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Apache Doris

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
13
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

13 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://doris.apache.org

Products and areas 12

  • Backup and restore, including how remote storage credentials are handled
  • Every ingest path, covering streaming loads, broker loads, routine loads driven from a message queue and the file formats each of them parses
  • Materialised views, and the machinery that keeps them refreshed on a schedule
  • The authentication and privilege model end to end: users, roles, catalog, database, table and column level grants, and how a grant is cached
  • The backend nodes in full: query execution, the storage layer and the RPC they accept from the frontend and from one another
  • The bundled web interface and everything reachable from it
  • The external catalog surface: the connections to Hive, Iceberg, JDBC sources and object storage, along with the credentials held for each
  • The frontend nodes in full: the MySQL-compatible protocol front door, SQL parsing and planning, metadata storage and the leader election between them
  • The HTTP and REST APIs exposed on both node types, including the administrative, diagnostic and metrics routes
  • The inter-node communication layer, and what a node accepts from something claiming to be a peer
  • The project declares its threat-model.md the canonical source for scope and for triage classification, and its SECURITY.md asks for any Doris security finding at [email protected]. Read the threat model before you start, and treat everything below as sitting inside it
  • User-defined functions, including the Java UDF path and anything else that loads code into an executing node
Out of scope (6)
  • A cluster deliberately exposed to an untrusted network with default credentials, which is a deployment decision
  • Commercial distributions and managed services built on Doris rather than the Apache release
  • Findings the project's own threat model classifies as a non-finding or places outside its trust boundaries
  • Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Doris's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
  • Vulnerabilities in the external systems Doris federates over, such as a Hive Metastore or a JDBC source, where Doris is only the client

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy. "We" in these lines means Sorona, not this site.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly.
  • Report privately to the address on the policy page and identify the project as Doris clearly in both the subject and the body, exactly as the project asks.
  • Read threat-model.md in the repository first.
  • Do not open a public issue or a pull request that describes the vulnerability before the fix is out
  • State which node type the finding lands on and whether it is reachable before authentication.
  • Include the SQL, the HTTP request or the load job that reproduces it, along with the cluster version and any external catalog configuration involved
  • Hold the detail until the release is out.

Not accepted

  • Findings the project's own threat model classifies as a non-finding or places outside its trust boundaries
  • A cluster deliberately exposed to an untrusted network with default credentials, which is a deployment decision
  • Vulnerabilities in the external systems Doris federates over, such as a Hive Metastore or a JDBC source, where Doris is only the client
  • Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Doris's own use of the dependency makes them reachable
  • Commercial distributions and managed services built on Doris rather than the Apache release
  • Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 3 Last 12 months Auth/access control 35 % Remote code execution 30 % Info disclosure 20 % Input validation 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Apache Doris is an MPP analytical database used for real-time reporting and BI, with a very large installed base across Chinese enterprises and a growing one elsewhere as the open alternative to ClickHouse. A cluster holds the reporting copy of a company's operational data and carries credentials for the lakes and warehouses it federates over. Three CVEs landed in the past year, running up to CVE-2026-58319 at critical severity. The Apache Software Foundation states that as a volunteer organisation it has no bug bounty, and no vendor around Doris pays instead. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The project declares its threat-model.md the canonical source for scope and for triage classification, and its SECURITY.md asks for any Doris security finding at [email protected] . Read the threat model before you start, and treat everything below as sitting inside it The frontend nodes in full: the MySQL-compatible protocol front door, SQL parsing and planning, metadata storage and the leader election between them The backend nodes in full: query execution, the storage layer and the RPC they accept from the frontend and from one another The HTTP and REST APIs exposed on both node types, including the administrative, diagnostic and metrics routes The authentication and privilege model end to end: users, roles, catalog, database, table and column level grants, and how a grant is cached Every ingest path, covering streaming loads, broker loads, routine loads driven from a message queue and the file formats each of them parses The external catalog surface: the connections to Hive, Iceberg, JDBC sources and object storage, along with the credentials held for each User-defined functions, including the Java UDF path and anything else that loads code into an executing node Materialised views, and the machinery that keeps them refreshed on a schedule Backup and restore, including how remote storage credentials are handled The bundled web interface and everything reachable from it The inter-node communication layer, and what a node accepts from something claiming to be a peer Out of scope Findings the project's own threat model classifies as a non-finding or places outside its trust boundaries A cluster deliberately exposed to an untrusted network with default credentials, which is a deployment decision Vulnerabilities in the external systems Doris federates over, such as a Hive Metastore or a JDBC source, where Doris is only the client Upstream dependency vulnerabilities, unless Doris's own use of the dependency makes them reachable Commercial distributions and managed services built on Doris rather than the Apache release Resource exhaustion from a query the cluster was sized for Most-valued findings Anything reachable on a frontend node's HTTP or protocol surface without valid credentials. CVE-2026-58319 is rated critical and pre-authentication reach is how findings get to that rating on this architecture Any path from SQL or from a load job to filesystem access or command execution on a backend node, the class CVE-2025-66336 sits at in severity terms Extraction of the credentials held for external catalogs and object storage. A Doris cluster is often configured with access to the whole lake, so one leak is a much larger breach Privilege model defects: a role reading a database, table or column it was not granted, or a grant that survives a revocation Trust between nodes, where a frontend or backend accepts an RPC from an unauthenticated peer and acts on it User-defined function loading that escapes the intended boundary and runs as the process owner Metadata manipulation that changes where the cluster thinks data lives or which node is the leader Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] and identify the project as Doris clearly in both the subject and the body, exactly as the project asks. The ASF security team routes it from there Read threat-model.md in the repository first. The project declares it the canonical source for scope and for how a report is classified, so it tells you in advance how your finding will be rated There is no money at any severity. The ASF runs no bug bounty as a foundation-wide position, and no commercial party around Doris pays either Do not open a public issue or a pull request that describes the vulnerability before the fix is out State which node type the finding lands on and whether it is reachable before authentication. The split between the frontend and the backend nodes is the first thing a triager will ask about Include the SQL, the HTTP request or the load job that reproduces it, along with the cluster version and any external catalog configuration involved Disclosure Handled under the ASF process: a private report to the security team, a fix developed under embargo with the project maintainers, then a public advisory and a CVE published alongside the release that carries the fix. Announcements go through the project's own security page and NVD rather than through GitHub advisories, so do not expect a GHSA. Hold the detail until the release is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability