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Apache Solr

Bug bounty on Sorona apache.org

Accepting reports open-source
Top reward
$1,500
Top severity paid
Critical
Assets in scope
12
Public CVEs
60
Last change
No changes yet

At a glance

What to know before you start testing.

Pays from $1,500
for critical bugs.
Partial safe harbor
Some legal protection; read the terms.
Replies within 7 days
As the policy promises.
Publish after a fix
Coordinate the timing with the company.

Rewards

What Sorona lists as the payout for each severity.

Severity Reward
Critical $1,500+
High $700+
Medium $300+
Low $100 $100 / 1 month Claude Max
Response
Within 7 days The published timeline is PMC triage inside seven days and investigation inside ninety
Safe harbor
Partial Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf.

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Scope

12 assets you may test, 6 excluded.

Web 1

  • https://solr.apache.org

Products and areas 11

  • Authentication and authorization plugins in full, covering the rule-based authorization plugin, JWT and Kerberos handling, and how a principal is resolved into permissions
  • Config-set handling, solrconfig.xml and schema processing, and any place a configuration document reaches a class loader
  • Query parsing across every parser Solr exposes, including function queries, the streaming expression language and the SQL interface
  • Replication, backup and restore, which move index files and credentials between machines
  • Scripting and plugin loading, including anything that resolves a class name or a URL from configuration
  • SolrCloud and its ZooKeeper interaction: cluster state, leader election, the collections API and inter-node requests that carry a trusted identity
  • The Admin UI and the administrative endpoints behind it, including core creation, core reload, replication and the config-set upload path
  • The bin/solr command-line tooling, including the auth setup path that writes credentials to disk
  • The data import and extraction paths that pull documents from remote sources and hand them to parsers
  • The full HTTP API surface: query handlers, update handlers, the schema and config APIs, and every request handler a core exposes
  • The published reporting process accepts any undisclosed security issue in Solr privately, with the PMC triaging it and the ASF process carrying it to a CVE. THREAT_MODEL.md narrows what counts as a finding rather than which components are in scope, so the whole server is fair ground
Out of scope (6)
  • Apache Lucene itself, which has its own report path even though Solr is built on it
  • Deployment choices an operator made, such as running Solr on an open port with no authentication plugin configured
  • Findings the threat model already answers: unauthenticated exposure of an instance an operator put on a public network, SSRF the operator's network controls are expected to bound, and features that ship disabled
  • Reports filed publicly on Jira or GitHub, which put the issue outside the coordinated process
  • Third-party Solr plugins and connectors that are not part of the Solr distribution
  • Upstream libraries Solr embeds, including Apache Tika. CVE-2025-66516 shows the pattern, a Tika XXE reached through the extraction module and attributed upstream

Rules

What the policy asks of you, and the bug types it won't reward, quoted from Sorona's policy.

While testing

  • Submit through sorona.xyz.
  • Report privately to the address on the policy page .
  • Read THREAT_MODEL.md in the repository before you write the report.
  • Send the report in plaintext.
  • Do not open a public Jira issue or a GitHub issue for a security bug.
  • Name the Solr version range you tested and whether authentication and authorization plugins were configured.

Not accepted

  • unauthenticated exposure of an instance an operator put on a public network
  • SSRF the operator's network controls are expected to bound
  • features that ship disabled
  • Upstream libraries Solr embeds, including Apache Tika
  • Apache Lucene itself
  • Deployment choices an operator made
  • Third-party Solr plugins and connectors that are not part of the Solr distribution
  • Reports filed publicly on Jira or GitHub

Summarised with AI from the program policy on Sorona, read 12 Nov 2026, and checked word for word against it. Read the original

Changes

Tracked since 11 Nov 2026. Last checked 1 hour ago.

No changes yet. When the rewards or scope move, you will see it here and in the RSS feed.

Public CVEs

Published vulnerabilities in this vendor's products, from the NVD.

Search NVD
CVESeverityPublished
CVE-2026-97355 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-97356 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82960 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83538 Medium 5.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-83542 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84183 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-84728 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-85627 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-92887 High 7.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82904 High 7.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82907 Critical 9.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82910 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82912 High 8.8 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82916 High 7.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-82902 Medium 4.3 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114233 High 8.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114235 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114271 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114272 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114277 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109129 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109837 Medium 5.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109856 Medium 6.5 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-109928 High 7.4 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-114229 Medium 6.1 5 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59267 Medium 5.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90631 Low 3.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90632 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90634 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90624 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90626 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90627 Medium 5.5 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90628 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-90629 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59264 High 7.8 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59268 High 7.3 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-59263 Low 1.9 4 Nov 2026
CVE-2026-64618 Critical 9.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-65874 High 8.8 30 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95628 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95629 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95663 Medium 4.8 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-95664 Medium 5.4 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-101259 Medium 5.3 26 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-111497 Critical 9.2 22 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-88900 High 8.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85313 Medium 4.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85314 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85315 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85316 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85317 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85254 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85257 Medium 5.3 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85260 Medium 5.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85296 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85312 Medium 4.8 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85247 Medium 5.9 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85249 Medium 6.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85250 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026
CVE-2026-85251 High 7.5 19 Oct 2026

Original policy

Copied from sorona.xyz on 12 Nov 2026. The summaries on this page are made from it; the live page may have changed since.

Skip to content What this pays This project runs no bounty of its own. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. Severity │ sorona.xyz pays Critical │ $1,500+ High │ $700+ Medium │ $300+ Low │ $100 / 1 month Claude Max Submit a vulnerability CVE history 3 Last 12 months Authorization bypass 40 % Input validation 25 % Credential handling 20 % Info disclosure 15 % Latest advisories Loading the feed Overview Solr is the enterprise search server behind a great many intranets and product catalogues, and it ships embedded inside commercial products whose operators do not think of themselves as running Solr. It holds an index of everything an organisation decided to make searchable, and it exposes an administrative API that creates cores and loads configuration. CVE-2026-44825 is the reference point: bin/solr auth enable wrote a hardcoded credential into the setup it had just secured. The Apache Software Foundation runs no bug bounty, so a report earns advisory credit and nothing more. sorona.xyz pays you directly on qualified, reproduced findings. In scope The published reporting process accepts any undisclosed security issue in Solr privately, with the PMC triaging it and the ASF process carrying it to a CVE. THREAT_MODEL.md narrows what counts as a finding rather than which components are in scope, so the whole server is fair ground The full HTTP API surface: query handlers, update handlers, the schema and config APIs, and every request handler a core exposes The Admin UI and the administrative endpoints behind it, including core creation, core reload, replication and the config-set upload path Authentication and authorization plugins in full, covering the rule-based authorization plugin, JWT and Kerberos handling, and how a principal is resolved into permissions SolrCloud and its ZooKeeper interaction: cluster state, leader election, the collections API and inter-node requests that carry a trusted identity Query parsing across every parser Solr exposes, including function queries, the streaming expression language and the SQL interface Config-set handling, solrconfig.xml and schema processing, and any place a configuration document reaches a class loader The data import and extraction paths that pull documents from remote sources and hand them to parsers Scripting and plugin loading, including anything that resolves a class name or a URL from configuration Replication, backup and restore, which move index files and credentials between machines The bin/solr command-line tooling, including the auth setup path that writes credentials to disk Out of scope Findings the threat model already answers: unauthenticated exposure of an instance an operator put on a public network, SSRF the operator's network controls are expected to bound, and features that ship disabled Upstream libraries Solr embeds, including Apache Tika. CVE-2025-66516 shows the pattern, a Tika XXE reached through the extraction module and attributed upstream Apache Lucene itself, which has its own report path even though Solr is built on it Deployment choices an operator made, such as running Solr on an open port with no authentication plugin configured Third-party Solr plugins and connectors that are not part of the Solr distribution Reports filed publicly on Jira or GitHub, which put the issue outside the coordinated process Most-valued findings Authorization bypass in the permission model: any path where a principal reaches a collection, a handler or an admin action the rules did not grant. CVE-2026-22022 sat in the rule-based authorization plugin's JWT handling across every release from 5.3.0 to 9.10.0 Input validation on the administrative APIs, particularly core and collection creation, where a crafted parameter reaches the filesystem or the class loader. CVE-2026-22444 landed exactly there Credentials written, logged or defaulted by the tooling. CVE-2026-44825 put a hardcoded credential into the output of the command that enables authentication Anything that turns a query into remote code execution, through a function query, a streaming expression, a config-set upload or a class name resolved from configuration Cross-collection reads on a multi-tenant SolrCloud cluster, where one tenant's query returns another tenant's documents Inter-node request handling that treats a request from the cluster as pre-authenticated, since reaching that path from outside collapses the whole authorization model Program rules Submit through sorona.xyz. This project runs no bounty of its own; we validate, coordinate disclosure with the maintainers, and pay you directly. Report privately to [email protected] . The Solr PMC is also reachable at [email protected] and the project alias is [email protected] Read THREAT_MODEL.md in the repository before you write the report. Triagers are told to read it before handling a tool, fuzzer or AI finding, and it rules out several classes on sight Send the report in plaintext. The published workflow asks for it and encrypted or attachment-heavy mail slows triage The published timeline is PMC triage inside seven days and investigation inside ninety, ending in coordinated disclosure with a CVE and an oss-security announcement Do not open a public Jira issue or a GitHub issue for a security bug. The process stays private until the announcement Name the Solr version range you tested and whether authentication and authorization plugins were configured. Solr's default posture and a hardened deployment behave differently, and the difference decides severity Nothing is paid at any severity. Neither SECURITY.md nor either Solr security page carries reward language Disclosure Coordinated through the ASF security team and the Solr project management committee, ending in a CVE, an advisory on solr.apache.org and an announcement to oss-security once a fixed release is available. The workflow states triage inside seven days and investigation inside ninety, so plan on an embargo measured against the next security release rather than a date you choose. Hold detail until the announcement is out. Safe harbor Sorona will not pursue legal action against you for good-faith research submitted to us in line with this policy. We cannot speak for the upstream project, its vendor, or any third party, and we do not grant authorization on their behalf. You are responsible for understanding and following the laws that apply to you, wherever you are, and for staying within any scope the project has defined. Submit a vulnerability