Wrangler

Skip to content What this pays sorona.xyz pays 1.25× the program's reward, up to +$1,000 per finding, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for especially complex or well-chained bugs. Finding │ Program pays │ Through sorona.xyz Critical (Tier 2 open-source row, not the $10,000 production tier) │ $3,500 │ $4,375 High │ $1,500 │ $1,875 Medium │ $750 │ $938 Low │ $250 │ $313 Submit a vulnerability CVE history 1 Last 12 months 4 Lifetime Info disclosure 35 % Code execution 25 % Access control 25 % Injection 10 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Wrangler is the only supported way to ship code to Cloudflare Workers, which makes it a permanent fixture on developer laptops and inside CI pipelines for a very large number of Workers, Pages and D1 deployments. Its security profile is the deployment-CLI profile in its purest form: it holds a Cloudflare API token in a local config directory and it holds the authority to publish code that then serves production traffic on Cloudflare's network, so a credential-handling or bundling bug here converts local access into remote publish rights. Cloudflare pays it on the Tier 2 open-source row of its public HackerOne program, $250 at Low up to $3,500 for a Critical, and sorona.xyz adds 1.25x on top of whatever Cloudflare awards, up to $1,000 more, plus a complexity bonus of up to $1,000 for a well-chained finding. Response times 10 business days First response 10 business days after first response Triage 10 business days after triage Bounty In scope Cloudflare declares its open-source scope org-wide: any Cloudflare-published project under github.com/cloudflare is bounty-eligible on the Tier 2 open-source row, capped at $3,500 for a Critical. cloudflare/workers-sdk , the repository that ships Wrangler, sits under that asset and is actively maintained, so it clears the archived and experimental carve-out. The policy adds a section for open-source libraries asking that impact be shown in a supported or realistic deployment The wrangler deploy publish pipeline: what code, configuration, bindings and secrets the CLI actually uploads, and which credentials it uploads them with OAuth device-flow login and API-token storage in the local config directory, including any path by which another local process or a hostile project reads a token Configuration handling: wrangler.toml and wrangler.jsonc parsing, environment selection, and how an account and a project get resolved Bundling of untrusted project source through the esbuild integration, and everything the build step runs on the developer's machine wrangler dev and the local runtime bridge, including the inspector and dev-server endpoints it opens and the remote-development tunnel Secret management commands and the bindings that expose those secrets to a deployed Worker The resource commands that reach the Cloudflare API on the developer's behalf, covering KV, R2, D1, queues, Pages and wrangler tail log streaming The other packages published from the same monorepo, including Miniflare, the create-cloudflare scaffolder and the Vite plugin, all of which run on a developer machine holding the same credentials Out of scope The workerd runtime itself, which is its own separately named scope asset and is reported against that scope rather than this one Pure API incompatibilities, standards deviations, or missing hardening in open source projects without demonstrated security impact Reports only affecting self-hosted or local deployments where Cloudflare production or documented production usage is not impacted Issues requiring a consumer application to misuse the library in an obviously unsafe way Denial of service against Cloudflare Source-code-only analysis with no runnable reproduction, which is closed Informational regardless of how the severity reads on paper Archived, demo-only and experimental repositories under the Cloudflare org, which the policy treats as Informational Severity cap to plan around: the open-source row tops out at $3,500 for a Critical, and the Tier 1 band reaching $10,000 covers production Cloudflare infrastructure as discretionary uplift Most-valued findings Exfiltration of the stored Cloudflare API token or OAuth credentials by a local attacker or a hostile project directory, which converts developer access into publish rights over production Workers A path by which wrangler deploy uploads code, bindings or secrets other than the ones the developer intended, including confusion between environments or accounts Code execution during bundling triggered by attacker-influenced project source or wrangler.toml content, the shape a poisoned dependency or cloned repo would take Secrets leaking through command output, logs, or a binding exposed to a Worker that should not have been able to read them Unauthenticated access to the wrangler dev inspector or local bridge from another process or another host on the network Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz first. We validate, coordinate with the program's security team, and add the payout uplift on top of whatever it awards. A credible runnable reproduction is required; a report that only reasons about the source is generally closed Informational Archived, demo-only and experimental repositories under the Cloudflare org are generally Informational, so confirm the code you are attacking is actively maintained The workerd runtime is a separately named scope asset on a higher reward row, so runtime escapes belong in that report, not this one Show impact in a supported or realistic deployment, not just isolated source-level behaviour, which is the policy's own standard for open-source reports Uplift into the Tier 1 band that reaches $10,000 is possible but entirely discretionary, and should never be assumed as this project's ceiling Program stats 376 Reports resolved $568k Bounties paid 77% Response efficiency Disclosure Coordinated with Cloudflare, on a bounded clock rather than an open-ended one: nothing may be published for 90 days from submission without prior written approval, and the policy then hands the decision back to you. sorona.xyz files the report and holds it until that window closes or Cloudflare approves publication earlier. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability