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GDM

By sorona.xyz Bug bounty on Sorona gnome.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
14
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Replies within 2 days
As the policy promises.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Response
Within 2 days The published process acknowledges within two business days and assigns CVEs through Red Hat Product Security.
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

14 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdm

Products and areas 13

  • Automatic login and timed login handling, including the window between boot and an authenticated session
  • Configuration file parsing, custom.conf handling and the session and language selection data read from user-writable locations
  • GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so the whole GDM tree below is inside it and nothing narrower is carved out
  • PAM integration and the authentication conversation, including how a result from a PAM module is interpreted and what happens on partial or repeated failure
  • Smartcard, fingerprint and other alternative authentication paths GDM wires into PAM
  • The D-Bus interfaces GDM exposes on the system bus and what an unprivileged local client can reach through them
  • The GDM daemon itself, which runs as root and supervises every graphical session on the machine
  • The greeter path in full: how the login screen is launched, what it is allowed to do before authentication and what it inherits from the daemon
  • The switch-user and user-switching flow, where two sessions exist at once and one of them is locked
  • The unlock path after a session is locked, and the handoff between the session's own lock and GDM's
  • The X11 and Wayland session setup GDM performs, including display server launch, authority file handling and the environment handed to the new session
  • User and seat handling through logind and accountsservice, covering the user list shown on the greeter, session registration and multi-seat configurations
  • Xauth cookie generation and file handling, and anything else GDM writes on a path a local user can influence
Out of scope (6)
  • An administrator's configuration decision, such as enabling automatic login or displaying the user list, where GDM behaves as documented
  • Attacks that require the attacker to already have a shell as the target user
  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific GDM patches rather than upstream GDM
  • GNOME Shell's own code, including the greeter session it provides. That belongs to the gnome-shell and mutter trees
  • PAM modules themselves and the underlying pam library, which are separate upstreams
  • systemd-logind, accountsservice and polkit as projects, though GDM's use of them is in scope

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • File through the report form at security.gnome.org. It opens a confidential issue on gitlab.gnome.org routed to the security team, and it is the documented private channel
  • Do not open an ordinary GitLab issue. A normal issue on gitlab.gnome.org is world-readable the moment it is filed
  • GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on the GNOME mirrors, so the advisory button there is not a route into this process
  • State whether the defect is in GDM itself or in the GNOME Shell greeter session GDM launches. The greeter is a separate tree and the fix lands in a different place
  • Record the distribution and its GDM configuration. Automatic login, user list display and the smartcard and fingerprint options are all distribution choices that change what the greeter exposes
  • For anything on the unlock path, include the exact input sequence and timing. This class reproduces reliably or it does not reproduce at all

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-102559 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102560 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102555 High 8.2 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102558 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102557 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102556 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-66337 Medium 6.5 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-66338 Medium 5.4 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-66339 Medium 6.5 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-12548 Medium 4.2 21 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-58014 High 7.3 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58015 Medium 5.9 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58016 High 7.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58010 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58011 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58012 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58013 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-13601 High 7.1 29 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-12549 Medium 4.8 22 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1766 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1767 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1764 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-2708 Low 3.7 23 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5201 High 7.5 31 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-5119 Medium 5.9 30 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2436 Medium 6.5 26 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2369 Medium 6.5 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-4271 Medium 5.3 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3633 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3634 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3632 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3099 Medium 5.8 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2443 Medium 5.3 13 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-1801 Medium 5.3 3 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-1536 Medium 5.8 28 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-1539 Medium 5.8 28 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-1467 Medium 5.8 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-14512 Medium 6.5 11 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-14087 Medium 5.6 10 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-13601 High 7.7 26 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-4056 High 7.5 28 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-6196 Medium 5.5 17 Jun 2025
CVE-2025-6199 Low 3.3 17 Jun 2025
CVE-2025-6052 Low 3.7 13 Jun 2025
CVE-2023-5616 Medium 4.9 15 Apr 2025
CVE-2025-3155 High 7.4 3 Apr 2025
CVE-2025-2784 High 7.0 3 Apr 2025
CVE-2022-1736 Critical 9.8 31 Jan 2025
CVE-2023-43091 Critical 9.8 17 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52533 Critical 9.8 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52530 High 7.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52531 Medium 6.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52532 High 7.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-42415 High 8.4 3 Oct 2024
CVE-2024-36474 High 8.4 3 Oct 2024
CVE-2024-34397 Medium 5.2 7 May 2024
CVE-2020-36774 Medium 5.5 19 Feb 2024
CVE-2022-48622 High 7.8 26 Jan 2024
CVE-2023-5557 High 7.5 13 Oct 2023
CVE-2023-43090 Medium 5.5 22 Sep 2023

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview GDM is the GNOME Display Manager, the login and lock screen shipped by default on Fedora, RHEL, Debian and Ubuntu's GNOME sessions. It runs as root at the console before anyone has authenticated, and it owns the unlock path afterwards. That makes it one of the shortest routes from standing at a keyboard to a root shell, and pre-authentication code on the greeter is the whole reason a small codebase earns attention. GNOME's bug bounty is defunct and GDM was never covered by it in the first place, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so the whole GDM tree below is inside it and nothing narrower is carved out The GDM daemon itself, which runs as root and supervises every graphical session on the machine The greeter path in full: how the login screen is launched, what it is allowed to do before authentication and what it inherits from the daemon PAM integration and the authentication conversation, including how a result from a PAM module is interpreted and what happens on partial or repeated failure The unlock path after a session is locked, and the handoff between the session's own lock and GDM's User and seat handling through logind and accountsservice, covering the user list shown on the greeter, session registration and multi-seat configurations The switch-user and user-switching flow, where two sessions exist at once and one of them is locked Automatic login and timed login handling, including the window between boot and an authenticated session Smartcard, fingerprint and other alternative authentication paths GDM wires into PAM The X11 and Wayland session setup GDM performs, including display server launch, authority file handling and the environment handed to the new session Xauth cookie generation and file handling, and anything else GDM writes on a path a local user can influence The D-Bus interfaces GDM exposes on the system bus and what an unprivileged local client can reach through them Configuration file parsing, custom.conf handling and the session and language selection data read from user-writable locations Out of scope GNOME Shell's own code, including the greeter session it provides. That belongs to the gnome-shell and mutter trees PAM modules themselves and the underlying pam library, which are separate upstreams systemd-logind, accountsservice and polkit as projects, though GDM's use of them is in scope An administrator's configuration decision, such as enabling automatic login or displaying the user list, where GDM behaves as documented Attacks that require the attacker to already have a shell as the target user Distribution packaging and distro-specific GDM patches rather than upstream GDM Most-valued findings Anything that reaches code execution from the greeter before authentication. GDM is root at the console, so this is the highest-severity shape available here Lock-screen and unlock defects that let someone at the keyboard reach a live session on a machine the owner locked Authentication logic that treats a failed, cancelled or partial PAM conversation as success, or that lets a second attempt inherit state from the first Switch-user and multi-seat handling where a locked session becomes reachable from a second seat or from the greeter Privilege escalation from the greeter user to root, since the greeter deliberately runs unprivileged while the daemon above it does not File handling on paths a local user controls: Xauth cookies, session files, temporary directories and anything GDM writes as root into a shared location Session environment handling where a variable or descriptor from the greeter survives into the authenticated session System D-Bus methods an unprivileged local client can invoke to affect another user's session Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. File through the report form at security.gnome.org. It opens a confidential issue on gitlab.gnome.org routed to the security team, and it is the documented private channel Do not open an ordinary GitLab issue. A normal issue on gitlab.gnome.org is world-readable the moment it is filed GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on the GNOME mirrors, so the advisory button there is not a route into this process State whether the defect is in GDM itself or in the GNOME Shell greeter session GDM launches. The greeter is a separate tree and the fix lands in a different place Record the distribution and its GDM configuration. Automatic login, user list display and the smartcard and fingerprint options are all distribution choices that change what the greeter exposes For anything on the unlock path, include the exact input sequence and timing. This class reproduces reliably or it does not reproduce at all There is no money at any stage. The GNOME bounty that once ran on YesWeHack is gone, and its scope only ever covered GLib and libsoup Disclosure Report through the security.gnome.org form, which opens a confidential issue visible to a small security team on gitlab.gnome.org. The published process acknowledges within two business days and assigns CVEs through Red Hat Product Security. Confidentiality runs until a fix is committed to the git repository or ninety days pass, whichever comes first. Enterprise distributions carry GDM for years, so the practical exposure window after a fix is long and the backport matters as much as the upstream commit. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability