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Apache Superset

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://superset.apache.org

Products and areas 11

  • Authentication integration, covering the database, LDAP, OAuth and OIDC paths that Flask-AppBuilder exposes
  • Database connection handling: the connection string parser, the driver-specific parameters, the credential store and the allow-lists meant to stop connection parameters becoming a file read or a code path
  • Import and export of dashboards, charts and datasets, where a YAML or ZIP artifact from elsewhere is deserialised into objects
  • Row-level security and any other tenant boundary an operator relies on to keep one team's rows away from another
  • SECURITY.md accepts any undisclosed vulnerability in Superset privately at the project security address, and the vendor separately invites upstream reports. Neither side declares a component carve-out, so the whole application is in scope
  • SQL Lab end to end, covering query execution, the async query worker, result caching and the controls that are supposed to keep a user inside the databases their role allows
  • The caching layer and the metadata database, including anything that leaks one user's cached results to another
  • The chart and dashboard layer, including saved queries, filters, the Jinja templating in datasets and any place a stored value is rendered back into a page
  • The REST API in full, including the security, chart, dashboard, dataset and database endpoints, plus the CSRF and session handling in front of them
  • The role and permission model in full: Gamma, Alpha, Admin, custom roles and every permission check that decides whether a user reaches a dashboard, chart, dataset or database
  • Thumbnails, alerts and reports, which render pages server-side and make outbound requests on a schedule
Out of scope (6)
  • An operator granting a role access to a database deliberately. A permission an administrator configured is a configuration decision
  • Database engines and their drivers, unless Superset's own use of the driver is what makes the defect reachable
  • Missing hardening on a deployment left with the default configuration and no authentication in front of it
  • Preset's hosted platform and its own infrastructure, which is a commercial service rather than the upstream project. The vendor address takes upstream Superset findings
  • Reports filed publicly on GitHub, which puts the issue outside both coordinated processes
  • Upstream dependencies including Flask-AppBuilder, unless the defect lives in how Superset calls them

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security bug. Both processes stay private until an advisory ships
  • Name the Superset version and say which database engine was connected.
  • State the role the attacker held: Gamma, Alpha, Admin or an anonymous visitor.
  • Show the path from the UI or API to the query that ran.
  • Hold detail until the advisory is public.

Not accepted

  • An operator granting a role access to a database deliberately. A permission an administrator configured is a configuration decision
  • Missing hardening on a deployment left with the default configuration and no authentication in front of it
  • Database engines and their drivers, unless Superset's own use of the driver is what makes the defect reachable
  • Upstream dependencies including Flask-AppBuilder, unless the defect lives in how Superset calls them

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 12 Last 12 months Access control 40 % SQL injection 25 % SSRF 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Superset is the biggest open-source BI project in the category, a dashboarding and SQL exploration layer that sits on a company's warehouse holding stored credentials for every database an analyst was given. Preset runs it as a commercial cloud on the same code. Twelve CVEs landed against it in the last twelve months, a rate nothing else in this category comes close to, and every one of those researchers worked for free. Neither the Apache Software Foundation nor Preset pays, though Preset does commit in public to remediating what the community reports upstream. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope SECURITY.md accepts any undisclosed vulnerability in Superset privately at the project security address, and the vendor separately invites upstream reports. Neither side declares a component carve-out, so the whole application is in scope The role and permission model in full: Gamma, Alpha, Admin, custom roles and every permission check that decides whether a user reaches a dashboard, chart, dataset or database SQL Lab end to end, covering query execution, the async query worker, result caching and the controls that are supposed to keep a user inside the databases their role allows Database connection handling: the connection string parser, the driver-specific parameters, the credential store and the allow-lists meant to stop connection parameters becoming a file read or a code path The chart and dashboard layer, including saved queries, filters, the Jinja templating in datasets and any place a stored value is rendered back into a page The REST API in full, including the security, chart, dashboard, dataset and database endpoints, plus the CSRF and session handling in front of them Row-level security and any other tenant boundary an operator relies on to keep one team's rows away from another Import and export of dashboards, charts and datasets, where a YAML or ZIP artifact from elsewhere is deserialised into objects Thumbnails, alerts and reports, which render pages server-side and make outbound requests on a schedule The caching layer and the metadata database, including anything that leaks one user's cached results to another Authentication integration, covering the database, LDAP, OAuth and OIDC paths that Flask-AppBuilder exposes Out of scope Preset's hosted platform and its own infrastructure, which is a commercial service rather than the upstream project. The vendor address takes upstream Superset findings Database engines and their drivers, unless Superset's own use of the driver is what makes the defect reachable An operator granting a role access to a database deliberately. A permission an administrator configured is a configuration decision Upstream dependencies including Flask-AppBuilder, unless the defect lives in how Superset calls them Missing hardening on a deployment left with the default configuration and no authentication in front of it Reports filed publicly on GitHub, which puts the issue outside both coordinated processes Most-valued findings Anything that lets a lower-privileged role reach a database, dataset or dashboard its permissions exclude. With twelve CVEs in a year this is where the volume sits, and it is the class the product is structurally worst at SQL injection or query manipulation that escapes the database an analyst is scoped to, particularly through Jinja templating in dataset definitions and through SQL Lab parameters Connection string handling that turns a database configuration into a file read, an outbound connection or code execution on the Superset host Server-side request forgery out of the thumbnail, alert and report workers, which fetch URLs server-side on a schedule with a privileged session Credential recovery: any path that returns a stored database password, an encrypted secret or an API key to a user who should only see query results Stored cross-site scripting through chart configuration, dashboard markdown or dataset metadata, where an Alpha user's content executes in an Admin's browser Deserialisation through the dashboard and dataset import path, where an uploaded artifact becomes objects on the server Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Two private channels exist and both are real: the ASF path at [email protected] , and the vendor path at [email protected] , where Preset states it monitors and remediates upstream community reports GitHub private vulnerability reporting is disabled on apache/superset , so the advisory button is not an option here even though it is the norm elsewhere Do not open a public GitHub issue for a security bug. Both processes stay private until an advisory ships Neither side pays. The ASF has no bounty and a full keyword scan of Preset's trust and security page finds no reward, bounty or compensation language of any kind Name the Superset version and say which database engine was connected. Half of this product's surface only exists once a data source is attached State the role the attacker held: Gamma, Alpha, Admin or an anonymous visitor. Superset's severity turns almost entirely on which role reached the endpoint Show the path from the UI or API to the query that ran. A finding that requires a database an operator deliberately granted is a configuration argument, so pre-empt it Disclosure Coordinated privately through the ASF security process with the Superset project management committee, ending in a CVE and an advisory published alongside a fixed release. The 2026 cadence has been steady rather than batched, so expect the embargo to run to the next release that carries the fix. Preset takes reports on the same finding and remediates its own cloud in parallel. Hold detail until the advisory is public. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability