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LXD

By Canonical Bug bounty on Sorona canonical.com

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
14
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

14 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://canonical.com/lxd

Products and areas 13

  • Authentication and authorisation: TLS client certificates, OIDC, the trust store and the fine-grained permission model
  • Backup, export and restore, including archive creation, the helpers invoked and extraction
  • Image handling: import, unpacking, templates and the contents of any supplied image
  • Instance configuration for containers and virtual machines, covering devices, profiles and disk attachments
  • LXD takes reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/lxd, handled by the Ubuntu Security Team under Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy. That policy governs process and credit rather than declaring a component boundary, so the whole product below is in scope
  • Migration and clustering, where one cluster member trusts another and accepts state from it
  • Networking: managed bridges, OVN integration, forwards and the firewall rules generated on the host
  • Projects and the restriction model separating one project's instances, networks and storage from another's
  • Storage drivers and volume handling in full, including attach, detach, custom volumes and snapshots
  • The exec, file transfer and console paths, where the daemon acts on a path inside a running instance
  • The guest-facing DevLXD endpoint an instance can reach from inside itself
  • The lxc command-line client and the snap packaging that ships the daemon
  • The LXD daemon and its REST API in full, over both the local UNIX socket and the network listener
Out of scope (5)
  • Escapes from privileged containers, which the container runtime beneath LXD does not treat as root-safe
  • Findings that only reproduce on Incus, which is a separate project with separate reporting
  • LXC and LXCFS defects below LXD, handled by the Linux Containers project under its own security page
  • Operator configuration that deliberately removes isolation, such as running an instance privileged or exposing the network listener to an untrusted network
  • Ubuntu kernel and QEMU defects rather than LXD's handling of them

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/lxd, the channel SECURITY.md names, backed by the Ubuntu Security Team
  • Credit runs through the CVE assignment and the Ubuntu Security Notice, with real names used by default. Say up front if you want a handle or no credit
  • If the finding reproduces on Incus as well, note it, because that side reports separately to the Linux Containers project
  • Say whether the target was a container or a virtual machine, and whether the container was privileged.
  • State how the daemon was reached: the local UNIX socket, the network listener and DevLXD from inside an instance are three different trust levels
  • Give the snap channel and revision as well as the version string.

Not accepted

  • Escapes from privileged containers, which the container runtime beneath LXD does not treat as root-safe
  • LXC and LXCFS defects below LXD
  • Ubuntu kernel and QEMU defects rather than LXD's handling of them
  • Findings that only reproduce on Incus
  • Operator configuration that deliberately removes isolation

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-66897 Critical 9.9 24 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-66898 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13476 High 7.3 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-16033 High 8.5 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13367 High 7.8 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63297 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63298 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63299 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63300 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-62420 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63293 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63294 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63295 Medium 4.3 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63296 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-28385 Medium 5.0 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-9639 Medium 6.5 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-9640 High 7.2 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-12411 High 8.4 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-47337 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47330 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47331 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47332 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47333 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47334 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47335 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47336 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47328 Medium 6.1 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47329 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47326 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47327 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-49237 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-49238 High 8.4 28 May 2026
CVE-2018-25306 Medium 6.9 29 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-31431 High 7.8 22 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-6369 Medium 5.7 20 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5412 Critical 9.9 10 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5774 Medium 6.0 10 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-15480 Low 2.7 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-14551 Low 2.7 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34177 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34178 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34179 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-68152 Medium 6.9 3 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-68153 High 7.1 3 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-4370 Critical 10.0 1 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-32694 Medium 6.6 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32692 High 7.6 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32693 High 8.8 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32691 Medium 5.3 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3888 High 7.8 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3497 Medium 6.9 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-28384 Critical 9.4 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3351 Low 2.1 3 Mar 2026
CVE-2025-5467 Low 1.9 10 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-6966 Medium 6.9 5 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-33208 High 8.8 3 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-7044 High 7.7 3 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-54293 High 7.1 2 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-54292 Medium 4.8 2 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-54291 Medium 6.9 2 Oct 2025

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 26 Last 12 months Authorization / restriction bypass 35 % Arbitrary file read/write 25 % Cross-guest access 25 % Command injection 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview LXD is Canonical's system container and virtual machine manager, continuing under Canonical after the Incus fork. It ships in the Ubuntu Server toolchain and is the container substrate beneath MAAS and Juju estates. Twenty-six advisories landed in the last twelve months, most shared with Incus through the common codebase heritage and some specific to this side, including CVE-2026-12411, a cross-guest volume hijack through a DevLXD device patch. Canonical states in its published disclosure policy that it is not affiliated with any bug bounty programme and does not pay for bug reports in its software. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope LXD takes reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/lxd, handled by the Ubuntu Security Team under Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy. That policy governs process and credit rather than declaring a component boundary, so the whole product below is in scope The LXD daemon and its REST API in full, over both the local UNIX socket and the network listener Authentication and authorisation: TLS client certificates, OIDC, the trust store and the fine-grained permission model Projects and the restriction model separating one project's instances, networks and storage from another's Image handling: import, unpacking, templates and the contents of any supplied image Instance configuration for containers and virtual machines, covering devices, profiles and disk attachments The guest-facing DevLXD endpoint an instance can reach from inside itself Storage drivers and volume handling in full, including attach, detach, custom volumes and snapshots Backup, export and restore, including archive creation, the helpers invoked and extraction Migration and clustering, where one cluster member trusts another and accepts state from it Networking: managed bridges, OVN integration, forwards and the firewall rules generated on the host The exec, file transfer and console paths, where the daemon acts on a path inside a running instance The lxc command-line client and the snap packaging that ships the daemon Out of scope Escapes from privileged containers, which the container runtime beneath LXD does not treat as root-safe LXC and LXCFS defects below LXD, handled by the Linux Containers project under its own security page Ubuntu kernel and QEMU defects rather than LXD's handling of them Findings that only reproduce on Incus, which is a separate project with separate reporting Operator configuration that deliberately removes isolation, such as running an instance privileged or exposing the network listener to an untrusted network Most-valued findings Cross-guest reach through the device and volume model. CVE-2026-12411 hijacked another guest's volume through a DevLXD device patch, and on a shared host that is the shape that matters most Project restriction bypass leading to command execution, the class CVE-2026-48751 landed in as a critical Arbitrary host file read or write driven from an instance or a supplied image, the family LXD shares with Incus through the common codebase Argument injection into host-side helpers invoked for backup, compression or storage operations Anything reachable over DevLXD, since that endpoint is guest-facing by design and has already produced a cross-guest compromise Unprivileged container escape, the boundary this stack does treat as real Authorisation defects on the network listener, where a client certificate or token reaches operations outside its granted entitlements Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/lxd, the channel SECURITY.md names, backed by the Ubuntu Security Team Handling follows Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy, which also states plainly that Canonical does not pay for bug reports Credit runs through the CVE assignment and the Ubuntu Security Notice, with real names used by default. Say up front if you want a handle or no credit LXD is Canonical's fork. If the finding reproduces on Incus as well, note it, because that side reports separately to the Linux Containers project Say whether the target was a container or a virtual machine, and whether the container was privileged. The privileged container boundary is not treated as root-safe by the runtime beneath State how the daemon was reached: the local UNIX socket, the network listener and DevLXD from inside an instance are three different trust levels Give the snap channel and revision as well as the version string. LXD ships primarily as a snap and the revision matters for reproduction Disclosure Coordinated by the Ubuntu Security Team through the GitHub private advisory workflow, with an OpenPGP key and a published embargo policy behind it. Publication lands as a GitHub Security Advisory on canonical/lxd with a CVE assigned, and as an Ubuntu Security Notice where a shipped package is affected. The 2026 record shows advisories publishing in batches alongside Incus, so plan for a coordinated release date rather than a fixed day count. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability