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Apache APISIX

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://apisix.apache.org

Products and areas 11

  • Request and response rewriting, header manipulation, and the proxy path to upstreams over HTTP, gRPC, WebSocket and raw TCP or UDP streams
  • Route matching and upstream selection, covering the router, host and path matching, priorities, variables and the rules that decide which upstream a request reaches
  • Standalone YAML configuration mode and the reload path that picks up a changed file
  • The Admin API in full: its key-based authentication, the allow-list that fronts it, and every resource it can create, modify or delete on a running gateway
  • The ASF process accepts reports on any Apache project by private mail to [email protected], and APISIX publishes its own threat model naming the issue classes it treats as vulnerabilities. Read that first; nothing narrower than the APISIX tree is carved out
  • The authentication plugins as a family, including jwt-auth, basic-auth, key-auth and forward-auth, and the identity each of them hands to the upstream
  • The Control API and the status endpoints a running data plane exposes
  • The etcd configuration path: how configuration reaches the data plane, how it is validated on arrival, and what a hostile or compromised configuration source can make the gateway do
  • The external plugin runner boundary, including the Java runner that carried CVE-2025-27446, and the Wasm plugin host
  • The Lua and OpenResty layer the gateway is written in, including any path that reaches the nginx Lua API with attacker-controlled data
  • The whole plugin set, where the gateway's logic actually lives: authentication, authorisation, traffic control, request and response transformation, observability and serverless plugins alike
Out of scope (6)
  • Custom or third-party plugins an operator wrote and loaded, as distinct from plugins shipped in the APISIX tree
  • Deployments that publish the Admin API to the internet on the default key, an operator decision rather than a gateway defect
  • etcd itself as a product, as distinct from how APISIX talks to it and what it trusts from it
  • Issue classes the project's published threat model places out of scope; it exists to be read before triage
  • OpenResty, LuaJIT and nginx defects, which belong upstream unless APISIX's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable
  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues, since the ASF process requires the private list

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Report privately to the address on the policy page and name APISIX as the project; the ASF security team routes it to the project's private list
  • Read the project's own threat model at docs/en/latest/security-threat-model.md before writing the report.
  • Include the route definition, the plugin configuration and the exact request.
  • Say which release line you tested and whether the gateway ran etcd-backed or in standalone configuration mode
  • Hold detail until the release is out: a gateway sits on the public edge and pre-release disclosure here is directly exploitable.

Not accepted

  • Issue classes the project's published threat model places out of scope
  • Custom or third-party plugins an operator wrote and loaded
  • OpenResty, LuaJIT and nginx defects
  • etcd itself as a product
  • Deployments that publish the Admin API to the internet on the default key
  • Reports filed as public GitHub issues

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 29 Lifetime Auth bypass 35 % Header injection 25 % Info disclosure 25 % Access control 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache APISIX is the ASF's API gateway, an OpenResty-based data plane that terminates north-south traffic for Kubernetes clusters and microservice estates and enforces authentication in plugins before requests reach anything behind it. CVE-2026-31908 is the reference point: header injection through the forward-auth plugin, rated critical, affecting every release from 2.12.0 through 3.15.0. A gateway defect is a defect in the one component every request passes through, and the authentication plugins are the only gate a lot of upstream services have. The Apache Software Foundation states in writing that a volunteer organisation runs no bug bounty, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The ASF process accepts reports on any Apache project by private mail to [email protected] , and APISIX publishes its own threat model naming the issue classes it treats as vulnerabilities. Read that first; nothing narrower than the APISIX tree is carved out The whole plugin set, where the gateway's logic actually lives: authentication, authorisation, traffic control, request and response transformation, observability and serverless plugins alike The authentication plugins as a family, including jwt-auth, basic-auth, key-auth and forward-auth, and the identity each of them hands to the upstream The Admin API in full: its key-based authentication, the allow-list that fronts it, and every resource it can create, modify or delete on a running gateway The Control API and the status endpoints a running data plane exposes Route matching and upstream selection, covering the router, host and path matching, priorities, variables and the rules that decide which upstream a request reaches Request and response rewriting, header manipulation, and the proxy path to upstreams over HTTP, gRPC, WebSocket and raw TCP or UDP streams The etcd configuration path: how configuration reaches the data plane, how it is validated on arrival, and what a hostile or compromised configuration source can make the gateway do Standalone YAML configuration mode and the reload path that picks up a changed file The external plugin runner boundary, including the Java runner that carried CVE-2025-27446, and the Wasm plugin host The Lua and OpenResty layer the gateway is written in, including any path that reaches the nginx Lua API with attacker-controlled data Out of scope Issue classes the project's published threat model places out of scope; it exists to be read before triage Custom or third-party plugins an operator wrote and loaded, as distinct from plugins shipped in the APISIX tree OpenResty, LuaJIT and nginx defects, which belong upstream unless APISIX's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable etcd itself as a product, as distinct from how APISIX talks to it and what it trusts from it Deployments that publish the Admin API to the internet on the default key, an operator decision rather than a gateway defect Reports filed as public GitHub issues, since the ASF process requires the private list Most-valued findings Authentication bypass in any auth plugin. CVE-2026-39999 took jwt-auth, and the entire premise of a gateway is that upstream services trust the decision it already made Header injection or smuggling into the upstream request, the shape of the critical forward-auth finding CVE-2026-31908, because the upstream reads those headers as identity Route-matching defects where a request reaches a route or an upstream the configuration never intended, including priority handling and variable resolution Admin API authentication or authorisation defects, since that API can create a route proxying anywhere the gateway can reach Credential exposure in logs or in transit. CVE-2025-62232 wrote plaintext basic-auth credentials into logs and CVE-2026-31923 was cleartext transmission Escapes from the external plugin runner boundary, the area CVE-2025-27446 landed in on the Java runner Arbitrary Lua execution or sandbox escape reachable from a plugin configuration, given that configuration usually arrives from a control plane rather than a human Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] and name APISIX as the project; the ASF security team routes it to the project's private list Read the project's own threat model at docs/en/latest/security-threat-model.md before writing the report. It sets out which issue classes the maintainers treat as vulnerabilities and which they do not The ASF is the CNA for its own projects, so the identifier comes from the foundation rather than from GitHub or MITRE Include the route definition, the plugin configuration and the exact request. A gateway finding that depends on a particular plugin chain is only reproducible if the chain is written down Say which release line you tested and whether the gateway ran etcd-backed or in standalone configuration mode, because how configuration reaches the data plane changes what an attacker can influence The foundation pays nothing for a report and has said so in writing, so there is no reward to negotiate Disclosure Handled by the ASF security team on the private list, with the fix prepared privately and shipped before anything is published. APISIX then announces the CVE on its own site alongside the fixed version, as it did for CVE-2025-62232, and the affected-version table is the part downstream operators act on. Hold detail until the release is out: a gateway sits on the public edge and pre-release disclosure here is directly exploitable. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability