Skip to content

sorona.xyz bug bounty programs

gnome.org Updated

Sorona.xyz runs 5 public programs on Sorona and its own site; 4 pay cash, the most up to $1,500 (libsoup).

Top reward
$1,500
Sorona
Programs
5
4 pay cash
Targets in scope
48
3 types, deduplicated
Last change
None yet
Tracked since Nov 2026

Where to report

5 programs, side by side. Report where the affected target is in scope; when two programs cover it, pick the one that pays more.

Start here

libsoup

Sorona · Pays the most of the 5 programs: up to $1,500.

Amounts are the top reward per severity in the currency each program pays. Green marks the highest per severity. First response is the platform's measured average when it publishes one, else what the policy promises.

What is in scope

48 targets across all 5 programs, each listed once with the programs that cover it. 23 excluded.

  • gitlab.gnome.org

    Domains

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • gnome.org

    Domains

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdm

    Web

    Covered by GDM

  • https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell

    Web

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2

    Web

    Covered by libxml2

  • https://libsoup.gnome.org

    Web

    Covered by libsoup

  • Authentication negotiation across Basic, Digest, NTLM and Negotiate, including how a challenge from an untrusted origin is parsed

    Products and areas

    Covered by libsoup

  • Automatic login and timed login handling, including the window between boot and an authenticated session

    Products and areas

    Covered by GDM

  • Canonical XML (c14n) serialization and the HTML parser (htmlParse) code paths

    Products and areas

    Covered by libxml2

  • Clipboard, primary selection and drag-and-drop as the compositor arbitrates them between clients

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Configuration file parsing, custom.conf handling and the session and language selection data read from user-writable locations

    Products and areas

    Covered by GDM

  • Content-Encoding and chunked transfer decoding, historically the richest source of length-confusion and overflow bugs in any HTTP stack

    Products and areas

    Covered by libsoup

  • Cookie jar handling and same-site logic, which decides what credentials leave the machine and for whom

    Products and areas

    Covered by libsoup

  • Defects reachable through the xmllint command-line front end

    Products and areas

    Covered by libxml2

  • Document parsing of untrusted XML through the xmlReadFile, xmlReadMemory, xmlReadDoc, and xmlParseFile family and related APIs

    Products and areas

    Covered by libxml2

  • DTD handling and entity processing, covering internal and external entities and entity-reference expansion, plus DTD validation

    Products and areas

    Covered by libxml2

  • GNOME project

    Products and areas

    Covered by Self-hosted

  • GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so both trees below are inside it and nothing narrower is carved out

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so the whole GDM tree below is inside it and nothing narrower is carved out

    Products and areas

    Covered by GDM

  • GNOME's SECURITY.md takes a libsoup security issue as a confidential issue on GNOME GitLab, and Google's Tier 2 row covers the whole library rather than the client half only. Everything below is inside that

    Products and areas

    Covered by libsoup

  • HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 request and response parsing in full, the surface a hostile server reaches the moment a page loads

    Products and areas

    Covered by libsoup

  • Input handling end to end through Clutter and libinput: keyboard grabs, pointer and touch routing, keybinding dispatch and the special-key path that reaches the shell before any application

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Monitor configuration, output handling and the display-management interfaces

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Mutter as a Wayland compositor: protocol object lifetimes, surface and subsurface handling, buffer management and every Wayland protocol extension it implements

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Mutter as an X11 window manager and its Xwayland integration, covering window property handling, selections, override-redirect windows and the X client boundary

    Products and areas

    Covered by GNOME Shell + Mutter

No target matches. Try part of a host name, such as the company name.

Out of scope 23

Don't test these. A program can exclude a host another program covers; the program you report to decides.

  • An administrator's configuration decision, such as enabling automatic login or displaying the user list, where GDM behaves as documented

    GDM

  • Application-level misuse of the libsoup API rather than a defect in the library

    libsoup

  • Attacks that require the attacker to already be running code as the logged-in user, unless the finding crosses out of that user's boundary

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Attacks that require the attacker to already have a shell as the target user

    GDM

  • Bugs already public in the issue tracker or already fixed in a newer release

    libxml2

  • Bugs that actually live in GnuTLS or glib-networking and are merely reached through libsoup

    libsoup

  • Crashes reachable only through deliberately unsafe or non-default build options

    libxml2

  • Denial of service that requires an already-privileged local attacker

    libsoup

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific GDM patches rather than upstream GDM

    GDM

  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than upstream gnome-shell or mutter

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Feature requests reframed as security issues, or purely theoretical claims with no reproducer or realistic attack path

    libxml2

  • Findings in third-party bindings, packagers, or downstream forks rather than upstream libxml2

    libxml2

  • GDM's own greeter process and PAM handling, which is a separate project with its own entry

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • GNOME Shell's own code, including the greeter session it provides. That belongs to the gnome-shell and mutter trees

    GDM

  • GTK, GLib, gdk-pixbuf, pango and other libraries beneath the shell; some of those ship in ChromeOS and are paid there

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Missing compiler hardening, best-practice suggestions, or static-analyzer noise with no demonstrated impact

    libxml2

  • PAM modules themselves and the underlying pam library, which are separate upstreams

    GDM

  • Patches outside the one-to-twelve-month age window the program requires

    libsoup

  • Reports that reduce to feeding untrusted data to a library its own README warns is not built to process it, absent a distinct memory-safety or logic flaw

    libxml2

  • systemd-logind, accountsservice and polkit as projects, though GDM's use of them is in scope

    GDM

  • Third-party GNOME Shell extensions, which are not part of either tree. An extension that grants itself privilege is that extension's defect

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

  • Vulnerability reports with no merged patch behind them, which earn nothing on Google's rail

    libsoup

  • Xwayland internals, which share the xserver repository with the X.Org Server and are reachable through the ChromeOS VRP as x11-base/xwayland

    GNOME Shell + Mutter

Recent changes

Reward and scope changes across every sorona.xyz program, newest first.

No changes recorded yet. New targets and reward moves show up here and in the RSS feed.

Recent CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in sorona.xyz products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When constructing a masked WebSocket client frame for a very large outgoing payload, size values passed to GByteArray allocation APIs could be truncated while the masking routine still used the full length, causing a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow.

  • A flaw was found in libsoup. When the permessage-deflate WebSocket extension compresses a very large outgoing message, truncated size calculations used for GByteArray growth could wrap, causing zlib to write past the allocated buffer and resulting in a heap buffer overflow.

About this page

This page gathers every public program listed under gnome.org: platform programs, self-hosted policies and security.txt contacts. Each program's own policy decides what is in scope and what it pays; check it before you test.

Something wrong or missing? Report a correction.