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GNOME Shell + Mutter

By sorona.xyz Bug bounty on Sorona gnome.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Replies within 2 days
As the policy promises.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Response
Within 2 days The published process acknowledges within two business days and assigns CVEs through Red Hat Product Security.
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell

Products and areas 12

  • Clipboard, primary selection and drag-and-drop as the compositor arbitrates them between clients
  • GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so both trees below are inside it and nothing narrower is carved out
  • Input handling end to end through Clutter and libinput: keyboard grabs, pointer and touch routing, keybinding dispatch and the special-key path that reaches the shell before any application
  • Monitor configuration, output handling and the display-management interfaces
  • Mutter as an X11 window manager and its Xwayland integration, covering window property handling, selections, override-redirect windows and the X client boundary
  • Mutter as a Wayland compositor: protocol object lifetimes, surface and subsurface handling, buffer management and every Wayland protocol extension it implements
  • Screen capture, screencast and remote-desktop interfaces, including the portal-facing surface and what an application is allowed to record
  • The D-Bus interfaces both projects expose on the session bus and what an unprivileged client can drive through them
  • The GNOME Shell JavaScript layer and the GJS boundary, including the extension API, extension installation and the privileges an installed extension inherits
  • The lock screen and screen shield in full: the unlock dialogue, the authentication prompt, the notification and media controls exposed while locked, and every transition into and out of the locked state
  • The search provider mechanism, the notification path and the on-screen keyboard, all of which render content from other applications
  • The session and login handling GNOME Shell performs, including the greeter mode it runs in for GDM and the switch-user path
Out of scope (6)
  • Attacks that require the attacker to already be running code as the logged-in user, unless the finding crosses out of that user's boundary
  • Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than upstream gnome-shell or mutter
  • GDM's own greeter process and PAM handling, which is a separate project with its own entry
  • GTK, GLib, gdk-pixbuf, pango and other libraries beneath the shell; some of those ship in ChromeOS and are paid there
  • Third-party GNOME Shell extensions, which are not part of either tree. An extension that grants itself privilege is that extension's defect
  • Xwayland internals, which share the xserver repository with the X.Org Server and are reachable through the ChromeOS VRP as x11-base/xwayland

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • File through the report form at security.gnome.org. It opens a confidential issue on gitlab.gnome.org routed to the security team, and it is the documented private channel
  • Do not open an ordinary GitLab issue. A normal issue on gitlab.gnome.org is world-readable the moment it is filed
  • GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on the GNOME mirrors, so the advisory button there is not a route into this process
  • Say which repository the defect lives in. gnome-shell and mutter are separate trees and a lock-screen finding frequently crosses both
  • State the session type. Wayland and X11 take genuinely different paths through Mutter and a bug in one often does not exist in the other
  • For a lock-screen finding, record the exact timing and input sequence. This class is reproducible but order-sensitive, and a report the triager cannot repeat goes nowhere

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-102559 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102560 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102555 High 8.2 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102558 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102557 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-102556 High 8.6 29 Sep 2026
CVE-2026-66337 Medium 6.5 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-66338 Medium 5.4 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-66339 Medium 6.5 24 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-12548 Medium 4.2 21 Jul 2026
CVE-2026-58014 High 7.3 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58015 Medium 5.9 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58016 High 7.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58010 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58011 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58012 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-58013 Medium 6.5 30 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-13601 High 7.1 29 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-12549 Medium 4.8 22 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1766 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1767 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-1764 Medium 5.6 16 Jun 2026
CVE-2026-2708 Low 3.7 23 Apr 2026
CVE-2026-5201 High 7.5 31 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-5119 Medium 5.9 30 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2436 Medium 6.5 26 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2369 Medium 6.5 19 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-4271 Medium 5.3 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3633 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3634 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3632 Low 3.9 17 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-3099 Medium 5.8 12 Mar 2026
CVE-2026-2443 Medium 5.3 13 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-1801 Medium 5.3 3 Feb 2026
CVE-2026-1536 Medium 5.8 28 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-1539 Medium 5.8 28 Jan 2026
CVE-2026-1467 Medium 5.8 27 Jan 2026
CVE-2025-14512 Medium 6.5 11 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-14087 Medium 5.6 10 Dec 2025
CVE-2025-13601 High 7.7 26 Nov 2025
CVE-2025-4056 High 7.5 28 Jul 2025
CVE-2025-6196 Medium 5.5 17 Jun 2025
CVE-2025-6199 Low 3.3 17 Jun 2025
CVE-2025-6052 Low 3.7 13 Jun 2025
CVE-2023-5616 Medium 4.9 15 Apr 2025
CVE-2025-3155 High 7.4 3 Apr 2025
CVE-2025-2784 High 7.0 3 Apr 2025
CVE-2022-1736 Critical 9.8 31 Jan 2025
CVE-2023-43091 Critical 9.8 17 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52533 Critical 9.8 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52530 High 7.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52531 Medium 6.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-52532 High 7.5 11 Nov 2024
CVE-2024-42415 High 8.4 3 Oct 2024
CVE-2024-36474 High 8.4 3 Oct 2024
CVE-2024-34397 Medium 5.2 7 May 2024
CVE-2020-36774 Medium 5.5 19 Feb 2024
CVE-2022-48622 High 7.8 26 Jan 2024
CVE-2023-5557 High 7.5 13 Oct 2023
CVE-2023-43090 Medium 5.5 22 Sep 2023

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview GNOME Shell is the desktop shell on the Ubuntu, Fedora, RHEL and Debian defaults, and Mutter is the compositor beneath it, acting as the Wayland compositor and the X11 window manager at once. Between them they own the lock screen, the input path and every pixel on the display. The class worth naming is lock-screen bypass: a way to reach a live session on a machine the owner believed was locked, and GNOME Shell has produced more than one. It costs almost nothing to demonstrate and earns nothing to report, because GNOME's bug bounty is defunct and this part of the stack was never inside it. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope GNOME's security process publishes no component scope list. It takes a private report on any GNOME project through a single form, so both trees below are inside it and nothing narrower is carved out The lock screen and screen shield in full: the unlock dialogue, the authentication prompt, the notification and media controls exposed while locked, and every transition into and out of the locked state The session and login handling GNOME Shell performs, including the greeter mode it runs in for GDM and the switch-user path Mutter as a Wayland compositor: protocol object lifetimes, surface and subsurface handling, buffer management and every Wayland protocol extension it implements Mutter as an X11 window manager and its Xwayland integration, covering window property handling, selections, override-redirect windows and the X client boundary Input handling end to end through Clutter and libinput: keyboard grabs, pointer and touch routing, keybinding dispatch and the special-key path that reaches the shell before any application Screen capture, screencast and remote-desktop interfaces, including the portal-facing surface and what an application is allowed to record Clipboard, primary selection and drag-and-drop as the compositor arbitrates them between clients The GNOME Shell JavaScript layer and the GJS boundary, including the extension API, extension installation and the privileges an installed extension inherits The D-Bus interfaces both projects expose on the session bus and what an unprivileged client can drive through them The search provider mechanism, the notification path and the on-screen keyboard, all of which render content from other applications Monitor configuration, output handling and the display-management interfaces Out of scope GDM's own greeter process and PAM handling, which is a separate project with its own entry GTK, GLib, gdk-pixbuf, pango and other libraries beneath the shell; some of those ship in ChromeOS and are paid there Xwayland internals, which share the xserver repository with the X.Org Server and are reachable through the ChromeOS VRP as x11-base/xwayland Third-party GNOME Shell extensions, which are not part of either tree. An extension that grants itself privilege is that extension's defect Attacks that require the attacker to already be running code as the logged-in user, unless the finding crosses out of that user's boundary Distribution packaging and distro-specific patches rather than upstream gnome-shell or mutter Most-valued findings Lock-screen bypass in any form: reaching the live session, reading its content or driving input into it from a locked machine. This is the flagship class here and GNOME Shell has a history of it Anything reachable from the greeter, where GNOME Shell runs before a user has authenticated at all Input routing defects that deliver keystrokes to the wrong client, defeat a keyboard grab or let one client capture another client's input on a Wayland session where the compositor is the only thing enforcing that separation Screen capture or screencast paths that let an application record the display without the user granting it, since the compositor is the enforcement point for that permission Clipboard and selection handling that leaks one client's data to another, particularly across the locked and unlocked boundary Wayland protocol handling defects in Mutter that a hostile client can drive: object lifetime confusion, buffer handling and use-after-free in surface management Extension API and GJS boundary flaws that let ordinary web-delivered content or an unprivileged process reach shell-privileged JavaScript Session D-Bus interfaces that accept an action from a client that should not be allowed to request it, especially anything touching session locking, unlocking or logout Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. File through the report form at security.gnome.org. It opens a confidential issue on gitlab.gnome.org routed to the security team, and it is the documented private channel Do not open an ordinary GitLab issue. A normal issue on gitlab.gnome.org is world-readable the moment it is filed GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on the GNOME mirrors, so the advisory button there is not a route into this process Say which repository the defect lives in. gnome-shell and mutter are separate trees and a lock-screen finding frequently crosses both State the session type. Wayland and X11 take genuinely different paths through Mutter and a bug in one often does not exist in the other For a lock-screen finding, record the exact timing and input sequence. This class is reproducible but order-sensitive, and a report the triager cannot repeat goes nowhere There is no money at any stage. The GNOME bounty that once ran on YesWeHack is gone, and its scope only ever covered GLib and libsoup Disclosure Report through the security.gnome.org form, which opens a confidential issue visible to a small security team on gitlab.gnome.org. The published process acknowledges within two business days and assigns CVEs through Red Hat Product Security. Confidentiality runs until a fix is committed to the git repository or ninety days pass, whichever comes first, so plan the embargo against that clock rather than a release date. Fixes reach users through distribution backports, and the enterprise distributions move on their own schedule after that. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability