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Multipass

By Canonical Bug bounty on Sorona canonical.com

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 5 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://canonical.com/multipass

Products and areas 12

  • cloud-init handling and the instance configuration passed into a guest at launch
  • Host mounts: the mapping of host directories into a guest and the path handling on both sides of that mapping
  • Image download, signature verification and caching, including everything parsed out of a fetched image
  • Multipass takes reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/multipass, handled under Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy. That policy governs process and credit rather than declaring a component boundary, so the daemon, the client and every guest-facing service are in
  • Networking setup, including bridge creation and any privileged host network change the daemon performs
  • The alias and shell integration features, which run guest commands from a host context
  • The built-in SFTP server and every file transfer and mount path it serves
  • The gRPC interface between the client and the daemon, including its authentication and its authorisation checks
  • The installer and the update path on each of the three platforms
  • The local settings store and any state the daemon reads from a location a less privileged user can write
  • The multipassd daemon, which runs with elevated privilege on all three host platforms
  • The virtual machine backends: QEMU on Linux, the Hyper-V and VirtualBox backends on Windows, and the macOS backend
Out of scope (5)
  • Canonical's published cloud images rather than the code that fetches and verifies them
  • Host platform hardening decisions, such as a developer disabling their own operating system's protections
  • QEMU, Hyper-V or VirtualBox defects rather than Multipass's configuration and use of them
  • Snap or installer packaging issues outside the Multipass codebase
  • Ubuntu guest operating system defects rather than Multipass

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/multipass, the channel the project names
  • Handling follows Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy, the same one that states Canonical does not pay for bug reports
  • Name the host platform. multipassd runs privileged on Windows, macOS and Linux with a different privilege model on each, and the Windows and macOS sides see far less independent research
  • Name the VM backend too. QEMU on Linux, Hyper-V and VirtualBox on Windows and the macOS backend are separate code paths
  • For an escape, state exactly which channel carried it: a host mount, the SFTP transfer path, an alias invocation or the guest console
  • Credit runs through the CVE assignment and the Ubuntu Security Notice with real names by default. Say up front if you want a handle or no credit
  • Give the version and the installation method, since the snap, the Windows installer and the macOS package differ in how the daemon is privileged

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-66897 Critical 9.9 24 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-66898 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13476 High 7.3 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-16033 High 8.5 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-13367 High 7.8 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63297 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63298 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63299 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63300 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-62420 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63293 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63294 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63295 Medium 4.3 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-63296 Critical 9.9 12 Aug 2026
CVE-2026-28385 Medium 5.0 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-9639 Medium 6.5 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-9640 High 7.2 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-12411 High 8.4 26 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-47337 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47330 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47331 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47332 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47333 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47334 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47335 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47336 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47328 Medium 6.1 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47329 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47326 Medium 5.5 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-47327 Low 3.3 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-49237 High 7.8 28 May 2026
CVE-2026-49238 High 8.4 28 May 2026
CVE-2018-25306 Medium 6.9 29 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-31431 High 7.8 22 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-6369 Medium 5.7 20 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5412 Critical 9.9 10 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5774 Medium 6.0 10 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-15480 Low 2.7 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-14551 Low 2.7 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34177 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34178 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-34179 Critical 9.1 9 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-68152 Medium 6.9 3 Apr 2026
CVE-2025-68153 High 7.1 3 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-4370 Critical 10.0 1 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-32694 Medium 6.6 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32692 High 7.6 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32693 High 8.8 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-32691 Medium 5.3 18 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3888 High 7.8 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3497 Medium 6.9 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-28384 Critical 9.4 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3351 Low 2.1 3 Mar 2026
CVE-2025-5467 Low 1.9 10 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-6966 Medium 6.9 5 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-33208 High 8.8 3 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-7044 High 7.7 3 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-54293 High 7.1 2 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-54292 Medium 4.8 2 Oct 2025
CVE-2025-54291 Medium 6.9 2 Oct 2025

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months Guest-to-host escape 40 % Path traversal 25 % Command injection 20 % Local privilege escalation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Multipass is Canonical's tool for running Ubuntu virtual machines on a developer's laptop, bundled through Canonical's developer tooling and installed on a very large number of Windows, macOS and Linux workstations. The host it runs on is a developer machine full of credentials and source code. CVE-2026-49238 is the reference point: a VM escape out of the built-in SFTP server through pipe injection and path traversal, breaking exactly the boundary a developer assumes is there. Canonical states in its published disclosure policy that it does not pay for bug reports in its software or its infrastructure. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope Multipass takes reports through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/multipass, handled under Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy. That policy governs process and credit rather than declaring a component boundary, so the daemon, the client and every guest-facing service are in The multipassd daemon, which runs with elevated privilege on all three host platforms The gRPC interface between the client and the daemon, including its authentication and its authorisation checks The built-in SFTP server and every file transfer and mount path it serves Host mounts: the mapping of host directories into a guest and the path handling on both sides of that mapping The virtual machine backends: QEMU on Linux, the Hyper-V and VirtualBox backends on Windows, and the macOS backend Image download, signature verification and caching, including everything parsed out of a fetched image cloud-init handling and the instance configuration passed into a guest at launch Networking setup, including bridge creation and any privileged host network change the daemon performs The alias and shell integration features, which run guest commands from a host context The installer and the update path on each of the three platforms The local settings store and any state the daemon reads from a location a less privileged user can write Out of scope Ubuntu guest operating system defects rather than Multipass QEMU, Hyper-V or VirtualBox defects rather than Multipass's configuration and use of them Host platform hardening decisions, such as a developer disabling their own operating system's protections Snap or installer packaging issues outside the Multipass codebase Canonical's published cloud images rather than the code that fetches and verifies them Most-valued findings Guest-to-host escape, ahead of everything else. CVE-2026-49238 got there through the SFTP server using pipe injection and path traversal, and on this product the host is a developer's own machine Path traversal in any mount or file transfer path, since mounting host directories into a guest is the normal workflow rather than an edge case Command or argument injection into anything the daemon executes on the host, given that the daemon holds elevated privilege on every platform Local privilege escalation on the host from an unprivileged user through the daemon's gRPC interface Image verification bypass, where a modified or substituted image is accepted and booted cloud-init and instance configuration handling that turns guest-side data into a host-side action Windows and macOS specific privilege defects, since the daemon's privilege model differs per platform and those two receive markedly less scrutiny than Linux Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report through GitHub private vulnerability reporting on canonical/multipass, the channel the project names Handling follows Canonical's published disclosure and embargo policy, the same one that states Canonical does not pay for bug reports Name the host platform. multipassd runs privileged on Windows, macOS and Linux with a different privilege model on each, and the Windows and macOS sides see far less independent research Name the VM backend too. QEMU on Linux, Hyper-V and VirtualBox on Windows and the macOS backend are separate code paths For an escape, state exactly which channel carried it: a host mount, the SFTP transfer path, an alias invocation or the guest console Credit runs through the CVE assignment and the Ubuntu Security Notice with real names by default. Say up front if you want a handle or no credit Give the version and the installation method, since the snap, the Windows installer and the macOS package differ in how the daemon is privileged Disclosure Coordinated by the Ubuntu Security Team through the GitHub private advisory workflow under Canonical's published embargo policy, published as a GitHub Security Advisory on canonical/multipass with a CVE assigned. Fixes reach users through the platform-specific installers and the snap, so the practical embargo runs to the coordinated release across all three host platforms rather than to a fixed day count. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability