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Apache HBase

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
14
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

14 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://hbase.apache.org

Products and areas 13

  • Bulk load of HFiles and the HFile reader itself, which parses files an operator or a job placed on the filesystem
  • Cell-level ACLs and visibility labels, plus the VisibilityController that enforces them on a scan
  • Coprocessor loading, including any path by which a table attribute or an administrative operation loads code into a RegionServer JVM
  • Replication between clusters, including the WAL entries shipped and the credentials the replication peer uses
  • Snapshot creation, export and restore, and the filesystem paths those operations construct
  • The authorization stack: the AccessController coprocessor and permission checks at global, namespace, table, column family and qualifier level
  • The Master and RegionServer web UIs and everything they disclose about tables, regions, configuration and running operations
  • The policy asks for a private email to [email protected] with the HBase PMC looped in, and it links a published threat model that defines the trust boundaries and what constitutes a valid report. Read that model first. It is the declared scope, and it names no exclusion narrower than the assumptions it lists
  • The RPC layer between clients and the Master or a RegionServer, covering authentication, the SASL and Kerberos handshake and delegation token handling
  • The shell and the administrative operations it drives, where they change server-side state
  • The Thrift and REST gateways in full, including their own authentication and the impersonation they perform on behalf of end users
  • The ZooKeeper interaction, the znodes HBase relies on and the ACLs protecting them
  • Transparent encryption of HFiles and WALs, along with the key provider and key handling behind it
Out of scope (6)
  • An unsecured cluster, with Kerberos and authorization switched off. The threat model treats a secure configuration as the premise, so this is a deployment decision
  • Anything the published threat model already records as an accepted assumption or an out-of-scope condition
  • Defects in Hadoop, HDFS or ZooKeeper themselves, unless HBase's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable
  • Resource exhaustion from expensive scans or compactions, which is a capacity question
  • Scope claims made by files inside the repository rather than by the ASF policy and the published threat model
  • Vendor distributions such as EMR, CDP, Dataproc and HDInsight, where the defect lives in that vendor's packaging or management layer

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Send a private email to the address on the policy page . The policy names it as the route, and the HBase PMC is looped in privately as part of the standard ASF process
  • Say whether the cluster ran with Kerberos and authorization enabled. An unsecured cluster is a documented configuration rather than a defect, so the secure configuration is the one worth attacking
  • Name the component and the version: Master, RegionServer, the Thrift gateway, the REST gateway or the client, along with the Hadoop version underneath
  • Include the RPC call or gateway request that reproduces it and the ACL or visibility state in force at the time
  • The ASF runs no bug bounty. There is no reward to negotiate and no reward terms to accept

Not accepted

  • An unsecured cluster, with Kerberos and authorization switched off
  • Defects in Hadoop, HDFS or ZooKeeper themselves, unless HBase's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable
  • Vendor distributions such as EMR, CDP, Dataproc and HDInsight, where the defect lives in that vendor's packaging or management layer
  • Anything the published threat model already records as an accepted assumption or an out-of-scope condition
  • Scope claims made by files inside the repository rather than by the ASF policy and the published threat model
  • Resource exhaustion from expensive scans or compactions, which is a capacity question

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview HBase is the wide-column store of the Hadoop world, and it ships as a first-class component of AWS EMR, Cloudera CDP, Google Dataproc and Azure HDInsight, so its real footprint sits inside managed enterprise data platforms rather than in individual deployments. It typically holds telemetry, fraud and time-series data at a scale where one authorization defect exposes years of records at once, and it is also a common storage backend under JanusGraph, so a bug can inherit a second product's users. The project publishes a threat model that states its trust boundaries and what counts as a valid finding. The ASF runs no bug bounty, so sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The policy asks for a private email to [email protected] with the HBase PMC looped in, and it links a published threat model that defines the trust boundaries and what constitutes a valid report. Read that model first. It is the declared scope, and it names no exclusion narrower than the assumptions it lists The RPC layer between clients and the Master or a RegionServer, covering authentication, the SASL and Kerberos handshake and delegation token handling The authorization stack: the AccessController coprocessor and permission checks at global, namespace, table, column family and qualifier level Cell-level ACLs and visibility labels, plus the VisibilityController that enforces them on a scan Coprocessor loading, including any path by which a table attribute or an administrative operation loads code into a RegionServer JVM The Thrift and REST gateways in full, including their own authentication and the impersonation they perform on behalf of end users The Master and RegionServer web UIs and everything they disclose about tables, regions, configuration and running operations Bulk load of HFiles and the HFile reader itself, which parses files an operator or a job placed on the filesystem Replication between clusters, including the WAL entries shipped and the credentials the replication peer uses Snapshot creation, export and restore, and the filesystem paths those operations construct The ZooKeeper interaction, the znodes HBase relies on and the ACLs protecting them Transparent encryption of HFiles and WALs, along with the key provider and key handling behind it The shell and the administrative operations it drives, where they change server-side state Out of scope An unsecured cluster, with Kerberos and authorization switched off. The threat model treats a secure configuration as the premise, so this is a deployment decision Defects in Hadoop, HDFS or ZooKeeper themselves, unless HBase's own use of them is what makes the issue reachable Vendor distributions such as EMR, CDP, Dataproc and HDInsight, where the defect lives in that vendor's packaging or management layer Anything the published threat model already records as an accepted assumption or an out-of-scope condition Scope claims made by files inside the repository rather than by the ASF policy and the published threat model Resource exhaustion from expensive scans or compactions, which is a capacity question Most-valued findings Authorization bypass at any granularity, letting a caller read or write a namespace, table, column family, qualifier or cell it holds no permission for. On a store that holds years of records per table this is the ceiling Visibility label and cell ACL enforcement defects, since these are exactly the controls regulated estates deploy HBase to rely on Coprocessor loading that reaches arbitrary JVM code on a RegionServer, which turns a table-level privilege into code execution on the cluster Impersonation defects in the Thrift or REST gateway, where a gateway holding a privileged identity acts for the wrong user RPC authentication and delegation token handling on a Kerberos-enabled cluster, the configuration the threat model is written about Deserialization anywhere on the RPC path, where a crafted request reconstructs a type the server should refuse HFile parsing on bulk import, an input the threat model flags as trusted by assumption and therefore under-checked Anything reaching the ZooKeeper state or the encryption key material, since either one undermines every control above it Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Send a private email to [email protected] . The policy names it as the route, and the HBase PMC is looped in privately as part of the standard ASF process Read the published threat model at hbase.apache.org/security-model/ before filing. It defines the trust boundaries and what does and does not constitute a valid report, and a finding that contradicts a documented assumption will close Say whether the cluster ran with Kerberos and authorization enabled. An unsecured cluster is a documented configuration rather than a defect, so the secure configuration is the one worth attacking Name the component and the version: Master, RegionServer, the Thrift gateway, the REST gateway or the client, along with the Hadoop version underneath Include the RPC call or gateway request that reproduces it and the ACL or visibility state in force at the time The ASF runs no bug bounty. There is no reward to negotiate and no reward terms to accept Disclosure Coordinated through the ASF security team, which hands the report to the HBase PMC and holds the embargo. Advisories are published on hbase.apache.org and through the CVE Program alongside a fixed release, with the reporter credited, rather than through a GitHub advisory feed. No fixed day count is published, so plan for an embargo that runs to the next release. Expect it to be a long one: the managed platforms that ship HBase rebase on upstream releases at their own pace, and the PMC knows it. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability