokio-boring library in version 4.0.0 is affected by a memory leak issue that can lead to excessive resource consumption and potential DoS by resource exhaustion. The set_ex_data function used by the library did not deallocate memory used by pre-existing data in memory each time after completing a TLS connection causing the program to consume more resources with each new connection. | Medium 5.3 | 5 Dec 2023 |
| CVE-2023-3747 | Zero Trust Administrators have the ability to disallow end users from disabling WARP on their devices. Override codes can also be created by the Administrators to allow a device to temporarily be disconnected from WARP, however, due to lack of server side validation, an attacker with local access to the device, could extend the maximum allowed disconnected time of WARP client granted by an overrid | Medium 5.5 | 7 Sep 2023 |
| CVE-2023-0654 | Due to a misconfiguration, the WARP Mobile Client (< 6.29) for Android was susceptible to a tapjacking attack. In the event that an attacker built a malicious application and managed to install it on a victim's device, the attacker would be able to trick the user into believing that the app shown on the screen was the WARP client when in reality it was the attacker's app. | Low 3.9 | 29 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-0238 | Due to lack of a security policy, the WARP Mobile Client (<=6.29) for Android was susceptible to this vulnerability which allowed a malicious app installed on a victim's device to exploit a peculiarity in an Android function, wherein under certain conditions, the malicious app could dictate the task behaviour of the WARP app. | Low 3.9 | 29 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-4241 | lol-html can cause panics on certain HTML inputs. Anyone processing arbitrary 3rd party HTML with the library is affected. | High 7.5 | 16 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-3766 | A vulnerability was discovered in the odoh-rs rust crate that stems from faulty logic during the parsing of encrypted queries. This issue specifically occurs when processing encrypted query data received from remote clients and enables an attacker with knowledge of this vulnerability to craft and send specially designed encrypted queries to targeted ODOH servers running with odoh-rs. Upon successf | Medium 5.9 | 3 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-3348 | The Wrangler command line tool (<[email protected] or <[email protected]) was affected by a directory traversal vulnerability when running a local development server for Pages (wrangler pages dev command). This vulnerability enabled an attacker in the same network as the victim to connect to the local development server and access the victim's files present outside of the directory for the developmen | Medium 5.7 | 3 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-2754 | The Cloudflare WARP client for Windows assigns loopback IPv4 addresses for the DNS Servers, since WARP acts as local DNS server that performs DNS queries in a secure manner, however, if a user is connected to WARP over an IPv6-capable network, te WARP client did not assign loopback IPv6 addresses but Unique Local Addresses, which under certain conditions could point towards unknown devices in the | High 7.4 | 3 Aug 2023 |
| CVE-2023-1862 | Cloudflare WARP client for Windows (up to v2023.3.381.0) allowed a malicious actor to remotely access the warp-svc.exe binary due to an insufficient access control policy on an IPC Named Pipe. This would have enabled an attacker to trigger WARP connect and disconnect commands, as well as obtaining network diagnostics and application configuration from the target's device. It is important to note t | High 7.3 | 20 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-3040 | A debug function in the lua-resty-json package, up to commit id 3ef9492bd3a44d9e51301d6adc3cd1789c8f534a (merged in PR #14) contained an out of bounds access bug that could have allowed an attacker to launch a DoS if the function was used to parse untrusted input data. It is important to note that because this debug function was only used in tests and demos, it was not exploitable in a normal envi | Low 3.7 | 14 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-3036 | An unchecked read in NTP server in github.com/cloudflare/cfnts prior to commit 783490b https://github.com/cloudflare/cfnts/commit/783490b913f05e508a492cd7b02e3c4ec2297b71 enabled a remote attacker to trigger a panic by sending an NTSAuthenticator packet with extension length longer than the packet contents. | High 8.6 | 14 Jun 2023 |
| CVE-2023-2512 | Prior to version v1.20230419.0, the FormData API implementation was subject to an integer overflow. If a FormData instance contained more than 2^31 elements, the forEach() method could end up reading from the wrong location in memory while iterating over elements. This would most likely lead to a segmentation fault, but could theoretically allow arbitrary undefined behavior. In order for the bug t | Medium 6.5 | 12 May 2023 |
| CVE-2023-1732 | When sampling randomness for a shared secret, the implementation of Kyber and FrodoKEM, did not check whether crypto/rand.Read() returns an error. In rare deployment cases (error thrown by the Read() function), this could lead to a predictable shared secret. The tkn20 and blindrsa components did not check whether enough randomness was returned from the user provided randomness source. Typically th | Medium 5.3 | 10 May 2023 |
| CVE-2023-0652 | Due to a hardlink created in the ProgramData folder during the repair process of the software, the installer (MSI) of WARP Client for Windows (<= 2022.12.582.0) allowed a malicious attacker to forge the destination of the hardlink and escalate privileges, overwriting SYSTEM protected files. As Cloudflare WARP client for Windows (up to version 2022.5.309.0) allowed creation of mount points from its | High 7.0 | 6 Apr 2023 |
| CVE-2023-1412 | An unprivileged (non-admin) user can exploit an Improper Access Control vulnerability in the Cloudflare WARP Client for Windows (<= 2022.12.582.0) to perform privileged operations with SYSTEM context by working with a combination of opportunistic locks (oplock) and symbolic links (which can both be created by an unprivileged user). After installing the Cloudflare WARP Client (admin privileges requ | High 7.0 | 5 Apr 2023 |
| CVE-2023-1314 | A vulnerability has been discovered in cloudflared's installer (<= 2023.3.0) for Windows 32-bits devices that allows a local attacker with no administrative permissions to escalate their privileges on the affected device. This vulnerability exists because the MSI installer used by cloudflared relied on a world-writable directory. An attacker with local access to the device (without Administrator r | High 7.5 | 21 Mar 2023 |
| CVE-2022-4428 | support_uri parameter in the WARP client local settings file (mdm.xml) lacked proper validation which allowed for privilege escalation and launching an arbitrary executable on the local machine upon clicking on the "Send feedback" option. An attacker with access to the local file system could use a crafted XML config file pointing to a malicious file or set a local path to the executable using Clo | High 8.9 | 11 Jan 2023 |
| CVE-2022-4457 | Due to a misconfiguration in the manifest file of the WARP client for Android, it was possible to a perform a task hijacking attack. An attacker could create a malicious mobile application which could hijack legitimate app and steal potentially sensitive information when installed on the victim's device. | Medium 5.5 | 11 Jan 2023 |
| CVE-2014-125026 | LZ4 bindings use a deprecated C API that is vulnerable to memory corruption, which could lead to arbitrary code execution if called with untrusted user input. | Critical 9.8 | 27 Dec 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3512 | Using warp-cli command "add-trusted-ssid", a user was able to disconnect WARP client and bypass the "Lock WARP switch" feature resulting in Zero Trust policies not being enforced on an affected endpoint. | Medium 6.7 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3337 | It was possible for a user to delete a VPN profile from WARP mobile client on iOS platform despite the Lock WARP switch https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-devices/warp/warp-settings/#lock-warp-switch feature being enabled on Zero Trust Platform. This led to bypassing policies and restrictions enforced for enrolled devices by the Zero Trust platform. | Medium 6.7 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3322 | Lock Warp switch is a feature of Zero Trust platform which, when enabled, prevents users of enrolled devices from disabling WARP client. Due to insufficient policy verification by WARP iOS client, this feature could be bypassed by using the "Disable WARP" quick action. | Medium 6.7 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3321 | It was possible to bypass Lock WARP switch feature https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-devices/warp/warp-settings/#lock-warp-switch on the WARP iOS mobile client by enabling both "Disable for cellular networks" and "Disable for Wi-Fi networks" switches at once in the application settings. Such configuration caused the WARP client to disconnect and allowed the user | Medium 6.7 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3320 | It was possible to bypass policies configured for Zero Trust Secure Web Gateway by using warp-cli 'set-custom-endpoint' subcommand. Using this command with an unreachable endpoint caused the WARP Client to disconnect and allowed bypassing administrative restrictions on a Zero Trust enrolled endpoint. | Medium 6.7 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-3616 | Attackers can create long chains of CAs that would lead to OctoRPKI exceeding its max iterations parameter. In consequence it would cause the program to crash, preventing it from finishing the validation and leading to a denial of service. Credits to Donika Mirdita and Haya Shulman - Fraunhofer SIT, ATHENE, who discovered and reported this vulnerability. | Medium 5.4 | 28 Oct 2022 |
| CVE-2022-2529 | sflow decode package does not employ sufficient packet sanitisation which can lead to a denial of service attack. Attackers can craft malformed packets causing the process to consume large amounts of memory resulting in a denial of service. | High 7.5 | 30 Sep 2022 |
| CVE-2022-2225 | By using warp-cli subcommands (disable-ethernet, disable-wifi), it was possible for a user without admin privileges to bypass configured Zero Trust security policies (e.g. Secure Web Gateway policies) and features such as 'Lock WARP switch'. | High 8.1 | 26 Jul 2022 |
| CVE-2022-2145 | Cloudflare WARP client for Windows (up to v. 2022.5.309.0) allowed creation of mount points from its ProgramData folder. During installation of the WARP client, it was possible to escalate privileges and overwrite SYSTEM protected files. | Medium 5.8 | 28 Jun 2022 |
| CVE-2022-2147 | Cloudflare Warp for Windows from version 2022.2.95.0 contained an unquoted service path which enables arbitrary code execution leading to privilege escalation. The fix was released in version 2022.3.186.0. | Medium 6.5 | 23 Jun 2022 |
| CVE-2021-3907 | OctoRPKI does not escape a URI with a filename containing "..", this allows a repository to create a file, (ex. rsync://example.org/repo/../../etc/cron.daily/evil.roa), which would then be written to disk outside the base cache folder. This could allow for remote code execution on the host machine OctoRPKI is running on. | High 7.4 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3912 | OctoRPKI tries to load the entire contents of a repository in memory, and in the case of a GZIP bomb, unzip it in memory, making it possible to create a repository that makes OctoRPKI run out of memory (and thus crash). | Medium 4.2 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3911 | If the ROA that a repository returns contains too many bits for the IP address then OctoRPKI will crash. | Medium 4.2 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3910 | OctoRPKI crashes when encountering a repository that returns an invalid ROA (just an encoded NUL (\0) character). | Medium 4.4 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3909 | OctoRPKI does not limit the length of a connection, allowing for a slowloris DOS attack to take place which makes OctoRPKI wait forever. Specifically, the repository that OctoRPKI sends HTTP requests to will keep the connection open for a day before a response is returned, but does keep drip feeding new bytes to keep the connection alive. | Medium 4.4 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3908 | OctoRPKI does not limit the depth of a certificate chain, allowing for a CA to create children in an ad-hoc fashion, thereby making tree traversal never end. | Medium 5.9 | 11 Nov 2021 |
| CVE-2021-3761 | Any CA issuer in the RPKI can trick OctoRPKI prior to 1.3.0 into emitting an invalid VRP "MaxLength" value, causing RTR sessions to terminate. An attacker can use this to disable RPKI Origin Validation in a victim network (for example AS 13335 - Cloudflare) prior to launching a BGP hijack which during normal operations would be rejected as "RPKI invalid". Additionally, in certain deployments RTR s | High 7.5 | 9 Sep 2021 |
Original policy
Copied from hackerone.com on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.
Our Values
Cloudflare appreciates the work of security researchers and takes security, trust, and transparency seriously. This program was developed to make vulnerability reporting easier and to recognize the efforts of all people striving to help make the Internet a better place.
If you believe you have found a security vulnerability that could impact Cloudflare or our users, we encourage you to inform us right away. We will investigate all legitimate reports and do our best to quickly fix the problem.
What we expect from you
By participating in this program, you agree to the following program rules and guidelines in addition to HackerOne's Disclosure Guidelines. Failure to follow these rules will lead to disqualification from the Cloudflare Bug Bounty program.
Program Rules
- You must make a good faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data and interruption or degradation of Cloudflare’s services and products during your research.
- All attacks must be executed against your own Cloudflare Account. You can sign up for a free Cloudflare account and use it for testing.
- Accounts should be created with a
@wearehackerone.comemail address.
- Accounts should be created with a
- Do not perform tests against customers of Cloudflare.
- Once you find a vulnerability, report it and reach out to us before you use the vulnerability to pivot across multiple in-scope assets.
- Make sure that scanners have a narrow scope set that is limited to authorized Cloudflare IPs only. Aggressive, overly broad scans or those which include Cloudflare customer IPs without permission will be considered tests against Cloudflare customers.
- Do not send unsolicited bulk messages (spam) or unauthorized messages.
- Do not knowingly post, transmit, upload, link to, or send any program or script that might be considered malicious.
- If your report is the product of collaboration, please add your collaborators before the bounty is awarded.
Any of the activities below will result in disqualification from the program permanently:
- Testing against Cloudflare customers, partners, service providers, suppliers, or vendors
- Social engineering of Cloudflare employees/contractors, including but not limited to: pre-authenticated clickjacking, phishing, impersonating Cloudflare in emails or convincing customer support to do something on behalf of another user
- Physical attacks against Cloudflare employees/contractors, offices, or data centers
- Executing Denial of Service attacks against Cloudflare
- Publishing, blogging, presenting, or otherwise publicly disclosing a report or its details within 90 days of submission without prior written approval from Cloudflare. This includes social media posts, conference talks, blog articles, YouTube videos, and any other public channel. Researchers who wish to disclose should coordinate with us per the Disclosure section below.
Submitting a report
When submitting a report, we expect that researchers:
- Provide detailed reports with reproducible steps. If the report is not detailed enough to reproduce the issue, the issue will not be eligible for a reward.
- Provide a realistic attack scenario including prerequisites for an attack and expected gains after the exploitation. Reports without such a scenario, with unrealistic assumptions, or without meaningful outcomes will not be eligible for reward.
- Submit one vulnerability per report, unless you need to chain vulnerabilities in order to demonstrate impact.
- Avoid salami-style reporting of multiple reports. If you identify the same vulnerability on a subset of our products or multiple similar vulnerabilities on the same products, please submit one holistic report.
- Do not store any Cloudflare IP or PII information once the report is submitted.
Report Quality Requirements
Submitting high-quality reports is highly encouraged and will speed up the triage and award process. Reports that are low quality and unclear will be closed. Please address the following in your report:
- Affected asset: Exact product, domain, repository, file, commit, package version, or endpoint.
- Description of the problem: What the vulnerability is and how it works.
- Security boundary: What trust boundary is crossed and why the attacker should not have that access.
- Attacker model: Required privileges, prior access, approval status, account type, network position, and user interaction.
- Steps to reproduce or Proof of Concept: Clear, reproducible steps using only authorized accounts and assets.
- Impact: What data, actions, or secrets are accessed or modified.
- Default relevance: Whether the issue affects default or documented configuration, or requires unusual setup.
- Production relevance: Whether impact is shown in Cloudflare production, a supported product, or only a local, demo, or test environment.
- Safety: Confirmation that no testing was performed against Cloudflare customers, partners, vendors, employees, or third parties.
- Public knowledge: Whether knowledge of this issue is currently public.
Reports that do not clearly identify the affected asset, security boundary, attacker prerequisites, reproduction steps, and meaningful impact may be closed as Informational or Not Applicable. Cloudflare reserves the right to fix hardening issues without awarding a bounty when the report does not demonstrate a bounty-eligible security impact.
Proof of Concept Requirement
A working Proof of Concept is required for all bounty-eligible reports. No PoC, no bounty. Theoretical vulnerability descriptions, source-code-only analysis, static-analysis findings, or speculative attack narratives without a demonstrated reproduction are not eligible for bounty regardless of the claimed severity. "I can provide a PoC if needed" or "please confirm I am allowed to test" is not a PoC. The PoC must be included with the initial submission or provided promptly upon request. Reports submitted without a PoC may be closed without waiting for one to be produced.
Acceptable PoC formats include: curl commands, scripts (Python, Bash, JavaScript, etc.), step-by-step browser reproduction, video recordings with visible requests and responses, or any other format that allows independent reproduction. The PoC must use only the researcher's own accounts and authorized test assets.
PoC readability requirement: Proofs of concept must be human-readable and independently verifiable by a security engineer without requiring specialized tooling, deobfuscation, or reverse engineering of the PoC itself. Researchers are welcome to use AI tools to assist in composing their reports, but the PoC code must be clear, commented where non-obvious, and written so that a reviewer can read the script and understand what each step does before running it. Minified, obfuscated, or unnecessarily complex PoC scripts that obscure the attack logic will be sent back for clarification. A good PoC should be short enough to read in under five minutes and should clearly separate setup steps from the exploit trigger. When in doubt, prefer a simple curl command or a short self-contained script over a multi-file framework.
PoC environment tiers and their impact on severity:
Not all reproduction environments carry equal weight. The environment in which a vulnerability is demonstrated directly affects the severity assessment and bounty eligibility:
| Tier | Environment | Severity Impact | Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Production | Cloudflare-operated production services, live customer-facing endpoints, production APIs | Full severity per bounty table | api.cloudflare.com, dash.cloudflare.com, *.mcp.cloudflare.com, 1.1.1.1, production Workers on *.workers.dev serving real traffic |
| Staging / Internal | Cloudflare-operated staging, internal tooling, or pre-production environments | Full severity if data or access is real; reduced if test-only | *.staging.cloudflare.com, *.cfdata.org internal services, staging API endpoints |
| Researcher-deployed on Cloudflare | Researcher's own Worker, Durable Object, or Pages project deployed on Cloudflare's managed infrastructure | Eligible if it demonstrates a library or platform-level flaw; severity based on demonstrated cross-client or cross-session impact | Researcher's own Pages deployment triggering a framework bug |
| Local / standalone | Local Docker, standalone Node.js, wrangler dev, self-hosted environments with no Cloudflare runtime constraints |
Informational unless the same code path is shown to be reachable in production with equivalent impact | Docker container running OSS libraries with no memory limits, local workerd build, wrangler dev localhost |
| Source-code-only | Static analysis, code review, theoretical analysis without any running reproduction | Informational regardless of claimed severity | "This function doesn't validate input" without demonstrating reachability or impact |
Researchers are encouraged to demonstrate findings at the highest applicable tier. A PoC that demonstrates a valid code-level issue may be upgraded if the researcher subsequently provides a reproduction showing production-context impact (for example, cross-client degradation on a shared Durable Object).
Leaked Credentials, Passwords, and Tokens
Cloudflare appreciates reports of leaked credentials and secrets, but not all credential reports are bounty eligible.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Passwords, username/password combinations, session dumps, cookies, or credential material found on breach forums, paste sites, dark web marketplaces, stealer-log dumps, Telegram channels, Discord servers, or other third-party leak sources.
- Reports that rely on validating leaked employee, customer, partner, or third-party credentials by attempting to log in.
- Reports containing credentials for non-Cloudflare systems, customer systems, vendor systems, or partner systems, unless Cloudflare explicitly owns and operates the affected system.
- Reports that only show that a password or token-looking string exists, without demonstrating that it is a live Cloudflare-owned secret and without safe evidence of impact.
- Reposts, recycled dumps, credential stuffing datasets, or previously public leaked credentials.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Live Cloudflare-owned API tokens, service account keys, private keys, signing secrets, deploy tokens, GitHub tokens, package registry tokens, or production credentials accidentally committed to a public repository controlled by Cloudflare.
Rules for credential reports:
- Do not attempt to authenticate with leaked credentials.
- Do not access non-public systems or data.
- Submit the credential value, source URL, commit hash, file path, and safe evidence showing why the secret appears to be Cloudflare-owned.
- Cloudflare will validate the credential internally. Attempting to validate credentials yourself may make the report ineligible.
GitHub Actions, CI/CD, and Workflow Reports
Reports involving GitHub Actions, CI/CD pipelines, repository automation, or workflow tokens must demonstrate a direct security boundary bypass and reproducible impact without relying on maintainer approval or trusted human action.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Issues requiring a maintainer, employee, reviewer, or bot operator to approve a workflow run, label a PR, merge a PR, approve a deployment, approve a GitHub Actions run, or otherwise grant trust before exploitation.
- Issues requiring the researcher to first become a trusted contributor, prior contributor, collaborator, organization member, maintainer, or approved workflow runner, unless the report also demonstrates an independent vulnerability that grants that status.
- Reports where the only impact is modification of the researcher's own fork, branch, pull request, or artifacts.
- Reports where the only impact is comments, labels, check output, preview output, or bot messages on the researcher's own PR, unless a meaningful security impact beyond spam or content injection is demonstrated.
- Reports that rely on untrusted code execution in a low-privilege
pull_requestworkflow without showing that secrets, write tokens, protected branches, deployments, or Cloudflare-owned systems are reachable. - Reports that rely on malicious changes being merged after normal manual or automated review.
- Reports where the claimed exploit requires social engineering maintainers, reviewers, employees, or contributors.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Reproducible CI/CD issues that allow an external attacker, without maintainer approval, to execute code in a privileged workflow context with access to secrets or write-scoped tokens.
- Artifact poisoning, cache poisoning, workflow injection, or
pull_request_target/workflow_runissues that cross from untrusted PR input into a privileged context and expose secrets, allow protected-branch modification, publish packages, deploy services, or modify Cloudflare-owned production assets. - Issues allowing unauthorized modification of another user's PR branch or repository branch without required approval, if the modified branch is Cloudflare-controlled and the impact is more than cosmetic.
Severity guidance:
- Direct write access to protected branches, package publishing, deployment, or production secret exposure may qualify as High or Critical depending on impact.
Developer Tools, CLIs, Build Systems, and Project-Controlled Files
Developer tools often execute project-controlled code by design. Reports must show a new security boundary bypass beyond the normal risk of running tools in an untrusted project.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Command execution requiring attacker control of
package.json, lockfiles, build scripts, project configuration, npm scripts, package-manager hooks, local plugins, or repository files where the victim must run developer tooling inside that attacker-controlled project. - Reports where the only impact is that malicious project files execute code when a developer runs install, build, test, or init commands in the project.
- Reports requiring a developer to clone and run commands in an untrusted repository without demonstrating impact beyond ordinary malicious-repository execution.
- Dependency confusion or package hijacking claims without proof that Cloudflare-controlled automation, production systems, or developers install the malicious package from an attacker-controlled namespace.
- VS Code workspace trust bypass claims where the developer has explicitly trusted the workspace.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Developer-tool vulnerabilities that execute attacker code when processing untrusted input that is not expected to be executable project code, such as a file upload, remote template, package metadata, archive, or URL.
- Issues where Cloudflare automation automatically processes untrusted projects or templates in a privileged environment without normal developer trust decisions.
- Vulnerabilities in official Cloudflare tooling that can be exploited remotely or through standard product workflows without requiring the victim to run commands in an attacker-controlled repository.
- Debug port or inspector exposure that is exploitable from a malicious webpage via WebSocket (which is not subject to browser Same-Origin Policy for localhost connections) without requiring the developer to opt into network exposure.
Local Access, Physical Access, and Same-Machine Attacks
Local access significantly limits security impact and is often out of scope unless a strong privilege boundary is crossed.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Attacks requiring physical access to a user's device.
- Attacks requiring local authenticated access where no privilege escalation, cross-user data access, protected secret exposure, or meaningful product security boundary bypass is demonstrated.
- Issues where the attacker can already perform equivalent or greater actions with the required local access (for example, reading diagnostic logs that contain no sensitive data beyond what the attacker can already observe through standard OS tools).
- Local denial-of-service against the attacker's own device or account.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Local non-admin to admin/SYSTEM privilege escalation in Cloudflare software (for example, command injection via IPC from an unprivileged local user to a SYSTEM-privileged Cloudflare service).
- Cross-user information disclosure where a low-privileged local user can access another user's Cloudflare-managed secrets, credentials, or sensitive data despite OS access controls.
- Local issues that expose Cloudflare Zero Trust credentials, device posture secrets, private keys, session tokens, or other high-value secrets not otherwise accessible to the local attacker.
Special note on local privilege escalation reports:
Local privilege escalation (LPE) reports in Cloudflare client software (such as WARP, cloudflared, or other desktop/mobile agents) must meet a high evidence bar due to the inherent complexity of local attack surfaces:
- The PoC must demonstrate a complete, end-to-end privilege escalation from a non-administrative user to admin, SYSTEM, root, or equivalent, without relying on pre-existing elevated access for any step other than initial test-environment setup.
- The report must clearly separate setup steps (which may require elevation for test configuration) from exploitation steps (which must run as the unprivileged attacker).
- Reports claiming LPE through debug ports, named pipes, IPC, or service communication channels must demonstrate that the channel is reachable from the claimed unprivileged context and that the escalation is not gated behind authentication, authorization, or platform security controls that the PoC bypasses only through test-environment configuration.
- Cloudflare reserves the right to adjust severity based on production-environment constraints, platform-specific mitigations (such as endpoint protection, application allowlisting, or managed device policies), and real-world exploitability in enterprise deployment contexts.
Demo, Example, Test, Playground, and Proof-of-Concept Applications
Demo and example applications are not production services unless explicitly listed as in scope. Before submitting a report against a demo, example, or playground application, please check the project's README and any deployment documentation for disclaimers regarding its intended use, security posture, and production status.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Issues only affecting demos, examples, sample apps, playgrounds, tutorial code, test harnesses, local development servers, mock services, or proof-of-concept deployments.
- Issues reproduced only in
wrangler dev, localhost, test fixtures, mock services, or synthetic examples without showing impact against a Cloudflare production service or supported product configuration. - Reports where the only affected asset is an example application intended to demonstrate functionality, not to provide production security guarantees.
- XSS, injection, or authentication issues in example code that is not deployed as a Cloudflare-operated production service, even if the example is deployable via "Deploy to Workers" or similar one-click mechanisms.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Issues in demo or example code that are also present in the production Cloudflare stack or in a supported production product.
- Vulnerabilities in widely distributed Cloudflare libraries or templates where the insecure pattern is documented for production use and creates a real security boundary failure in consumer deployments.
Open Source Libraries, Frameworks, and Templates
Open source reports must demonstrate security impact in a supported or realistic deployment, not just isolated source-level behavior. Before submitting a report against a Cloudflare open-source repository, please review the project's README, security model documentation, and any stated disclaimers regarding usage, maturity, deployment context, and known limitations. Many repositories document their intended deployment model, security boundaries, and experimental status. Reports that conflict with documented design decisions, known limitations, or explicitly stated security assumptions may be closed without bounty.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Pure API incompatibilities, standards deviations, or missing hardening in open source projects without demonstrated security impact.
- Issues requiring a consumer application to misuse the library in an obviously unsafe way.
- Reports only affecting self-hosted or local deployments where Cloudflare production or documented production usage is not impacted.
- Reports against abandoned, experimental (version 0.x), internal-only, test-only, or demo-only code unless Cloudflare confirms production use.
- IETF interop endpoints, draft-protocol reference implementations, alpha/preview products, and endpoints operated solely for protocol testing or standards conformance are not treated as production Cloudflare services, even when hosted on Cloudflare-controlled domains (e.g.,
*.cloudflare.com,*.cfdata.org,*.mediaoverquic.com). Findings against these targets are Informational and not bounty eligible unless the report demonstrates impact against a supported Cloudflare product or production deployment with real users, SLA, or SLO commitments. - Correctness bugs (such as panic on attacker input, API contract violations, or boundary-check errors) that do not cross a security boundary, do not expose unauthorized data, and are isolated per request in Cloudflare's production architecture.
- Reports where the vulnerability is in the library code but production Cloudflare deployments have independent controls that prevent the vulnerable code path from being reached.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Vulnerabilities in Cloudflare-published packages, frameworks, or templates that create a default insecure behavior for documented production use.
- Tenant isolation failures, auth bypasses, secret exposure, or code execution in supported production deployment patterns.
- Issues that are reproducible in Cloudflare production, Cloudflare-hosted services, or official supported deployment flows.
- Issues in Cloudflare-maintained OSS that is documented for use in Cloudflare's own production infrastructure (such as JSRPC bindings, WAF components, or DNS resolver libraries), even if tested locally, provided the same code runs in production with no independent mitigating layer.
Proxy, Protocol, and Request Smuggling Reports
Reports involving HTTP request smuggling, protocol-level parsing differentials, or proxy behavior in Cloudflare's proxy infrastructure (Pingora, nginx, CDN edge) must demonstrate that the vulnerability is exploitable end-to-end through Cloudflare's stack, not only against a non-conformant upstream or downstream component.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Spec-compliance gaps or missing header normalization in Cloudflare proxy software where the actual security impact (such as request smuggling, response splitting, or cache poisoning) depends on the upstream or downstream server also having a parsing bug or non-conformant behavior. Cloudflare proxying a malformed header that a well-behaved upstream would reject is a hardening issue, not a smuggling vulnerability.
- Protocol-level findings that require the researcher to control both the client and the upstream server to demonstrate the differential. Request smuggling requires a disagreement between two real systems about message boundaries -- not a disagreement between the researcher's custom client and the researcher's custom server with Cloudflare in the middle.
- Reports where Cloudflare's proxy faithfully forwards headers or body content and the claimed vulnerability is that a non-conformant upstream misinterprets them. The upstream's parsing bug is outside Cloudflare's security boundary.
- Defense-in-depth observations about secondary protection mechanisms (such as connection pool poisoning guards or overread detection) that are only relevant if a primary vulnerability is already present.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Request smuggling where Cloudflare's own proxy disagrees with itself or with Cloudflare's own origin infrastructure about message boundaries, leading to cross-tenant request mixing, cache poisoning of Cloudflare-served content, or unauthorized access to Cloudflare-operated services.
- Protocol-level parsing differentials between Cloudflare's edge and Cloudflare's own upstream services that result in requests being routed, cached, or authenticated differently than intended.
- HTTP desynchronization attacks that are exploitable against standard, spec-compliant upstream servers (not only against intentionally misconfigured or non-conformant upstreams).
WAF, Bot, Rate Limiting, and Detection Bypass Reports
Reports must demonstrate a true Cloudflare-controlled detection or enforcement bypass, not only a payload that was not blocked by a specific rule configuration.
The Cloudflare WAF uses a layered detection approach:
- Managed Rules: signature-based detection for known attack patterns.
- WAF Attack Score: ML-based detection that catches mutations and variations not covered by signatures.
Covering all possible attack payload mutations through signature rules alone is not feasible. This is the intended purpose of the Attack Score layer. The recommended approach for comprehensive protection is to deploy a custom rule based on the WAF Attack Score alongside managed rules.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Generic WAF bypass payloads, scanner payloads, fuzzing output, or encoded attack strings without a demonstrated security impact against an in-scope Cloudflare-owned application.
- SQL injection, XSS, SSRF, command injection, path traversal, or other application-layer payloads that are not blocked by WAF but do not exploit an actual vulnerability in a Cloudflare-owned application.
- Reports showing that a single managed rule, custom rule, score threshold, sensitivity level, or customer configuration did not block a request.
- Reports where the WAF inspected the request and produced a score, log entry, match, or partial detection, but the customer's rule configuration allowed the request.
- Claims based only on TCP fragmentation, TLS record splitting, HTTP/2 framing, case changes, URL encoding, chunking, compression, or request smuggling terminology without proving that Cloudflare parsed the request differently from the origin in a way that bypasses all relevant inspection.
- Reports requiring an origin server, customer application, or test endpoint configured in an insecure, non-default, or intentionally vulnerable way.
- Reports against Cloudflare customer zones, customer origins, third-party applications, or researcher-owned vulnerable apps unless Cloudflare explicitly authorizes the target and the report demonstrates a Cloudflare product bypass.
- CAPTCHA/Turnstile automation, bot-score tuning disputes, rate-limit threshold disputes, or requests for new signatures or rules without a concrete bypass of an intended Cloudflare enforcement boundary.
- Null-byte injection claims in HTTP headers without packet-level evidence (pcap, tcpdump, or curl --trace) showing a literal 0x00 byte transmitted on the wire and browser-observable payload execution against the designated WAF testbed.
- Status-code differences (such as 403 vs 200) between different endpoints, different WAF configurations, or different request structures without demonstrating that semantically identical requests are treated differently by the same WAF policy.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- A reproducible parser differential where Cloudflare security products allow a request that the protected origin interprets as a materially different malicious request, and the bypass affects Cloudflare-owned infrastructure or a clearly in-scope test asset.
- A bypass of a documented Cloudflare-managed protection that should apply independent of customer rule tuning, such as a request class that is systematically invisible to WAF inspection.
- A WAF, rate-limit, or bot enforcement flaw allowing unauthorized access, account compromise, data exposure, or protected action execution on a Cloudflare-owned application.
- A default managed ruleset bypass with a concrete exploit against an in-scope Cloudflare-owned application where the same request should have been blocked according to the documented product behavior.
Required evidence for WAF reports:
- Exact target, zone, endpoint, request, response, Ray ID, timestamp, and account or zone ownership.
- Clear comparison between blocked and bypassing requests that are semantically equivalent at the origin (same payload location, same HTTP method, same protocol version).
- Evidence that Cloudflare security inspection did not occur or was materially bypassed, not merely that the configured action was log, skip, challenge, or allowed by score threshold.
- Demonstrated impact beyond "payload reached the origin," such as exploitation of an in-scope Cloudflare-owned vulnerability or unauthorized action.
- For claims involving raw bytes, null bytes, or protocol-level manipulation: packet capture (pcap, tcpdump, or curl --trace) showing the exact bytes on the wire. Filtered curl -v output or status-code differences alone are not sufficient evidence.
Theoretical, Configuration-Dependent, and Missing-Impact Reports
Reports must demonstrate a realistic attack path and meaningful impact.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Reports without a working PoC or reproducible steps.
- Reports that only show source-code behavior without demonstrating exploitability or a realistic affected deployment.
- Reports requiring insecure, non-default, uncommon, or intentionally vulnerable customer configuration.
- Reports where the attacker must control all relevant preconditions, including both attacker and victim services, open redirects, Worker code, callbacks, or downstream systems.
- Reports that describe best-practice improvements, hardening, missing validation, or defense-in-depth changes without a concrete security impact.
- Reports with only scanner output, static analysis warnings, dependency warnings, or framework warnings without exploitability.
- Reports that present theoretical attack narratives using Cloudflare terminology without empirical evidence (such as fabricated packet captures, fictional API endpoints, invented tool names, or speculative root-cause analyses that are not supported by observable behavior).
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Reports with a clear, reproducible attack path against an in-scope asset.
- Reports showing that a default or documented Cloudflare configuration leads to unauthorized access, data exposure, privilege escalation, account takeover, protected action execution, or meaningful tenant isolation failure.
AI Agent, MCP, and Prompt Injection Reports
Reports involving AI agents, MCP (Model Context Protocol) servers, AI-powered automation, or LLM-based tools must demonstrate a concrete security impact beyond normal AI tool behavior.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Reports where the only demonstrated impact is that an MCP tool returns data that the authenticated user already has access to through a different API path (for example, path traversal within the same user's authorized API scope).
- Prompt injection claims where the "attacker" is the authenticated user injecting into their own session.
- Reports claiming that AI agent tools return data without "provenance markers" or "trust signals" as a vulnerability class. AI tools returning data from their configured data sources is expected behavior, not a security boundary violation.
- Reports against AI Playground, demo, or testing tools where the security model is intentionally simplified for experimentation.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Cross-user data exposure through AI agent infrastructure (for example, one user's session credentials or data accessible to another user through an AI-mediated channel).
- MCP consent screen or OAuth flow vulnerabilities that enable XSS, credential theft, or authorization bypass against production Cloudflare MCP servers.
- AI agent configuration injection that enables secret exfiltration or unauthorized actions in production deployments (not demo or playground environments).
Memory Safety and Denial-of-Service in Cloudflare Runtimes
Reports involving memory corruption, panics, crashes, or resource exhaustion in Cloudflare runtimes (workerd, lol-html, quiche, etc.) are evaluated based on exploitability and production impact.
Not eligible for bounty:
- Panics or crashes that are isolated per request in production, result in a clean restart, and do not expose data or enable code execution.
- Resource exhaustion claims where the processing cost is linearly proportional to the input size with no amplification (for example, "sending 10MB causes 10MB of memory usage").
- Memory corruption bugs that are only reproducible in local or self-hosted environments where Cloudflare production has independent controls that prevent the vulnerable code path from being reached.
- API contract violations or correctness bugs (such as ArrayBufferView boundary errors) that do not cross a security boundary and where the affected data remains within the same allocation already accessible to the caller.
Potentially eligible for bounty:
- Memory corruption enabling cross-tenant data exposure or code execution outside the V8 sandbox.
- Denial-of-service where a small attacker-controlled input causes disproportionate resource consumption (super-linear amplification) or a deterministic crash that is reachable through Cloudflare production without independent mitigating controls.
- Memory safety issues in Cloudflare runtimes that affect all tenants sharing a process, where the crash is reachable through standard Worker primitives (such as fetch, streams, or HTTP decompression) without requiring product-specific bindings.
workerd (Open Source) vs. Cloudflare Workers (Production Service)
workerd is Cloudflare's open-source JavaScript/WebAssembly runtime. Cloudflare Workers is the production service that runs workerd inside Cloudflare's infrastructure with additional layers of isolation, resource enforcement, and operational controls provided by the edgeworker supervisor, process sandboxing, and fleet-wide monitoring.
The security boundaries differ between the two:
- workerd alone (as run locally or self-hosted): the V8 isolate sandbox is the primary security boundary. Bugs that escape V8 or corrupt memory outside the isolate are security-relevant at this layer.
- Cloudflare Workers in production: workerd runs inside additional containment (process-level sandboxing, per-request resource limits, supervisor-enforced CPU and memory caps, network policy enforcement). Some bugs that are exploitable in standalone workerd may be independently mitigated by these production layers.
Production reachability is required, production exploitation is not.
Researchers must demonstrate that the vulnerable code path is reachable through standard Cloudflare Workers APIs and primitives (such as fetch, Web Streams, crypto, HTMLRewriter, WebSocket, or JSRPC) under default production configuration. However, researchers must not attempt to exploit the vulnerability against Cloudflare's production Workers infrastructure, other tenants, or customer workloads. Reproduce locally against your own workerd instance and explain why the same code path is reachable in production. We will validate production reachability internally.
For workerd's security model and the boundaries it is designed to enforce, see workerd's security documentation.
Exploit primitives and novel research are valued.
Cloudflare recognizes that some of the most impactful security research involves discovering exploit primitives -- building blocks that advance the state of the art in attacking a runtime, even before a full end-to-end chain is demonstrated.
Reports that identify novel exploit primitives, new attack surface in the runtime, or techniques that meaningfully reduce the cost of future exploitation are eligible for bounty at severity levels reflecting the primitive's power and production reachability, even without a fully weaponized end-to-end chain. We encourage researchers to explain the primitive's significance and how it could compose with other techniques.
Severity calibration for workerd reports:
- Critical: Reliable V8 sandbox escape, cross-tenant code execution, or cross-tenant data read in production-reachable code paths.
- High: Memory corruption outside V8 (heap UAF, OOB write) reachable through core Worker primitives (fetch, streams, crypto) with demonstrated control over corrupted data, even without a full exploitation chain.
- Medium: Deterministic process crash (SIGSEGV, abort) reachable through core Worker primitives that affects all co-located tenants. Memory corruption with limited attacker control or reachable only through product-specific bindings (Queues, KV, D1).
- Low: Crashes or resource exhaustion reachable only through narrow or product-specific APIs, or where production resource limits independently bound the impact. DoS with linear cost proportional to input.
- Informational: Correctness bugs without security boundary crossing. Resource consumption proportional to input where production controls (CPU time limits, memory caps, body size limits) prevent meaningful impact. Bugs reproducible only in standalone workerd where production has independent mitigating layers.
Any vulnerability that only affects a standalone or self-hosted build of workerd (for example, behavior that requires a non-production build configuration and is not reachable on Cloudflare's production Workers platform) will be treated as Informational. Reports must demonstrate impact on production Workers to be eligible for a bounty. Contributions may still be submitted as a Pull Request to the open-source repository.
Billing, Subscription, and Plan Enforcement Cap
Reports involving billing bypass, subscription bypass, plan enforcement gaps, access to premium features from a free account, or race conditions in billing or subscription flows are capped at Low severity and $250 maximum payout, unless Cloudflare determines that the report demonstrates a broader security boundary bypass beyond billing or feature-entitlement impact.
What you can expect from us
Handling of reports
Cloudflare will make best effort to handle reports within the following time frame. Note that all times are in business days.
| First Response | Triage | Bounty | Resolution |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10 days | 10 days (from first response) | 10 days (from triage) | Depends on severity and complexity |
Rewards
When duplicates occur, we award only the first report that was received, provided that it can be fully reproduced. If multiple vulnerabilities are caused by one underlying issue, we reserve the right to award only one bounty. All reward decisions are at the sole discretion of Cloudflare.
Cloudflare continuously invests in internal security research, including automated vulnerability discovery using frontier AI models. Findings identified internally before an external submission are treated as duplicates. Researchers may encounter cases where a valid vulnerability they discovered independently was already identified by Cloudflare's internal security programs. In such cases, the report will be closed as Informational (already known) regardless of severity. We appreciate the independent validation and encourage researchers to continue submitting as many critical findings are first reported through the bug bounty program.
Mergers and acquisitions
We encourage and appreciate researchers who report vulnerabilities in new Cloudflare products coming through mergers and acquisitions. However, findings are eligible for rewards at Cloudflare's sole discretion.
Big Bonanza
We're excited to announce an exclusive opportunity for our top-tier talent! Researchers who demonstrate excellence by submitting 2 valid critical severity reports or 4 valid high severity reports can request entry into our prestigious Cloudflare VIP Program.
As a member of the VIP program, you’ll unlock:
✨ Access to enterprise features! ✨ Exclusive access to test our cutting-edge Beta products ✨ Opportunity to participate in special bug bounty campaigns ✨ Higher bounty payouts and more!
Join our VIP program and take your bug hunting to the next level!
Disclosure
Cloudflare strongly supports coordinated disclosure. Our pledge to you, a vulnerability reporter, is to respond promptly and to fix the vulnerability in the sensible timeframe and in exchange we ask you to coordinate the disclosure with us.
Cloudflare aims to resolve all the vulnerabilities within the 90 days and we ask you not to disclose the information before that time. If we won’t be able to uphold that commitment on our end, we will let you know (but the decision if you would like to publish after the 90 days will be yours).
For some of the submissions we might decide not to treat it as vulnerability or not to issue a bounty. Still, we would like you to coordinate the disclosure with us so we are prepared for it.
Often we decide on the payout before the vulnerability is fixed so the reward is not a payment for your silence. Still, we really want to have a chance to fix the vulnerability before it can be used by a malicious actor. For this reason we ask you to let us know about any plans you might have regarding plans to present your findings in any way (like blog posts, articles, conference presentations etc.)
At the end of the day the decision on what to disclose and when to disclose it is yours and we would like to support you so feel free to share any drafts of your presentation or article before the publishing so we can even provide some feedback or share it with internal teams.
We have to mention however, that any actions done in bad faith might result in excluding malicious reporters from the program or, in case of disclosing Cloudflare or Cloudflare customers’ information (like PII, or other sensitive information) might even force us to take legal actions.
Privacy Policy, Restrictions and Taxes
Cloudflare maintains both a privacy policy and transparency report. As mentioned in our Privacy Policy, Cloudflare's website and services are not intended for, or designed to attract individuals under the age of 18. Due to the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), we cannot accept submissions from children under the age of 13. Reporters under the age of 18 will not be eligible to receive Cloudflare service rewards.
This program is not open to any individual on, or anyone residing in any country on, any U.S. sanctions lists. Cloudflare employees and their family members are not eligible for bounties.
The decision to pay a reward is entirely at our discretion. You must not violate any law. You are responsible for any tax implications or additional restrictions depending on your country and local law. We reserve the right to cancel this program at any time.
Mediation
Cloudflare encourages hackers to Request Mediation directly on the reports when they feel the program does not honor commitments made on the policy page. Please provide as much context and reasoning for requesting mediation. Please refer to https://docs.hackerone.com/en/articles/8466617-hacker-mediation for when and how to request mediation from HackerOne.
If you still feel dissatisfied or do not receive a response within 30-60 days, depending on the severity of your report, please escalate to the internal Cloudflare team via [email protected].
This address is only for querying or escalating a report that already exists on HackerOne. It is not an intake channel for new vulnerabilities. New findings sent to [email protected] will not be triaged and must be filed through HackerOne as described in the Submitting a Report section.