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Apache Druid

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://druid.apache.org

Products and areas 12

  • Authentication and authorisation extensions, including the basic security extension, Kerberos and any escalated internal client credentials the processes use between themselves
  • Deep storage and the metadata store: the connection configuration, the credentials held for them and what the cluster does with data read back
  • Every process type in a cluster: broker, coordinator, overlord, historical, middle manager, indexer, peon and router, including the HTTP surface each one exposes
  • Ingestion end to end: task and supervisor specs, streaming ingestion from message queues, batch ingestion, and the transform and filter expressions a spec can carry
  • Input sources and input formats, covering HTTP, object storage, HDFS and local file inputs and every file and compression format the parsers accept
  • Inter-process communication and the coordination layer, including what a process accepts from something presenting itself as a peer
  • Segment handling: the segment file format, loading, downloading and the code that opens a segment the process did not create
  • The extension loading mechanism and the classpath it assembles, including how an extension's configuration is trusted
  • The JDBC and Avatica interfaces exposed for client tools
  • The query layer in full, covering native JSON queries, Druid SQL, the parsing and planning of both, and every function they can reach
  • The repository's security policy asks that new vulnerabilities be reported through the ASF process to [email protected] and draws no boundary narrower than Druid itself
  • The web console and everything reachable from it, including the routes it calls on the user's behalf
Out of scope (6)
  • A cluster deliberately deployed with authentication and authorisation disabled on an untrusted network, which the project treats as a deployment decision
  • Defects in the message queues, object stores or metadata databases Druid connects to, where Druid is only the client
  • Findings that require an existing cluster administrator, who can already submit tasks that run code
  • Imply's commercial distribution and hosted service, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release
  • Resource exhaustion from a query or ingestion volume the cluster was sized for
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Druid's own use of the dependency makes them reachable

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report privately to the address on the policy page , following the ASF vulnerability reporting process that the repository's security policy points at. Name Druid clearly in the subject
  • Do not open a public GitHub issue or pull request describing the vulnerability before the fixed release ships
  • Say which process type the finding lands on.
  • State the authentication and authorisation extensions in use, since a cluster running the basic security extension and one running with no authorizer at all are very different targets
  • Attach the query, the ingestion spec or the request that reproduces it, along with the Druid version and the extensions loaded
  • Hold the detail until the release announcement.

Not accepted

  • Resource exhaustion from a query or ingestion volume the cluster was sized for
  • Findings that require an existing cluster administrator, who can already submit tasks that run code
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Druid's own use of the dependency makes them reachable

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 9 minutes ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 2 Last 12 months Remote code execution 35 % Auth/access control 30 % SSRF/file read 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache Druid is the real-time analytics store behind user-facing dashboards and event exploration at Netflix, Confluent and Salesforce, and it sits inside several observability and product-analytics products as the engine their customers never see. A cluster ingests from streaming sources and object storage, exposes query APIs across a handful of process types, and holds the event history of whoever runs it. Both CVEs published against Druid in the past year were rated critical. The Apache Software Foundation runs no bug bounty as a matter of policy, and Imply, the commercial vendor around Druid, publishes a security contact with nothing attached to it. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The repository's security policy asks that new vulnerabilities be reported through the ASF process to [email protected] and draws no boundary narrower than Druid itself Every process type in a cluster: broker, coordinator, overlord, historical, middle manager, indexer, peon and router, including the HTTP surface each one exposes The query layer in full, covering native JSON queries, Druid SQL, the parsing and planning of both, and every function they can reach Ingestion end to end: task and supervisor specs, streaming ingestion from message queues, batch ingestion, and the transform and filter expressions a spec can carry Input sources and input formats, covering HTTP, object storage, HDFS and local file inputs and every file and compression format the parsers accept The extension loading mechanism and the classpath it assembles, including how an extension's configuration is trusted Authentication and authorisation extensions, including the basic security extension, Kerberos and any escalated internal client credentials the processes use between themselves Inter-process communication and the coordination layer, including what a process accepts from something presenting itself as a peer Deep storage and the metadata store: the connection configuration, the credentials held for them and what the cluster does with data read back The web console and everything reachable from it, including the routes it calls on the user's behalf Segment handling: the segment file format, loading, downloading and the code that opens a segment the process did not create The JDBC and Avatica interfaces exposed for client tools Out of scope A cluster deliberately deployed with authentication and authorisation disabled on an untrusted network, which the project treats as a deployment decision Imply's commercial distribution and hosted service, where the finding cannot be reproduced against the Apache release Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Druid's own use of the dependency makes them reachable Defects in the message queues, object stores or metadata databases Druid connects to, where Druid is only the client Resource exhaustion from a query or ingestion volume the cluster was sized for Findings that require an existing cluster administrator, who can already submit tasks that run code Most-valued findings Anything reachable without credentials on any process's HTTP surface. Both CVEs in the twelve months to July 2026, CVE-2025-59390 and CVE-2026-23906, are rated critical, and unauthenticated reach is what puts a Druid finding in that band Ingestion specs and query expressions that reach code execution. A task spec is close to a program already, and the boundary between an expression and arbitrary execution is the most productive seam in this codebase Server-side request forgery and arbitrary local file read out of input sources, since ingestion is designed to fetch whatever URL or path a spec names Authorisation bypass in the security extensions: a datasource read by a user the authorizer should have refused, or an internal client credential reachable from outside Trust between processes, where a coordinator, overlord or historical acts on an instruction from an unauthenticated peer Extraction of the credentials held for deep storage, the metadata store or streaming sources, which usually reach far beyond the cluster Deserialisation and segment parsing defects, where loading a segment or a spec written by someone else changes what the process does Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] , following the ASF vulnerability reporting process that the repository's security policy points at. Name Druid clearly in the subject There is no project-specific security alias. The ASF security team is the intake and it routes the report to the Druid maintainers No money is available at any severity. The ASF states it runs no bug bounty, and Imply publishes a security contact with no reward attached Do not open a public GitHub issue or pull request describing the vulnerability before the fixed release ships Say which process type the finding lands on. Broker, coordinator, overlord, historical, middle manager and router expose different surfaces, and a triager needs that first State the authentication and authorisation extensions in use, since a cluster running the basic security extension and one running with no authorizer at all are very different targets Attach the query, the ingestion spec or the request that reproduces it, along with the Druid version and the extensions loaded Disclosure Handled under the ASF process: private report to the security team, embargoed fix with the maintainers, then a public advisory and a CVE alongside the release carrying the fix. Druid publishes through the ASF and NVD rather than as a GitHub advisory, so do not expect a GHSA on the repository. Hold the detail until the release announcement. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability